STATE v. FRANKLIN (2026)

The defendant, Albert Jermaine Franklin, Jr., was charged by grand jury indictment with manslaughter, in violation of La. R.S. 14:31. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to forty years imprisonment at hard labor and subsequently denied his motion to reconsider sentence. The defendant now appeals, alleging the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and his sentence is constitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On March 2, 2018, an arrest warrant was issued for the defendant for multiple felonies.² On March 12, 2018, Officer Chad Felps with the Zachary Police Department (“ZPD”) and Christopher Lawton, a firefighter and commissioned reserve police officer, were attempting to execute the warrant. After receiving information about the defendant's location from several sources, the officers spotted the defendant sitting in a U-Haul at a Sonic in Baker, Louisiana. The defendant then drove to and parked in the nearby Walmart parking lot, and the officers planned to park behind the U-Haul in Officer Felps's well-known blue Ford truck. Within seconds of parking, Lawton jumped out of the truck, ran towards the passenger door of the U-Haul where Ashley Chaney, who was in a relationship with the defendant, was sitting, and opened the passenger door.³ The defendant sped away before Officer Felps had the opportunity to get to the driver's side door of the U-Haul. Lawton, holding on to the outside of the passenger door as the U-haul drove away, lost his balance and eventually fell. His body became lodged beneath the U-Haul and a grocery cart return, and he sustained fatal blunt force injuries. Lawton died as a result of his injuries. The defendant was subsequently apprehended, and he provided a statement to law enforcement wherein he claimed it was an accident.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of manslaughter.⁴

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460; see also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B).

In this case, the grand jury indictment did not specify the manner wherein the defendant was charged with committing the offense of manslaughter. It simply alleged the defendant committed the offense of manslaughter, in violation of La. R.S. 14:31. However, in instructing the jury, the trial court stated that, assuming that the evidence established proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury could convict the defendant under La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(b). Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:31(A)(2)(b) defines manslaughter as a homicide committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm when the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be murder under Article 30 or 30.1. Resisting an officer is defined, in pertinent part, as the intentional interference with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest when the offender knows or has reason to know that the person arresting is acting in his official capacity. La. R.S. 14:108(A). The phrase “obstruction of” as used in La. R.S. 14:108 can describe flight by one sought to be arrested before the arresting officer can restrain him and after notice is given that he is under arrest. See La. R.S. 14:108(B)(1)(a).

At trial, Detective Markus Sylvester, the lead detective in the case, testified he responded to the crime scene about fifteen minutes after the incident. To orient the jury, Detective Sylvester described the incident as occurring in the Walmart parking lot near a shopping cart return and several other vehicles. Surveillance footage from the Walmart captured the incident, albeit from a distance and under the glare of an area light. Detective Sylvester testified the surveillance footage depicted the U-Haul pulling into the parking lot from the nearby Sonic and parking. Then, Officer Felps's blue Ford truck parked a short distance away before swiftly pulling directly behind the U-Haul. Both officers exited the police vehicle and quickly approached the U-Haul, at which point the U-Haul sped off. Detective Sylvester testified Lawton was wearing a badge,⁵ firearm, and tactical vest at the time of his death.

Greg Brown was a homicide detective with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office on March 12, 2018. Detective Brown testified the defendant and Chaney were apprehended about five to ten minutes down the road from the Walmart. Like Detective Sylvester, Detective Brown described the events captured on the surveillance footage. After the defendant fled in the U-Haul, Officer Felps ran to his truck, got in, and went to pursue the U-Haul until he realized Lawton was injured.

Christy Robertson, a cashier working at Walmart that night, witnessed the incident unfold as she was walking to her vehicle. Robertson testified she heard a bang, looked over, and saw a man hanging on the passenger side of a U-Haul. She thought he was pulling the door handle, and she saw the female passenger of the U-Haul closing the door. Robertson said the U-Haul sped out of the parking spot and Lawton eventually fell near the shopping cart return and “kind of up under the truck a little bit.” Then, Robertson saw the U-Haul run over Lawton's head. Robertson testified she called 911 and ran to render aid to Lawton, who was still alive and able to speak. On cross-examination, Robertson testified she did not see anything prior to hearing the bang, and she agreed the incident happened very quickly. She estimated the U-Haul was about six parking spots away from where she was standing by her vehicle. Robertson confirmed Officer Felps's truck was not identifiable as a police vehicle and there were neither sirens or flashing blue lights.

