MUNSON v. HENIFF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS LLC LLC (2026)

The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded this matter with instructions to utilize the manifest error standard of review to determine whether a Louisiana court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Express Container Services of Atlanta, LLC (“Express-Atlanta”) based on the single business enterprise theory. Munson v. Heniff Transportation Systems, LLC, 2025-00857 (La. 12/23/25), 425 So.3d 100, 101 (per curiam). If this court does not find personal jurisdiction on that basis, the supreme court further instructed us to consider whether personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta exists under the long arm statute, La. R.S. 13:3201(B). See Munson, 425 So.3d at 101. Finally, the remand included the writ application filed by Nautilus Insurance Company, Express-Atlanta's general liability insurer, which was denied in this court's original opinion.

After review, we find the trial court properly sustained Express-Atlanta's declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction. We grant Nautilus's writ application and, after review, deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2022, Michael Munson was preparing to offload the contents of a pressurized tanker trailer in Plaquemine, Louisiana. Munson discovered air leaking from the metal cap of a clean-out pipe on top of the tanker. As he investigated the leak, the metal cap allegedly blew off and struck Munson in the face, causing injuries. Munson, individually and on behalf his minor child, and Munson's wife (collectively, “Munson”) filed a petition for damages in November 2022, naming several defendants, including Express-Atlanta. Munson averred the tanker trailer was cleaned and inspected by Express-Atlanta's employee in March 2022, before it was loaded and shipped to Louisiana. Munson alleged that Express-Atlanta failed to properly inspect the tanker trailer and failed to alert the affected parties of any defects in the tanker trailer. See Munson v. Heniff Transportation Systems, LLC, 2025-0022 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/25), 417 So.3d 915, 919, writ granted, decision reversed, 2025-00855 (La. 12/23/25), 425 So.3d 98 (per curiam).

After receiving long arm service in Georgia, Express-Atlanta filed a declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, urging it was a Georgia corporation that neither does business nor is authorized to do business in Louisiana. See La. C.C.P. art. 925(A)(5). The trial on the exception, originally set in April 2023, was continued without date to allow an opportunity for jurisdictional discovery.

In August 2023, Munson filed his first supplemental and amending petition, adding Nautilus as a defendant and reurging his claims against Express-Atlanta. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 919. Munson further asserted that, at the time of the incident, Express-Atlanta was doing business in Louisiana and acting as an alter ego of Express Container Services of Iberville, LLC; Express Container Services of Louisiana, LLC; Express Container Services of Reserve, LA, LLC; and/or Express Container Services of St. Gabriel, LLC (collectively, the “Louisiana Entities”), each a Louisiana limited liability company. Munson alleged that Express-Atlanta engages in the same business activities and utilizes the same trade name as the Louisiana Entities, uses the same logo and marketing materials, and shares the same marketing department, accounting services, and Nautilus insurance policy. Finally, Munson alleged that Nautilus was Express-Atlanta's insurer at the time of the incident and was liable in solido with Express-Atlanta for all damages. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 919.

In response to Munson's first supplemental and amending petition, Express-Atlanta and Nautilus filed a declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, a peremptory exception of no cause of action. See La. C.C.P. arts. 925(A)(5) and 927(A)(5). Express-Atlanta argued that it did not possess the requisite minimum contacts with Louisiana for a Louisiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it without offending traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Nautilus asserted that if Munson was unable to establish personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta then suit against it and Express-Atlanta, in solido, was impossible. Nautilus farther contended that Munson did not assert facts to demonstrate that an action against Nautilus alone could be maintained under Louisiana's direct action statute, La. R.S. 22:1269. Therefore, Express-Atlanta and Nautilus prayed that the court sustain their exceptions and dismiss them from this suit. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 919.

