OWENS v. DRIVER (2026)

This civil case originated with an action by the descendants of a corporation's shareholder—Shannon Driver and Jason Boothe—against an officer of the corporation and fellow shareholder—Jack F. Owens, Jr.—for improper activities depriving them of the profits derived from the corporation's business and sale of corporate assets. The claimants sought the dissolution of the corporation as well as their share of proceeds from various corporate transactions. After a trial on the merits, the trial court dissolved the corporation, appointed a liquidator, and awarded Driver and Boothe their portion of the profits from the corporation's business and sale of certain corporate assets. Owens appealed.

While that appeal was pending before this court, Owens filed a separate action asking the trial court to declare the judgment dissolving the corporation a nullity due to alleged vices of form. Driver and Boothe, now the defendants in this secondary suit, filed exceptions in response to the petition for nullity of judgment. A hearing was held before the trial court, after which it granted Driver's and Boothe's exceptions of no cause of action and lack of jurisdiction, dismissing the matter with prejudice. Owens has now appealed that judgment, which is currently before this court. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shannon Driver and Jason Boothe v. Jack Owens, Jr., et al.

The original lawsuit in which Driver and Boothe filed their action against Owens was assigned docket number 30,906 at the trial court level. The judgment in that matter dissolving the corporation has now been affirmed by this court in Driver v. Owens, 25-79 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/1/25), 422 So.3d 812. We adopt the facts and procedural history outlined in that opinion as they are relevant to an understanding of the proceedings currently before this court.

On December 28, 2001, Shirttail Estates, Inc. was formed and incorporated. Relevant to this appeal, in 2012 the corporation passed a resolution naming the owners’ interest of Shirttail Estates as Willie Ray Bridge[s] (“Bridge[s]”) at 32.552583%, Jack F. Owens, Jr. (“Owens”) at 38.75551% and Enoch Denver Boothe (“Boothe”) at 28.691908%. According to the Louisiana Secretary of State records, Shirttail Estates’ charter was administratively terminated on April 4, 2015, and no further filings have transpired since that termination. Boothe died on September 16, 2016, and Bridge[s] died in 2021.

Plaintiffs Shannon Driver and Jason Boothe, (Plaintiffs) the children of Enoch Denver Boothe, filed suit against Jack F. Owens, Jr. (Owens) and Shirttail Estates. Plaintiffs alleged in their suit that Owens conducted Shirttail Estate's business and sold its property without authorization from the shareholders or corporation. Further, Plaintiffs alleged that Owens personally gained from conducting Shirttail Estate's business to the detriment of the corporation and Plaintiffs, as stockholders.

Plaintiffs sought dissolution of Shirttail Estates and compensation from Owens for their share of the profits received by Owens for Shirttail Estates’ business transactions and the sale of certain corporate property. A stipulated judgment was entered into by Plaintiffs and Owens granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting the sale of any corporate assets and granting Plaintiffs access to Shirttail Estates’ bank accounts from the time of their father's death. The stipulated judgment also set a hearing on all issues for June 4, 2024, which was continued to July 17, 2024.

After the trial on the merits, the trial court dissolved Shirttail Estates and appointed a liquidator to conduct business on behalf of Shirttail Estates. Further, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for $7,965.44 against Owens based on the evidence in the record of certain business transactions and property sales by Owens. Finally, the trial court assessed all costs of the proceedings to Owens.

Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).

The judgment at issue in Driver v. Owens dissolving the corporation and rendering judgment against Owens was issued by the trial court in docket number 30,906 on September 4, 2024. Owens filed a Notice of Appeal on October 1, 2024, in which he also asked for a new trial, arguing in part that the corporation had never been served. After a hearing on November 22, 2024, the trial court dismissed the motion for new trial and granted Owens a suspensive appeal, setting the appeal bond at $12,000.00. In granting the appeal, the trial court noted that no appeal had been filed on behalf of the corporation. Owens failed to pay the appeal bond, resulting in an order issued on December 26, 2024, granting Owens a devolutive appeal. On appeal, Owens asserted three assignments of error. The first assignment is relevant to the proceedings in this current matter:

The court erred to dissolve the corporation. The corporation was sued as a defendant by minority stockholder, who only owned 14+ percent. The plaintiff did not file the necessary derivative action. The plaintiff has no service of process on the defendant corporation. The corporation did not answer the suit. A default judgment was entered against the corporation without a minute entry of a preliminary default being entered into the record. [citation omitted] The default judgment was granted on a rule to show cause.

Driver v. Owens, 422 So.3d at 815–16.

