RACHEL RENEE SKINNER BRUNT IN HER CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT EXECUTRIX OF THE SUCCESSION OF GEORGE DASHIELL SKINNER v. MARY THERESA STASZ SKINNER (2026)

The defendant/appellant, Mary Theresa Stasz Skinner (Mary), appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of the plaintiff/appellee, Rachel Renee Skinner Brunt, independent executrix of the succession of George D. Skinner (Rachel), which declared a joint petition to partition the community property of Mary and George D. Skinner a valid compromise between them. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

George and Mary married in Florida in 2016. They moved to Lafayette Parish. They separated in early 2024. George and Mary each retained counsel, who prepared a joint petition that contemplated an amicable partition of their community and establishment of a separate property regime and prayed that the attached proposed partition be made a judgment of the court. Based upon this joint petition, they did not contemplate divorce.

Before the joint petition could be filed, George died. Rachel was named executrix of George's estate. In September 2024, Rachel filed the present action as a petition for declaratory judgment to persuade the court to declare that the joint petition compromised the partition of the community property.

In June 2025, Mary filed a motion for summary judgment. That motion argued that the partition agreement was never signed by any party and could not constitute a valid compromise of the community. The record reflects that the motion was not supported by any documentation, not even the joint petition.

Rachel responded with a motion for summary judgment of her own. Her motion was supported by her affidavit, various pleadings in the matter, responses to discovery, and the joint petition. The joint petition was accompanied by affidavits of George and Mary, documents entitled “Matrimonial Agreement Terminating Existing Matrimonial Regime (Community of Acquets and Gains or Modified Community of Acquets and Gains) and Establishing a Regime of Separation of Property” and “Partition of Community property Between George Dashiell Skinner and Mary Theresa Stasz Skinner,” and George's death certificate.

The joint petition was signed by George and Mary and their attorneys. It asserted that they separated and wished to end the community of acquests and gains. To that end, they attached a partition. The partition explicitly stated in several places that it represented an “agreement.”

George's affidavit asserted, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

That he is one of the Joint Petitioners in the above and foregoing “Joint Petition for Termination of Matrimonial Regime, for Approval of Regime of Separation of Property and For Approval of Partition of Community Property,” all of which he has read and understood, and that all of the allegations of fact contained therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

That he is represented by counsel who has advised him of the legal consequences of the parties’ renunciation of the community of acquets being separate in property, and that the proposed agreement between the parties terminating the community of acquets and gains and the consequences of henceforth implementing a separate property and income regime is in his best interest.

Similarly, Mary's affidavit reads, in pertinent part (emphasis added):

That she is one of the Joint Petitioners in the above and foregoing “Joint Petition for Termination of Matrimonial Regime, for Approval of Regime of Separation of Property and For Approval of Partition of Community Property,” all of which she has read and understood, and that all of the allegations of fact contained therein are true and correct to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

That she is represented by counsel who has advised her of the legal consequences of the parties’ renunciation of the community of acquets being separate in property, and that the proposed agreement between the parties terminating the community of acquets and gains and the consequences of henceforth implementing a separate property and income regime is in her best interest.

George's affidavit was executed on June 26, 2024, in Lafayette. Mary executed her affidavit on June 29, 2024, in Santa Rosa County, Florida. George died on July 7, 2024.

Both motions were heard by the trial court on August 18, 2025. Following argument, the trial court denied Mary's motion and granted Rachel's. That judgment allocated assets and debts to Mary and George and declared that certain properties were separate.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Mary's appeal of the judgment asserts that the trial court erred in the following respects:

Assignment of Error No. 1

The Trial Court erred in finding a valid and enforceable compromise for the partition of community property existed.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court erred in finding that the necessary formalities for a community property partition existed.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying the same criteria used by trial courts. Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels La., Inc., 24-840 (La. 3/21/25), 403 So.3d 573. The issue is whether, “[a]fter an opportunity for adequate discovery․ the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ.P. art 966(A)(3). The mover bears the burden of proof. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, it is not required to negate all essential elements of its opponents’ claim; instead, it is only required to point out “the absence of factual support for one or more” essential elements. Id.

Pryor v. CCRR Props., LLC, 25-254, p. 10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/22/25), 423 So.3d 617, 625. The purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, (1986).

Assignment of Error No. 1

“A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.” La.Civ.Code art. 3071. A compromise must be written or recited in open court. La.Civ.Code art. 3072. “The same rules of contractual interpretation apply to compromises as to other contracts.” Broussard v. Brown's Furniture of Lafayette, Inc., 13-596 p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/13), 128 So.3d 640, 643, writ denied, 14-333 (La. 4/11/14), 138 So.3d 605. A compromise need not be contained in a single document. Id.

In the present matter, neither Mary nor George signed the actual partition agreement. However, they did sign the joint petition, which prayed that the “proposed Partition Agreement” be approved, i.e., made a judgment of the trial court. They also signed affidavits indicating that the partition agreement was in their best interests.

Mary argues that the term “proposed” used in the documents to refer to the partition agreement indicates that there was no meeting of the minds. We disagree. As noted above, the joint petition that Mary signed prayed that the proposed agreement be made a judgment of the trial court. In that context, “proposed” indicates that the agreement awaited court approval. We find no issue of fact regarding this. As the first circuit observed, “Obviously, the clearest route to a valid agreement would be to sign the submitted agreement after the court has approved the document.” Matter of Boyer, 616 So.2d 730, 732 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 620 So.2d 882 (La.1993). The trial court in Boyer had invalidated an agreement, in part because the parties had signed it before they sought court approval.

