STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DALE DWAYNE CRAIG (2020)

The defendant, Dale Dwayne Craig, was convicted of first degree murder and the jury sentenced the defendant to death in 1994. The offense occurred in September 1992, when the defendant was seventeen years old. His conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Craig, 95-2499 (La. 5/20/97), 699 So.2d 865, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 935, 118 S.Ct. 343, 139 L.Ed.2d 266 (1997).

In 2005, the trial court resentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole after the United States Supreme Court held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. State v. Craig, 2005-2323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/06), 944 So.2d 660, 660, writ denied, 2006-2782 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So.2d 518, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062, 128 S.Ct. 714, 169 L.Ed.2d 554 (2007); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).

Following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the State in the instant case filed a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In 2023, the trial court conducted a Miller hearing,¹ determined the defendant was eligible for parole, and resentenced the defendant accordingly.² The State appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the governing statutory scheme and improperly weighing the evidence presented. This court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and dismissed the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded for briefing, argument, and a full opinion on the merits.³ State v. Craig, 2023-1296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/24), 2024 WL 4661804 (unpublished), rev'd and remanded, 2025-00024 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So.3d 952, 956. The parties have filed supplemental briefs raising additional arguments on remand. The Louisiana Center for Children's Rights filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief, which this court granted.⁴ After careful consideration, we reverse the trial court's imposition of parole eligibility and reinstate the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole.

FACTS 5

Near midnight on September 14, 1992, Kipp Gullett, a freshman at Louisiana State University (LSU), parked his Ford Bronco in the parking lot outside his campus dormitory. Craig, 699 So.2d at 867. Gullett was returning to his room after visiting with a friend. As he began to exit his vehicle, the defendant rushed up and struck him in the face with a pistol. The defendant ⁶ and his three accomplices ⁷ had spent much of the evening lurking in parking lots looking for a car to steal because the defendant needed transportation to visit his girlfriend. Id.

The defendant held his gun to Gullett's head in the back of the vehicle while the others got inside and accomplice Maurer drove them out of the parking lot. As they were driving, Gullett pled with his captors, offering them money and his vehicle, and telling them his parents were rich and would pay for his safe return. Gullett also attempted to keep his face hidden in his hands in an effort to convince his captors that he would not be able to identify them if they were to let him go, but the defendant instructed him to sit up straight to “look normal.” While Gullett continued to cry and beg for mercy, the defendant probed him for information on whether his disappearance would be noticed. He also asked Gullett if he had “gotten any” from his girlfriend that evening. Craig, 699 So.2d at 867.

As they drove around town looking for a gas station without too many cars or people around, the defendant and his companions debated Gullett's fate. The defendant expressed his decision to kill Gullett, but the others suggested beating him into unconsciousness. The defendant seemed to acquiesce, and they drove to a secluded construction site near South Kenilworth Crossing in East Baton Rouge Parish. The defendant and accomplice Lavigne, both armed with handguns, pulled Gullett from the vehicle and marched him at gunpoint away from the vehicle. They reached a grassy area where Lavigne struck Gullett in the head with the butt of his gun. Gullett fell to the ground and laid in a fetal position. As Lavigne began to walk back to the Bronco, the defendant knelt at Gullett's side and fired three bullets through his head, killing him. Craig, 699 So.2d at 867.

The four drove quickly away from the scene. The defendant told his accomplices that he had killed Gullett to protect their identities, and then he said to the group, “I love you all, you are my boys. If you say one f–––ing word, I'll kill you, too.” To Maurer, he said, “I told you I was hard.” The defendant asked if the group should go kill anybody else while they were at it, but he answered his own question by responding, “No, the game warden might get pissed.” Craig, 699 So.2d at 867.

The defendant drove the Bronco to visit his girlfriend, who was at his house. He told her the details of his crime and how he decided to kill Gullett when one of his accomplices had used an identifying name. The following day, the defendant decided to destroy the Bronco, so he stripped the vehicle of its stereo system. Accompanied by his mother, girlfriend, and Lavigne, who all followed in a separate car, the defendant took the vehicle to the levee, where he set it afire. Craig, 699 So.2d at 867.

Soon after daybreak, the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office investigated the suspected arson of a Ford Bronco at the levee and discovered that the registered owner was Gullett's father and that the vehicle was regularly driven by his son. After Gullett's father was notified concerning the vehicle, he contacted the LSU Police Department to relate that he was unable to locate his son. Simultaneously, deputies were investigating reports of a body found at a construction site near the Kenilworth Ridge Apartments. Craig, 699 So.2d at 867-68. Officers conducting the two investigations quickly realized the connection between the two crimes and identified the body as Gullett. Id. at 868.

