STATE v. DOUGLAS III (2026)

In a trial, potential jurors are faced with multiple real-life issues if they are selected to serve on a jury, not the least of which is childcare. Though certainly impactful, is the issue of childcare sufficient to warrant an exclusion from a jury for cause under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure? That is the question posed to this Court by the defendant, James Douglas, III, whose sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in allowing a State's challenge for cause and excused a juror because of issues with childcare.

A grand jury indicted the defendant with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, the jury convicted him as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's combined motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal or new trial and sentenced him to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals.

For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On February 12, 2022, officers with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a shooting at the Super 8 motel on Reiger Road in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Upon arrival, officers located Charlton Henry suffering from two gunshot wounds, which ultimately killed him. Based on eyewitness statements and surveillance footage, officers arrested and charged Douglas with Henry's murder. Douglas pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, the jury convicted him as charged. He was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Douglas now appeals.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In his sole assignment of error, Douglas argues the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause against a potential juror. As the State eventually exhausted its peremptory challenges, the defendant contends this ruling essentially granted the State more peremptory challenges than allowed by law.

For trials of offenses punishable by imprisonment at hard labor, such as herein, the defendant and the State shall each have twelve peremptory challenges. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 799; La. R.S. 14:30.1. The record reflects the State used all twelve of its peremptory challenges allowed by law. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 799. Accordingly, we review whether the trial court erroneously granted the State's challenge for cause. Patrick August, the potential juror at issue, was called in the last panel of prospective jurors. When questioned, August advised he is a single father to three children. The following colloquy then occurred between August and the trial court:

Q. Are you going to have any problems with any day care this week if you're selected?

A. Possibly.

Q. Possibly. Okay. So -- Okay --

A. I have joint custody.

Q. So, you have -- you're in the rotation this week? So when would the latest time that you would need to be in court if you were to be selected?

A. Three o'clock.

Q. Three o'clock in the afternoon?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do on yesterday when we stayed here until late?

A. She was in after-school after-care.

The trial court then inquired whether August or anyone close to him had ever been the victim of a crime. August disclosed a police officer murdered his best friend approximately eight years prior in Baton Rouge. When August stated the officer was never charged with a crime, the trial court asked whether he had any negative feelings towards law enforcement as a result. August responded: “I don't think so, no, ma'am.” The trial court then asked if there was any reason he could not be fair and impartial, and August replied: “No, ma'am.”

The State later questioned the potential jurors about the State's standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt. August agreed with another juror's statement that it was not the defendant's job to defend himself but, rather, the State's job to convince the jury the defendant committed a crime. Later, August confirmed he would not hold the State to a higher standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, when defense counsel asked whether August had a problem with the presumption of innocence, August responded he did not.

The State subsequently challenged August for cause on two grounds. First, it challenged August on the basis he might have potential childcare issues if selected, causing him not to be fair and impartial and “listen like he needs to.” Second, it challenged August based on his statement that he did not think he would have negative feelings towards law enforcement. The trial court granted the State's challenge for cause and excused August based on his explained “issues with his childcare assistance[,]” stating it has previously “allowed everyone who has always had a day care issue if they can't find an alternative [because] that means kids might be sitting at a school.” The defendant noted his objection.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797(2) does not require a prospective juror to state with absolute certainty that he/she cannot be impartial in order to be removed for cause. State v. Dotson, 2016-0473 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So. 3d 34, 45. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a challenge for cause because it “has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questions by the parties’ attorneys.” State v. Lee, 1993-2810 (La. 05/23/94), 637 So. 2d 102, 108. “Such expressions and intonations are not readily apparent at the appellate level where review is based on a cold record.” Id.

A reviewing court should only reverse such ruling where it appears, upon review of the voir dire examination as a whole, the trial court's exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, thereby prejudicing the defendant. See State v. Dorsey, 2010-0216 (La. 09/07/11), 74 So. 3d 603, 625, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 930, 132 S.Ct. 1859, 182 L.Ed.2d 658 (2012). Further, the trial court has discretion when determining what constitutes undue hardship or extreme inconvenience for a prospective juror.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 783(B) states:

If jury service, whether criminal or civil, would result in undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, the district court may excuse a person from such service either prior to or after his selection for the general venire, jury pool, or jury wheel. The court may take such action on its own initiative or on recommendation of an official or employee designated by the court.

