GASPARD v. RODRIGUEZ (2026)

Bryce Gaspard appeals the granting of summary judgment to Ohio Security Insurance Company and Indian Harbor Insurance Company.¹ The trial court found no coverage under the policy. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

U.S. Installation Group, Inc. (USIG) and Reynaldo Rodriguez, through R&B Carpet, LLC, his company, entered into a contract titled “INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE FLOORING INSTALLATION SERVICES.” Rodriguez was the sole member of R&B Carpet but employed a helper who assisted him in laying carpet.

The contract provided that R&B Carpet “is an independent contractor and is completely qualified and responsible for performing the flooring installation work ․ without supervision or control by U.S. Installation.” It added that the independent contractor in “Contractor's sole discretion, shall determine and designate (1) the days Contractor desires to provide installation services under this Agreement, and (2) the square footage of flooring for the days Contractor designates.” And, it continued, “no officer, agent or employee of U.S. Installation shall have the authority to direct Contractor as to the manner or means employed to achieve such objectives in results.”

The agreement also said, “Nothing herein shall prevent Contractor from performing installation services for other third parties[.]” However, in practice, USIG was R&B Carpet's only client. Rodriguez testified that he believed he was an independent contractor rather than an employee. His deposition also confirmed that no one from USIG ever directed or instructed him on how to perform his work.

USIG did not pay Rodriguez a wage, but rather R&B Carpet billed USIG for each individual job. He testified that he had the ability to decline and reschedule a job, if necessary. USIG never told him to do a job differently. USIG did not provide Rodriguez with office space, and Rodriguez supplied his own tools.

Rodriguez was on his way home from installing carpet for USIG when he collided with Gaspard. Rodriguez owned the vehicle he was driving. Gaspard sued Rodriguez, Rodriguez's insurer, and USIG's insurers. Gaspard did not sue USIG.

USIG's liability insurers filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that their policy did not provide coverage in this case. The trial court granted the motion, and Gaspard now appeals this decision.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The standard of review for a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Breaux v. Romero & Assocs., Inc., 95-691 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95), 664 So.2d 683. Under the case law, “[w]hether an insurance policy, as a matter of law, provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be properly resolved within the framework of a motion for summary judgment.” Boudreaux v. Coco, 21-09, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/28/22), 342 So.3d 354, 359. The jurisprudence continues:

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed using the general rules of contractual interpretation. Interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. When the words of an insurance contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent and courts must enforce the contract as written.

Id. at 359–60.

Here, the trial court based its ruling on the signed independent contractor agreement between R&B Carpet and USIG. It found no genuine issue of material fact of Rodriguez's status as an independent contractor, and consequently he could not meet the definition of insured under the policy.

The policy restricts insureds to the policy holder, permissive users of vehicles owned by the policy holder, and “employees” under certain circumstances. The trial court's finding that Rodriguez was an independent contractor precluded him from being considered an insured, resulting in no coverage.

On appeal, Gaspard argues that Rodriguez's vehicle qualified as a covered non-owned vehicle and that the policy's term “employee” was sufficiently broad to include the arrangement between Rodriguez and USIG. To survive summary judgment, the policy terms must be satisfied, or there must be genuine issues of material fact surrounding their application: covered “non-owned auto” and “insured.”

The policy describes “Non-Owned ‘Autos’ ” as “those ‘autos’ you do not own, lease, hire, rent or borrow that are used in connection with your business. This includes ‘autos’ owned by your ‘employees’ ․ but only while used in your business or your personal affairs.” Even if an argument could be made that Rodriguez's truck was a covered non-owned vehicle under the policy, his status as an independent contractor would be fatal to coverage.

The policy states, “We will pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies, caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered ‘auto.’ ” Rodriquez points to the following provision to argue that he is an insured: “Any ‘employee’ of yours while using a covered ‘auto’ you do not own, hire or borrow but only for acts within the course and scope of their employment by you.”

The policy does little to define “employee.” The insurance company argues that Florida law applies to the interpretation of this insurance contract. Florida law and Louisiana law utilize similar tests.²

The Louisiana jurisprudence states, “The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor status is a factual determination to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Boudreaux, 342 at 361. We should consider “the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether an employer-employee relationship exists or whether it is an instance where the individual has independent contractor status.” Id. at 362.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has summarized the employee-independent contractor issue as follows:

The single most important factor to consider in deciding whether the employer-employee relationship exists, for purposes of La. C.C. art. 2320, is the right of the employer to control the work of the employee. In Blanchard [v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 44, 215 So.2d 902, 905 (La. 1968)], this court stated: “It is the right of control of the time and physical activities in the other party and the existence of a close relationship between the parties which determine that one is a servant.” This court further stated: “ ‘Servant’ must be interpreted as that particular kind of agent who has a very close economic relation to, and is subject to very close control by, the principal ․ He is an integral part of his employer's business and must submit to the control of his physical conduct as well as of his time.” [Id. at 906.]

․

In contrast to the employer-employee relationship ․ [a]n independent contractor relationship presupposes a contract between the parties, the independent nature of the contractor's business, and the nonexclusive means the contractor may employ in accomplishing the work. Moreover, it should appear that the contract calls for specific piecework as a unit to be done according to the independent contractor's own methods, without being subject to the control and direction, in the performance of the service, of his employer, except as to the result of the services to be rendered. It must also appear that a specific price for the overall undertaking is agreed upon; that its duration is for a specific time and not subject to termination or discontinuance at the will of either side without a corresponding liability for its breach. The law further recognizes the inquiry to determine whether a relationship is that of independent contractor or that of a servant/employee requires, among other factors, the application of the principal test: the control over the work reserved by the employer. In applying this test it is not the supervision and control which is actually exercised which is significant; the important question is whether, from the nature of the relationship, the right to do so exists.

Bolden v. Tisdale, 21-224, pp. 13–14 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 697, 708-09 (citations omitted).

In this case, USIG neither had contractual authority to control Rodriguez nor did it ever attempt to exercise control over him as a matter of practice. The signed contract was explicit in this regard, and Rodriguez's deposition testimony confirmed this. Further, he was not paid a wage. Instead, R&B Carpet would submit bills for individual jobs. Although the contract would renew unless a party gave written notice, it was for a specific term.

None of these facts are in dispute. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and under the totality of the circumstances, we find that Rodriguez does not qualify as an insured under the policy. Therefore, there is no insurance coverage for this accident under the policy at issue.

DECREE

The judgment of the trial court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed. Gaspard shall bear the costs of appeal.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indian Harbor is the excess insurer to Ohio Security's primary policy. Indian Harbor's coverage is controlled by the underlying policy, so for the sake of simplicity, we treat the two insurers as one and use the singular tense.

2.   For example, See Kane Furniture Corp. v. Miranda, 506 So.2d 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). As both states’ independent contractor vs. employee tests are similar, an analysis under either here would render the same result.

DAVIS, Judge.