STATE v. COLEMAN III (2026)

In this criminal appeal, Defendant, Jackie Lee Coleman, III, complains that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing maximum, consecutive sentences, totaling sixty-six years at hard labor, which resulted in a constitutionally excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm the sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State recited the following statement of facts at Defendant's guilty plea:

Judge, if called to trial, the State would prove that on June 25th of 2021, detectives with the Sulphur Police Department were dispatched to the Motel 6 on Ruth Street in Sulphur in reference to a battery incident where the victim was in the lobby with injuries -- suggesting that she had been physically beaten and strangled in the presence of a minor child.

Officers contacted the victim, who was covered in blood and had two black eyes, as well as, a large laceration on her head. The victim stated to the officers at that time that [Defendant], who was her boyfriend, had pistol whipped her and beat her with a sawed-off shotgun. Officers received a search warrant for the room where the incident was learned to have taken place and they observed the room to be smeared in blood on the walls, floors and bedding.

Officers were able to detain [Defendant] at that time, where they observed blood s[p]latter on his pants. The blood stains located on the pants were later test[ed] by the Southwest Louisiana Crime [Lab] and compared to a reference sample that was provided by the victim. And it was conf[i]rmed that the blood that was found on [Defendant's] pants was consistent of that belonging to the victim. And all these events occurred within the confines of Calcasieu Parish, Judge.

And he is a previously convicted felon, Judge. Because he was convicted under docket number 3527-20 of one count of possession of CDS II. That was in the Fourteenth Judicial District, [P]arish of Calcasieu, [S]tate of Louisiana.

When asked by the trial court about the obliterated serial number and two firearm possession counts, the State responded:

So at that time, officers were able to locate a Phoenix Arms 22 caliber pistol on [Defendant's] person, as well as, a sawed-off shotgun in the car that [Defendant] was learned to be operating. And after further observation of that 22 caliber Phoenix Arms pistol, law enforcement was able to determine that that firearm did have an obliterated serial number.

On July 27, 2021, Defendant was charged by bill of information with attempted second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30.1; cruelty to juveniles, in violation of La.R.S. 14:93(A)(1); domestic abuse child endangerment, in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(I); domestic abuse battery—first offense—strangulation, in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(C) and (L); aggravated second degree battery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7; false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon, in violation of La.R.S. 14:46.1; two counts of possession of a firearm or carrying of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1; two counts of illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of drugs, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95(E); illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, in violation of La.R.S. 14:94(A); possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.7; possession or dealing in unregistered or illegally transferred weapons, in violation of La.R.S. 40:1785; and possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine), in violation of La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1).

A plea hearing was held on December 12, 2023. Prior to the plea, the State indicated that it intended to file a habitual offender bill of information on a future date. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm or carrying of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, aggravated second degree battery, domestic abuse battery—first offense—strangulation, domestic abuse battery with child endangerment, and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number.

In return, the State dismissed Defendant's charges of attempted second degree murder, cruelty to juveniles, false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon, two counts of illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of drugs, illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, possession or dealing in unregistered or illegally transferred weapons, and possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine). A presentence investigation report was ordered, and a sentencing hearing was set for March 15, 2024.

On March 15, 2024, the State filed a third and subsequent habitual offender bill of information alleging the following:

[Defendant], on or about December 12, 2023, in the Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana, was convicted of two (2) counts of Possession of a Weapon by a Convicted Felon; in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1, Domestic Abuse Battery with Child Endangerment; in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(I), Domestic Abuse Battery by Strangulation; in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3.C and 14:35.3.L, Aggravated Second Degree Battery; in violation of La.R.S. 14:34.7, and Possession of a Firearm with an Obliterated Serial Number; in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.7, all felony offenses which occurred on June 24, 2021, and are currently awaiting sentencing, on the above listed docket number;

That on March 14, 2011, in the County of Jefferson, State of Texas, [Defendant] was convicted of Manufacture / Deliver a Schedule I Controlled Dangerous, to-wit: Cocaine, an offense which was committed on April 1, 2010, in violation of Texas Health and Safety Code 481.112(d), sentencing was deferred and he was placed on probation; under case number 10-10599; probation for that offense was revoked on March 26, 2012 and [Defendant] was sentenced to ten (10) years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and was on parole supervision until April 22, 2021;

That on April 6, 2020, in the 14th Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana, [Defendant] was convicted of Possession of CDS II, to-wit: Methamphetamine, an offense which was committed on January 26, 2020, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967.C, and was sentenced that same day to credit for time served in the parish jail, under docket number 3527-20[.]