In Walton v. Walton, 597 So.2d 479 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), the parties recited in open court an agreement to partition their community property. When questioned in open court about the agreement and his understanding, the only doubts expressed by the husband were over the divorce itself, which he did not believe in. When he was presented with a stipulated judgment of divorce, the husband refused to sign it or to execute documents necessary to convey the home to the wife. The wife filed a rule for contempt against him, and the trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the recitations in open court. On appeal, the first circuit found that the open-court recitation met all the criteria required for a compromise and bound the parties.

The proposed agreement, joint petition, and affidavits, taken as a whole, constitute a written agreement to divide the community property and establish a separate property regime. This constitutes a written agreement to settle a dispute or an uncertainty regarding a legal relationship. That was this court's conclusion in Thibodeaux v. Thibodeaux, 511 So.2d 102 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1987), and that of our second circuit colleagues in Nash v. Nash, 55,848 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/28/24), 400 So.3d 982.

Assignment of Error No. 2

“A matrimonial regime is a system of principles and rules governing the ownership and management of the property of married persons as between themselves and toward third persons.” La.Civ.Code art. 2325. These regimes can be legal, contractual, or partly legal and partly contractual. La.Civ.Code art. 2326. The legal regime—the default—is the establishment of a community property regime. La.Civ.Code art. 2327. The spouses are allowed to enter into matrimonial agreements that modify the legal regime or establish a separate-property regime. La.Civ.Code art. 2328. Contractual regimes are limited in that they may not contravene public policy, and spouses already married may not modify or terminate the legal regime except on joint petition and a finding that the modification “serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles and rules.” La.Civ.Code art. 2329. The Louisiana Civil Code also imposes formal requirements for the execution of matrimonial agreements; they “shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses.” La.Civ.Code art. 2331.

But the community no longer exists. The community terminates at the death of one of the spouses. La.Civ.Code art. 2356. The requirements imposed on contractual alterations of existing community property regimes reflect a “strong legislative policy against spouses giving up their community rights during marriage without judicial supervision.” Deshotels v. Deshotels, 13-1406, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d 541, 544. It is for that reason that the formal requirements are strictly enforced. Id.

The most important legislative policy underpinning the Louisiana community property regime has been that spouses share equally in “the produce of the reciprocal labor and industry of both husband and wife.” No matter how married couples organize their lives—one earning income, the other managing the home; both working for wages; or neither earning wages and both producing things—the basic rule is that they share equally in whatever each produces and accumulates. Historically, this policy protected the wife who was not a wage earner by giving her a share in the husband's accumulations of income. The policy now fosters equality as households with two working spouses is far more common.

Andrea Carroll, Bradford Felder & Richard D. Moreno, 16 La.Civ. L. Treatise: Matrimonial Regimes § 3:1 (5th ed. 2026)(footnotes omitted).

Once the community is terminated, that legislative policy is no longer implicated. See Lanza v. Lanza, 04-1314 (La. 3/2/05), 898 So.2d 280 (holding that there is no presumption that income received after termination of the community was community property).

The community regime governs the acquisition and disposition of community property. As already noted, altering or terminating the regime requires court approval. But Louisiana Civil Code Article 2336 provides (emphasis added):

Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the community property. Nevertheless, neither the community nor things of the community may be judicially partitioned prior to the termination of the regime.

During the existence of the community property regime, the spouses may, without court approval, voluntarily partition the community property in whole or in part. In such a case, the things that each spouse acquires are separate property. The partition is effective toward third persons when filed for registry in the manner provided by Article 2332.

Altering the community regime and partitioning the community property are not the same. Agreements to terminate or alter the community regime require judicial approval, while agreements partitioning the community property do not.

It may well be that the document establishing a matrimonial regime may also incorporate other provisions dealing with donations of existing property and partition of existing property. Those aspects, though, could be separate contracts not requiring judicial approval, and the inclusion of them in one document for convenience should not require those aspects of the agreement to be subject to the court's findings of understanding and best interests.

Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, 16 La.Civ. L. Treatise: Matrimonial Regimes, § 8.6 (2d Ed. 1997).

We find that the lack of judicial approval of this agreement poses no impediment to its enforcement. The community regime ended with George's death. The provisions partitioning the community do not require judicial approval.

CONCLUSION

A compromise is an agreement between parties to settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship through mutual concessions. That agreement may be contained in more than one document. In the present case, the parties’ attorneys drafted a joint petition setting forth the desire of the parties to end the community regime and divide the community assets. The parties acquiesced by affixing their signatures to the joint petition and affidavits. Heeding the advice of our first circuit colleagues, they withheld their signatures from the actual agreement until approval was obtained. Unfortunately, George died before the joint petition could be filed. His death does not invalidate the agreement to the extent that it partitions the community assets, which does not require judicial approval at all.

All costs of this appeal are taxed to defendant/appellant, Mary Theresa Stasz Skinner.

AFFIRMED.

SHANNON J. GREMILLION JUDGE