Express-Atlanta and Nautilus supported the exception of lack of personal jurisdiction with Munson's petitions and the affidavit of Shane Soldinger, a regional manager of “Express Container Services.” Soldinger pertinently attested that Express-Atlanta is a limited liability company authorized to do and doing business in Georgia, is domiciled in Georgia, and has never been authorized to do nor has it done business in Louisiana. The affidavit further provided that any business that Express-Atlanta may conduct occurs outside of Louisiana, that it does not contract to supply services or things in Louisiana, does not own immovable property in Louisiana, does not manufacture any products or component parts in Louisiana, and does not market its services to Louisiana residents or companies. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 919-20.

Munson opposed both exceptions, asserting that Louisiana has jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta pursuant to the long arm statute, La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(4), and the single business enterprise theory. Specifically, Munson maintained that Express-Atlanta and the Louisiana Entities operate under the name “Express Container Services” and form a single business enterprise. Munson argued that Express-Atlanta caused injury in Louisiana by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state, and that “Express Container Services” regularly does or solicits business in this state. Thus, personal jurisdiction over the Louisiana Entities should be imputed to Express-Atlanta. Next, Munson argued that Nautilus could still be liable under the direct action statute even if Express-Atlanta was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 920.

Munson supported his opposition with Express-Atlanta's discovery responses, which established that Express-Atlanta and the Louisiana Entities offer some of the same services or engage in similar business activities, use the same logo, flyers, and marketing and accounting departments. Munson also included a printout of Express Container Services locations, which listed Express-Atlanta and the Louisiana Entities. The corporate filings of Express-Atlanta and the Louisiana Entities were also attached and demonstrated that Express-Atlanta's principal office and Express Container Services of Iberville's mailing address were similar and located in New Jersey. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 920.

Munson also attached Express-Atlanta's corporate deposition. Soldinger, who testified as Express-Atlanta's corporate representative, testified that all Express entities (i.e., those operating as “Express Container Services”) are owned by one individual and share a single general manager. There are two regional managers - Soldinger, who oversees locations in the East, and another, who oversees the locations in the Gulf, including the Louisiana Entities. All Express entities utilize the same human resources director, safety coordinator, and salesperson. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 920.

Soldinger explained that the Express entities utilize a hybrid accounting system. Each entity generates its own bills and sends them to customers, who then remit payment to a single accounting office for disbursement into each entity's respective bank account. Soldinger testified that each Express entity has its own administrative office and employees and emphasized that, despite the shared accounting office, each business has its own bank account, operates at a profit, and does not fund any of the other or new locations. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 920-21.

The trial on these exceptions took place in May 2024. The trial court admitted both parties’ exhibits into evidence. See La. C.C.P. arts. 930 and 931. Following party arguments, the trial court sustained Express-Atlanta's exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Express-Atlanta was a Georgia entity that had abided by proper corporate formalities and had not engaged with Louisiana in such a way as to confer personal jurisdiction to Louisiana courts. The trial court further denied Munson leave to amend his petition as to Express-Atlanta, because the petition was amended following jurisdictional discovery to assert allegations demonstrating personal jurisdiction. The trial court sustained Nautilus's exception of no cause of action, but allowed Munson leave to amend his petition to state a cause of action against Nautilus. See La. C.C.P. art. 934. This ruling was memorialized in a judgment signed on June 20, 2024.¹ See Munson, 417 So.3d at 921.

Munson appealed, urging the trial court erred by sustaining Express-Atlanta's exception of lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissing Express-Atlanta with prejudice. In the first opinion, this court discussed the application of the single business enterprise theory in relation to the long arm statute and personal jurisdiction. After de novo review, this court found that Louisiana courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's judgment. Munson, 417 So.3d at 924-25.