The defendant was convicted of first degree murder after a three-day trial. Following another three-day penalty phase, the jury found as aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed in the course of an aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery and that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel manner. The jury unanimously determined the defendant should receive the death sentence, which the trial court thereafter imposed. Craig, 699 So.2d at 868.

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY

On appeal, the State asks this court to reverse the trial court's ruling reducing the defendant's sentence to life imprisonment with parole eligibility and to reinstate the defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole eligibility. In its original brief to this court, the crux of the State's argument was as follows:

The Defendant presented no real expert testimony; instead, the Court erroneously permitted multiple witnesses to testify, essentially as experts, about subjects in which they have no qualification, training, or certification. Moreover, the real expert testimony that does exist, from the original trial by one of the Defendant's own witnesses, paints a picture of a likely sociopath—one who is not likely to learn from experience or maturity and who should remain in prison for life. At the Miller hearing, the Defendant did not rebut or even address this finding.

The State alleged the trial court misapplied the governing statutory scheme set forth in La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(C) by requiring the State to prove the defendant was irreparably incorrigible. Further exacerbating the error, the State contended the trial court relied on evidence outside the record and improperly weighed the evidence presented.

In its brief on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court, the State argues a jury has already found the defendant to be the worst of the worst, and the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed when it affirmed his death sentence; therefore, the defendant is one of the worst offenders and his case is one of the worst cases, which precludes parole eligibility under La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(D).⁸ The State again asserts the trial court impermissibly required it to prove the defendant was permanently incorrigible and focuses its argument on Justice Cole's concurrence in Craig, 421 So.3d at 960-62. Because we granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal in Craig, 2024 WL 4661804, we will discuss the merits of the State's arguments raised in the original and supplemental briefs.

Discussion of Statutory and Jurisprudential Law

Before we address the specific arguments advanced by the State, we begin with a review of the applicable Louisiana statutes and controlling jurisprudence regarding juvenile sentencing.

In Miller, 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, the United States Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Supreme Court went on to require a sentencing court to “follow a certain process—considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics” before imposing a life without parole sentence. See Id. at 483, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. Later, in Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 212, 136 S.Ct. at 736, the United States Supreme Court held that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively. Montgomery, 577 U.S.at 210, 136 S.Ct. at 735.

The Louisiana legislature enacted, and later amended, La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 in response to the holdings of Miller and Montgomery. Craig, 421 So.3d at 954 n.1. As applied to the defendant, La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 ⁹ provided:

B. (1) If an offender was indicted prior to August 1, 2017, for the crime of first degree murder (R.S. 14:30) or second degree murder (R.S. 14:30.1) where the offender was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of the offense and a hearing was not held pursuant to this Article prior to August 1, 2017, to determine whether the offender's sentence should be imposed with or without parole eligibility, the district attorney may file a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole within ninety days of August 1, 2017. If the district attorney timely files the notice of intent, a hearing shall be conducted to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility. If the court determines that the sentence shall be imposed with parole eligibility, the offender shall be eligible for parole pursuant to R.S. 15:574.4(G). If the district attorney fails to timely file the notice of intent, the offender shall be eligible for parole pursuant to R.S. 15:574.4(E) without the need of a judicial determination pursuant to the provisions of this Article. If the court determines that the sentence shall be imposed without parole eligibility, the offender shall not be eligible for parole.

․

C. At the hearing, the prosecution and defense shall be allowed to introduce any aggravating and mitigating evidence that is relevant to the charged offense or the character of the offender, including but not limited to the facts and circumstances of the crime, the criminal history of the offender, the offender's level of family support, social history, and such other factors as the court may deem relevant. The admissibility of expert witness testimony in these matters shall be governed by Chapter 7 of the Code of Evidence.

D. The sole purpose of the hearing is to determine whether the sentence shall be imposed with or without parole eligibility. The court shall state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis for its determination. Sentences imposed without parole eligibility and determinations that an offender is not entitled to parole eligibility should normally be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst cases.