Jack Owens, Jr. v. Shannon Driver and Jason Boothe

While that appeal was pending before this court, Owens filed a Petition for Nullity of Judgment on February 3, 2025, in the trial court under a new docket number, 31,189, on behalf of Shirttail Estates, seeking to annul the rulings and judgments rendered in 30,906. Driver and Boothe were named as defendants. Owens argued that Shirttail Estates was not served with process in the original proceedings, and thus, no valid judgments or rulings could be rendered against the corporation. According to Owens, the person tasked with serving the original petition on Shirttail Estates in docket number 30,906 attempted service on the corporation's agent designated for service of process, Henry C. Edwards, on March 4, 2024. However, a notation was made on the citation, stating, “No longer at 2003 Fourth St. STE B, Jonesville, La. Possibly in Nursing Home 3/4/2024.” Owens argued that such an attempt at service did not constitute due diligence, per La.Code Civ.P. art. 1261(B), and thus, service on Owens as an officer of the corporation did not fulfill the requirements of service on Shirttail Estates.¹

In response to Owens’ petition for nullity, Driver and Boothe filed exceptions of no right and no cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss. They argued that service on Shirttail Estates was made when Owens was served with the petition as he was “a major stockholder and the Agent for Service of Process had not been active for years due to dementia and being in a nursing home.” They further insisted that Owens “ran the corporation as his personal property as a fiefdom without any meetings and has never filed an Annual Report nor filed any tax returns.” They concluded that Owens “has no right nor cause of action since the matter is in Appeal, which takes jurisdiction away from the federal [sic] court.” Additionally, in a later-filed memorandum entitled “Memo in Opposition,” counsel for Driver and Boothe argued the following:

In the Judgment of the lawsuit Drive[r] v. Owens, the court ruled that the corporation, Shirt-Tail Estates Inc., is dissolved. No one has objected nor appealed that portion of the decision. The Judgment is final, and the Corporation is dissolved. A dissolved corporation can not be made an indispensable party since it no longer exists.

On July 21, 2025, after a hearing on the exceptions, the trial court found that due diligence was satisfied in the attempt to serve the corporation's designated agent for service of process, and that service on Owens was sufficient. The trial court further found that it lacked jurisdiction over the issues raised in the petition for judgment of nullity due to the appeal pending before this court from the judgment in docket number 30,906. A judgment was signed on August 7, 2025, stating:

After consideration of the record, the exhibits, the law, and evidence, it is

IT IS ORDERED that, based on the fact that due diligence was made on process service at the last known address of the Agent listed, Henry C Edwards. In twelve (12) years, no annual report had been filed to update any information, that the exception of no cause of action is granted.

IT IS ORDERED that the Exception on the Lack of Jurisdiction is granted due to this same matter being on Appeal.

On September 16, 2025, the trial court granted Owens a devolutive appeal from the August 7, 2025 judgment. This court remanded the matter to the trial court by Order dated March 2, 2026, because the judgment appealed lacked proper decretal language. On March 11, 2026, the trial court rendered an Amended Judgment on Exceptions of No Cause of Action and Lack of Jurisdiction, adding the language, “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this matter herein is dismissed with prejudice.”

Judgment and Opinion in Driver v. Owens, 25-79

On October 1, 2025, after the trial court granted the exceptions of no cause of action and lack of jurisdiction in docket number 31,189, this court released its opinion in Driver v. Owens, 422 So.3d 812, finding no merit to Owens’ assignments of error and finding no error in the trial court's judgment in docket number 30,906. Thus, the trial court's judgment dissolving Shirttail Estates and awarding Driver and Boothe their portion of profits from Shirttail Estate's business and sale of certain corporate assets was affirmed. Owens applied for a rehearing, which was denied on December 17, 2025. Neither party applied for writs with the supreme court. That judgment is now final.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The matter currently before us involves Owens’ appeal from the trial court's August 7, 2025 judgment and March 11, 2025 amended judgment, by which the trial court dismissed Owens’ petition for nullity of judgment with prejudice based on its findings that there was no cause of action as due diligence was made to attempt service on Shirttail Estate's designated agent, and that there was a lack of jurisdiction due to the appeal pending before this court. Owens has asserted one assignment of error:

The Court erred in finding that the corporate agent for service was served according to law and that the process server used due diligence to serve the registered agent for service of process.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's granting of an exception of no cause of action is reviewed on appeal de novo as the exception raises a question of law. Dowd v. Helena Emergency Physicians, PPLC, 23-527 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/24), 387 So.3d 31, writ denied, 24-536 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So.3d 893. The granting of an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction also involves a question of law and is thus also subject to de novo review on appeal. Franklin v. City of Alexandria, 18-634 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/19), 272 So.3d 120.

DISCUSSION

Owens argues that the trial court erred in finding that the process server exercised due diligence in his effort to serve the corporate agent for service of process, and as the service in this matter failed to comply with La.Code Civ.P. art. 1261, the judgment is a nullity and all proceedings in this matter are absolutely null. In support of his argument, Owens refers to La.Code Civ.P. art. 2002(A)(2), which provides, “A final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered ․ [a]gainst a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.”

At the time Owens filed his Petition for Nullity of Judgment, an appeal was pending before this court, also filed by Owens, involving the same judgment at issue in his petition for nullity. The effects of an appeal on an action of nullity were discussed in Assensoh v. Diamond Nails, 04-1130, pp. 5–6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/05), 897 So.2d 806, 810, writ denied, 05-601 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So.2d 1073:

Article 2005 provides that “[a]n action of nullity does not affect the right to appeal” and that “[a] judgment may be annulled prior to or pending an appeal therefrom, or after the delays for appealing have elapsed.” La. C.C.P. art.2005. Simply stated, this article provides that “the two remedies may be sought simultaneously.” 1 Frank L. Maraist and Harry T. Lemmon, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Civil Procedure § 12.6 (1999). “[T]he defendant must bring an action for nullity when the basis of her or his attack on the judgment does not appear in the record and therefore cannot be corrected on appeal.” Id. “[T]he practical effect behind requiring that the defendant bring an action to annul the judgment is to permit the introduction of additional evidence.” Decca Leasing Corp. v. Torres, 465 So.2d 910, 915 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985).

