OSMAN ARSLAN SERPIL BRICE AND SOBA ENTERPRISES LLC v. LOUISIANA USED MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION (2026)

Osman Arslan, Serpil Brice, and Soba Enterprises, LLC sought judicial review of a decision issued by the Louisiana Used Motor Vehicle Commission and filed exceptions pleading the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action. The district court granted the exceptions; dismissed the Commission's claims with prejudice; reversed the Commission's decision; and, having found the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction, nullified the Commission's previous decision. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1

The Louisiana Used Motor Vehicle Commission (the “Commission”) is an administrative agency authorized to license and regulate the independent used motor vehicle industry pursuant to LSA-R.S. 32:781, et seq. (sometimes herein, the “LUMVC Act”). On June 6, 2024, the Commission issued an interlocutory cease and desist order prohibiting Osman Arslan, Serpil Brice, and Soba Enterprises, LLC (“Appellees”) from operating or engaging in the business of renting used motor vehicles without a license. Subsequently, the Commission issued a notice advising Appellees of an August 20, 2024 administrative hearing to address allegations that Appellees “rented” used motor vehicles without a license through Turo, Inc. (“Turo”), a peer-to-peer car sharing platform, in violation of LSA-R.S. 32:791, on 119 occasions after the issuance of the cease and desist order.

Prior to the administrative hearing, Appellees filed peremptory exceptions pleading the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action (the “exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction” and the “exception of no cause of action,” respectively).² The Commission heard the Appellees’ exceptions on August 20, 2024, took the exceptions under advisement, and continued the administrative hearing until December 9, 2024.

On March 26, 2025, the Commission issued written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order (the “Commission's decision”). The Commission's decision indicated that the Commission had previously denied Appellees’ exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action. The Commission's decision further found Appellees in violation of the LUMVC Act, specifically LSA-R.S. 32:784 and LSA-R.S. 32:786, for conducting a daily rental business for used motor vehicles without a license issued by the Commission, and for continuing to conduct a daily rental business for more than 50 days after the issuance of the cease and desist order. Thus, the Commission imposed fines in the amount of $2,000.00 per day for the 50 days Appellees operated the business after the issuance of the cease and desist order, for a total of $100,000.00; assessed costs of the administrative proceedings to Appellees in the amount of $10,000.00; and permanently enjoined Appellees from conducting a daily rental business for used motor vehicles without a license issued by the Commission.

On April 21, 2025, Appellees filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Commission's decision in the 19th Judicial District Court.³ Concurrently with the petition for judicial review, Appellees filed motions and incorporated memorandums for stay pending judicial review and for expedited consideration of Appellees’ exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action, both of which the district court granted. The Commission opposed Appellees’ exceptions.

The district court heard Appellees’ exceptions pleading the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and no cause of action on June 11, 2025.⁴ The district court granted Appellees’ exceptions; dismissed the Commission's claims against Appellees with prejudice; reversed the Commission's decision; and, having found the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction, nullified the Commission's decision in a judgment signed on June 26, 2025. The Commission appealed.⁵

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Peremptory Exception of lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised through the peremptory exception. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(8). Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2. Subject matter jurisdiction is created by the constitution or by legislative enactment; the parties cannot confer or waive it. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 3; Louisiana Environmental Action Network, Inc. v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 2019-1551 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/20), 314 So.3d 841, 847. Subject matter jurisdiction raises a question of law, which is reviewed on appeal de novo to determine whether the lower court was legally correct. Acadian Gardens Condominium Association v. DeForest, 2024-0314 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 982, 986.

On the trial of a peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert the objections pleaded when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 931. When no evidence is introduced, the court must accept the properly-pled material allegations of fact contained in the petition as true for the purpose of ruling on the exception. See Bryan v. Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board, 2024-1253 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/9/25), 2025 WL 3537342, *8 (unpublished), writ denied, 2026-00032 (La. 3/31/26), 428 So.3d 684; Hill v. Franklin, 2023-0970 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/24), 2024 WL 4284619, *4, (unpublished), writ denied, 2024-01416 (La. 3/18/25), 402 So.3d 1211. However, the court is not required to accept conclusory allegations or allegations of law as true for purposes of the exception. Id.