Express-Atlanta then applied for a writ of certiorari, which the supreme court granted. After review, the supreme court reversed this court's opinion and remanded the matter for consideration under the manifest error standard of review. Munson, 425 So.3d at 101. The supreme court further instructed that, if the single business enterprise theory was inapplicable, this court should consider whether a Louisiana court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta pursuant to the long arm statute.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

A two-part test is applied to determine whether a court may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. The plaintiff has the initial burden under the “minimum contacts” analysis to show a single act or actions by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Ruckstuhl v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 98-1126 (La. 4/13/99), 731 So.2d 881, 885, cert. denied, Hollingsworth & Cose Co. v. Ruckstuhl, 528 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 526, 145 L.Ed.2d 407 (1999). See International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (holding that personal jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident who has “certain minimum contacts [with the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (finding the assertion of personal jurisdiction comported with notions of fair play and substantial justice where nonresident had purposefully directed his activities toward the forum state and failed to show other conditions that would render the assertion of jurisdiction unreasonable).²

Once the plaintiff meets his burden of proving minimum contacts, a presumption of reasonableness of jurisdiction arises. The burden then shifts to the opposing party to overcome the presumption by proving the assertion of jurisdiction would be unreasonable in light of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Ruckstuhl, 731 So.2d at 885-86.

Federal courts have consistently acknowledged that it is compatible with due process for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporation that would not ordinarily be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court when the corporation is an alter ego or successor of a corporation that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court. Patin v. Thoroughbred Power Boats Inc., 294 F.3d 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2002). Because the two corporations are treated as the same entity, the jurisdictional contacts of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis. See Patin, 294 F.3d at 653.

This same imputation of minimum contacts of one company to another based on various veil piercing theories has likewise been used in analyzing whether jurisdictional contacts of one company may be imputed to another through the single business enterprise theory. See Bona Fide Demolition and Recovery, LLC v. Crosby Construction Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 690 F.Supp.2d 435, 443 (E.D. La. 2010). Relying on the single business enterprise theory, Munson seeks to impute the Louisiana Entities’ contacts with this state to Express-Atlanta to satisfy the “minimum contacts” requirement.

SINGLE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE THEORY

Under the single business enterprise theory, the legal fiction of a distinct corporate entity is disregarded when a corporation is so organized and controlled as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation. Hill International, Inc. v. JTS Realty Corporation, 2021-0157 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/20/22), 370 So.3d 16, 30. The single business enterprise theory permits multiple companies to be treated as a single entity (but still an entity separate from its human owners) as if all of the different companies within an affiliated group had been organized as one, all-encompassing corporation or limited liability company. Hill International, 370 So.3d at 30.

An illustrative, non-exhaustive list of eighteen factors has been used to determine whether a group of entities constitute a single business enterprise.³ See Green v. Champion Ins. Co., 577 So.2d 249, 257 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 580 So.2d 668 (La. 1991). Known as “the Green factors,” this list considers:

1. Corporations with identity or substantial identity of ownership, i.e., ownership of sufficient stock to give actual working control;

2. Common directors or officers;

3. Unified administrative control of corporations whose business functions are similar or supplementary;

4. Directors and officers of one corporation act independently in the interest of that corporation;

5. Corporation financing another corporation;

6. Inadequate capitalization;

7. Corporation causing the incorporation of another affiliated corporation;

8. Corporation paying the salaries and other expenses or losses of another corporation;

9. Receiving no business other than that given to it by its affiliated corporations;

10. Corporation using the property of another corporation as its own;

11. Noncompliance with corporate formalities;

12. Common employees;

13. Services rendered by the employees of one corporation on behalf of another corporation;

14. Common offices;

15. Centralized accounting;

16. Undocumented transfers of funds between corporations;

17. Unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations; and

18. Excessive fragmentation of a single enterprise into separate corporations.

No one factor is dispositive of the single business enterprise determination; instead, the totality of the circumstances should be considered in evaluating the existence of a single business enterprise. Green, 577 So.2d at 257-58.

