CITY OF HAMMOND v. PM FIREWOOD PATRICK MILLER AND BRIDGETTE MILLER (2026)

Defendants/appellants, PM Firewood, Patrick Miller, and Bridgette Miller (“the Millers”), appeal a trial court judgment that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff/appellee, the City of Hammond (“the City”), and prohibited the Millers from “cutting, burning, hauling, or making firewood” at their residential premises or within the limits of the City. For the following reasons, we affirm the preliminary injunction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 14, 2023, the Millers submitted an Occupational License Tax Application to the City to conduct business at 1313 MC Moore Road in Hammond, Louisiana, identifying “retail firewood” as the type of business. Although the location was zoned as single-family residential, the occupational license was issued by the City under the home occupation exception found in the City's Unified Development Code. Shortly after the issuance of the occupational license to the Millers, on April 10, 2023, the City revoked the occupational license, stating that the nature of the Millers’ firewood operation was inconsistent with the description in their license application. Specifically, the City stated that the business was presented to them as a small operation; however, upon further inspection it had been determined that trees were being trucked there for cutting, leading the City to believe the amount of firewood being cut is on a commercial level and not just a seasonal amount.

Later, on April 12, 2023, because the Millers continued their firewood operations, the City posted a Notice to Comply on the door of the Millers’ property, ordering them to cease and desist operating its business as it was in violation of the Unified Development Code. The Millers continued their firewood operations despite the Notice to Comply. On December 2, 2024, the City filed a Petition to Enforce Unified Development Code, requesting the trial court order the Millers to “discontinue their business operation[,]” issue a daily fine against the Millers, and to grant the City all equitable relief.

The Millers excepted to the petition and generally denied the allegations asserted by the City, namely that they operated a business on the premises. In their incorporated reconventional demand and third party demand, the Millers named Wallace Seals, their neighbor, along with the City and another individual, Bobby Carter,¹ as defendants. In their reconventional and third party demand, the Millers alleged that they cut firewood on their property to give to family and friends and have never conducted any business operations or made any sales of firewood that would subject them to any zoning enforcement. The Millers also alleged that the City “colluded” and “conspired” with Mr. Seals for personal and political reasons to prevent the Millers from peaceably enjoying their property. The Millers concluded that all the acts set forth constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, for which the Millers sought punitive damages “to curtail such behavior of [the City] in the future.” In response, the City filed an answer to the Millers’ reconventional demand, as well as a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity and a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. In response, On February 6, 2025, Mr. Seals filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action and a special motion to strike.²

During a March 11, 2025 hearing, the trial court considered the City's peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity, as well as the Millers’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dilatory exception raising the objection of unauthorized use of summary proceedings. Following the hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on March 31, 2025, denying the exceptions filed by the City, denying the exception of no cause of action filed by the Millers, and granting the exception of unauthorized use of summary proceedings filed by the Millers. Additionally, the trial court ordered that “a preliminary injunction issue herein against PM Firewood, Patrick Miller, and Bridget[tte] Miller, prohibiting them, and anyone acting on their behalf from cutting, burning, hauling, or making firewood at the premises of 1207 M.C. Moore Road[,] Hammond, LA 70401, 1313 M.C. Moore Road, Hammond, [LA] 70401, or within the City Limits of the City of Hammond, pending further order of this Court.” It is from this March 31, 2025 judgment that the Millers timely filed the instant devolutive appeal.³

ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Assignment of Error

The Millers contend that the trial court erred in granting the City a preliminary injunction, prohibiting them from “cutting, burning, hauling, or making firewood” on their premises or within the limits of the City. Specifically, the Millers claim that “[t]he basis of all of [their] defenses against the City's claim [are] quite simple: [they] have not sold a stick of firewood in over three years prior to the suit being filed, and were not conducting any ‘business’ that could be regulated by the City.”

Standard of Review

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3612(B) provides that “[a]n appeal may be taken as a matter of right from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary or final injunction.” A party aggrieved by a judgment either granting or denying a preliminary injunction is entitled to an appeal. Country Club of Louisiana Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Dornier, 1996-0898, n. 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/14/97), 691 So.2d 142, 144 n. 1. We are, however, mindful that appellate review of a trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction is limited. The issuance of a preliminary injunction addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless a clear abuse of discretion has been shown. Hill v. Jindal, 2014-1757 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/17/15), 175 So.3d 988, 1002, writ denied, 2015-1394 (La. 10/23/15), 179 So.3d 600.