Another eyewitness to the incident, Catherine Reed, gave a similar version of events as Robertson. Reed testified that when she approached Lawton, who was still alive on the ground, she noticed the badge on his belt and realized he was an officer. She recalled the other officer, Officer Felps, was wearing a tactical vest. Reed said she did not hear police sirens or see flashing lights prior to the incident.

Officer Chad Felps testified that in addition to his position with the ZPD, he held commissions in several parishes, including East Baton Rouge Parish, which gave him enforcement authority to make arrests.⁶ Officer Felps became aware of the warrant for the defendant's arrest on March 2, and he testified law enforcement put a lot of effort into locating the defendant. Officer Felps talked to the defendant's family members, acquaintances, and friend, Ashley Chaney. On March 12, Officer Felps was working leads on the case with Lawton. Officer Felps and Lawton received information that the defendant was driving a U-Haul and was with a white female named Ashley. Later in the day, another source confirmed the defendant was with Ashley Chaney, and law enforcement obtained the geolocation of Chaney's cell phone. Officer Felps and Lawton began searching for the U-Haul and observed a U-Haul in the Sonic drive-thru near Walmart. Officer Felps testified his blue Ford truck was an unmarked police vehicle formerly belonging to the Chief of Police. The truck was well-known in the area and the defendant would have known it was him had he seen the truck. Therefore, to remain concealed from view, Officer Felps maintained a distance from the U-Haul until he confirmed the defendant was inside. Officer Felps observed the defendant drive to and park in the Walmart parking lot and turn off the vehicle's lights.

After devising a plan and putting on his tactical vest, Officer Felps quickly drove his truck and parked behind the U-Haul. Lawton approached the passenger side where Chaney was sitting while Officer Felps ran towards the driver's side. Officer Felps testified he announced he was with the police department. According to Officer Felps, he saw the defendant looking at him in the side mirror,⁷ and the defendant “immediately put the truck in drive.” Officer Felps testified this happened before he made it to the driver's side door. As soon as the U-Haul sped away, Officer Felps ran to his truck and began following until he noticed a woman running in the parking lot and saw Lawton on the ground. Lawton was motionless, appeared unconscious, and was hemorrhaging from a head wound. Lawton was wearing a vest underneath his shirt and a Louisiana State Fire Marshal's badge, and he had a gun in his holster.

Dr. William Beau Clark, the coroner for East Baton Rouge Parish, was qualified as an expert in emergency medicine and testified regarding the autopsy performed by Dr. Karen F. Ross, a forensic pathologist. The cause of Lawton's death was multiple blunt force injuries with massive craniocerebral trauma, and the manner of death was ruled a homicide. Lawton suffered from numerous skull fractures resulting in damage to and bleeding in the brain, and both of his lungs were collapsed. The autopsy additionally revealed several rib fractures and lacerations of the pulmonary artery and atrium of the heart. Dr. Clark opined someone with Lawton's injuries would live only one to two minutes after suffering the trauma.

Captain James Sullivan of the ZPD uniform patrol division testified he was home when he heard Officer Felps's call for assistance.⁸ Captain Sullivan knew the defendant was from Zachary and proceeded to drive the route he surmised the defendant would travel. Captain Sullivan spoke with local residents who informed him they observed a vehicle drive down a dead-end road and assumed the vehicle had gotten stuck in a nearby field. Other law enforcement officers arrived to assist Captain Sullivan. After the officers located the defendant, they placed him in handcuffs without issue. According to Captain Sullivan, the defendant immediately stated, “What's going on? I saw that officer and I drove off. What's going on?” Chaney was also taken into custody.

