STATE v. FORD (2026)

A grand jury for the parish of East Baton Rouge indicted the defendant, Thomas Earl Ford, for the following offenses:

Count 1: First degree rape of A.J.,1 a juvenile under the age of 13, between the dates of June 22, 2013 - June 21, 2017, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42;

Count 2: Molestation of A.J., a juvenile over the age of 13 but under the age of 17, between the dates of June 22, 2017 - April 4, 2020, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2;

Count 3: Sexual battery upon A.J., a juvenile under the age of 13, between the dates of January 1, 2013 - June 21, 2017, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1;

Count 4: Sexual battery upon AL.J., a juvenile under the age of 13, between the dates of January 1, 2011 - November 20, 2015, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1;

Count 5: Sexual battery upon D.S., a juvenile under the age of 13, between the dates of January 1, 2011 - August 21, 2015, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1;

Count 6: Indecent behavior with A.J., a juvenile under the age of 17, between the dates of January 1, 2013 - April 4, 2020, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81;

Count 7: Indecent behavior with AL.J., a juvenile under the age of 17, between the dates of January 1, 2011 - November 20, 2019, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81; and

Count 8: Indecent behavior with D.S., a juvenile under the age of 17, between the dates of January 1, 2011 - August 21, 2019, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.

The defendant entered a plea of not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on counts one through seven. The defendant was found not guilty on count eight.

The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one; ten years imprisonment at hard labor on count two; ninety-nine years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count three; ninety-nine years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count four; ninety-nine years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count five; seven years imprisonment at hard labor on count six; and seven years imprisonment at hard labor on count seven, with the sentences on all counts to run consecutively to each other.

The defendant now appeals, assigning as error insufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and excessive sentence.² For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On April 5, 2020, Officer Chadrick Bell of the Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD) was dispatched to the defendant's home for a sexual offense complaint. A.J. reported the defendant, her mother's live-in boyfriend, had been sexually abusing her for a number of years. Detective Charles Ruble with the BRPD Special Victims Unit was assigned to investigate the matter and learned there were two additional victims, AL.J., A.J.’s older sister, and D.S., A.J.’s cousin. All three victims were interviewed at the Baton Rouge Children's Advocacy Center (CAC). Following the forensic interviews, Detective Ruble issued an arrest warrant for the defendant, who was arrested in December 2020.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove the age of the victims at the time of the offenses, and therefore the first degree rape charge and the sexual battery charges were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460.

Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person's lawful consent. La. R.S. 14:41(A). First degree rape is a rape committed where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because the victim is under the age of thirteen years old. Lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense. La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4).³

Relevant hereto, sexual battery is the intentional touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the offender using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the offender, or the touching of the anus or genitals of the offender by the victim using any instrumentality or any part of the body of the victim, when the victim has not yet attained thirteen years of age and is at least three years younger than the offender. La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2).⁴

It is well-settled that, if found credible, the testimony of a victim of a sex offense alone is sufficient to establish the elements of the offense, even when the State does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Figueroa, 2024-0739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/23/25), 417 So.3d 795, 799, writ denied, 2025-00809 (La. 12/9/25), 422 So.3d 301. Likewise, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005).

N.J. testified she is D.S.’s mother. Her sister, K.J.,⁵ was the mother of A.J. and AL.J. In 2011, N.J. and K.J. lived at the same apartment complex in Baker, Louisiana. A.J. and AL.J. lived with K.J., as did the defendant. N.J. testified that in 2011, D.S. was eight or nine years old. AL.J. was the same age as D.S., and A.J. was a year or two younger than D.S. and AL.J. According to N.J., the defendant watched A.J. and AL.J. at K.J.’s apartment, and D.S. spent time at the apartment when the defendant was present. N.J. testified that the defendant moved K.J. out of Baker to Baton Rouge because he did not want N.J.’s family close with K.J.’s family anymore. N.J. testified that the years were hazy but she thought K.J. and her family moved to Baton Rouge in “[e]ither 2010, 2011 or something.”