On September 23, 2024, Defendant filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea,” requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas in this matter. In his motion, Defendant argued that his pleas were “unintelligent due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Defendant further alleged:

Counsel at no time explained that [D]efendant's prior out of state convictions could be used to enhance his sentence under the Habitual Offender Statute. There was absolutely no benefit to agreeing to a plea if the State was seeking a sentence of life. Counsel filed no motions, sent discovery, or met with [D]efendant about his innocence or guilt.

Hearings on Defendant's motion were held on March 21 and March 26, 2025. The trial judge denied the motion on March 26, 2025.

Defendant was sentenced on June 13, 2025. Prior to sentencing, the State withdrew the habitual offender bill of information and proceeded to sentencing under the original bill of information. The trial court sentenced Defendant to three (3) years at hard labor on his conviction of domestic abuse battery—first offense—strangulation, three (3) years at hard labor on his conviction of domestic abuse child endangerment, fifteen (15) years at hard labor on his conviction of aggravated second degree battery, twenty (20) years at hard labor on each of two counts of possession of a firearm or carrying of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, and five (5) years at hard labor on his conviction of possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, which were all maximum sentences, and ordered each sentence to run consecutively.

On June 25, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for appeal and designation of record challenging his sentences as excessive.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are several errors patent involving some of the sentences imposed.

First, we find the sentences imposed for count three, domestic abuse child endangerment, and count four, domestic abuse battery by strangulation (first offense), are illegally lenient. For counts three and four, Defendant was charged as follows:

Count 3 – Domestic Abuse Child Endangerment Law:

Jackie Lee Coleman III, on or about June 24, 2021, committed a battery upon Christian Marie Paladino, while a minor child thirteen years of age or younger was present at the time of the commission of the offense, in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(I);

Count 4 – Domestic Abuse Battery – First Offense – Strangulation:

Jackie Lee Coleman III, on or about June 24, 2021, committed domestic abuse battery involving strangulation upon Christian Marie Paladino, in violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3.C. & L.[.]

After Defendant pled guilty to these charges, the trial court sentenced him to serve three years at hard labor on each count.

In pertinent part, the penalty provision of La.R.S. 14:35.3 states:

A. Domestic abuse battery is the intentional use of force or violence committed by one household member or family member upon the person of another household member or family member.

․

C. On a first conviction, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the offender shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more than six months. At least forty-eight hours of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence․

․

I. This Subsection shall be cited as the “Domestic Abuse Child Endangerment Law.” Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, when the state proves, in addition to the elements of the crime as set forth in Subsection A of this Section, that a minor child thirteen years of age or younger was present at the residence or any other scene at the time of the commission of the offense, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned as follows:

(1) For a first offense, not less than one year nor more than three years at hard labor.

․

L. (1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the domestic abuse battery involves strangulation, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years.

Subsections “I” and “L” provide for penalties in addition to any other penalties imposed under La.R.S. 14:35.3. Subsection “C” provides that the penalty for a first offender is a fine of $300 to $1000 and imprisonment of thirty days to six months, with at least forty-eight hours to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.¹ Thus, we find the sentences imposed on counts three and four are illegal since they include neither a fine nor restriction of benefits for at least forty-eight hours. See State v. Simon, 22-726 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 360 So.3d 528, writ denied, 23-148 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 714.

We find the failure to impose the mandatory fine renders the sentence illegally lenient. Although the authority to correct an illegally lenient sentence is granted and discretionary under La.Code Crim.P. art. 882, no action by this court will be taken in light of the March 28, 2007 conference decision to not recognize an illegally lenient sentence if the issue is not raised as an error. See also State v. Brown, 19-771 (La. 10/14/20), 302 So.3d 1109 (supreme court found the court of appeal erred in vacating an illegally lenient sentence absent any complaint by the State).

As for the trial court's failure to impose at least forty-eight hours of each sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, we also find this failure renders the sentences illegally lenient or indeterminate. However, because this court has found this error also renders a sentence illegally lenient, and because the issue is not raised as an error, no action will be taken.