The United States Supreme Court later clarified that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole. Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 118, 141 S.Ct. 1307, 1321, 209 L.Ed.2d 390 (2021). In Jones, the Supreme Court reiterated that under Miller, “an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.” 593 U.S. at 100, 141 S.Ct. at 1311. The “key assumption of both Miller and Montgomery,” the Supreme Court explained, “was that discretionary sentencing allows the sentencer to consider the defendant's youth, and thereby helps ensure that life-without-parole sentences are imposed only in cases where that sentence is appropriate in light of the defendant's age.”¹⁰ Jones, 593 U.S. at 111-12, 141 S.Ct. at 1318. According to Jones, if the Miller or Montgomery Court wanted to require sentencers to make an additional factual finding of permanent incorrigibility, the Court could have easily said so, but it did not do so. On the contrary, the Montgomery Court declared the sentencer need not make such a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility. Jones, 593 U.S. at 112, 141 S.Ct. at 1318.

In Craig, 421 So.3d at 961-62, Justice Cole, joined by Justices McCallum and Crain, opined in his concurring opinion, that, at a Miller hearing, trial courts should give the utmost weight to evidence of the offense committed, reasoning:

I also write separately to note that, while article 878.1 is worded to permit a trial court to consider “any aggravating and mitigating evidence that is relevant to the charged offense or the character of the offender” (emphasis added), it is my view that a resentencing court should give paramount consideration to the information considered by the trier of fact when the original sentence was rendered. That is the best evidence of the “charged offense” available, and the original conviction and sentence necessarily takes into account any mitigating and aggravating factors that may reflect on the “character of the offender.” See generally State v. Williams, 03-3514, p.15 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, 17 (“[A]n appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.”); State v. Thompson, 15-0886, p.29 (La. 9/18/17), 233 So. 3d 529, 548 (noting the high level of deference given to “the jury's obvious assessment of credibility and weighing of the evidence”); State v. Frank, 99-0553 (La. 5/22/07), 957 So. 2d 724, 743 (noting the deference given to the “good sensibility and fairmindedness of juries”).

In Adams v. Alabama, Justice Alito expressed his view that “[i]n cases in which a juvenile offender was originally sentenced to death after the sentencer considered but rejected youth as a mitigating factor, courts are free on remand to evaluate whether any further individualized consideration is required.” 578 U.S. 994, 136 S.Ct. 1796, 1799, 195 L.Ed.2d 251 (2016) (Alito, J„ concurring). Under Louisiana law, a jury considering whether to impose a death sentence is required to consider the relative “youth of the offender at the time of the offense” and the “capacity of the offender to appreciate the 3 and criminality of his conduct.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.5. In this case, the trial jury was required by law to consider mitigating factors concerning this offender that are exceedingly similar to those under art. 878.1, and it nonetheless unanimously decided that this serious offense warranted the imposition of the state's utmost penalty.

․

A finding of incorrigibility is not required by either the Eighth Amendment, or by the Louisiana statutory resentencing guidelines. To properly consider the “charged offense or the character of the offender,” any resentencing hearing conducted under article 878.1 must carefully consider the original sentence imposed by the jury— which had the best view of the totality of evidence concerning the crime and all aggravating or mitigating factors.

Id. (Cole, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).11

Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

The parties herein contest which party bears the burden of proof at a Miller hearing. Both La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 and its jurisprudence are silent as to this question. The State contends the United States Supreme Court implicitly placed the burden of proof on the defendant as reflected by some of the language used in its Montgomery decision. For example, the Supreme Court stated that “when the Constitution prohibits a particular form of punishment for a class of persons, an affected prisoner receives a procedure through which he can show that he belongs to the protected class.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 210, 136 S.Ct. at 735 (emphasis added). According to the State, this is further supported by the Supreme Court's conclusion that “prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption.” Id. at 213, 136 S.Ct. at 736 (emphasis added). The State argues that, while not expressly holding as such, the Supreme Court has implicitly ruled a defendant must prove his or her life without parole sentence is disproportionate in light of his or her age at the time of the offense.

On the other hand, the defendant notes a Miller hearing is required in Louisiana only if the State files a notice of intent to seek a sentence of life without parole. Otherwise, La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1 defaults to the imposition of parole eligibility for juvenile offenders, which seemingly places the burden on the State to prove the defendant is the worst of the worst. In other words, the defendant argues the State has complete discretion to seek a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, and if the State exercises that discretion, the burden is on the State to prove that life without parole is the appropriate sentence for that particular defendant. The defendant further argues the State's reliance on Montgomery is misplaced as the sole issue before the Supreme Court was whether Miller would be applied retroactively to allow Montgomery an opportunity for a determination as to the legality of his sentence.

