WILDFOWL PROPERTIES LLC v. BROWN (2026)

Wildfowl Properties, L.L.C. and Brady Brown own adjacent properties in rural, isolated northwest Jeff Davis Parish. Brown accesses his landlocked property through a private road on Wildfowl's property. Brown and his family have been using this access since 1982 without incident.

Wildfowl appeared on the scene in 2023 with its purchase of 180 acres next to Brown. The installation of a gate by Wildfowl led to conflicts. Eventually, Wildfowl sought an injunction to bar or limit Brown's passage over its property. Brown responded with a reconventional demand seeking continued passage.

After a trial of Brown's reconventional demand, the trial court ordered Brown to pay Wildfowl $4,000 in compensation for his passage but denied Wildfowl's claim for damages pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 696. The trial court did not address Wildfowl's request for limitations, restrictions, or indemnification, but it did cast all costs against Wildfowl even though it granted relief to both parties. Wildfowl appeals that judgment.

FACTS

Wildfowl's main, private roadway, Wildfowl Road, begins at Marsh Bayou Road and goes south through the tract. Brown owns two adjacent tracts east of Wildfowl's property. To access those tracts, Brown and others who own camps on his property cross a culvert-style bridge (recently rebuilt by Wildfowl) and travel south on Wildfowl Road until they turn east toward Brown's tracts. Marsh Camp Road is the only road providing access to Wildfowl's property, and thus, the camps.

After Wildfowl bought its acreage, it installed a locked gate at Marsh Bayou Road (the entrance to its property). Brown, those who own camps on his property, and guests use a key to one of the locks in the multi-lock system to unlock the gate and travel through Wildfowl's property to access the tracts. Wildfowl placed two combination locks on the gate – one for emergency vehicle access, and the other for Wildfowl access. Additionally, four keyed locks allow access for Brown, Ronald Reeves (another landlocked property owner), utility companies, and Wildfowl. Unlocking any one of the six locks opens the gate.

The previous owner had verbally allowed Brown and other landlocked neighbors to use the existing roads to access their property. Wildfowl likewise verbally allowed Brown to use its road in exchange for Brown's assistance in maintaining it and preventing trespassing and unauthorized use of the road and Wildfowl property. Wildfowl stopped Brown's access “[b]ecause they are constantly leaving the gate open.”

Wildfowl's petition sought injunctive relief from Brown alleging he promoted trespassing, caused property damage, and allowed unauthorized use of the road; cut and changed the locks on Wildfowl's gate without permission; left the gate unlocked and open without authorization; and allowed unknown, third parties to use the property, including areas they were not authorized to use. The petition alleged Brown's actions caused extensive damage to roadways and improvements; caused Wildfowl to incur numerous expenses; and exposed Wildfowl to inconvenience, irreparable harm, and unnecessary liability. The petition further alleged Brown's misconduct prevents Wildfowl from using and enjoying the property to its full and desired extent. Wildfowl sought injunctive relief to bar Brown from passing over, damaging, or interfering with its use of the property.

Alternatively, Wildfowl sought an order for Brown to construct a direct road at his expense from his property to the nearest public road.¹ In the alternative, Wildfowl sought to limit Brown's passage by requiring him to use gates, comply with reasonable restrictions, help maintain and prevent unauthorized use of the property, compensate Wildfowl for his passage, indemnify Wildfowl for damages arising from Brown's use, and require Brown to obtain $1 million of insurance coverage for his potential liability and name Wildfowl as an additional insured.

In response to Wildfowl's petition, Brown alleged Wildfowl had denied him peaceable possession of and access to his property. Brown contended he had made substantial repairs and improvements to help Wildfowl maintain the road. He alleged unnamed third parties had caused any damage Wildfowl claimed.

Brown further alleged Wildfowl's placement of a lock on the gate caused emergency response vehicles to be unable to assist in emergencies. Because Wildfowl refused to grant Brown the access he wishes, Brown asked the court to impose a servitude on Wildfowl's land “for access and utilities.”

Wildfowl sought compensation and indemnity from Brown in return for passage. It asked the court to order Brown to maintain and insure the passage area at his cost. Wildfowl wanted the passage limited to designated hours and controls put in place to limit damage to the passage area. Wildfowl also asked Brown to “[r]estrict the number of people that can access it, payment for road maintenance, and restricted hours.” Wildfowl sought an injunction only against Brown because the other owners “do what we ask of them.”