We also note that La.R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) carries a mandatory fine of “not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars.” Because the trial court failed to impose a fine on counts seven and eight, we also find those sentences illegally lenient but, again, because the issue is not raised as an error, no action will be taken.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing maximum, consecutive sentences totaling sixty-six years imprisonment at hard labor, resulting in a constitutionally excessive sentence. Defendant argues that while the trial court did take into consideration the sentencing factors of La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 883, he did not consider that Defendant has two daughters, one of whom is a small child. Because the trial court did not consider Defendant's responsibility to his children, Defendant argues that the maximum, consecutive sentences, make no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering and shocks the sense of justice.

On March 15, 2024, prior to Defendant's sentencing, the victim testified as follows:

It was the most devastating time of my life. I've never gone through anything in my life like that before. It was pure torture. Only someone with an evil heart would do to someone -- to another human being.

The way I was tortured, the crime has left a devastating impact on my life. I suffered seven months of head injuries and still suffering from memory loss. I had to move several hours away from my family to protect them as well as myself and my son.

I still suffer from emotional trauma, as well as a financial hardship because I can't go to work. I was put on disability due to not being able to work in the public any more. I have trouble sleeping. Judge, I have eight holes in my head three millimeters deep, three millimeters wide, through my skull that I still go every few months to have CAT scans done to make sure there's no tumors or anything.

I ask that Jackie gets the maximum because this isn't the first time he's done this to someone. He's done it before. I forgive him for what he's done to me. I just pray that he gets the psychiatric help that he needs so where he doesn't do it to anyone else if he is let out.

My son ․ he has trouble at school. He doesn't want to leave home. He doesn't want to leave my side most of the days. He doesn't sleep at night. We're both going through counseling right now. We've been going through counseling for the last three years and it's getting a little easier, but we still have our days to where we just don't leave the house because we're scared to walk outside. My little one, he can't play sports and he doesn't do any of that. It's like he's taken his childhood life away from him because he's scared most of the time. He's a straight A student in school. He's very smart and does a lot of his work at home. It's just affected us both mentally and physically and I think it's going to be a while before we're both back to ourselves. I'm tired of moving, I'm tired of running, and I really just want it behind me to where I can try to be myself again. That's it.

The trial court made the following statements prior to sentencing Defendant:

Oh, okay. And so, you called her on her cell phone. You know, what amazes me is that, as I look at this -- at this horrific, horrific set of facts and circumstances here, you just write it off as “a bad day”, and you have no idea how, you know. And then, you got caught, you lied about it. You said oh, well you got in a fight with two women. The reality is you -- this wow, you didn't know who it was, whatever. These two -- you know this woman that you were in a relationship with, for a year or so -- she had a child, she left you for a few weeks. She made the terrible mistake of going to pick you up in Texas and bringing you back here, to a motel in Sulphur. And her son apparently even said -- asked you not to do it, saying “Mom, He's gonna kill us.” And the six-year-old child was prophetic, because that very likely would have happened had they not escaped and gotten out of there.

And the beating and the torture that these folks went through, for 12-hours -- the trauma and the terror that you put them through, that you consider was just a “bad day” for yourself. And that you have no idea -- obviously, you have no insight into what you caused them; that's gonna [sic] affect them for the rest of their lives. And then, you have the nerve to find out from somebody -- to get her phone number from somebody. And whoever it was that was, that was so disrespectful to her, to give you her phone number, when she had been so traumatized by you, just amplifies her fears even more.

And for you to say, that fact that you would -- “Oh, yeah, we're not bad, we're actually okay”, because you got her on the phone a couple of weeks ago. I'm not sure what you expect her to say -- because she lives in fear every day; that child lives in fear every day. To think that they could've gone through something like that, to think that anybody could treat another human being or other human beings the way you treated them -- and just be okay after that, Mr. Coleman. That definitely indicates that there's a problem. And it indicates that if you think that's okay, and if you think they could just be okay with that kind of abuse, then that tells me that you're certainly capable of doing that again.

But not only that -- I mean, as I look at this letter, and she talks about this devastating nightmare on June 24, almost right at five years ago. That she experienced pure -- she describes it as “pure torture”. And she wrote this letter just over a year ago, about 14-months ago, 15-months ago.

I'm gonna tell you the injuries she had as a result of that, in case you may not be aware. She says the way she was tortured, she said it left a devastating impact on her life. She suffered seven months of physical injuries and emotional trauma, as well as financial hardship; there is $60,000 or more in just hospital bills alone. There was six months of doctor care, for just cleaning the wounds in her head, that were holes three millimeters deep and three millimeters wide, through the skull. She said she had eight of them, eight of those wounds, and had to spend about another $7,000, out-of-pocket, on eye care and dental care. Not to mention the cost of hotels and food, every time there was a court date that had to be canceled or reset, in the last three years. She's had trouble sleeping, doesn't even feel safe in her home, sometimes, and lives in fear nearly every day.