Both parties agree this court should review the trial court's ruling under the abuse of discretion standard of review. A trial court has complete discretion to impose any sentence authorized by law which is not constitutionally excessive. The trial court has broad discretion, and a reviewing court may not set a sentence aside absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See State v. Mangrum, 2023-01609 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 765, 767-68 (per curiam). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Louding, 2014-1642 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/5/15), 2015 WL 3613194, *10 (unpublished), writ denied, 2015-1303 (La. 6/17/16), 194 So.3d 1112.

Because we find the trial court abused its discretion regardless of which party bears the burden of proof, we pretermit further discussion of this issue.

Trial Court Proceedings

The Miller hearing in this matter took place over the course of two days in December 2022 and March 2023. The trial court took judicial notice of the record, which the State referred to in its post-hearing memorandum, and of the defendant's Department of Corrections records. The State also presented testimony from two members of Gullett's family who described the devastating impact the murder had on them. Georgiann Gullett, Gullett's mother, testified her son was an incredible child who was loved and adored by many, and his death had a profound impact on their family. She further testified how difficult it was to live with the knowledge her son was terrified and begging for his life in the minutes leading to his death. Georgiann stated that to her knowledge, the defendant did not apologize or accept responsibility during his 1994 trial, nor had he done so since. Gullett's maternal uncle testified that he was a good kid who would not hurt a fly. He testified as to the senselessness of his nephew's murder and further stated he was not aware of the defendant ever reaching out to the family to offer an apology. The State also introduced a written statement from Gullett's sister, as well as eight photographs of Gullett from the time he was a small child to his senior year of high school. Gullett's sister discussed the impact her brother's death had on her and her family and also stated that she was not aware of any remorse the defendant had shown for her brother's murder. She also stated that she believed the defendant would harm other people given the opportunity.

The defendant presented several witnesses on his behalf.¹² ,¹³ Lawson Strickland, a former death row inmate who had become a Class B Trustee at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“Angola”), testified that in 1999, he and the defendant tried to escape from the prison. He explained they cut a barred window, left their unit, went across a roof, exited on the other side of the security fence, and headed towards the Mississippi River. They were captured within four hours and never left the prison grounds. He and the defendant were then moved to a disciplinary housing unit at Angola called Camp J. According to Strickland, they were the first death row inmates to be disciplined to that extent, and he described the conditions at Camp J as “brutal.”

Over the course of almost thirty years, Strickland and the defendant became friends. Strickland testified he saw the defendant develop and mature into a trusted and responsible individual, serving as a programming facilitator and Class B Trustee. Strickland facilitated a victim awareness class, which required inmates to admit to their crime and take responsibility for their actions, as well as write an accountability letter. According to Strickland, a victim's family may be notified regarding the letter, after which it would be up to the family as to whether to access the letter. However, Strickland testified offenders are prohibited from directly contacting a victim or a victim's family by state law. While he was not the defendant's victim awareness facilitator, Strickland testified the defendant completed the victim awareness class and had taken responsibility and expressed remorse for his crime.

Wilbert Kelly, an inmate at Angola and friend of the defendant's, testified as to the changes he had witnessed in the defendant, as well as his generosity and kindness to others. Kelly testified the defendant moved to a transitional dorm offering Department of Corrections (“DOC”) classes six months before Kelly. By the time Kelly arrived, the defendant had already completed all the programming available to him, and he encouraged Kelly to enroll in the many programs offered by Angola. Kelly also confirmed the defendant had expressed remorse for his crime through both his words and his actions.

Ashley Roubique, a friend of the defendant's since about 1988, who had frequently visited him over the years at Angola, testified that the defendant had expressed regret for his involvement in the case.

Katie Yotter, the defendant's twenty-nine-year-old daughter, testified she met her father for the first time when she was seventeen. Yotter, her partner, and their daughter lived in Melville, Louisiana, on property the defendant inherited from his mother, and she testified that she had frequent communication and visitation with the defendant. Yotter testified if the defendant was granted parole, they planned for him to move in with her family.

The defendant offered the expert testimony of Andrew Hundley, executive director of the Louisiana Parole Project (“LPP”). Over the State's objection, Hundley was accepted by the trial court as an expert:

limited on what he actually considers in his role and then the reports that he received on [the defendant], and how he has now evaluated that based upon the criteria that his agency -- I think all of that is going to help the court in determining whether or not the Miller and Montgomery factors have been met.