According to N.J., in early 2020, while K.J. and the defendant were living in Baton Rouge, N.J. became concerned about A.J. N.J. asked AL.J. if the defendant had ever touched her or A.J., and AL.J. told N.J. that something had happened and explained everything to N.J. N.J. testified that following the disclosure, she went to the defendant's home with AL.J. and D.S. to get A.J. out of the home. While they were in the car, D.S. confirmed that the defendant had sexually abused AL.J. and A.J. and disclosed that he had also been sexually abused by the defendant. According to N.J., D.S. told her it had “been happening since Baker.” N.J. testified that when A.J. would not come out of the house, N.J. returned home and called 911.

Officer Bell testified he was dispatched to the defendant's home for a sexual offense complaint on April 5, 2020, and, upon arriving at the scene, spoke with A.J. and K.J. on the front porch. Officer Bell testified that A.J. was not initially forthcoming with information, but after talking to family members at the scene, she provided Officer Bell with information about the defendant. Officer Bell testified that based upon the information A.J. provided, he assisted A.J. and K.J. in retrieving their belongings so they could leave the home. According to Officer Bell, he came into contact with the defendant inside the home but did not arrest him at that time because Officer Bell wanted detectives to interview the defendant first. Officer Bell testified he prepared a detailed report about the events of that night, obtained contact information on the defendant, and forwarded the information to the Special Victims Unit.

Detective Ruble with the BRPD Special Victims Unit testified he was assigned to investigate the defendant's case and reviewed the initial offense report. After learning there were two additional victims, Detective Ruble scheduled interviews for the three victims at the CAC. Detective Ruble testified that after observing the CAC interviews, he learned the abuse occurred in several locations, and over a period of time, so he began to construct a timeline. He contacted the family and asked that A.J. come to his office for an interview to provide additional information to establish the location and time period of the alleged abuse. According to Detective Ruble, during that interview, A.J. provided additional information that led to an elevated charge against the defendant. Following the interview with A.J., Detective Ruble issued an arrest warrant for the defendant.

Janet Daigle was a forensic interviewer at the CAC and conducted the 2020 interviews of A.J., AL.J., and D.S.⁶ Ms. Daigle testified that each victim had a consistent, independent recollection of the abuse. According to Ms. Daigle, they all related that the abuse began when they were seven to nine years old, at an apartment, in the care of the defendant, and it was always the same group of victims. She testified the victims all related that the abuse began with the defendant showing them pornography on a tablet before escalating with a progression of abusive behavior that they all participated in and witnessed. Ms. Daigle testified A.J. was fifteen years old at the time of the interview, and D.S. and AL.J. were seventeen years old.

A.J. testified at trial that she was born on June 22, 2004. She testified she met the defendant in 2011 when she was seven years old and living in Baker. According to A.J., the defendant began vigorously rubbing his penis against her body and inappropriately touching her when she was nine years old, and the touching continued “almost every day” until she was fifteen years old. She testified the touching occurred, regardless of the time of day, when the other people in the house were not aware of what he was doing or were asleep, and at an abandoned house in the neighborhood. A.J. also testified that starting when she was around nine or ten years old and the family had moved to Baton Rouge, the defendant began forcing her to perform oral sex on him until he ejaculated. She confirmed the oral sex would happen regularly from the time she was nine years old until she was fifteen years old.

A.J. testified that she still had “visions of the things that happened to [her]” and had nightmares “almost every day.” She testified there were days she thought of committing suicide, and that she felt she would never escape from the years of trauma caused by the abuse, stating it would “forever damage [her].”

AL.J. testified that she was born on November 21, 2002. AL.J. testified the defendant, who was her mother's boyfriend, started abusing her when the family lived in Baker, when she was around nine years old, and continued until she was fifteen or sixteen years old. According to AL.J., the first time the defendant touched her she was nine years old; the defendant touched her vagina, and she kicked him. She further testified that while the families were living in Baker, the defendant would ask the kids (AL.J., A.J., and D.S.) to touch each other. AL.J. testified that when she was ten or eleven years old and living in Baker but starting to move to Baton Rouge, the defendant exposed his penis to the children and made them look at it. She testified that the defendant began touching her breasts under her clothes when she was around twelve or thirteen years old.

D.S. testified he was born on August 22, 2002. According to D.S., the defendant, who was dating his aunt, began sexually abusing him when he was eight or nine years old. He testified that when he was nine years old, the defendant made him, AL.J., and A.J. watch the defendant masturbate to pornographic videos. D.S. testified that when he and AL.J. were nine years old, the defendant made D.S. lick AL.J.’s breasts while the defendant watched. D.S. testified about an incident in his aunt's bedroom when the defendant pushed him forward onto the bed and mimicked having anal sex with him. According to D.S., his cousins were in the bedroom and all of them were in their underwear. D.S. testified that the abuse lasted from when he was eight years old until he was eleven years old and K.J.’s family moved from Baker.

