STATE v. WALKER II (2026)

The defendant, Wilfred Walker, II, was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder (count one), in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (count two), in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:95.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty Of the responsive verdict of attempted manslaughter on count one, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:31, and guilty as charged on count two. The defendant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor on each count and ordered the sentences to be served concurrent to one another and consecutive to a prior sentence.¹ The defendant now appeals, alleging the trial court imposed constitutionally excessive sentences. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On May 23, 2021, officers with the Thibodaux Police Department were dispatched to AutoZone at 509 St. Mary Street to respond to a shooting. The responding officers determined the victim, Juamall Walker,² had been shot while in the parking lot. He was alive, but losing blood and his condition was rapidly deteriorating. Before he was airlifted to University Medical Center in New Orleans, Juamall identified his cousin “lil Will Walker” as the assailant. As a result of a single gunshot wound to the back, Juamall remained in a coma for about a month, had a kidney removed, underwent twenty-three surgeries, and was paralyzed for two years. The defendant's identity as the assailant was confirmed by an AutoZone receipt at the scene and video surveillance of the shooting. At the time of the shooting, the defendant was on probation for a 2020 conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. At trial, Juamall testified that the defendant shot him in the back after he punched defendant in the face during a heated argument. The defendant was thereafter convicted of attempted manslaughter and possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant asserts the trial court imposed constitutionally excessive sentences. The defendant acknowledges the trial court articulated reasons for the sentences but nonetheless argues that in light of the nature of the crimes and his personal background, the imposition of the maximum sentence on each count is excessive. The defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence, but generally objected to the sentences imposed “for appeal purposes.” As such, the defendant is relegated to a bare claim of excessiveness. See State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059, 1060, (La. 1993) (per curiam).

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. U.S. Const, amend. VIII; LSA-Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than a needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Livous, 2018-0016 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So.3d 1036, 1044, writ denied, 2018-1788 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1130. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks one's sense of justice. Id. The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Fruge, 2014-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 579, 584. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Grigsby, 2016-1213 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/17/17), 2017 WL 658783, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2017-0670 (La. 5/18/18), 242 So.3d 572, cert. denied, 586 U.S. 1162, 139 S.Ct. 1202, 203 L.Ed.2d 229 (2019).

At the time of the commission of the offenses, the penalty for attempted manslaughter was not more than twenty years imprisonment at hard labor.³ See LSA-R.S. 14:27(D)(3) and 14:31(B). The sentencing range for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies was imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. See LSA-R.S. 14:95.1(B). As such, the defendant received the maximum term of imprisonment on each count. Maximum sentences may be imposed only for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. State v. Parker, 2012-1550 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/26/13), 116 So.3d 744, 754, writ denied, 2013-1200 (La. 11/22/13), 126 So.3d 478.

Prior to imposing the sentences, the trial court considered whether there was an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant would commit another crime, whether the defendant was in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that could be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution, and whether a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the crimes. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1(A). The trial court detailed the defendant's criminal history, which included the following arrests and convictions: carnal knowledge in 2010; possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance less than two and a half pounds (marijuana) in 2020; and possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance more than twenty-eight grams (cocaine) in 2020. The trial court noted that none of his prior convictions were felony crimes of violence. Regarding the seriousness of the instant offenses, the trial court detailed the extensive injuries inflicted by the defendant on his cousin, Juamall. The trial court found the maximum sentence on each count was justified, reasoning as follows:

To give anything less than a sentence of imprisonment would deprecate from the seriousness of this crime. In looking at the list of factors to be considered, again, the factors are not exhaustive and not controlling, but I have considered the following factors: that the offender committed a crime using actual violence and in the commission of the offense; that the offense resulted in significant injury, in this case, to the victim; the offender in this case used a dangerous weapon, a firearm; the offender, the defendant, was on probation prior to this offense, and was prohibited from possessing a firearm based on that probated sentence.

I've also considered the fact that the evidence showed that the defendant left the scene. Well, did not leave the scene, but he left the area of the victim's car and then returned to that area with a weapon. The defendant shot the victim as he was running away or fleeing. And then finally, the Court's also considered that the defendant in this case was found in Massachusetts and had to be extradited back here for this -- to face this charge.

The defendant presented no evidence in mitigation. The record demonstrates the trial court adequately considered the defendant's criminal history and the nature of the offenses. When considering the circumstances of this case, we find the sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offenses committed, nor are they shocking to the sense of justice. The defendant showed a disregard for human life by firing his gun multiple times in a commercial area. The target of his gunfire—his cousin—was shot in the back and would have died if not for the efforts of emergency medical personnel. Further, the injuries inflicted on Juamall were permanent and life-altering. The gunshot entered near his spine, which Juamall testified resulted in long-term paralysis and physical therapy. Therefore, we find the trial court did not manifestly abuse its wide discretion in sentencing the defendant to the maximum sentence on each count, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

PATENT ERRORS

Pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found three patent errors.

First, the defendant's sentence for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (count two) is illegally lenient as the trial court failed to impose the mandatory fine. Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:95.1(B), whoever is convicted of possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies “shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.” We decline to amend the sentence as correction of the sentence would involve discretion as to the amount of fine imposed. Since the sentence is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant, and neither the State nor the defendant has raised this sentencing issue on appeal, we decline to correct this error. State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/19/24), 387 So.3d 641, 652, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865.

Second, although the court minutes and commitment order reflect the trial court imposed the sentence for attempted manslaughter without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, the transcript reveals the trial court did not restrict parole eligibility. In the event of a discrepancy between the transcript and the commitment order and/or minutes, the transcript prevails. See State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983); see also State v. Johnson, 2020-0679 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/28/21), 2021 WL 1662420, *6 n.4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2021-00802 (La. 10/5/21), 325 So.3d 381. Therefore, we instruct the trial court to amend the commitment order to delete the benefits restriction and to transmit a corrected commitment order to the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections. See State v. Ledezma, 2024-0258 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 988, 1001, writ denied, 2025-00114 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 574.

Finally, the transcript reflects after the trial court imposed the defendant's sentences, it inaccurately advised he had “two years from the date that this conviction becomes final to apply for post-conviction relief.” Though the transcript and the minutes state the trial court provided the defendant with a copy of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 setting forth the post-conviction relief prescriptive period, the record does not contain a copy. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentences imposed and is not grounds to reverse the sentences or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications that seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences have become final under the provisions of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158.

Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note the court minutes and commitment order reflect the sentence for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies (count two) was imposed without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, though the transcript is silent as to the benefits restriction. The penalty provision for possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies requires the sentence be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See LSA-R.S. 14:95.1(6). In instances where statutory restrictions on parole, probation, or suspension of sentence are not recited at sentencing, LSA-R.S. 15:301.1(A) deems those required statutory restrictions to be contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court. Thus, the defendant's sentence on count two is deemed to contain the benefits restriction by operation of law and no correction by this court is warranted. See State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, 799. However, as later discussed in the patent error section, we find it necessary to correct the court minutes and commitment order with respect to the sentence for attempted manslaughter (count one).

2.   As the defendant and the victim share the same last name, we hereinafter refer to the victim by his first name to avoid confusion.

3.   A defendant must be sentenced under the version of the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. See State v. Sugasti, 2001-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520-21.

McCLENDON, C.J.