I mean, that's the kind of stuff that -- I mean, that shouldn't be a surprise to you, that something like that causes -- she's had severe health problems. Her son is scared to play outdoors. She's afraid to be an outdoor person. She has had severe distress, she said she had a heart attack in November of ‘23. She said somebody texted her, saying that, “they were going to kill her” at some point. Those are the kind of things that affect people for the rest of their lives; that one day that was a bad day for you.

It's like people who molest children. Their few moments of gratification affect people for the rest of their lives. And this was much more than a few moments. And then, the child, you know, and all this stuff. And the thing is, you fired off a shotgun into the bed at that hotel, making this child think he was gonna die; making this child think you were gonna murder his mother; making the child's mother think she was gonna die. You said that, “if he tried to run that you were gonna shoot him in the head.” That kind of stuff --

When Defendant alleged that the court's statements were “all lies,” the court continued:

Hey, we're talking about a 12-hour time frame in a Motel Six in Sulphur. Where all the evidence is so clear, and all the blood, the gunshot, the bullets, all the stuff that was in -- the holes in her head, all the stuff that happened. They interviewed them separately, at the time. They didn't have them in the same room talking to them about what happened; they took different statements. You know how that works, Mr. Coleman? When they interviewed them, she had her injuries that needed to be tended to and they had this child; that's how they do it. They didn't have them in the same room. They took this child and had him interviewed separately by counselors, and they had her. And it's amazing how the things that they both said where [sic] the same. Even though, they didn't have a chance to get together and talk about with all that trauma that happened. When they got out of that room, they didn't have a chance to get their story straight, with all the stuff that happened. But it's amazing how their stories were the same.

So, when you say it's all lies, it's amazing how they both came up with the same lie, without any time to talk about it ahead of time. But yet, you made up some story, that day that you were arrested, about how you fought with two women; you didn't know who they were or something like that.

The following exchange regarding Defendant's police statement and criminal history then took place:

THE DEFENDANT:

Fight with two women?

THE COURT:

Let me see what it said here. Let me see if I remember right. Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah. I'm mistaken about that. It says when they ․ took your statement, on June 25, Sulphur Police conducted an interview with you, and noticed your hands were extremely swollen, your left eye appeared to be bruised. You had cuts, including a large gash on your thumb. And you claimed you had a pistol in your possession, because you didn't like to be without one.

It says, “Ms. Paladino got into a fight with two women outside of the hotel, but was unable to provide details. Claimed he did not get into an altercation with her except for play wrestling”. You described the room as dirty with clothes everywhere, and you did not mention the blood. You denied knowing how the blood got into the room. You said you cut your thumb on the nightstand, when you and the six-year-old were wrestling. Then, you claimed the shot gun was the victim[’]s, Ms. Paladino. You don't know how it got in the car. Didn't know anything about the drugs under the pillow. Claimed to be asleep from 7:00 p.m. until midnight, except for a little bit of TV watching.

Anyway, the bottom line is this was a brutal -- I'm not gonna try to read through all of the facts here, on the record, but this was a brutal, torturous set of circumstances. But I am going to go through the criminal history. You do have a history of violence, Mr. Coleman.

THE DEFENDANT:

I don't have a history of violence.

THE COURT:

Well, let me just say this: I show a history of being arrested for -- I see like in 2003, there was an arrest for an assault causing bodily injury to a family member -- I guess that was in Texas, but they --

THE DEFENDANT:

That was my --

THE COURT:

-- but that was dismissed after you completed an anger management class. I'm not sure what that terroristic threat charge was about but they -- it doesn't show a disposition on that; that was in 2004. That was Apri1 4, 2004. And then, a couple of weeks later, another terroristic threat. There's no -- that one was dismissed. It show[s] a disposition on that. Then, we show some theft charges in 2005. And then, a 2006 conviction for a drug charge 240 grams of codeine. You received ten years suspended and five years probation; probation was revoked in 2008. I'm not sure what this was, in 2006, but it says deadly conduct, but it was a misdemeanor. You were convicted of that.