Here, neither the Commission nor Appellees introduced evidence at the hearing on the exceptions. Accordingly, this court must conduct a de novo review to determine whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to bring claims against Appellees, based on the properly-pled material allegations of fact contained in Appellees’ petition for judicial review. See McDaniel v. Olmos, 2023-1305 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/6/24), 405 So.3d 609, 611 n.5, writ denied, 2024-01465 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 929; Bryan, 2025 WL 3537342 at *8; and Hill, 2024 WL 4284619 at *4.

Appellees maintain that the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims based on Appellees’ purported sharing of vehicles through Turo's peer-to-peer car sharing platform. More specifically, Appellees maintain that the Commission's claims against them arise strictly from Appellees’ purported sharing of vehicles through Turo's peer-to-peer car sharing platform, which is subject to the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act, LSA-R.S. 22:1300.1, et seq., and is not subject to the Commission's authority to license and regulate the independent used motor vehicle industry pursuant to the LUMVC Act, LSA-R.S. 32:781, et seq.

The issue before us is the correct interpretation of the LUMVC Act and the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act. Because this matter involves the interpretation of statutes and presents a question of law, this court applies the de novo standard of review. See Red Stick Studio Development, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Department of Economic Development, 2010-0193 (La. 1/19/11), 56 So.3d 181, 187. The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. LSA-C.C. art. 9. However, when the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law. LSA-C.C. art. 10. Moreover, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. LSA-C.C. art. 12; Id. at 187-188.

We first consider the LUMVC Act, set forth in LSA-R.S. 32:781, et seq. The LUMVC Act created the Commission and authorized it to license and regulate the independent used motor vehicle industry. LSA-R.S. 32:783; see State ex rel. Used Motor Vehicle Commission v. Sundance Boats, Inc., 2010-0479 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 50 So.3d 956, 957. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:783 grants the Commission explicit authority, in relevant part, as follows:

(E)(1) The [C]ommission is hereby vested with the powers and duties necessary and proper to enable it to fully and effectively carry out and enforce the provisions and objectives of this Chapter [Chapter 4-C] and is hereby authorized and empowered to make and enforce all reasonable rules and regulations and to adopt and prescribe all forms necessary to accomplish said purpose.

* * *

(1)The [C]ommission's powers and duties shall include but are not limited to the following:

* * *

(6) Holding and conducting hearings on violations of this Chapter [Chapter 4-C], mandatory repurchase disputes, imposing civil penalties, cease and desist orders, and revocation or suspension of licenses.

Pertinently, LSA-R.S. 32:784(A)(7)⁶ provides that, unless licensed by the Commission, no person, firm, or corporation shall carry on or conduct the business of “daily rentals of used motor vehicles as defined in R.S. 32:781.”⁷ And, LSA-R.S. 32:791(A)(1) further provides:

It shall be unlawful and shall constitute a misdemeanor for any person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or trust to engage in business as, or serve in the capacity of, or act as a used motor vehicle dealer, rental dealer, or used motor vehicle salesperson in this state without first obtaining a license therefor as provided in this Section.

As set forth above, subject matter jurisdiction is created by the constitution or by legislative enactment. The plain language of the LUMVC Act, et seq., vests the Commission with the powers and duties necessary and proper to enable it to fully and effectively carry out and enforce the provisions and objectives of the LUMVC Act. Further, the plain language of the LUMVC Act expressly authorizes the Commission to hold and conduct hearings of violations of the provisions therein. The LUMVC Act contains two express provisions against the unlicensed business of renting used motor vehicles: LSA-R.S. 32:784(A)(7) precludes any person, firm, or corporation from carrying on or conducting the business of “daily rentals of used motor vehicles,” and LSA-R.S. 32:791(A)(1) expressly states that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or trust “to engage in business as, or serve in the capacity of, or act as a ․ rental dealer ․ in this state without first obtaining a license therefor as provided in this Section.” In short, the LUMVC Act both prohibits the business of renting used motor vehicles without a license and grants the Commission broad authority to investigate and enforce violations of same.