Sergeant Ty Stephens was the chief of detectives in the ZPD and Officer Felps's supervisor in March 2018. Sergeant Stephens testified he had knowledge of Officer Felps's plan to arrest the defendant and had full confidence in his ability to do so. Sergeant Stephens was in his police car heading towards the area when he heard Officer Felps yell over the radio that there was an officer down. Sergeant Stephens testified Officer Felps's Ford truck was well-known in Zachary, because the ZPD is a small agency and Officer Felps made many arrests.

Detective Sylvester testified that after processing the crime scene and collecting evidence, he participated in an interview of the defendant at the Louisiana State Police Compound along with Lieutenant Scott Henning. Initially, the defendant refused to speak to law enforcement and requested an attorney, at which point Detective Sylvester left the interview room. Simultaneously, detectives were interviewing and obtaining information from Chaney. The defendant later stated he wished to provide a statement, and he was again advised of his Miranda 9 rights, which he waived. The defendant said he and Chaney were sitting in the U-Haul eating food when “all of a sudden” someone grabbed the door handle. He said he was scared, because he heard that Officer Felps had told others he was going to kill the defendant. According to the defendant, his instinct was to “smash” it, referring to the accelerator pedal, when he saw the passenger door open. The defendant claimed he did not see anyone and denied that he told Chaney he had seen Officer Felps. He said he thought he hit a pole or a car. He acknowledged that he had a warrant for his arrest but said he thought they were being robbed. Detective Sylvester testified he never saw any tears from the defendant.

On appeal, the defendant argues he did not know Officer Felps and Lawton were the individuals attempting to gain access to the U-Haul. He contends the officers were not easily identifiable as law enforcement, and it was, therefore, reasonable for him to believe lay people were breaking into his vehicle.

As explained above, the necessary elements of proving manslaughter under the State's theory included proving the homicide was committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm when the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be murder under Article 30 or 30.1. See La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(b). Our jurisprudence is scant with cases discussing manslaughter by resisting lawful arrest, but we have found one case discussing La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(b). See State v. Jenkins, 454 So.2d 282, 284 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted in part and remanded on other grounds, 458 So.2d 109 (La. 1984). However, in Jenkins, the “lawful arrest” element of the statute was at issue. The defendant stipulated at trial that an active warrant for his arrest was in effect on March 12, 2018, and he does not contest the “lawful arrest” element of the statute on appeal.

After reviewing the record, Officers Felps's and Lawton's actions, coupled with the defendant's reaction to their presence, established the defendant's knowledge that law enforcement was pursuing him with the intent to arrest him. The incident occurred in a well-lit and public parking lot. Multiple ZPD officers testified that Officer Felps's blue Ford truck was known by most in the community, including the defendant who had been arrested by Officer Felps in the past. Lawton was wearing a fire investigator badge, firearm, and tactical vest underneath his shirt while Officer Felps was wearing a department-issued vest, radio, firearm, and handcuffs. Officer Felps testified he verbally announced their presence as police and said he and the defendant locked eyes in the side mirror before the defendant put the U-Haul in drive and sped off, crushing Lawton. The defendant fled to a secluded wooded area before being arrested. Captain Sullivan testified the defendant was placed in handcuffs and admitted: “I saw that officer and I drove off.” In his interview with Detective Sylvester, the defendant said he knew he had an active arrest warrant and admitted he knew Officer Felps. The State need not have proven intent; rather, it was required to prove the defendant resisted lawful arrest in a manner not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be first or second degree murder. We find the State met its burden.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of manslaughter. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant asserts the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by imposing the maximum forty-year sentence. The defendant argues his action of resisting arrest which, in turn, resulted in the accidental death of Lawton is not the worst type of manslaughter.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than a needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. State v. Livous, 2018-0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1036, 1044, writ denied, 2018-1788 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1130. The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Fruge, 2014-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 579, 584. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Grigsby, 2016-1213 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/17/17), 2017 WL 658783, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2017-0670 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 572, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1162, 139 S.Ct. 1202, 203 L.Ed.2d 229 (2019).

The penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment at hard labor for not more than forty years. See La. R.S. 14:31(B). As such, the defendant received the maximum term of imprisonment. Maximum sentences may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety in light of his past repeated criminality. State v. Looney, 2018-1416 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/28/19), 274 So.3d 685, 689, writ denied, 2019-00735 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So.3d 600; State v. Parker, 2012-1550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 744, 754, writ denied, 2013-1200 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 478.

At sentencing, Lawton's family declined to make a statement. In a letter read by his attorney, the defendant expressed his sympathy to Lawton's family and apologized for causing his death. He maintained he had no intent to hurt or kill anyone and characterized the situation as a “tragic incident[.]” Neither the State nor defense counsel presented argument prior to sentencing. Before imposing the sentence, the trial court observed the courtroom was packed with people interested in the case and remarked that Lawton's family had been waiting for closure for years. Then, the trial court reasoned:

Mr. Franklin, on October 10, 2022, you were found guilty by jury of manslaughter. I ordered a presentence investigation report. Pursuant to that report, it was determined that you are deemed to be a third-class felony offender. And as a result of that and all of that was unveiled throughout the trial process ․ your sentence shall be as follows: Albert Franklin, you are hereby sentenced to serve 40 years in the Department of Corrections.

The defendant objected to the excessiveness of the sentence imposed, to which the trial court replied that the defendant had multiple violent arrests and charges pending in East Baton Rouge Parish and St. Helena Parish.

In his motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant argued he was a thirty-eight-year old man with no history of violence, a lifelong resident of Louisiana, and supported by his family. He requested leniency given the circumstances of Lawton's death, arguing this was not an intended act, the outcome was not desired or obviously foreseeable, and the crime did not involve the use of a weapon. The defendant then discussed manslaughter cases where lesser sentences were imposed. The motion was denied without a hearing.

The presentence investigation (PSI), which the trial court referenced in its reasons for sentencing, reveals numerous arrests and several convictions. Of note, the defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine in 2005 and placed on five years of probation. His probation was later revoked due to his commission of attempted unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. The defendant also had pending charges of second-degree battery and aggravated assault with a firearm in St. Helena Parish and pending charges of aggravated second-degree battery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and aggravated assault with a firearm in East Baton Rouge Parish.

A thorough review of the record reveals the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence. The trial court presided over the defendant's trial in this matter and was familiar with the facts and circumstances of this case prior to imposing its sentence. The defendant had several prior felony convictions when he committed the instant offense. Moreover, this most recent offense was especially tragic given that his actions resulted in the death of a reserve police officer who volunteered his personal time to make the community safer. The defendant further demonstrated his disregard for the rule of law by actively evading arrest. The defendant presented no evidence in mitigation, and high and maximum sentences have been imposed on defendants convicted of manslaughter under a variety of circumstances.

When considering the circumstances of this case, we find the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense committed, nor shocking to the sense of justice. Thus, we find the trial court did not manifestly abuse its wide discretion by imposing a sentence of forty years, and such a sentence is not constitutionally excessive. This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects after the trial court imposed the sentence, it advised the defendant he had “two years from the date that [his] conviction becomes final to seek post conviction relief.” The prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief is two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A); State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

We affirm the conviction and sentence of the defendant, Albert Jermaine Franklin, Jr.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The State and defense stipulated that “on March 12, 2018, there was an active arrest warrant in effect commanding the arrest of Albert Franklin for crimes of violence, signed by the Honorable Judge Richard Moore of the 19th Judicial District Court.”

3.   The record reveals that the officers believed her safety was at issue, and she might have been in danger.

4.   The question of the legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 790 n.3 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177. The defendant failed to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. However, the failure to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Washington, 421 So.2d 887, 889 (La. 1982).

5.   Officer Felps later identified the badge as a Louisiana Fire Marshal's badge.

6.   At the time of trial, Officer Felps was a narcotics sergeant with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office.

7.   Although Officer Felps testified several times that he saw the defendant looking at him in the rear view mirror, he later clarified that it was a side view mirror on the U-Haul truck.

8.   Captain Sullivan retired from the ZPD in 2019.

9.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

WOLFE, J.