In the instant case, we find the trial court reasonably concluded August might be unable to concentrate during the trial due to childcare issues or have to leave early, both of which might impede the trial process and prejudice the defendant. In State v. Mitchell, 2017-0431 (La. App. 1st Cir. 09/21/17), 232 So. 3d 60, 67-68, writ denied, 2017-1928 (La. 06/15/18), 257 So. 3d 686, this court noted a seated juror's lack of childcare during trial was a valid hardship that could prevent her from appearing at court the following day. August was a prospective juror, not a seated juror, nonetheless the same logic applies. It was within the trial court's discretion to find August's potential childcare issues to be a hardship that could impair his ability to concentrate and, therefore, be fair and impartial.¹ See also State v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2d Cir. 02/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, 695, writ denied, 2009-0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913, cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1013, 130 S.Ct. 3472, 177 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2010) (“It is possible that a juror's concern over work or home life is so great that the juror's ability to be fair and impartial is called into question.”).

Moreover, the trial court had the benefit of observing August's demeanor and hearing his responses first-hand and was in a better position to determine whether August would be fair and impartial. See Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 625. After a review of the entire voir dire proceedings and considering the trial court's vast discretion, we find the trial court was well within its discretion to excuse August. Accordingly, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the State's challenge for cause against August. This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERRORS

This court routinely conducts a review for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2). On review, we have found two patent sentencing errors.

In this case, the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant immediately after denying his combined motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal or new trial. If a defendant files a motion for new trial, the trial court shall not impose a sentence until at least twenty-four hours after such motion is overruled. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 873 ² . While a defendant may expressly waive the delay, “[a]n implicit waiver ․ runs afoul of the plain language of [Article] 873[.]” See State v. Kisack, 2016-0797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So. 3d 1201, 1205 (per curiam), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175, 200 L.Ed.2d 322 (2018). Herein, the trial court failed to observe the mandatory twenty-four-hour delay between the motion ruling and sentencing, and the defendant did not expressly waive such delay. Therefore, the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant immediately after denying his motion for new trial.³

A trial court's failure to observe the twenty-four-hour delay provided in Article 873 is considered harmless error where the defendant could not show he suffered prejudice from the violation, and sentencing is not raised on appeal. See State v. Augustine, 555 So. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (La. 1990); State v. White, 404 So. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (La. 1981). The error may also be harmless if the defendant faces a mandatory life sentence. See State v. Tate, 2024-0344 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So. 3d 993, 1002. Herein, the trial court sentenced the defendant to the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder. The defendant did not file a motion to reconsider the sentence, challenge the sentence on appeal, or assign as error the trial court's failure to observe the twenty-four-hour delay in Article 873. Accordingly, any error in the trial court's failure to comply with Article 873 is harmless. See Tate, 405 So. 3d at 1002.

Additionally, after sentencing, the trial court informed the defendant he had “up to two years from the date that this conviction becomes final to seek any post-conviction relief.” A defendant generally has two years “after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final” to seek post-conviction relief. La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A). The prescriptive period does not initially begin to run until the judgment of conviction and sentence have both become final under Article 914 or Article 922. State v. Flat, 2024-0662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/07/25), 423 So. 3d 1240, 1255. Thus, the trial court failed to adequately advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction relief. However, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Id. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead advise the defendant that Article 930.8 generally provides no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of Articles 914 or 922. Id.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the defendant, James Douglas, III.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The United States Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that a State may have an important interest in assuring that those members of the family responsible for the care of children are available to do so.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370, 99 S.Ct. 664, 671, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). The same can be said about excusing jurors because of responsibilities relating to childcare. See United States v. Darden, 346 F.Supp.3d 1096, 1108 (M.D. Tenn. 11/02/18).

2.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873 was amended by 2026 La. Acts, No. 634, § 1, effective August 1, 2026. The mandatory twenty-four-hour delay between sentencing and the denial of a motion for new trial that was in effect at the time of defendant's sentencing is no longer in effect.

3.   A trial court, in this regard, is not required to observe the same delay after the denial of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Thus, the trial court's failure to apply Article 873’s twenty-four-hour sentencing delay is not a patent error. See State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 797 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 04/23/25), 406 So. 3d 1177.

BALFOUR, J.