Nevertheless, Appellees maintain the Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to pursue its allegations that Appellees were engaged in the business of renting used motor vehicles without a license because peer-to-peer car sharing is not subject to the LUMVC Act, but rather, is exclusively governed by the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act, set forth in LSA-R.S. 22:1300.1, et seq. The Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act is contained within Title 22, Chapter 4, Part IV of the Louisiana Insurance Code, titled “Property and Casualty,” rather than within Title 32, which addresses motor vehicles and traffic regulation. The Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act requires that a peer-to-peer car sharing program ensure that, during each car sharing period, the shared vehicle owner and the shared vehicle driver are insured under a motor vehicle liability policy that provides insurance coverage. LSA-R.S. 22:1300.3(C).

Appellees maintain that peer-to-peer car sharing is a separate and distinct activity and industry from car rentals. Appellees further argue that, by definition, the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act governs a person sharing a vehicle through a peer-to-peer car sharing program such as Turo, and that Turo is not a rental company or engaged in renting vehicles. Appellees rely on the following statutory language found in LSA-R.S. 22:1300.2:

(6) “Peer-to-peer car sharing” means the authorized use of a vehicle by an individual other than the vehicle's owner through a peer-to-peer car sharing program. “Peer-to-peer car sharing” does not mean rental motor vehicle, rental vehicle, vehicle, or similar, as defined in R.S. 22:1523 or 1762.

(7) “Peer-to-peer car sharing program” means a business platform that connects vehicle owners with drivers to enable the sharing of vehicles for financial consideration. “Peer-to-peer car sharing program” does not mean a service provider that is solely providing hardware or software as a service to a person or entity that is not effectuating payment of financial consideration for use of a shared vehicle. “Peer-to-peer car sharing program” does not mean lessor, rental company, or similar, as defined in R.S. 22:1523 or 1762.

(8) “Shared vehicle” means a vehicle that is available for sharing through a peer-to-peer car sharing program. “Shared vehicle” does not mean rental motor vehicle, rental vehicle, vehicle, or similar, as defined in R.S. 22:1523 or 1762.

(9) “Shared vehicle driver” means an individual who has been authorized to drive the shared vehicle by the shared vehicle owner under a car sharing program agreement. “Shared vehicle driver” does not mean lessee, renter, or similar, as defined in R.S. 22:1523 or 1762.

(10) “Shared vehicle owner” means the registered owner, or a person or entity designated by the registered owner, of a vehicle made available for sharing to shared vehicle drivers through a peer-to-peer car sharing program. “Shared vehicle owner” does not mean lessor, rental company, or similar, as defined in R.S. 22:1523 or 1762.

Appellees argue that, “[as] defined in [the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act,] a person sharing a vehicle through a peer-to-peer sharing program like Turo is not a rental company or engaged in renting vehicles.” (Emphasis original). We disagree.

The title of the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act, and the language thereof, indicate that it is intended to regulate the business of insurance relative to peer-to-peer car sharing programs. In contrast, and as set forth above, the LUMVC Act precludes any person, firm, association, corporation, limited liability company, or trust from carrying on or conducting, or engaging in the business, serving in the capacity of, or acting as a rental dealer without a license. See LSA-R.S. 32:784(A)(7) and LSA-R.S. 32:791(A)(1). This broad statutory language is clearly intended to extend the licensing requirement to all parties that, in effect, are involved in the business of renting used motor vehicles, regardless of the means by which they rent said vehicles.

In sum, the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Act applies to the regulation of the business of insurance relative to peer-to-peer car sharing programs, while the LUMVC Act applies to any party effectively involved in the business of renting used motor vehicles. There is no language in the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Act that divests the Commission of its authority under the LUMVC Act. And, while we find no ambiguity in the relevant statutory language, we note that, in order to find merit in Appellees’ arguments, we would have to determine that the legislature intended to divest the Commission of its authority to regulate the business of renting used motor vehicles, in the event that business was conducted via a peer-to-peer car sharing platform rather than through a traditional rental business. We cannot find the legislature intended such an absurd result.

Finding no legal support for Appellees’ argument that the enactment of the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act precludes the simultaneous application of the LUMVA, we likewise conclude that the district court erred in granting the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in reversing and nullifying the Commission's decision on that basis.