The defendant contends the State failed to prove the dates of the incidents of abuse and therefore the evidence was insufficient to prove the age of the victims at the time of each offense. However, in their testimony at trial, each of the victims testified as to their ages at the times of the sexual abuse. A.J. testified the defendant began touching her genitals with his penis when she was nine years old and began forcing her to perform oral sex on him when she was nine or ten years old. AL.J. testified the defendant touched her genitals when she was nine years old. D.S. testified the defendant touched his anus using the defendant's genitals when D.S. was between eight and eleven years old. As noted above, the testimony of victims of a sex crime alone is sufficient to establish the elements of the offense. See Figueroa, 417 So.3d at 799.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are convinced a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that A.J. was under the age of thirteen when the defendant committed first degree rape upon her and all three victims were under the age of thirteen at the time the defendant committed sexual battery upon them.

Accordingly, we find this assignment of error meritless.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel as there was no investigation and no theory of the case for argument or cross-examination. The defendant asserts he was represented by six different attorneys over three years, with trial counsel enrolling mere months before trial. Further, he argues the record is unclear how many, if any, cause challenges were urged by the defense, and there could be no review of denied cause challenges because only eleven peremptory challenges were used.⁷ The defendant also argues counsel failed to follow-up on his pro se Brady motion.⁸ The defendant argues this court should remand for a factual hearing regarding these issues rather than requiring post-conviction litigation.

Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is relegated to post-conviction proceedings, where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted, unless the record permits definitive resolution on appeal. State v. Miller, 99-0192 (La. 9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 411, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1196, 149 L.Ed.2d 111 (2001); State v. Lafont, 2023-0086 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/23), 375 So.3d 1002, 1012. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the two-prong test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.E.2d 674 (1984). In order to prove his trial attorney was ineffective, the defendant must first show the attorney's performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious he was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. State v. McMillan, 2009-2094 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/1/10), 43 So.3d 297, 302, writ denied, 2010-1779 (La. 2/4/11), 57 So.3d 309. The second prong of the test requires the defendant to prove the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This element requires a showing that the errors were so serious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial; the defendant must prove actual prejudice before relief will be granted. Id.

Under our adversary system, once a defendant has assistance of counsel, the vast array of trial decisions, both strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial, rests with an accused and his attorney. Lafont, 375 So.3d at 1012. The fact that a particular strategy is unsuccessful does not establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

In this case, the defendant has failed to provide evidence that his representation by different attorneys or the enrollment of trial counsel months before trial prejudiced him. His remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel center on matters of trial strategy, which cannot be reviewed on appeal. See Lafont, 375 So.3d at 1012.

Accordingly, the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit and/or is not subject to appellate review.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues his consecutive sentences amounting to over 300 years plus life are unreasonable and constitutionally excessive.⁹

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than a needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. State v. Livous, 2018-0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1036, 1044, writ denied, 2018-1788 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1130. The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Fruge, 2014-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 579, 584. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Odomes, 2023-1363 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/21/25), 2025 WL 3248851, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2025-01583 (La. 4/28/26), 430 So.3d 1083, reconsideration denied, 2025-01583 (La. 6/25/26), 434 So.3d 563.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 207, 211, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 410. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Id. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even when there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. State v. Harris, 2022-1190 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 447, 451.

Moreover, there is no need for the trial court to justify a sentence under Article 894.1 when it is legally required to impose that sentence. State v. Glaze, 2024-0329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/24/25), 2025 WL 1189445, *14 (unpublished), writ denied, 2025-00968 (La. 11/25/25), 421 So.3d 532. As such, any failure to articulate reasons as set forth in Article 894.1 when imposing a mandatory life sentence is not an error; articulating such reasons or factors would be an exercise in futility since the court has no discretion. Id. Mandatory sentences have been repeatedly upheld as constitutional and consistent with the federal and state constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel, unusual, or excessive punishment. State v. Dickerson, 2016-1336 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 642, writ denied, 2017-1147 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 1062. To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, which means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. Id., citing State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676.