Scott Long, a fifty percent owner of Wildfowl and one of its managers, testified at the trial of the reconventional demand that Wildfowl installed the gate to protect its property, improvements, and equipment. Long testified that Brown's invitees have removed Wildfowl's proprietary lock several times and replaced it with their own locks. They obtain the combination locks’ codes and:

allow anybody to come in there ․ they're constantly doing what we ask them not to do. We asked them not to use the road when there's water over it. As soon as it rains, the first thing that's coming – his fishing buddies are coming to put their nets out when the water's over the road, and it just further does damage to it.

Long did not identify “anybody,” offer dates and/or times when the “fishing buddies” came, or provide any other details to support his statement.

Brown testified that his father purchased the property in May 1982.² For all of Brown's life, the family accessed the property by traveling south on Marsh Bayou Road, crossing a bridge through a locked gate, continuing south to an intersection, and turning east for approximately half a mile to their camps. Their access in that manner was never interrupted. Everyone who used the property had a key for the single lock on that gate. Brown said, “it was kind of a buddy system․ [If] you didn't have a key, you wasn't suppose[d] to be back there.” At some point around 2012 to 2015, someone cut off the gate and stole it. No one presented any evidence of any prior complaints regarding Brown or anyone else at trial.

When Wildfowl purchased its property, it installed a new gate with a multi-lock system of four keyed and two combination locks. Brown and others who had camps on his property were given keys to one of the locks designated solely for them. Brown requested combination locks because with keyed locks, “we can't get in if nobody has a key to get in it. So whoever's at the camp first has to go out and unlock the gate every single time somebody wants to come.” He testified “it would be a lot more convenient” for them with only combination locks. Approximately a dozen people use the roadway. Other permanent residents who live on other landlocked property also travel through the gate. Brown did not know of any problems with the other landlocked property owners regarding access.

Brown purchased a load of rock at some point and agreed to “contribute a load of rock every year ․ until the road was maintained well enough that [they] didn't need more rock.” He has also graded the road. He did not think the other residents had contributed anything toward road maintenance. Brown testified he was willing to continue maintaining his access to the road.

When asked whether any of Brown's invitees to his property ever left Wildfowl's gate open, he explained that at Easter, the gate was locked while “[p]eople were trying to come in and out, and ․ people were hanging up at the gate and couldn't get in.” When no one could reach Wildfowl, Brown said “we went and removed the lock so it couldn't be locked. The gate was shut, just remove the lock.” While guests were still present, someone put another lock on the gate. Brown said, “we were locked in and couldn't get out.” The keys Wildfowl had given Brown did not fit the lock.

Brown testified video evidence would show Dempsey Martin, the owner of one of the camps on Brown's property, cutting the lock on another occasion. Brown said further video would show Martin “telling the camera that you got six hours to take the lock off[.]” Wildfowl had previously agreed to allow Brown and the others to leave the gate open when water was on the road, and the water was rising in the video such that the road “would be covered probably within an hour or two.”

Martin testified no one uses his camp except him, his children, and grandchildren, and they share one key to the gate. They use the property only for fishing and swimming; they do not hunt on it. Verifying Brown's testimony, Martin explained how, on one occasion, visitors were coming to Martin's camp. He unlocked the gate and left it “dummy locked” so his guests could come through it. Someone came behind him and locked the gate. Martin had to travel from his camp to the gate to unlock it three times for visitors arriving at various times. He finally cut the lock. Someone then put a different lock on the gate, and Martin's guests could not get out. Martin looked at the video camera at the gate and said he would remove the lock if it was still in place by dark. No one ever came, so he cut the lock and replaced it, after his guests left, with the original lock he had removed. Martin had no problem with having a gate, and he would be happy with a combination lock. The only time he knew of anyone intentionally leaving the gate open was in a flood situation. He understood they were authorized to leave the gate open in that event.