Exception of No Cause of Action

Alternatively, Appellees argue that even if the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims asserted against Appellees, the Commission failed to state a cause of action against Appellees. Appellees maintain that their purported actions are governed solely by the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act, not LSA-R.S. 32:784, LSA-R.S. 32:786, and/or LSA-R.S. 32:791, and therefore, LSA-R.S. 32:791 does not provide a legally viable cause of action against them.

As used in the context of the peremptory exception, a cause of action refers to the operative facts that give rise to a plaintiff's right to judicially assert an action against a defendant. Touchet v. McGehee, 2024-1283 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/15/25), 418 So.3d 438, 453. The issue at the trial of the exception is whether, on the face of the petition, the plaintiff is legally entitled to the relief sought. The exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents. The pertinent question is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff's behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Paulsell v. State, Department of Transportation and Development, 2012-0396 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/12), 112 So.3d 856, 864, writ denied, 2013-0274 (La. 3/15/13), 109 So.3d 386. While the well-pleaded facts in the petition must be accepted as true, the correctness of conclusions of law is not conceded. See Touchet, 418 So.3d at 454. Because the exception raises a question of law and the district court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition, a judgment sustaining an exception of no cause of action is reviewed by an appellate court de novo. Touchet, 418 So.3d at 454.

The Commission's factual allegations that Appellees have engaged in the unlicensed business of renting used motor vehicles clearly state a cause of action under the LUMVC Act, LSA-R.S. 32:781, et seq. Moreover, in considering Appellees’ exception of subject matter jurisdiction, we have already found no merit in Appellees’ assertions that the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act excludes application of the LUMVC Act. The district court erred in granting Appellees’ exception of no cause of action.

Judicial Review of the Commission's Decision

Judicial review of final decisions in agency adjudications is governed by LSA-R.S. 49:978.1 ⁸ of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act. A party aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(A). The aggrieved party may institute judicial review by filing a petition in the district court of the parish in which the agency is located. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(B). Within thirty days after the service of the petition, or within further time allowed by the court, the agency shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(D). Judicial review is conducted by the court without a jury and is confined to the record. LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(F). The court may affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the decision of the agency. LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G). The court may only reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (6) not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court, based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety upon judicial review. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G); Rise St. James v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 2023-0578 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1/19/24), 383 So.3d 956, 973, writs denied, 2024-00354 (La. 9/4/24), 391 So.3d 1051, 2024-00355 (La. 9/4/24), 391 So.3d 1052, and 2024-00351 (La. 9/4/24), 391 So.3d 1060.

When reviewing an administrative final decision, the district court functions as an appellate court. ASG Technologies Group, Inc. v. Office of Technology Services, 2021-1046 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/30/22), 344 So.3d 136, 149. Following judicial review of an administrative decision in the district court, an aggrieved party may seek review by appeal to the appropriate appellate court. LSA-R.S. 49:979; Bankers Insurance Company v. Donelon, 2023-0871 (La.App. 1 Or. 3/22/24), 388 So.3d 411, 417. Appellate review of the district court's judgment is de novo, without regard for the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the district court. An appellate court sitting in review of an administrative agency reviews the findings and decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the district court. 29:11 Academy v. Louisiana Department of Education, 2023-0984 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/22/24), 392 So.3d 329, 335.

As set forth above, Appellees filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission's decision, which found Appellees violated the LUMVC Act by conducting a daily rental business for used motor vehicles without a license and by continuing to conduct said business for more than 50 days after the issuance of the cease and desist order. Based on these findings, the Commission's decision further imposed fines, assessed costs, and permanently enjoined Appellees from conducting said business without a license. In support of Appellees’ petition for judicial review, they contend their substantial rights had been prejudiced, and the Commission's decision should be reversed, because the Commission's decision: violated the statutory provisions of the Peer-to-Peer Car Sharing Program Act; exceeded the Commission's statutory authority; violated Appellees’ due process rights; was arbitrary and capricious and characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; and was not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of the evidence. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G).

Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G), this court is required to determine whether the Commission's decision was supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence, based upon our own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety. Here, however, the appellate record does not contain the record of the Commission's administrative proceedings. Thus, we are unable to rule on the merits of Appellees’ petition for judicial review, and we are constrained to remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein.⁹ See O'Connell v. Allstate Insurance Co 2021-0194 La App. 1 Cir. 7/2/21 328 So. 3d 1185 1188 n.2.