Courts have recognized that Green's eighteen-factor test is difficult to apply, because it provides no guidance as to the weight to be given any of the factors. Further, some of the factors are consistent with legitimate, efficient business operations, such as common control; common employees, officers, and directors; shared offices; and some form of centralized accounting. Bona Fide Demolition & Recovery, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 445. Finally, Louisiana has a strong policy in favor of recognizing corporate separateness. Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., 2003-0492 (La. 5/25/04), 922 So.2d 1113, 1128.

A trial court's factual findings underlying its ruling on an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction are reviewed under the manifest error standard. Munson, 425 So.3d at 101; Hayes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 54,017 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/21), 326 So.3d 324, 330, writ denied, 2021-01387 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So.3d 83. To reverse a trial court's factual finding, a court of appeal must find there is no reasonable factual basis in the record to support the finding, such that it is “clearly wrong.” State v. OptumRx, Inc., 2025-00911 (La. 11/12/25), 422 So.3d 754, 757. The appellate court must not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual findings because it would have decided the case differently. Jones v. Market Basket Stores, Inc., 2022-00841 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 452, 463.

After review, we find no manifest error in the trial court's factual determination that Express-Atlanta and the Louisiana Entities are not part of a single business enterprise. Although the trial court did not expressly assign weight to one or more Green factors, a reasonable factual basis exists in the record to support the trial court's conclusion. See OptumRx, Inc., 422 So.3d at 757. For instance, the trial court may have reasonably concluded that utilizing a central accounting office, sharing employees, and assigning two regional managers to oversee all locations are indications of legitimate, efficient business operations among the Express entities. Thus, while these facts appear to “satisfy” several Green factors, the trial court may have assigned less weight to these considerations, choosing instead to give more weight to the fact that each entity is independently profitable and has its own employees, bank account, profits, and losses. Because no single business enterprise exists, the Louisiana Entities’ contacts with this state may not be imputed to Express-Atlanta for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION VIA LONG ARM STATUTE

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3201 governs personal jurisdiction over nonresidents and pertinently provides:

A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident:

****

(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.

****

B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.

Munson asserts that, even if Express-Atlanta is viewed as a nonresident entity, separate and distinct from the Louisiana Entities, La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(4) applies and permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta. We disagree. Although Express-Atlanta allegedly caused injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state, the evidence establishes that it does not regularly do or solicit business in this state, nor does it engage in any other persistent course of conduct in this state. Finally, no evidence was presented to show that Express-Atlanta derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. Therefore, La. R.S. 13:3201(A) does not provide a basis for a Louisiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta.

For these reasons, La. R.S. 13:3201(B) likewise does not apply. Munson offered no evidence to satisfy his burden of showing a single act or actions by which Express-Atlanta purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Louisiana, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 3 at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and Kel-Sea Adventures LLC v. Contender Boats, Inc., 2024-0208 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 799, 805 (recognizing the limits of La. R.S. 13:3201(B) and constructional due process are coextensive).

Thus, we find no basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta.

NAUTILUS

As noted, the trial court's June 20, 2024 judgment granted Munson thirty days to amend his petition to remove the grounds of the objection raised in Nautilus's exception of no cause of action. On June 26, 2024, Munson filed his second supplemental and amending petition, asserting additional allegations against Nautilus. In response, Nautilus filed a peremptory exception of no right of action, asserting that Munson had no right of action under the direct action statute, La. R.S. 22:1269. See La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6). Munson opposed, and the trial court orally denied the exception in December 2024 and confirmed its ruling in a judgment signed on January 9, 2025.

Nautilus then filed a writ application with this court, seeking reversal of the January 9, 2025 judgment.⁴ The writ was referred to this appeal panel and was denied in this court's original opinion. See Munson, 417 So.3d at 925.

Suit Was “Brought” Against the Insurer and Insured

Nautilus first argues that Munson's second supplemental and amended petition named only Nautilus, not Express-Atlanta; therefore, suit was not “brought” against the insured and insurer jointly and in solido as required by La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1). Consequently, Nautilus maintains Munson was required to satisfy one of the exceptions set forth in La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a) through (f).