The trial court found Brown's property is an enclosed estate as defined by La.Civ.Code art. 689. Thus, Brown may claim a right of passage over Wildfowl's property to the nearest public road, but he must compensate Wildfowl for that right and indemnify Wildfowl for any damage caused by his right of passage. The trial court assessed the fair market value of Brown's right of passage (noting the value of that right is not equal to the value of the property) at $4,000 and awarded that amount to Wildfowl. Finding no evidence or testimony of any damage Brown caused to Wildfowl's property resulting from the right of passage, the trial court declined to award any amount for indemnification. However, the judgment provides Brown will owe Wildfowl indemnity if Wildfowl shows damage resulting from Brown's exercise of the servitude. The trial court assessed all court costs against Wildfowl.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Wildfowl alleges three assignments of error in this appeal:

I. The District Court abused its discretion by awarding Appellant compensation of $4,000 and no damages under La. Civ. Code [sic] art. 696, when the undisputed evidence and testimony presented at trial indicated the passage allowed imposes significant inconvenience, interference, and hardship on Appellant-Wildfowl.

II. The District Court manifestly erred in failing to impose any restrictions on Appellee's use of Appellant's property and roadway.

III. The District Court abused its discretion in casting Appellant with all court.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

We review the assignments of error under two different standards. The abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court's award of damages and costs, while the manifest error standard applies to factual issues regarding restrictions and/or encumbrances. Levine v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 23-488, 23-499 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/24), 381 So.3d 908, writ denied, 24-426 (La. 6/19/24), 386 So.3d 310.

Assignment of Error No. 1

Wildfowl complains that the $4,000 compensation award did not consider the damages, hardship, inconvenience, and interference caused by Brown. It suggests $40,000 as compensation for Brown's right of passage and for damages pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 696.

The version of La.Civ.Code art. 689 in effect at the time this action began addresses both avenues of recovery.³ It stated:

The owner of an estate that has no access to a public road or utility may claim a right of passage over neighboring property to the nearest public road or utility. He is bound to compensate his neighbor for the right of passage acquired and to indemnify his neighbor for the damage he may occasion.

Wildfowl cites Hutchinson v. Jackson, 399 So.2d 1238 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1981), where this court computed the value of the right of passage based on expert testimony that assigned a value to the square footage of the roadway involved. That court noted “that absent some extraordinary circumstances, the value of a servitude taken is not the same as the full market value of the land.” Id. at 1241. This court reduced the trial court's award of damages in “an amount equal to the full market value of the property within the servitude” by ten percent because of the plaintiff's residual rights over the servitude property. Id.

Using that rationale, Long testified that Wildfowl paid $2,000 per acre for the eighty-acre plot on which Wildfowl claims compensation and damages. As part of that plot, the roadway involved is, as Long measured, approximately three thousand feet long and sixteen to twenty feet wide at various spots. Based on Long's measurements, the square footage involved ranges from 48,000 to 60,000 square feet.

But Wildfowl seeks an award of $40,000 – twenty-five percent of the price it paid for the entire eighty acres – for compensation and damages. That figure assumes the entire eighty-acre plot is subject to the right of passage. It is not; only the road is. Using a standard measurement of 43,560 square feet to constitute an acre and Wildfowl's purchase price of $2,000 per acre, the value of 48,000 square feet (1.1019 acres) is approximately $2,204, while the value of 60,000 square feet (1.3774 acres) is approximately $2,755. Thus, absent expert or any other testimony to the contrary, the value of the property, based on Wildfowl's purchase price of $2,000 per acre, ranges from $2,204 to $2,755 as compensation for Brown's right of passage, less than the trial court's award of $4,000.

Wildfowl also seeks damages from Brown. The trial court ordered Brown “to indemnify Wildfowl Properties, LLC for any damage caused by the right of passage that he now owns, if any damage can be demonstrated from the exercise of the servitude in accordance with La. Civil Code [sic] art. 696; otherwise, no indemnification to Wildfowl Properties, LLC is owed.” The trial court's Reasons for Ruling explained that Wildfowl offered “no testimony or evidence” that it “sustained any damage to its property as a result of the defendant's use of his right of passage.”

Wildfowl's idea of “damages” is the limitation of its use of the eighty acres – its hunting activities and use of the road for travel among its hunting locations – resulting from Brown's right of passage. Wildfowl contends Brown's unrestricted passage “presents safety concerns and interferes with hunting activities and driving on the roadway before daylight and after sunset to go to and from hunting locations.”

Testimony established that Brown had verbal agreements with Wildfowl and the prior property owner to use the road. Thus, Brown claimed his right of passage long ago. Wildfowl knew of that right and the impact it may have on its hunting preferences when it bought the property. If anything, Wildfowl's hunting activities – shooting guns and arrows – present safety concerns to Brown's right to use the roadway before daylight and after sunset, not the other way around.