Hundley testified LPP provides reentry support and advocacy to men and women who have served long prison sentences. The program has served more than 370 individuals since its inception, and just over 100 of whom were juveniles at the time they committed their crime. Hundley reviewed the defendant's DOC records, including his disciplinary history and programming certificates. Hundley noted the defendant's completion of programming was exceptional in that he completed every program available to him as soon as it became available. Hundley also testified that offenders are prohibited by law from reaching out to the victim's family. He noted the defendant earned his GED in 2017 and was currently working as a mentor within Angola, a position reserved for only a few dozen inmates. Hundley testified this required the defendant to take various courses and demonstrated the institution's trust in him. Hundley also noted the defendant's participation in the Prisoners Assisting Warriors Services (“PAWS”), a service dog training program in which no more than ten inmates, personally selected by the warden, are partnered with a dog for which they are responsible for training. The dogs are then adopted by veterans in need of service animals.

Hundley also testified regarding the defendant's DOC disciplinary record, noting that in the defendant's more than three decades at Angola, he received a total of twenty-two write-ups. The majority of the write-ups came from the defendant's early years of incarceration, with the defendant receiving only three write-ups in the last twenty years, and no write-ups in the last six years. Taking into consideration the defendant's crime, his DOC disciplinary and programming history, as well as his current assignments as a trustee and mentor within Angola, Hundley testified he believed the defendant had demonstrated great growth and maturity.

Finally, the defendant offered a sworn allocution in which he read aloud his accountability letter intended for Gullett's family. The defendant stated, in pertinent part:

To the mother and family of Kipp Gullett, the words do not exist that would express just how remorseful I am for having taken Kipp's life. He did not deserve this, nor should any of his family and friends have to live with that loss. Over the years I've learned just how much of a wonderful person he was ․

And knowing that I'm responsible for his death and preventing him from achieving the many positive things he undoubtedly would have done with his life it's a horrible reality I deal with every day and I will forever, as I should.

Both the State and the defendant filed post-hearing memoranda, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court later issued its Amended Sentencing Order, resentencing the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In its Order, the trial court referred to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Roper, Miller, and Montgomery and the legislature's enactment and amendment of La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1. The trial court noted the defendant was seventeen years old at the time at the offense and found his “unstable home life, exposure to drugs and alcohol and unaddressed educational needs contributed to his emotional immaturity and poor mental health.” The trial court referred to Justice Crichton's concurrence in Montgomery, 194 So.3d at 610, emphasizing its focus under La. Code. Crim. P. art. 878.1(D) must be not only on the nature and circumstances of the underlying offense, but also on evidence of the defendant's maturity and rehabilitation. As such, the trial court considered the defendant's limited disciplinary history, particularly in the last twenty years. It further noted the defendant's successful completion of every course and program made available to him at Angola, as well as his recruitment by prison administrators to serve as a program facilitator and mentor for other inmates and a trustee. Finally, the trial court ruled:

This Defendant's actions reveal transient immaturity of youth. This Court is obligated to fashion a sentence that protects the community. Additionally, a defendant's sentence is supposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense. Notwithstanding the aforementioned, the Court recognizes the maturity and educational rehabilitation that the Defendant has gained. The mitigation outweighs the aggravation of the type of offense committed in this case and the way in which it was committed.

This Court is charged with ensuring that the Defendant does not receive a sentence that is in violation of the Constitution; a sentence that does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court articulated a concept of ‘irreparable corruption’ to guide the lower courts in identifying the rare case where a juvenile would receive the harshest punishment. This Court must ask the very difficult but essential question of whether this Defendant is among the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. This is not such a juvenile. This is not such a case. This Court finds that the appropriate sentence is [l]ife imprisonment with the possibility of parole.

Analysis

Turning now to the question of whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant parole eligibility, we find it did.

A sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders should be reserved for the worst offenders and the worst cases. La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(D). The State contends the trial court erred in granting the defendant parole eligibility given the heinous facts of the underlying offense, the defendant's storied criminal history, and his utter failure to take responsibility for his crimes or participate in rehabilitative programming until it benefitted him. Because the record clearly supports that the defendant is one of the worst offenders and this is one of the worst cases, we agree the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendant parole eligibility.