Prior to its amendment, effective August 1, 2024, La. R.S. 22:1269 granted a plaintiff a procedural right to name an insurer as a party to litigation where a substantive cause of action against the insured already existed.⁵ In August 2023, when Munson named Nautilus and Express-Atlanta as defendants in his first supplemental and amending petition, La. R.S. 22:1269 pertinently stated:

* * * *

B. (1) The injured person․shall have a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido․; however, such action may be brought against the insurer alone only when at least one of the following applies:

(a) The insured has been adjudged bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction or when proceedings to adjudge an insured bankrupt have been commenced before a court of competent jurisdiction.

(b) The insured is insolvent.

(c) Service of citation or other process cannot be made on the insured.

(d) When the cause of action is for damages as a result of an offense or quasi-offense between children and their parents or between married persons.

(e) When the insurer is an uninsured motorist carrier.

(f) The insured is deceased.

Nautilus's argument is contrary to Soileau v. Smith True Value & Rental, 2012-1711 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So.3d 771, 778-79, wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an action is “brought” for purposes of La. R.S. 22:1269(B) when it is “initially filed” or “commenced.” If suit is brought against the insurer and insured jointly and in solido, the circumstances enumerated in La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a) through (f) are not implicated, regardless of whether the insured tortfeasor is thereafter dismissed. Following this precedent, as we must, we find Munson “brought” suit against Express-Atlanta and Nautilus by asserting claims against both parties in his first supplemental and amending petition and was not required to satisfy the circumstances enumerated in La. R.S. 22:1269(B)(1)(a) through (f). See Soileau, 144 So.3d at 778-79.

Substantive Cause of Action

Nautilus next argues that the trial court erred by implicitly finding that Munson has a substantive cause of action against Express-Atlanta even after sustaining its exception of lack of personal jurisdiction.

When the injured party's substantive cause of action against the original tortfeasor is extinguished, the procedural right of direct action against the insurer, which is purely remedial and ancillary to the cause, must fall by operation of law. See Williams v. SIF Consultants of Louisiana, Inc., 2012-419 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/7/12), 103 So.3d 1172, 1177, writ denied, 2012-2637 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 381; and Marsh Engineering Inc. v. Parker, 2004-0509 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/29/04), 883 So.2d 1119, 1127, writ denied, 2004-2669 (La. 1/28/05), 893 So.2d 73. However, Louisiana courts have recognized the direct action statute was not intended to give the insurer the right to plead defenses that are purely personal between the insured and claimant and in no way growing out of, or connected with, the accident or policy. Danzy, for Use and Benefit of Danzy v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 380 So.2d 1356, 1359 n.5 (La. 1980); and Marsh Engineering, Inc., 883 So.2d at 1127.

When identifying personal defenses, courts have distinguished a cause of action from a right of action. A personal defense bars a right of action where a cause of action would otherwise have existed. Descant v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 93-3098 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 246, 250; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 579 So.2d 1090, 1093 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 563 (La. 1991). Personal defenses are those that erect a procedural bar to asserting the cause of action but do not eliminate the underlying cause of action. Arthur v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 95-956 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1/22/97), 690 So.2d 86, 89, writ denied, 97-1031 (La. 5/30/97), 694 So.2d 252.

Express-Atlanta's successful defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is a procedural bar to Munson's ability to assert a cause of action against it. The cause of action is not eliminated or extinguished; it simply cannot be pursued against Express-Atlanta in a Louisiana court. See Arthur, 690 So.2d at 89;⁶ and Marsh Engineering Inc., 883 So.2d at 1127.⁷ Thus, we find that lack of personal jurisdiction is a personal defense available to Express-Atlanta.⁸ As such, Nautilus cannot assert the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta to bar Munson's right of direct action.⁹

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the June 20, 2024 judgment sustaining the declinatory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction in favor Express Container Services of Atlanta, LLC, and dismissing it from this suit is affirmed. We grant the writ application filed by Nautilus Insurance Company and, after review, deny relief. Plaintiffs, Michael Munson, individually and on behalf of his minor child Ethan Munson, and Kelly Munson, are cast with 50% of the costs of appeal, and Nautilus Insurance Company is likewise cast with 50% of the costs of appeal.