In this matter, LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(D) required the Commission to transmit the original or a certified copy of the entire record of the administrative proceedings under review within thirty days after service of the petition. Thus, it was the Commission's responsibility to ensure the record of the administrative proceedings was transmitted to the district court. However, LSA-R.S. 49:978.1 does not provide remedies for an agency's failure to transmit the record of the administrative proceeding. In re Forgione, 36,130 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/12/02), 821 So.2d 673, 676-677. Moreover, the plain language of LSA-R.S. 49:978.1 provides that a party aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review. Here, Appellees are the parties aggrieved, and they have asserted in their petition for judicial review that the Commission's decision should be reversed because Appellees’ substantial rights have been prejudiced and because the Commission's decision was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In conducting the judicial review to which Appellees are entitled, the reviewing court is required to make its own determination and conclusions of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety. See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G)(6). Without the record of the administrative proceedings, this court cannot conduct the judicial review to which Appellees are entitled.

Further, prior jurisprudence indicates that when the appellate court record does not contain a complete record of the administrative proceedings, the matter must be remanded for supplementation of the record. See Bell Oaks, Inc. v. Louisiana Department of Health & Hospitals, 96-1256 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/26/97), 697 So.2d 739, 749, writ denied, 97-2202 (La. 11/21/97), 703 So.2d 1313; Johnson v. Odom, 470 So.2d 988, 994 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 476 So.2d 355 (La. 1985); 3000-3032 St. Claude Ave., LLC v. City of New Orleans, 2021-0139 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/9/21), 332 So.3d 1251, 1256-1257.

For example, in Bell Oaks, this court attempted to conduct its own review of the of the administrative proceedings to determine whether the agency's decision should be affirmed, modified, or reversed pursuant to LSA-R.S. 49:964(G), the predecessor statute to LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G). However, in reviewing the record of the administrative proceedings, this court found that the administrative hearing was conducted improperly. Bell Oaks, 697 So.2d at 749. As a result, this court did not have the facts needed to determine whether the agency's decision was reasonable and was in accord with applicable regulations. This court concluded, “Therefore, because this court does not have an ‘otherwise complete record’ upon which to make a [de novo] review and base a decision, the case must be remanded to the agency for a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with the applicable statutes and regulations.” Bell Oaks, 697 So.2d at 749.

Similarly, in Johnson, 476 So.2d 355, interpreting the predecessor statutes to LSA-R.S. 49:978.1, this court noted that the appellate record did not contain written findings of fact or conclusions of law relative to the administrative hearing, nor did it contain the complete record of the administrative proceedings. Id. Further, the agency had imposed an illegal penalty. In view of the omissions from the record and of an illegal penalty imposed, the appellate court partially reversed the administrative agency's action and remanded to the administrative agency to provide a proper record for judicial review. And likewise, in 3000-3032 St. Claude Ave., LLC, 332 So.3d at 1256-1257, interpreting the predecessor statutes to LSA-R.S. 49:978.1, the district court found that the record of the administrative proceeding lacked sufficient clarity for judicial review of the agency's decision, and remanded the petition for judicial review. Id. at 1254. The agency sought review with the Fourth Circuit. Id. After concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Fourth Circuit further found that the agency “[had] not shown that there [was] sufficient record evidence that would allow [the Fourth Circuit] to make a ruling on the petition for judicial review.” Id. at 1257.

In short, without the record of the Commission's administrative proceedings, this court cannot make its own determination and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon its own evaluation of the record and, therefore, is unable to rule on the merits of the petition for judicial review.¹⁰ See LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(G). Because we cannot rule on the merits of the petition for judicial review, we are constrained to remand this matter to the district court for consideration of the entirety of the Commission's record of the administrative proceedings and the proceedings consistent herewith.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court, reinstate the March 26, 2025 decision issued by the Louisiana Used Motor Vehicle Commission, and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed equally against Osman Arslan, Serpil Brice, and Soba Enterprises, LLC.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; DECISION OF THE LOUISIANA USED MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION REINSTATED; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Appellees captioned and referred to their exceptions as a declinatory exception pleading the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, in the alternative, a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action. However, at all pertinent times herein, LSA-C.C.P. art. 927 has included the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the objection of no cause of action as objections that may be raised through the peremptory exception. A pleading is governed by its substance rather than its caption, and we construe the pleading for what it really is, not for what it is erroneously designated. Carrington v. Carrington, 2024-1016 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/11/25), 411 So.3d 852, 862, writ denied, 2025-00830 (La. 10/1/25), 417 So.3d 576.