We agree with the State's argument that the trial court improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence. At a Miller hearing, trial courts should give the utmost weight to evidence of the offense committed, and must carefully consider the original sentence imposed by the jury, which had the best view of the totality of evidence concerning the crime and all aggravating or mitigating factors. Craig, 421 So.3d at 961-62 (Cole, J., concurring). The law is clear that the details of the defendant's underlying crime are factors to be considered at a Miller hearing, as is the information considered by the trier of fact when the original sentence was rendered. Here, the trial court's consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense extends no further than averring the case involved the “carjacking, kidnapping, terrorizing, and ultimate murder of Kipp Gullett in September 1992.”¹⁴

We must presume the trial court's references to the defendant's “unstable home life, exposure to drugs and alcohol and unaddressed educational needs,” are from the information presented to the defendant's initial sentencing jury.¹⁵ The defendant thoroughly presented three days of mitigation testimony to a jury of his peers following his conviction in 1994. That presentation included ten witnesses who discussed the defendant's youth, character, troubled home life, limited education, and exposure to drugs and alcohol. The culmination of that testimony came from Dr. Christine Turin, who presented the jury with a comprehensive assessment of the defendant, including his limited adult role models, his childhood traumas, and their lasting impact on his character.¹⁶ In spite of that presentation, the jury originally sentenced the defendant to death, the highest criminal penalty under our law, for his senseless and vicious murder of an unsuspecting college student. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the death penalty was not disproportionate to the crime he committed and to his circumstances. Craig, 699 So.2d at 874-76. When the defendant's death sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to life without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, this court again considered the appropriateness of that sentence and again denied relief. Craig, 944 So.2d at 664-65. In affirming that sentence, this court rejected the defendant's claim that his sentence was excessive, concluding:

In the instant case, there was no reason for the trial court to deviate from the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant failed to clearly and convincingly show that because of unusual circumstances he was a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that were meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. The sentence imposed was not unconstitutionally excessive and was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense. Further, we specifically reject the argument that a sentence of life without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, of a defendant who was seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is a per se violation of the prohibition against the imposition of excessive punishment.

Id.¹⁷

The trial court placed much emphasis on the defendant's disciplinary record during his twenty-eight-year incarceration, noting that “[a]part from his attempted escape in 1999” the write-ups were not serious but were for “minor contraband violations.” The trial court detailed the defendant's completion of every course and program available to him at Angola, his position as a mentor, facilitator, and Class B Trustee within the prison, and the letters prison officials wrote on his behalf, stating the defendant “ ‘has changed for the better.’ ” Ultimately, the trial court found the mitigation evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence.

While we note the defendant's recent accomplishments as an inmate at Angola, we find the trial court abused its discretion in finding this evidence outweighed the heinous nature of the defendant's crime, his escalating criminal history leading to this offense, and his ill-conceived attempts at escaping incarceration.¹⁸ As his original sentencing jury heard, while awaiting trial in 1993, the defendant attempted to escape from custody by arming himself with a shank, overpowering a prison guard, and threatening to kill him. In 1999, the defendant's escape attempt from death row demonstrated his continued disregard for the law and the safety of others, as well as his unwillingness to take responsibility and be held accountable for the mindless brutality of his crime.¹⁹ See State v. Wilson, 40,767 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1111, 1147, writ denied, 2006-2323 (La. 4/20/07), 954 So.2d 159, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 917, 128 S.Ct. 275, 169 L.Ed.2d 201 (2007).

Again, we find it highly problematic that the trial court gave little to no weight to the facts of the underlying offense detailed above and gave the utmost weight to the defendant's actions while in prison. The defendant's crime was heinous and inexcusable, and the trial court's summation of his crime as the “carjacking, kidnapping, terrorizing, and ultimate murder of Kipp Gullett in September 1992” does not reflect a meaningful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the crime. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(C).

One of the State's principal arguments on appeal pertains to the legal standard used by the trial court in granting the defendant parole eligibility. The State alleges the trial court based its determination on the standard of whether the defendant was permanently incorrigible, a standard expressly denounced in Jones, 593 U.S. at 118, 141 S.Ct. at 1321, and not required by La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1. In its brief, the State contends this error, coupled with the trial court's improper weighing of the evidence, requires the defendant's sentence of life without parole eligibility to be reinstated.

As discussed above, the trial court's order—which was issued two years post-Jones—focused on whether the defendant was permanently incorrigible. The Amended Sentencing Order specifically stated: “This Court must ask the very difficult but essential question of whether this Defendant is among the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility. This is not such a juvenile. This is not such a case.” Neither Miller nor Montgomery requires a court considering parole eligibility to make factual findings of transient immaturity or irreparable corruption. Rather, those cases instruct a court to consider the circumstances of each particular case and determine whether those circumstances show a life without parole sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime committed as a juvenile. The United States Supreme Court held in Jones that a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required, and our legislature has declined to make such a finding a prerequisite under La. Code Crim. P. art. 878. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 113, 141 S.Ct. at 1318-19. Jones also confirmed that a proper sentence is based on both the facts and circumstances of the offense as well as the background of the offender. See Jones, 593 U.S. at 120, 141 S.Ct. at 1322.

Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendant parole eligibility. We, therefore, reverse the trial court's grant of parole eligibility and we reinstate the defendant's life sentence of imprisonment without the benefit of parole eligibility.

REVERSED; SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE ELIGIBILITY REINSTATED.

The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Fruge, 2014-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So.3d 579, 584; State v. Mangrum, 2023-01609 (La. 10/25/24), 395 So.3d 765, 768. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Bourque, 2025-0441 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/15/26), 2026 WL 1746174, *2.

As Justice Crichton noted inmates who have “committed homicide when they were juveniles are entitled to a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ based on ‘demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ as required by [Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)].” State v. Montgomery, 2013-1163 (La. 6/28/16), 194 So.3d 606, 610-11 (Crichton, J., concurring).

In the instant case, following a Miller ¹ hearing, the trial court resentenced the defendant to life imprisonment with the benefit of parole. Prior to resentencing the defendant, the trial court weighed and considered aggravating and mitigating evidence that was relevant to the charged offense, the defendant's character, the facts and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's criminal history, the defendant's level of family support, the defendant's social history, the defendant's behavior while incarcerated, and other factors the trial court deemed relevant. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(C). The testimony at that hearing established that the defendant had not received any write-ups in the last six years. The defendant earned his GED and completed all of the programming available to him. He served as a program facilitator, Class B Trustee, and a mentor—a position reserved for only a few dozen inmates. The defendant also has strong family support.

The trial court was tasked with distinguishing whether the defendant was “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity” or “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Based on the evidence presented at the Miller hearing, the trial court concluded the “[d]efendant's actions reveal transient immaturity of youth.” The court found “the mitigation outweigh[ed] the aggravation of the type of offense committed in this case and the way in which it was committed.”

Considering the evidence of the defendant's rehabilitation, I cannot say the trial court abused its wide discretion by resentencing the defendant to life with the benefit of parole. Fruge, 179 So.3d at 584. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to amend the sentence to life without the benefit of parole.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A hearing conducted pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(B)(1) is colloquially referred to as either a “Miller hearing” or a “Montgomery hearing.” We will use the former term.

2.   Judge Bonnie Jackson, now retired, presided over the defendant's trial and his subsequent post-conviction proceedings. Judge Eboni Johnson Rose succeeded Judge Jackson, and she presided over the Miller hearing and rendered the subsequent ruling.

3.   The Louisiana Supreme Court's holding was strictly limited to finding the State had a right to appeal a trial court's ruling on retroactive parole eligibility determinations and the resentencing of juvenile homicide offenders resulting therefrom. State v. Craig, 2025-00024 (La. 10/24/25), 421 So.3d 952, 954-56.

4.   We note that the amicus brief included an attached exhibit which this court did not consider.

6.   The defendant was about one week shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of the homicide. Craig, 699 So.2d at 872.

7.   The defendant's accomplices were Zebbie Berthelot, James Conrad Lavigne, and Roy Maurer, all of whom were teenagers, ranging in age from fifteen to nineteen years old. See Craig, 699 So.2d at 866; Craig v. Cain, 2011WL 6130594, *3 (M.D. La. 2011) (unpublished), adopted, 2011 WL 6130607 (M.D. La. 2011) (unpublished).

8.   The State also discusses the defendant's prior appeal post-Roper wherein this court found his life without parole sentence was not unconstitutionally excessive. See State v. Craig, 2005-2323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/25/06), 944 So.2d 660, 664, writ denied, 2006-2782 (La. 6/29/07), 959 So.2d 518, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062, 128 S.Ct. 714, 169 L.Ed.2d 554 (La. 2007).

9.   2026 La. Acts, Act No. 585 § 1, effective August 1, 2026, amended La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(A) and (D), but the amended version of the statute is not applicable in this case.

10.   The United States Supreme Court likened a sentencer's discretion to consider youth before imposing a sentence of life without parole under Miller to a capital sentencer's “discretion to

11.   As noted in footnote 9, La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(D) was amended in 2026. 2026 La. Acts, Act No. 585 § 1. The amendment substituted the following sentences for the last sentence of section (D), echoing the language in Justice Cole's concurrence:A reviewing court shall give paramount consideration to the information considered by the trier of fact that rendered the original sentence. In cases where a juvenile offender was originally sentenced to death after the court considered but rejected youth as a mitigating factor, a reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trier of fact unless the trier of fact clearly abused its discretion and could not have reasonably reached that result.As stated in footnote 9, the amended version is not applicable in this case, and we did not consider it.