Thus, per La.Code Civ.P. art. 2005, Owens was permitted to file an action seeking to nullify the judgment rendered in 30,906, even though that matter was simultaneously on appeal with this court. However, the action for nullity may only be brought before the trial court while the matter is pending on appeal if “ ‘the basis for her or his attack on the judgment does not appear in the record and therefore cannot be corrected by appeal.’ ” Assensoh, 897 So.2d at 810 (quoting Maraist and Lemmon § 12.6).

Owens based his petition for nullity of judgment on the argument that the corporation had not been served with the original petition. In reviewing the record of the appeal pending at that time, under docket number 25-79, we find that the same complaint appeared in that record. After the trial court rendered judgment in docket number 30,906 dissolving the corporation, Owens requested a new trial, arguing that no service was made on the corporation's designated agent for service of process. A hearing was held on November 22, 2024, at which the trial court stated on the record:

The Court denies the motion for new trial on two grounds. One, is that it was not filed timely, and secondly, the Court did the best I could on the merits which are spelled out in the reasons for judgment and the judgment itself, and I have not received anything to - - that would satisfy me that there was some error in the judgment or in the reasons for judgment. So, the Court will motion - - will deny the motion for new trial on both grounds.

When Owens filed an appeal with this court under docket number 25-79, his “first assignment of error [was] that the trial court erred in dissolving the corporation. Owens argue[d] in this assigned error that Plaintiffs did not file the necessary derivative action, nor did they serve process on the defendant corporation.” Driver v. Owens, 422 So.3d at 817. (Emphasis added.)

Driver and Boothe argued in their exceptions to the petition for nullity of judgment that “the matters of the suit are on Appeal and the court does not have the legal authority to hear the matter due to the lack of jurisdiction.” Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2088(A) specifically provides:

The jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal, or on the granting of the order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal.

Based on the above, we find that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the issues raised in the action of nullity, and thus, the trial court did not err in granting the exception of lack of jurisdiction “due to the same matter being on Appeal.” While an action in nullity may be filed while an appeal is pending, it may not address the same issues contained in the record of the appeal, nor may a trial court exercise jurisdiction over any matters reviewable under appeal. See La.Code Civ.P. art. 2005; Assensoh, 897 So.2d 806; and La.Code Civ.P. art. 2088.

Furthermore, we note that after these matters were argued before the trial court in the action for nullity, this court rendered a final judgment in Drivers v. Owens, affirming the trial court's judgment dissolving the corporation and stating that “[a]fter a thorough review of the record, we find the record supports the trial court's decision, and therefore, we find no error by the trial court in dissolving Shirttail Estates.” Drivers, 422 So.3d at 818. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2005 provides that “[a] judgment affirmed, reversed, amended, or otherwise rendered by an appellate court may be annulled only when the ground for nullity did not appear in the record of appeal or was not considered by the appellate court.” La.Code Civ.P. art. 2005. As the judgment dissolving the corporation has been affirmed on appeal and the ground for nullity appeared in the record of that appeal, Owens is prohibited from any further actions seeking to annul this final judgment.

The finding of this court that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the issues presented in Owens’ petition for nullity of judgment in docket number 31,189, as well as the finality of the judgment rendered in docket number 30,906 dissolving the corporation, renders the matter of whether the corporation was properly served moot.

It is well settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. Joseph v. Ratcliff, 2010-1342 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/25/11), 63 So.3d 220, 225. A case is moot when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. If the case is moot, there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate. Id.

Russell v. Cantrelle, 19-815, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/11/20), 303 So.3d 1081, 1086. Thus, we will not address the question of whether the corporation was properly served with the original petition.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting the exceptions filed on behalf Shannon Driver and Jason Boothe and dismissing Jack F. Owens, Jr.’s Petition for Judgment of Nullity is affirmed. Costs of this proceeding are assigned to Jack F. Owens, Jr.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1261 provides the following:A. Service of citation or other process on a domestic or foreign corporation is made by personal service on any one of its agents for service of process.B. If the corporation has failed to designate an agent for service of process, if there is no registered agent by reason of death, resignation, or removal, or if the person attempting to make service certifies that he is unable, after due diligence, to serve the designated agent, service of the citation or other process may be made by any of the following methods:(1) By personal service on any officer, or director, or any person named as such in the last report filed with the secretary of state.(2) By personal service on any employee of suitable age and discretion at any place where the business of the corporation is regularly conducted.(3) By service of process under the provisions of R.S. 13:3204, if the corporation is subject to the provisions of R.S. 13:3201.C. Service of citation or other process on a bank is made pursuant to R.S. 6:285(C).

STILES, Judge.