The writ of injunction, a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy, should only issue in those instances where the moving party is threatened with irreparable loss or injury, and is without an adequate remedy at law. Giauque v. Clean Harbors Plaquemine, L.L.C., 2005-0799 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 135, 140, writs denied, 2006-1720 (La. 1/12/07), 948 So.2d 150 & 2006-1818 (La. 1/12/07), 948 So.2d 151. Irreparable injury has been interpreted to mean a loss that cannot be adequately compensated in money damages or measured by a pecuniary standard. Id. A preliminary injunction is essentially an interlocutory order issued in summary proceedings incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief. The courts have generally held that a preliminary injunction is designed to preserve the status quo pending a trial of the issues on the merits of the case. Id. Generally, a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue and must show entitlement to the relief sought; this must be done by a prima facie showing that the party will prevail on the merits of the case. Id.

Preliminary Injunction Against the Millers

Section 119.03 of the Code of Ordinances for the City of Hammond provides that, “[n]o person shall operate or maintain a business establishment within the city without first obtaining a general business license therefor as provided in this chapter. Any business establishment not otherwise covered by a separate licensing provision shall require this general business license.” Therefore, the issue before the trial court was whether the City made a prima facie showing that it will prevail on the merits of the case proving that the Millers were operating a business in violation of the City's Code of Ordinances.

A trial court's factual determinations made after a bench trial are reviewed with the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003-1734 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98. This standard precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Id. In matters of credibility, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings, as the trial court is in the best position to view the witnesses’ demeanor. When conflicting testimony exists, this court cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Compton v. Chatman, 2021-0706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 341 So.3d 581, 586, writ denied, 2022-00527 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So.3d 154.

During the hearing, Joey Millazo, the City's code enforcement chief, testified about his knowledge of the occupational license the Millers applied for as well as what he observed and photographed at 1313 MC Moore Road. Mr. Millazo testified that he took the first set of photos on December 6, 2024, showing a “goose neck trailer” filled with firewood. He testified that day he observed “a firewood operation” with “lots of firewood.” Mr. Millazo said that he also went to 1313 MC Moore Road the day before the trial and took photographs. He testified about what he observed, including a trailer with uncut tree logs as well as a rack with cut firewood.

Kasey Daigle, an accounting supervisor for the City who was part of the process of reviewing the Millers’ application for an occupational license, also testified: During his testimony, the Millers’ application was introduced showing that they applied for the occupational license because they “started a new business” under the trade name PM Firewood and listed “Firewood” as the type of business they were applying for and listed “Firewood” as the kind of merchandise. Mr. Daigle testified that the occupational license was revoked because of “inconsistent activity” as the volume of firewood being cut was a lot higher than what was originally presented to the zoning office. Mr. Daigle said he received notification from the zoning office that it was excessive for a home-based business because of the nuisance and equipment that was being used on the site. Both Mr. Daigle and Mr. Millazo acknowledged during their testimony that they had no knowledge of money being exchanged for the firewood.

Mr. Miller testified that he cuts firewood “almost every day” and that somebody's cutting firewood “pretty much every day.” When asked where the wood comes from, he replied that sometimes he cuts the wood on his property, sometimes he brings leftover wood home from his work, and sometimes the City would bring him wood. Mr. Miller said that he gives the firewood to his family and neighbors and that he has not sold a stick of firewood to anybody in the last three years.

Mr. Miller also testified about the pictures introduced into evidence by the City. He said the pictures depicted two cords of firewood loaded on a trailer, a rack used to measure a cord of wood, and his tractor and dump trailer. Mr. Miller further testified about pictures introduced into evidence by Mr. Seals showing several large tree logs on the property, about three cords of firewood being stored, and equipment including a tractor and trailers. He acknowledged that one picture depicted one of his trailers hauling firewood to his “wife's uncle's place,” a firewood warehouse in Montpelier, Louisiana. Mr. Miller testified that his wife's uncle sells firewood from the warehouse and lets him store firewood in there. He estimated he had about fifteen cords of firewood stored in the warehouse, but only uses one side to keep his firewood out of the way.

Finally, Mr. Seals testified that he lives next door to the 1313 MC Moore Road property and has observed Mr. Miller cutting and splitting logs “every day.” Mr. Seals said he sees a whole trailer load of firewood hauled off of the property “every week.” He testified that he took a video of Mr. Miller pulling into the firewood warehouse in Montpelier with two trailers full of firewood. Mr. Seals expressed his frustration regarding the firewood operation because of the traffic and the constant smoke.