12.   Prior to the scheduled Miller hearing, the defendant sought to introduce several expert reports, including psychiatric evaluation reports by Dr. Sarah DeLand, M.D. and Dr. R.M. Storer, Ph.D. After the State moved to exclude the reports or, alternatively, to continue the hearing, the defendant withdrew his intention to introduce the contested reports into evidence. The trial court granted the State's motion to strike the reports from the record and ordered the clerk of court to remove the reports authored by Dr. DeLand and Dr. Storer from the record. Nevertheless, those reports are contained in the record before us. We do not consider any reports not properly and officially offered and admitted into evidence, even if the reports are physically contained in the appellate record. See State v. Nguyen, 25-312 (La. App. 5th Cir. 11/12/25), 427 So.3d 267, 281, writ denied, 2025-01475 (La. 5/12/26), 430 So.3d 1087.

13.   While the transcript shows that the defendant offered exhibits that the trial court admitted into evidence, the record of the hearing does not include those exhibits. Pursuant to this court's interim order, the Clerk of Court for the Nineteenth Judicial District Court informed this court that the exhibits “were not tendered to the clerk in the courtroom during the hearing.” While the defendant sought to stay the appeal to supplement the record with these exhibits subsequent to the submission of the case for decision by this court, the motion to stay was denied.

14.   The significance of this bare bones phrasing from a resentencing judge (who was not the trial judge and did not preside over any prior post-conviction relief proceedings) is not lost on this court. The Amended Sentencing Order overlooks the litany of procedural history existing in this case. Though the resentencing judge assured she took “judicial notice” of the entire trial court record, we find some parts of the prior jurisprudence noteworthy for citation herein.

15.   Notably, the defendant successfully sought funding for and was interviewed by multiple mental health professionals and mitigation experts in preparation for the Miller hearing. However, in an effort to minimize the delay and expenses associated with the State's rebuttal evidence on mitigation, the defendant withdrew from evidence all expert reports and exhibits prepared in conjunction with his Miller hearing.

16.   Dr. Turin testified she compiled the information after interviewing the defendant for thirteen and a half hours, his mother for approximately ten hours, and his grandparents for approximately three hours.

17.   We find this language particularly relevant, given that a sentence of life without parole remains constitutional as applied to those offenders similarly situated as the defendant (a seventeen-year-old defendant convicted of first degree murder).

18.   These escalating crimes were summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in its Capital Sentence Review:Finally, the Capital Sentence Investigation Report indicates that defendant, while a juvenile, was first arrested on January 17, 1985, for simple burglary. On April 16, 1985, he was placed on Informal Adjustment Agreement and on October 30, 1986, the matter was dismissed. On October 16, 1986, defendant was arrested for illegal possession of stolen things. On May 27, 1987, disposition was deferred pending defendant's adjustment to the District Attorney's Diversion Program. On August 24, 1988, adjudication was vacated and the charge was dismissed. On November 12, 1988, defendant was arrested for misdemeanor theft and on November 12, 1988, this charge was also dismissed. On August 30, 1990, defendant was arrested for theft of a bicycle. On March 15, 1991, disposition was deferred for one year and defendant was placed on supervised probation for one year. On April 13, 1991, defendant was arrested for illegal carrying of a weapon (.25 caliber handgun); on July 13, 1991, defendant was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. On December 4, 1991, defendant received a six month suspended commitment to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and was placed on one year supervised probation. On August 6, 1991, defendant was arrested for forcible rape and aggravated assault; however, these charges were dismissed on December 9, 1991. Furthermore, according to the probation report, on November 4, 1991, defendant was stopped in the Chimes Street area in Baton Rouge by the Street Gang Task Force. He was searched and a large knife was found and confiscated. On November 6, 1991, a probation violation hearing was held. Defendant was found in contempt and sentenced to five days in detention. In addition, it should be noted that defendant was on supervised probation at the time he committed the present offense.Craig, 699 So.2d at 873.

19.   According to Strickland, the defendant's witness and co-perpetrator in this escape attempt, he and the defendant were the first death row inmates to ever be disciplined by reassignment to Camp J.

1.   A hearing conducted pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1(B)(1) and the guidance set forth in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).

Fields, J. dissents with reasons.