You were convicted of another drug charge in 2007, received three years at Texas Department of Corrections. In 2007, assault causing bodily injury. Even though -- it doesn't have to be a felony to be a crime of violence. An assault causing bodily injury, that was a misdemeanor in 2007. Another one, in 2008, another assault causing bodily injury, involving a family member. You were convicted of that. More drug charges in 2010. You received a deferred [ad]judication, but then your probation was revoked in 2012.

More drug charges in January of 2020, felony drug charges. And this carjacking charge -- what is the date of offense on that? Was that prior to these charges? You have a bond on that?

THE DEFENDANT:

I was never arrested for none of that.

THE COURT:

Okay. That just came up after he was arrested for this? You just got charged with that after you were in jail for this?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay. All right. In any event, it shows that by Probation and Parole -- anyway, the bottom line is, looking at this criminal history that dates back all the way to -- the Office of Probation and Parole shows that your offender class is fourth offender -- even though they're not filing an Habitual Offender Bill. You have a criminal history that dates back over 20 years, which includes arrest for crimes of violence.

Like I said, domestic violence, even though it's considered a misdemeanor, it can be extremely violent. I've seen some extremely violent, violent acts of domestic violence be classified as misdemeanors. So anyway -- but the offender class being fourth offender is just with regard to felonies. But the bottom line is this: With what happened that day, I can tell you -- when we talked about “one bad day”, there are people at Angola, serving life sentences, who had one bad few minutes. Made one decision with intent to do one thing within a matter of a minute or two and took somebod[y’]s life, and they are doing life at Angola. And so, things happen, when people -- you can say, “Well, I had a bad day.” Well, a couple things about that: This wasn't something, that all of a sudden you hadn't had any indications of any violence against family members in your past; because, you have at least two convictions for domestic violence in your past.

THE DEFENDANT:

That was juvenile.

THE COURT:

Well, it's showing up on your rap sheet.

THE DEFENDANT:

It's juvenile. I was a juvenile.

THE COURT:

In 2007 and 2008? You weren't a juvenile in 2007 or 2008.

THE DEFENDANT:

No sir. I ain't got no convictions from it.

THE COURT:

Well, as I'm looking at 2007, it says disposition -- Hardin County. It says “convicted, placed on probation”. The arrest date was August 8, 2007. You had another assault, causing bodily injury to a family member. The arrest date was March 19, 2008, and May 14, 2008, you were sentenced to 60 days. Actually, on that first assault causing bodily injury, you were convicted June 24, 2008, and it was administratively closed April of ‘09.

But in any event, yeah, you were not a juvenile, at that time. But anyway, in any event, you had opportunities in your life to get yourself together, to get help that you need to get some -- and it culminated in an act of unspeakable violence and trauma against this adult victim and a child, that is gonna affect them the rest of their lives, Mr. Coleman. And I can tell you -- society and these victims have to be protected in the future. Because I don't think you have insight into the severity of what you have done. And so, the only saving grace for you, at this point, is that the State is withdrawing its Habitual Offender Bill. And I think, had they not escaped, we could have really been looking at, at least a single homicide, maybe a double homicide, and combined with maybe a suicide. Which, we see often times, these things lead to. And I think there was this tremendous jealousy involved here. As I read in here, that you were afraid that she had slept with someone else. And that was kind of -- those kin[d] of obsessive jealousy things leads to -- they just lead to destruction, and that's why we ended up here.

Regarding the sentencing factors, the trial court stated:

But anyway, I'm gonna go ahead at this time and impose sentence. I'm just gonna say that I have considered, under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1, the sentencing guidelines there. Under 894.1 A, I find that all three of those things apply, especially 1 and 3. Well, the Defendant is not eligible for any type of suspended sentence, number 1. And number 2, a lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crime. And under B, aggravated and unmitigated circumstances, I see absolutely no mitigating factors whatsoever. I have heard none; I have seen none, but I do see some aggravating, for sure. B1, the offenders conduct under the conviction of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim or victims, in this case. Number 2, the offender knew or should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistances, due to extreme youth.