By filing his reconventional demand, Brown admitted his willingness to indemnify Wildfowl for damages resulting from his use of his right of passage. See Robertson v. Arledge, 54,129 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 328 So.3d 551, writ denied, 21-1837 (La. 2/8/22), 332 So.3d 667. Thus, Wildfowl has no need to “demand payment of indemnification that was already admitted.” Id. at 564–65. But Wildfowl does have the burden “to prove the amount of damage resulting from the servitude of passage.” Id. at 565.

If the “damages” Wildfowl seeks are “severance damages,” those damages:

are ordinarily calculated as the difference between the market value of the remaining property immediately before and immediately after the taking. The burden of proving alleged severance damages to the remainder of the property involved rests upon the owner who must establish such damages with legal certainty by a preponderance of evidence.

State Through Dep't of Highways v. Denham Springs Dev. Co., Inc., 307 So.2d 304, 307 (La.1975) (citations omitted). This court applied that definition where a servient estate owner sought damages for the dominant estate's right of passage in May v. Miller, 06-418 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/06), 941 So.2d 661, writ denied, 07-09 (La. 3/9/07), 949 So.2d 443.

Here, Wildfowl presented no evidence that Brown's right of passage diminished the market value of the eighty acres. While Wildfowl's claim that Brown's use results in safety concerns, interference with its hunting activities, and inconvenience, those claims address only potential personal effects on its members. Wildfowl has shown nothing to suggest those claimed elements have affected the market value of the land.

The only damage Wildfowl proved was a cut lock. The trial court's generous award of $4,000 in compensation for the right of passage is fully sufficient to cover the cost of replacing that lock. The trial court correctly denied Wildfowl's claim for further damages.

Assignment of Error No. 2

Wildfowl argues the trial court erred when it refused to impose terms and limitations on the servitude of passage it recognized in Brown's favor. Wildfowl's post-trial memorandum to the trial court sought fifteen separate restrictions. Wildfowl contends the trial court erred when it failed to impose or even address any of those limitations, terms, or conditions on Brown's right of passage.

The requested restrictions include Brown's maintenance of the roadway east of Wildfowl Road; payment of a maintenance fee from Brown, depending on the number of people Brown authorizes to access his property; indemnification for damages and a $1 million liability insurance policy; control of the gate, locks, keys, and key distribution, with Wildfowl providing the locks and Brown paying for them; speed limitations on the road; prohibiting pedestrians or recreational vehicles from using the road, parking, hunting, or otherwise using Wildfowl property; limiting Brown's right of passage to him and his immediate family or requiring him to identify guests with forty-eight-hour notice; requiring disclosure of heavy equipment transport; requiring Brown to provide restrictions to guests and subsequent property owners; and requiring the prevailing party in future disputes to recover attorney fees and court costs. Other requests address limiting passage on the roadway during certain hours, with stricter limitations during hunting season so as not to inconvenience Wildfowl's hunting activities.

While La.Civ.Code art. 728 does allow “[t]he use of a predial servitude” to be limited, La.Civ.Code art. 748 states, “The owner of the servient estate may do nothing tending to diminish or make more inconvenient the use of the servitude.” Brown's right of passage began in 1982 when his father purchased the property. Wildfowl limited Brown's access by placing the multi-lock gate on Wildfowl Road. The trial court ordered Brown to indemnify Wildfowl “if any damage can be demonstrated from the exercise of the servitude[.]” We will not diminish or make Brown's right of passage more inconvenient for him than it was at the time of Wildfowl's purchase by imposing restrictions solely for Wildfowl's benefit.

Assignment of Error No. 3

Wildfowl contends the trial court erred in casting it with all court costs. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 states:

Unless the judgment provides otherwise, costs shall be paid by the party cast, and may be taxed by a rule to show cause.

Except as otherwise provided by law, the court may render judgment for costs, or any part thereof, against any party, as it may consider equitable.

The trial court has great discretion in awarding court costs. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion here.

DECREE

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of the appeal are cast against Wildfowl Properties, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Scott Long, Wildfowl's representative, admitted at trial that Marsh Bayou Road provided the closest access to Brown's property.

2.   Brown and his siblings inherited the property from his father, and he subsequently bought his siblings’ interest in it.

3.   The current version of La.Civ.Code art. 689(A) addresses compensation for Brown's right of passage, while the current version of La.Civ.Code art. 696 addresses indemnification for damages. The revision does not change the law.

DAVIS, Judge.