HOOVER v. WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (2026)

Appellant seeks review of a judgment sustaining an exception of res judicata. Appellant also seeks review of an interlocutory judgment denying his motion to amend the petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 15, 2000, appellant Stephen Todd Hoover executed a promissory note for $351,000 in favor of Landmark Mortgage Corporation. The note was secured by a mortgage encumbering immovable property bearing the municipal address 609 Grand Lakes Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 70810. On the same day, Landmark Mortgage endorsed and assigned the note to First Union Mortgage Corporation; First Union Mortgage Corporation subsequently changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage Corporation (Wachovia), which then merged with Wells Fargo Bank, National Association (Wells Fargo). In 2011, an ordinary process foreclosure suit was filed, alleging that Mr. Hoover had failed to pay the monthly installment due on June 1, 2010, and remained in default. Wells Fargo later filed a motion for summary judgment in the foreclosure suit to enforce the terms of the promissory note, and Mr. Hoover opposed the motion for summary judgment, raising arguments regarding deficiencies of the note and related allonge.¹ ,  ² The trial court in the foreclosure suit granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment and Mr. Hoover appealed that judgment. This court affirmed the judgment in Wachovia Mortgage Corporation v. Hoover, 2021-1035 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 1, 6, writ denied, 2022-00860 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 156. (Hoover I). Specifically, the Hoover I court stated:

Wells Fargo proved its prima facie case against Mr. Hoover by producing the original note, which establishes the debt, unrefuted evidence that Wells Fargo currently owns the note, and proof of Mr. Hoover's default on the note. With this showing, the burden shifted to Mr. Hoover to prove the existence of a triable issue of material fact and/or any affirmative defenses.

Wachovia Mortgage Corporation, 342 So.3d at 6.

The Hoover I court also noted that, “[w]hile there were some differences between the allonges and endorsements on the copies of the note and the original note, the differences do not bear on Mr. Hoover's obligation to pay the note[.]” Id. at 6.

On March 31, 2023, Mr. Hoover filed a petition for nullity of judgment wherein he alleged that the prior foreclosure judgment rendered in 2021, and affirmed in Hoover I, was obtained through fraud and/or ill practices in violation of LSA-C.C.P. art. 2004. In support of the petition for nullity, Mr. Hoover attached an “Affidavit of Quit Claim of Rights and Promissory Note Release” purportedly signed by Jack DiFranco on August 8, 2022. The affidavit states that Mr. DiFranco was president and owner of Landmark Mortgage Corporation prior to its dissolution around 2009. The affidavit further states that although the signature page on the March 15, 2000 allonge to the note transferring it from Landmark Mortgage to First Union is presented as his signature, “he did not personally sign this document, nor is it his signature, nor did he great [sic] a Power of Attorney for another person to sign legally on his behalf.” Mr. Hoover alleged in his petition for nullity that “[b]ecause the original endorsement of the note was fraudulent, subsequent endorsements did not transfer any rights ․ Therefore, any judgment obtained based on the purported transfers is null and void.”

In response to Mr. Hoover's nullity suit, appellee Wells Fargo filed an exception of res judicata on May 3, 2023. The trial court heard oral argument on the exception on October 23, 2023, and ordered supplemental briefing to be filed by both parties. On December 4, 2023, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining the exception of res judicata and later, on February 2, 2026, signed an amended judgment dismissing Mr. Hoover's petition for nullity.³ Mr. Hoover filed a “Motion for New Trial and to Amend Original Petition” on December 19, 2023. Following a hearing on November 4, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment on December 3, 2024, denying the motion for new trial and adopting the “reason[s] orally rendered in open court.”⁴ Mr. Hoover timely appealed the December 3, 2024 judgment denying his “Motion for New Trial and to Amend Original Complaint.” On appeal, Mr. Hoover asserts the trial court erred in dismissing the alleged forgery as immaterial, in sustaining the exception of res judicata, in failing to find exceptional circumstances, and in denying his motion to amend the petition. We consider an appeal of the denial of a motion for new trial as an appeal of the judgment on the merits when it is clear from the appellant's brief that he or she intended to appeal the underlying judgment. Wessinger v. Morris, 2025-0019 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/25), 424 So.3d 753, 757. As stated above, it is clear from Mr. Hoover's brief that he intended to appeal the judgment sustaining the res judicata exception, as well as the judgment denying his motion to amend the petition.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Exception of res judicata

Mr. Hoover asserts as his first and second assignments of error that the trial court erred in dismissing the alleged forgery as immaterial and that the trial court erred in applying res judicata to bar his nullity action. Mr. Hoover alleges that his nullity action is a distinct cause of action arising from newly uncovered evidence of fraud or ill practices that was concealed and therefore not litigated in the original proceeding. Both of these assignments of error concern whether the trial court erred in sustaining Wells Fargo's exception of res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata is codified in LSA-R.S. 13:4231, which states:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.