Number 5, the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily har[m] to more than one person. Number 6, the offender used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense. And this isn't necessarily gonna make any difference in my sentencing, but I think this applies. Number 9, the offense resulted in a significant permanent injury. Well, actually I do think this applies -- the offense resulted in a significant permanent injury or loss to the victim or her family. I think this is gonna result in significant, permanent, emotional trauma to this victim and the child, which is injury. Number ten, the Defendant used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense. Number 11, the offense involved multiple victims for which separate[ ] sentences have not been imposed. Number 18, the offender foreseeably endangered human life by discharging a firearm during the commission of an offense. Tries, as an element the use, attempted use or threaten use of physical force against the person or property of another. And which, by its very nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used in the co[u]rse of committing the offense. I'm not sure that one applies; I'm gonna have to read that again. And 19 is similar to that.

And I think I've listed out all the other trauma that has been caused and will be caused for the foreseeable future and the rest of the defendant's like, along with the criminal history of the Defendant.

After sentencing Defendant, the trial court stated:

And one of the things I'm taking into consideration, as well, is that the State showed much grace and mercy on you already, whenever they dismissed several of the companion charges that you were charged with, which could have made this -- the false imprisonment charge with a dangerous weapon was dismissed as part of this plea, and several other charges were dismissed, as part of this plea, that could have greatly increased your sentence even more. And the Habitual Offender Bill, ultimately, was dismissed today, which could have greatly increased your prison exposure.

So, I take into consideration those things, as well. Well, the ones that were dismissed are considered unadjudicated crimes that the court is allowed to take into consideration. Which, I think, the facts of this case clearly indicate that they could have been prosecuted. So, all things considered, I think that this sentence is -- you came out as well as you possibly could have, Mr. Coleman, in light of all the circumstances. Even though I've imposed consecutive sentences and the maximum sentences on these. In light of the fact that you're a fourth offender, and all these other charges that were dismissed.

Thereafter, Defendant made a general objection to the sentences.

Defendant did not raise the issue of the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences in a motion to reconsider sentence. “In State v. Pardue, 22-565 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/15/23), 359 So.3d 158, this court held that the defendant's failure to raise an argument regarding the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences in his written motion to reconsider or at the hearing on his motion to reconsider sentence precluded review.” State v. Haywood, 25-445, p. 22 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/29/26), 434 So.3d 182, 198. Similarly, we find this argument has not been preserved for review, and as such, will not be addressed. We will, however, address whether his sentences are excessive.

As the State indicated, Defendant did not make or file a motion to reconsider sentence. As such, this court's review is limited to a “bare claim of excessiveness.” State v. Pyke, 95-919, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 713, 715. Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979). In State v. Barling , 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042–43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00), 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant's sentences, the appellate court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958[, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996)].

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005–06 (alterations in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261. “Generally, maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious violation of the offense and the worst type of offender.” State v. Herbert, 12-228, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/13/12), 94 So.3d 916, 920, writ denied, 12-1641 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 78.

As noted, Defendant received the maximum sentence for each conviction. The respective sentences include twenty years for each of two counts of possession of a firearm or carrying of a concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies, fifteen years for aggravated second degree battery, three years for domestic abuse battery—first offense—strangulation, three years for domestic abuse child endangerment, and five years for possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, totaling sixty-six years to run consecutively. The violent nature of the offenses and Defendant's history were thoroughly set out by the trial court at sentencing.

As a preliminary matter, we note that the plea bargain resulted in a significant reduction in Defendant's potential sentencing exposure due to the dismissal of eight charges including attempted second degree murder. The State also dismissed the habitual offender bill despite Defendant's classification as a fourth offender.² Such a benefit may be considered when determining whether a sentence is excessive. See State v. Hicks, 07-726 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/5/07), 977 So.2d 1008.

Defendant's convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon require imprisonment at hard labor for “not less than five nor more than twenty years” without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.R.S. 14:95.1(B). As stated, Defendant was sentenced to twenty years, the maximum sentence provided by law. This court has previously upheld maximum sentences for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

In State v. Tucker, 22-735 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/23), 368 So.3d 187, the sixty-three-year-old defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm and was sentenced to the maximum of twenty years. The defendant had previously been convicted of armed robbery. This court upheld the defendant's twenty-year sentence, noting that the defendant started committing crimes at nineteen years old, had been on parole twice, committed crimes before his parole was completed, and was considered a fourth felony offender.

In State v. Charles, 20-498 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/21), 318 So.3d 356, the forty-five-year-old defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and received the maximum sentence of twenty years. This court subsequently affirmed the defendant's sentence, noting that the defendant had a lengthy criminal history, as he was a fifth felony offender. The court also noted that the defendant had a prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and thus, the maximum sentence was warranted.