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. Other sentences of imprisonment shall be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that some or all of them be served concurrently. La. Code Crim. P. art. 883.

On count one, first degree rape of a victim under the age of 13, the defendant was subjected to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:42(D)(2)(b). On count two, molestation of a victim over the age of 13 but under the age of 17, the defendant was subjected to a sentence of a fine not to exceed $5,000.00, or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not less than five nor more than 10 years, or both. La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(1). On counts three, four, and five, sexual battery on a victim under the age of 13, the defendant was subjected to a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than 25 years nor more than 99 years, with at least 25 years of the sentence imposed to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2). On counts six and seven, indecent behavior with juveniles, the defendant was subjected to a sentence of a fine not to exceed $5,000.00, or imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for not more than seven years, or both. La. R.S. 14:81(H)(1). Thus, the defendant received the mandatory sentence on count one, and maximum term sentences on counts two through seven, with ail sentences to be served consecutively.

The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI) at the defendant's request. The PSI shows that the defendant pled guilty to cruelty to juveniles and was on probation for that offense at the time he began abusing the victims in this case.

Prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court indicated it reviewed the sentencing guidelines, and commented as follows:

In listening to the testimony at trial I found that the allegations and the evidence [were] serious, the defendant perpetrated these offenses on vulnerable and young children. He would use his position and status to facilitate the offense. Specifically, he would take things away when sexual contact was refused, and would further give the things back then the ․ contact was resumed. Of course, the offenses involved multiple incidents and multiple victims.

The trial court then imposed the mandatory life sentence and the maximum sentences on the remaining counts. The trial court found that “given the nature and term of the incidents, as far as the time period, ․ the sentences are most justly to be run consecutively.”

The instant case involved three children who were the victims of numerous, separate crimes, that occurred on different dates, over a significant period of time. Thus, the sentences were properly ordered to be served consecutively under La. Code Crim. P. art. 883. See Glaze, 2025 WL 1189445 at * 15. Further, the defendant failed to show that he is exceptional such that a deviation from the mandatory minimum life sentence was warranted in this case. The instant crimes fall within the category of the most serious violations of the described offenses, and defendant poses an unusual risk to the safety of the public as reflected by the nature of the offenses for which he was convicted. The record clearly supports the trial court's imposition of the maximum sentences allowed by law for his convictions.

Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects that after the trial court sentenced the defendant, it advised the defendant, “you have two years to apply for post-conviction relief.” The prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief is two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A). Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications that seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. State v. Butler, 2025-0435 (La. App. 1st Cir. 8/3/26), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2224833. *9.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use the victims’ initials and their relatives’ initials to protect their identity. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

2.   In addition to his counseled brief, the defendant filed a pro se brief and a supplemental pro se brief wherein he argued a variety of issues, including the insufficiency of the grand jury indictment, the lack of a preliminary examination, issues regarding discovery jury bias, a non-unanimous jury verdict, and that he was shown bias and prejudice in the case. The defendant's pro se briefs did not contain any assignments of error, as required by La. Code Crim. P. art. 920 and Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4. Nevertheless, we reviewed the pro se briefs and found no merit to any of the arguments made therein.

3.   Effective August 1, 2015, the crime of “aggravated rape” was renamed “first degree rape.” 2015 La. Acts No. 256, § 1. Any reference to the crime of aggravated rape is the same as a reference to the crime of first degree rape. La. R.S. 14:42(E).

4.   We note the offenses in this case, depending on the victim, occurred between 2011-2017. La. R.S. 14:43.1 has been amended twice during this time period, but the amendments are not relevant based on the facts of this case.

5.   K.J. died on November 12, 2023, prior to the trial.

6.   The CAC interviews of A.J., AL.J., and D.S. were introduced into evidence and played for the jury.

7.   The record reflects that the defense made multiple cause challenges, and eleven defense challenges for cause were granted.

8.   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

9.   The defendant failed to orally move for reconsideration of his sentence at the time of sentencing, nor did he timely file a written motion to reconsider the sentence as required by La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1. Therefore, we review the defendant's sentence for bare constitutional excessiveness. See State v. Odomes, 2025-00125 (La. 6/25/25), 412 So.3d 210.

PENZATO, J.