Therefore, under the res judicata statute, a second action is precluded when the following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid; (2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of the final judgment in the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action in the second suit arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2014-0808 (La. 12/9/14), 158 So. 3d 761, 765; LaBarre v. Occidental Chemical Company, 2023-0139 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/23), 376 So.3d 896, 901, writs denied, 2023-01531, 2023-01525 (La. 1/17/24), 377 So.3d 246, 248.

The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Pierrotti v. Johnson, 2011-1317 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/19/12), 91 So.3d 1056, 1063. Res judicata bars relitigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence of a previous suit and promotes judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes. Three Rivers Commons Owners’ Association, Inc. v. Grodner, 2023-0050 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/31/23), 382 So.3d 972, 977. Inherent in the concept of res judicata is the principle that a party had the opportunity to raise a claim in the first adjudication, but failed to do so. See Griffin v. BSFI Western E & P, Inc., 2000-2122 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/15/02), 812 So.2d 726, 731.

A “valid judgment,” as could support application of res judicata to preclude a second action, is one rendered by a court with jurisdiction over both subject matter and parties after proper notice was given. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2004-0882 (La. 1/19/05) 893 So.2d 746, 771. Herein, it is undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and parties and that proper notice was given. Furthermore, Mr. Hoover admits in his petition for nullity that the judgment is final, and we note that the named parties are the same in each suit. Thus, the first three requirements of res judicata are met.

Res judicata also requires that the cause of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of the final judgment in the first litigation, and that the cause of action in the second suit arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. Chauvin, 158 So.3d at 765. Thus, res judicata has two different aspects: (1) foreclosure of relitigating matters that have never been litigated but should have been advanced in the earlier suit; and (2) foreclosure of relitigating matters that have been previously litigated and decided. Global Marketing Solutions, L.L.C. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2018-1765 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/19), 286 So.3d 1054, 1061, writ denied, 2019-01886 (La. 2/10/20), 347 So.3d 741. In this case, Mr. Hoover was aware of the existence of the 2000 allonge at the time of the first suit insofar as he actually raised concerns about the validity of said allonge in that suit. Although Mr. Hoover claims that he only became aware that Mr. DiFranco's signature on the 2000 allonge was allegedly fraudulent after the Hoover I judgment became final, the fact remains that the 2000 allonge was part of the record in the first suit and was litigated during that suit. Mr. Hoover offered no explanation for his failure to investigate the signature on the 2000 allonge in the first suit, nor has he alleged that the name of the signatory on the 2000 allonge was concealed from him in any way. Wells Fargo argues that the Hoover I court considered the validity of the allonge and found that certain inconsistencies and differences “[did] not bear on Mr. Hoover's obligation to pay the note, and these facts raised by Mr. Hoover [were] not material in that their existence or nonexistence [were] not essential to Wells Fargo's cause of action for enforcement of a note by ordinary process.” Hoover I, 342 So.3d at 6. It is clear that in Hoover I, both the trial court and this court considered the validity of the allonge. Thus, we find that Mr. Hoover's claim as to the invalidity of the allonge in the second suit existed at the time of the judgment in the first suit and arose out of the same transaction as the underlying action.

Mr. Hoover additionally argues in support of his first and second assignments of error that res judicata cannot render LSA-C.C.P. art. 2004 meaningless, and that the article specifically provides a remedy in the rare case when a judgment is obtained through fraud or ill practices. On the contrary, Wells Fargo argues that LSA-C.C.P. art. 2004 cannot serve as an “escape hatch” from res judicata. In a suit to annul a judgment, where the record reflects that the essential elements of res judicata are clearly established and show that the issues raised in the suit to annul were raised or could have been raised in the prior suit, then the exception of res judicata will be maintained. Schiff v. Pollard, 2016-0801 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/28/17), 222 So.3d 867, 874. Clearly, issues concerning the validity of the 2000 allonge were raised in the prior suit and issues concerning the alleged forgery could have been raised at the same time.