JUNE 20, 2024 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. WRIT APPLICATION GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED.

I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority's opinion affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining Express-Atlanta's peremptory exception of lack of personal jurisdiction. Despite each of the facilities maintaining separate bank accounts and local employees at each location, the totality of the circumstances weigh in favor of finding a single business enterprise. Based on the forgoing, I find Express Container Services availed itself of the laws and protections of this state by establishing the Louisiana Entities, which it runs as part of its tanker cleaning business; therefore, the courts of this state likewise have personal jurisdiction over Express-Atlanta. Thus, I find no reasonable factual basis exists in the record for the trial court's judgment. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Munson purported to appeal the entirety of the June 20, 2024 judgment, a ruling that sustains a peremptory exception and allows a period of time for an amendment of the petition is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory judgment. Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. Bayou Bridge Pipeline, LLC, 2018-0417 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/22/19), 272 So.3d 567, 570. Additionally, Munson did not assign error to the trial court's ruling as to Nautilus. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(A)(5), (9). Finally, we review Nautilus's writ application seeking reversal of the denial of its exception of no right of action, urged in response to Munson's second supplemental and amending petition, which was filed after he was given the opportunity to amend. For these reasons, we do not consider the trial court's ruling on Nautilus's exception of no cause of action set forth in the June 20, 2024 judgment.

2.   Where the defendant deliberately engaged in significant activities within a state or has created continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there. Because his activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require the defendant to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. de Reyes v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd., 586 So.2d 103, 106 (La. 1991).

3.   This case arose before the enactment of La. R.S. 12:1705, which went into effect on August 1, 2024, and applies prospectively only. See Munson, 425 So.3d at 101 n.1.

4.   The de novo standard of review applies to the trial court's ruling on an exception of no right of action, which presents a question of law. The function of an exception of no right of action is a determination of whether plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the petition. Finley v. Claybourn, 2023-0081 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/23), 375 So.3d 998, 1001 n.5.

5.   This court has held that the 2024 amendment to La. R.S. 22:1269 is procedural and applies retroactively, unless doing so would disturb a litigant's vested rights. Avrie as Next Friend of A.A. v. Ascot Specialty Ins., 2025-1029 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/20/26), ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (2026 WL 1429934, *4-5). Munson's procedural right of action against Nautilus became operative when the remedy served by the direct action statute was timely invoked, i.e., when Munson filed the second supplemental and amending petition in August 2023. Because this occurred before the amendment removed the procedural right of action against an insurer, Munson had a vested right of action against Nautilus, which cannot be disturbed. See Farque v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 2025-22 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/18/25), 416 So.3d 796, 806, writ denied, 2025-00912 (La. 11/5/25), 420 So.3d 33.

6.   In Arthur, 690 So.2d at 89, the plaintiffs’ underlying cause of action against the insured was eliminated; therefore, the insurer was entitled to assert the defense of res judicata.

7.   The court in Marsh Engineering, Inc., 883 So.2d at 1127, held that the insurer could assert the defense of no cause of action based on peremption where the plaintiff's claims against the insured were perempted. A peremptive statute totally destroys the previously existing right with the result that, upon expiration of the prescribed period, a cause of action or substantive right no longer exists to be enforced.

8.   The parties do not cite a case addressing whether lack of personal jurisdiction over the insured is a personal defense unavailable to the insurer, and we have found none.

9.   There is no assertion that Louisiana lacks personal jurisdiction over Nautilus.

PENZATO, J.

Fields, J. Dissents with reasons.