3.   Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 49:950, et seq., and LSA-R.S. 49:978.1(B), Appellees were required to seek judicial review in the district court within thirty days of the transmittal of the notice of the Commission's final decision. Here, the Commission's final decision was sent via certified mail on March 28, 2025, and Appellees filed their petition on April 21, 2025.

4.   The record reflects that no evidence was filed with the Clerk of Court for the 19th Judicial District Court as of August 27, 2025.

5.   On appeal, the Commission raises the following assignments of error:(1) The trial court erred in finding Appellees were not engaged in the business of renting used motor vehicles subject to the Commission.(2) The trial court erred in finding the Peer2Peer Car Sharing Program Act conveyed exclusive jurisdiction to the Department of Insurance to license and regulate businesses engaged in renting used motor vehicles.(3) The trial court erred in failing to find Appellees were operating as a “rental company” which is excluded from the Peer2Peer Car Sharing Program Act.Although we do not address each assignment of error individually, this opinion disposes of all issues raised.

6.   While the Commission's appellate brief references LSA-R.S. 32:784(A)(5), this appears to be a typographical error.

7.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:781(12) defines a “[u]sed motor vehicle” as “a motor vehicle, which has been previously titled to an ultimate purchaser[.]”

8.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:978.1 was re-designated from LSA-R.S. 49:964 by 2022 La. Acts, No. 663, § 1. As Act 663 merely renumbers these procedural laws with no substantive changes, the laws apply prospectively and retroactively. See LSA-C.C. art. 6; Perdido Energy Louisiana, LLC v. Beauregard Parish Board of Review, 2025-0639 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/21/25), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 3248984, *3 n.8, as amended on rehearing (1/9/26).

9.   Pertinently, on January 21, 2026, this court received a proposed supplement to the record from the 19th Judicial District Court. The proposed supplement included a November 12, 2025 motion requesting that the district court order the Clerk of Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge to supplement the appellate record with an answer to the appeal, the notice of the lodging of the record, and the Commission's record of the administrative proceedings. The proposed supplement further indicated that the district court granted the motion to supplement on November 20, 2025, and that the Commission filed its record of the administrative proceedings with the district court on December 9, 2025. On January 29, 2026, this court returned the proposed supplement, unfiled, to the Clerk of Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, explaining that this court's review is limited strictly to the record as it existed at the time the underlying judgment complained of was rendered. This court noted in its enclosure letter:In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal's review is limited strictly to the record as it existed at the time the underlying judgment complained of was rendered. [See Collins v. Mike's Trucking Company, Inc., 2005-0238 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/06), 934 So.2d 827, 836, writ denied, 2006-1914 (La. 12/8/06), 943 So.2d 1094; Cortez v. Cortez, 2011-1485 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/29/12)(unpublished), 2012 WL 1079201, *2; Levatino v. Levatino, 2007-1238 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07)(unpublished), 2007 WL 3407004, *2; see also Rule 1-3 of the Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3 (The courts of appeal “will review only issues which were submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise”). Accordingly, the record on appeal should not contain any filings subsequent to the petition and order of appeal, notice of return date and/or proof and date of cost paid, and designations of the appellate record, if filed. [See] Rule 2-1 - 2-1.17 of the Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal and Rule 5 of the Local Rules of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Supplementing and/or Superseding Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal.

10.   Although the Commission and Appellees both filed copies of the Commission's decision into the record, the decision was not offered into evidence at the hearing. Further, the Commission's decision indicates that evidence adduced at the administrative hearing included the testimony of two complainants, the testimony of the Commission's investigator, and numerous exhibits, none of which are available for this court's review. Thus, review of the Commission's decision further supports this court's conclusion that we cannot rule on the merits of the petition for judicial review on the record now before us.

MCCLENDON, C.J.