Mr. Hoover argues as a third assignment of error that the trial court erred in failing to find exceptional circumstances. Louisiana law allows for certain exceptions to the general requirements of res judicata under LSA-R.S. 13:4231. The exceptional circumstances exception to the application of res judicata generally only applies to complex procedural situations in which litigants are deprived of the opportunity to present their claims due to unanticipated quirks in the system, to factual situations that could not be anticipated by parties, or to decisions that are totally beyond the control of parties. Cepriano v. B Square Builders, L.L.C., 2014-1568 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 170 So.3d 1043, 1047-48. Mr. Hoover argues that the post-judgment discovery of a forged endorsement, established through sworn affidavit of the purported signatory obtained only after the prior judgment became final, constitutes exceptional circumstances justifying relief from res judicata since the forgery was latent and undiscoverable through reasonable diligence. However, Mr. Hoover has not shown that the alleged forgery was undiscoverable through reasonable diligence during the pendency of the first suit, or that anything prevented him from raising the issue of the validity of the signature on the allonge when the same allonge was being litigated in the first suit. We agree with Wells Fargo's argument that the DiFranco affidavit is “not newly discovered evidence ․ but rather newly procured evidence that could have been obtained during Hoover I.” Therefore, we do not find that this case presents an exceptional circumstance precluding the application of res judicata.

Thus, having considered Mr. Hoover's first, second, and third assignments of error, we find the trial court properly sustained the exception of res judicata.

Motion to amend petition

As his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Hoover argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend his petition to add the underlying forger as a defendant, when such amendment would cure the “identity of the parties” element of res judicata and thus permit adjudication on the merits. Under LSA-C.C.P. art. 934, when the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment. However, if the grounds of the objection raised through the exception cannot be so removed, the action shall be dismissed. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 934.

The jurisprudence has liberally construed Article 934 to mandate that unless remanding for amendment would be vain and useless, the judgment sustaining a peremptory exception must permit amendment of the petition. Trepagnier v. Crump, 2023-0040 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 436, 440. However, the right to amend a petition is not absolute, and a trial court is not required to allow a plaintiff the opportunity to speculate on unwarranted facts merely for the purpose of defeating the exception. Lift Louisiana v. State, 2021-1453 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/3/22), 343 So.3d 203, 209. Ultimately, the decision to allow amendment of a pleading to cure grounds for a peremptory exception is within the discretion of the trial court. Trepagnier, 369 So.3d at 440.

Amending the petition herein would appear to be done for the sole purpose of defeating res judicata by adding additional parties and additional causes of action. In fact, Mr. Hoover goes so far as to admit that nothing would preclude Wells Fargo from filing a second exception of res judicata to his proposed amended petition. In denying Mr. Hoover's motion to amend the original petition, the trial court stated, “This matter has been litigated and re-litigated [․] The issue surrounding whether the allonge was forged was certainly raised in some context or could have been raised when the original petition was filed.”

Based on our review of the record, the pleadings, and the trial court's reasons for disallowing Mr. Hoover from amending his petition, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. In thus finding, we again note that the issues raised by Mr. Hoover in the suit to annul could have been raised in the prior foreclosure suit, and any purported additional parties were discoverable during the pendency of the prior foreclosure suit. We also note that a concept behind res judicata is to enforce the finality of judgments. See Three Rivers Commons Owners’ Association, Inc., 382 So.3d at 977. To allow Mr. Hoover to amend his petition at this stage to add a John Doe could potentially allow a party to deliberately withhold a claim or party in a first suit, only to use it to defeat res judicata in a later suit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment denying Mr. Hoover's motion to amend his petition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's December 4, 2023 judgment granting Wells Fargo's exception of res judicata, as amended on February 2, 2026, and the trial court's December 3, 2024 judgment denying Stephen Todd Hoover's motion to amend petition. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Stephen Todd Hoover.

AFFIRMED. APPEAL MAINTAINED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Specifically, Mr. Hoover argued in the foreclosure suit that there were variations in the original note and copies of the note, that the original note lacked an allonge, and that Wells Fargo's initial statement that it had lost the note before it eventually submitted the original note created genuine issues of material fact. Wachovia Mortgage Corporation v. Hoover, 2021-1035 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 1, 6, writ denied, 2022-00860 (La. 9/27/22), 347 So.3d 156.

2.   An allonge is defined by Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) as a slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.

3.   In response to a January 12, 2026 order from this court, the record on appeal was supplemented with the February 2, 2026 amended judgment signed by the trial court clarifying the identity of the parties and the relief granted. Because the amended judgment corrected the deficiencies, the appeal is maintained.

4.   At the November 4, 2024 hearing, the trial court stated, “The court is going to deny the motion for new trial as well as the motion to amend the original petition.”

McCLENDON, C.J.