At the conclusion of the hearing, when addressing the preliminary injunction, the trial court found that Mr. Miller was operating in the same way as when he had a business license and continued to haul the firewood to his wife's uncle's property who owned a commercial firewood operation. The trial court stated, “I just don't believe that all of this work, all the cutting, hauling loads and loads and loads of firewood up to Montpelier isn't involved some way commercially with—with your uncle.” Therefore, the trial court granted the preliminary injunction and told the parties to set a trial date.

In so ruling, the trial court made a credibility determination with regard to Mr. Miller's testimony. In giving deference to the trial court's credibility determination, the evidence including the pictures depicting large equipment, large quantities of firewood, and the hauling of the firewood to a commercial operation, we find no manifest error by the trial court in finding that the Millers were operating a business in violation of the City's Code of Ordinances, and therefore, the City made a prima facie showing that it will prevail on the merits of the case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. All costs of this proceeding are assessed to the defendants, PM Firewood, Patrick Miller, and Bridgette Miller.

AFFIRMED.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion to affirm the trial court's preliminary injunction and prohibit the Millers from “cutting, burning, hauling, or making firewood” at their residential premises or within the limits of the City of Hammond. Although the issuance of a preliminary injunction does rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, the mover for a preliminary injunction - the City - must make a prima facie showing that it will prevail on the merits of the case. See Giauque v. Clean Harbors Plaquemine, L.L.C., 2005-0799 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 135, 140, writs denied, 2006-1720 (La. 1/12/07), 948 So.2d 150 & 2006-1818 (La. 1/12/07). Based on a review of the record, I conclude that the City failed to make this showing.

At the preliminary injunction hearing, Joey Millazo, Code Enforcement Chief for the City, and Kasey Daigle, accounting supervisor for the City, both acknowledged that in their respective investigations of the Millers’ firewood processing operation, they did not observe or have any evidence of the Millers exchanging their goods or services for money. Additionally, Mr. Seals, in connection with his special motion to strike, was asked whether he observed any “money change hands between Mr. Miller and anybody buying firewood,” to which he replied it “wasn't [his] concern.” Further, Mr. Miller testified that he “give[s] away firewood to all around the neighborhood. It's not a money thing for [him].” He also stated he has not sold any firewood in at least three years. Moreover, Mr. Miller testified that the “Code Enforcement people never gave [him] a ticket, never hauled [him] to court before [he] applied for a license[,]” and the only reason he applied for a license is, “[b]ecause the City told [him] that's what [he] needed.” Lastly, in the trial court's reasons for the issuance of the preliminary injunction, it does not city to any specific evidence of a business operation by the Millers, but rather assumes that the amount of work the Millers put into firewood processing must have some underlying commercial motive.

I conclude that the City failed to make a prima facie showing that it would prevail on the merits of the case and, therefore, that the trial court erred in granting the City a preliminary injunction. Without positive proof, the volume of the Millers’ firewood processing should not be misconstrued or assumed as an indication of underlying commercial activity. Therefore, as the record does not contain any indication of commercial activity, I find that the Millers’ firewood processing operation does not fall under the regulatory purview of the City's Unified Development Code, and I would reverse the trial court's preliminary injunction.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bobby Carter is not a party to the issue before us.

2.   Mr. Seals’ peremptory exceptions were denied by the trial court and were not reviewed by this court. As to the special motion to strike, Mr. Seals asserted that his alleged defamatory statements were made in furtherance of his right to petition or free speech in connection with a public issue before an executive or judicial body. In a judgment dated March 24, 2025, the trial court ultimately granted Mr. Seals’ special motion to strike and set a contradictory hearing for an award of attorney fees and costs to Mr. Seals. In a prior opinion, this court reviewed the trial court's March 24, 2025 judgment, affirming same. See City of Hammond v. PM Firewood, Patrick Miller, and Bridgette Miller, 2025-0956 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/20/26), 2026 WL 1430655 (unpublished). Thus, the only issue currently before us is the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction in favor of the City.

3.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 3612(C) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n appeal from an order or judgment relating to a preliminary injunction must be taken, and any bond required must be furnished, within fifteen days from the date of the order or judgment.” Herein, the subject judgment was signed on March 31, 2025 and the Millers’ Motion for Devolutive Appeal was filed on April 10, 2025.

HESTER, J.

EW by WIL dissents with reasons