Here, the firearm offenses to which Defendant pled guilty, namely the possessions of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number, which carries a sentence of one to five years with or without hard labor under La.R.S. 14:95.7. Defendant, a multiple prior felon, not only possessed two firearms, one with an obliterated serial number, he beat his girlfriend bloody with them in front of her minor child over a course of hours, and shot them off in a hotel room. There is no question that these are among the most serious violations of these offenses and that Defendant is the worst type of offender. Defendant's maximum sentences are affirmed.

“Whoever commits the crime of aggravated second degree battery shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than fifteen years, or both.” La.R.S. 14:34.7(C). As stated, Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor, the maximum sentence provided by law. This court has previously upheld maximum sentences for aggravated second degree battery.

Regarding Defendant's maximum fifteen-year sentence for aggravated second degree battery, we find State v. Vice, 21-143 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/21), 329 So.3d 388, persuasive. In Vice, the intoxicated defendant repeatedly beat and abused his romantic partner, choked her, and kicked her in the face with his boot, bloodying her lip. The trial court, in sentencing the defendant to the maximum, properly described the pair's time together as a ‘ “reign of terror.” ’ Id. at 397. The court also noted that the defendant benefitted from the plea agreement, as the State dismissed multiple charges including one that could have mandated a life sentence.

Unlike Vice, Defendant did not merely kick his girlfriend in the face, he hit her in the head and leg with a firearm, breaking bones and necessitating surgery, in addition to striking her with his hands and choking her. Blood was found throughout the hotel room. The trial court properly described the victim's plight as a “brutal, torturous set of circumstances.” The victim attested to her ongoing care and the extensive medical bills Defendant's deliberate cruelty caused. As in Vice, Defendant has a lengthy criminal history. Based on the facts and Vice, we find Defendant's maximum sentence is warranted.

Regarding Defendant's maximum three-year sentence for domestic abuse battery—first offense—strangulation, we find State v. McGinnis, 19-381 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/11/20), 364 So.3d 172, relevant. In McGinnis, the fourth circuit upheld the defendant's maximum sentence even though it was a first offense because the evidence showed that the victim was held captive for approximately ten hours, repeatedly beaten, and the defendant's arm was wrapped around her neck at one point. Because the victim suffered grave bruising and swelling, the defendant could have been charged with second degree battery and faced a maximum of eight years imprisonment.

Like in McGinnis, the victim here was held captive, beaten and choked, and suffered disfigurement. Unlike in McGinnis, Defendant was actually charged with and pleaded guilty to aggravated second degree battery. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and also note that because Defendant “pistol-whipped” the victim, he could have been sentenced to up to ten or fifteen years had the State charged him with a violation of La.R.S. 14:35.3(O) or (P).³

Under La.R.S. 14:35.3(I), the state is only required to prove that a minor child was present at the time of the commission of the offense in order for the offender to receive a felony child endangerment enhancement with a sentence of up to three years at hard labor. This court finds no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to sentence Defendant to the maximum sentence of three years at hard labor given the facts and the statute. The minor child warned his mother not to pick up Defendant because he thought Defendant was going to kill them. Defendant proceeded to commit the acts described above in the presence of the child while also threatening to kill the child.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its broad sentencing discretion and that the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the maximum sentences imposed. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court discussed the applicable aggravating factors and the fact that no mitigating factors existed. The trial court also acknowledged the fact that Defendant received a substantial benefit by not being adjudicated as a habitual offender. Defendant's lengthy criminal history indicates that he is the worst type of offender, and the facts of these crimes suggest that Defendant committed the most serious violations of these offenses.

DECREE

We find the sentences imposed are not disproportionate to the crimes Defendant committed and do not shock the sense of justice. Defendant's sentences, as imposed by the trial court, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that count three, domestic abuse child endangerment law, cited section I of La.R.S. 14:35.3 but not section C. However, because there is no allegation that this omission misled Defendant to his prejudice, we find any error is harmless. La.Code Crim.P. art. 464; State v. Allen, 09-1281 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/10), 36 So.3d 1091.

2.   Our calculations indicate that Defendant reduced his sentencing exposure by approximately 127 years.

3.   La.R.S. 14:35.3(O) states that “if the intentional use of force or violence is committed with a dangerous weapon, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years.”La.R.S. 14:35.3(P) states that “if the intentional use of force or violence is committed with a dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury, the offender, in addition to other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifteen years.”

PERRET, Judge.