SANDRA MONAHAN INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CLASS REPRESENTATIVE OF CERTIFIED CLASS AGAINST THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE FOR THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS (2026)

The City of New Orleans appeals the district court's July 7, 2025 judgment granting the petition for writ of mandamus filed by Sandra Monahan, individually and as class representative. The underlying April 4, 2024 judgment, which the City did not appeal, orders the City to reimburse the certified class $8,284,084.51 for unconstitutional late payment and collection penalties imposed through the City's ad valorem tax system. The narrow issue in this case is whether the City may treat payment of this particular refund judgment as discretionary and thereby postpone indefinitely the constitutionally guaranteed prompt recovery of an illegal tax collection.

For the following reasons, we hold that, under the circumstances presented, La. Const. art. VII, § 3(A), as reinforced by La. Const. art. V, § 35, provides the specific constitutional authority that makes satisfaction of this final refund judgment a ministerial duty. We therefore affirm the judgment granting mandamus. Because the applicable constitutional provisions mandate recovery but do not prescribe the precise time or manner of payment, we remand for the district court to establish a payment plan that ensures full satisfaction within a reasonable period, consistent with Watson Mem'l Spiritual Temple of Christ v. Korban, 24-00055, p. 20 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So.3d 499, 513-14.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1998, the New Orleans City Council adopted Ordinance No. 18637 (hereinafter sometimes referred to as “the Ordinance”), codified in the New Orleans Code of Ordinances, Chapter 150, Article II, §§ 150-46.1 through 150-46.6.¹ The Ordinance was enacted “to provide for interest and increased penalties on delinquent ad valorem taxes and for the payment of costs and attorneys’ fees in connection with the collection of such taxes.” Ordinance No. 18637. In pertinent part, it provided:

Sec. 150-46.2 Penalty and Interest.

(a) A delinquent tax incurs a penalty of three percent of the amount of the tax on the day such tax becomes delinquent.

(b) A delinquent tax accrues interest at a rate of one percent for each month or portion of a month the tax remains unpaid in accordance to [La.] R.S. 47:2101.

Sec. 150-46.3 Additional Penalty for Collection Costs.

(a) All delinquent taxes for prior years, and taxes that remain delinquent on April 1 of the year in which they became delinquent, incur an additional penalty to defray costs of collection if the taxing unit has referred the collection of the delinquent taxes, penalty and interest to an attorney or collection agent. The amount of the additional penalty shall be thirty percent of the amount of taxes, penalty and interest due.

The Ordinance further provided that specified collection costs and expenses constituted charges against the property and were collectible with the taxes, interest, penalties, and costs owed by the tax debtor. See New Orleans Code of Ordinances, § 150-46.5.

After paying penalties assessed in accordance with the Ordinance, A. Remy Fransen, Jr., and Allain F. Hardin, in 2002, filed a class action challenging their constitutionality and seeking reimbursement. During the period relevant to the proposed class, neither the then applicable version of La. R.S. 47:2110 nor the later enacted City ordinance supplied an applicable payment under protest procedure for these charges.² See Fransen v. City of New Orleans, 02-2384, pp. 7-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/19/03), 862 So.2d 142, 146-48, writ denied, 03-3498 (La. 3/12/04), 869 So.2d 823.

In 2008, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed Fransen and Hardin's constitutional challenge, finding the Ordinance unconstitutional “to the extent it imposes penalties, other than interest, upon delinquent ad valorem property taxes on immovables.” Fransen v. City of New Orleans, 08-0076, 08-0087, p. 25 (La. 7/1/08), 988 So.2d 225, 242. The Court explained that the constitutional provisions governing property taxation permit a governmental subdivision to impose “only the taxes, interest and costs in proceeding to sell the property for the delinquent ad valorem taxes.” Id.

In 2009, Thomas Monahan and Sandra Monahan (“the Monahans”), among others, were substituted as proposed class representatives. Following a three-day class certification hearing, the district court rendered judgment on November 24, 2015, certifying a class of persons and entities who were assessed and paid the unconstitutional penalties and collection fees during the class period, defining the class as follows:

Those persons and/or entities or their heirs, successors or assigns, who pursuant to New Orleans City Ordinance No. 18637 were assessed city penalties and collection/penalty fees ․ and who paid these unconstitutional penalties and collection/penalty fees from April 17, 2000 through February 21, 2002.

Fransen v. City of New Orleans, 16-0844, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/28/18), 317 So.3d 372, 378. On appeal, this Court amended the district court's class certification judgment to reflect an ending date of March 6, 2002, in lieu of February 21, 2002. Id., 16-0844, pp. 25-27, 317 So.3d at 389-90.

The Monahans, individually and as class representatives, filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 26, 2023, the district court rendered judgment in favor of the Monahans and the class and against the City, declaring the challenged provisions of the City's municipal code adopted via the Ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the Monahans and to the certified class and ordering the City to return all late payment and collection penalties paid during the class period April 17, 2000 to March 5, 2002. The City did not appeal that judgment.

The Monahans then moved for summary judgment on behalf of the class as to the total amount owed to the class. On March 21, 2024, the district court ruled in in favor of the class. On April 4, 2024, the district court signed a judgment ordering the City to reimburse the class $8,284,084.51 for the unconstitutionally assessed late payment and collection penalties. The City did not appeal the April 4, 2024 judgment, and it is now final.

When the City failed to satisfy the April 4, 2024 judgment, Sandra Monahan, individually and on behalf of the class (collectively “Plaintiffs”), filed a petition for writ of mandamus against the City and its tax collector, Director of Finance Romy Schofield-Samuel (the “Director of Finance”), to compel the Director of Finance to pay all sums due and owing under the April 4, 2024 judgment. Following a hearing on December 19, 2024, the district court rendered judgment on July 7, 2025, granting the petition and directing the Director of Finance to pay the sums due. This appeal by the City followed.

The City contends that the district court erred by compelling the Director of Finance to satisfy the April 4, 2024 judgment without a specific appropriation by the New Orleans City Council. It argues that no applicable constitutional or statutory provision expressly requires the Director to pay this judgment or specifically authorizes mandamus in these circumstances. The City distinguishes Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C. v. Bridges, 16-1663 (La. 5/3/17), 223 So.3d 488. According to the City, Jazz Casino involved state taxes governed by Subtitle II of Title 47 and statutes that expressly required the Secretary of the Department of Revenue to refund an overpayment. La. R.S. 47:1621 directed that the refund be made from current collections of the particular tax, and La. R.S. 47:1437 expressly authorized mandamus to enforce the final judgment. The City argues that those statutes do not apply to the local ad valorem tax penalties and collection charges at issue in the case sub judice, which are governed by Subtitle III of Title 47.

The City further argues that, even if La. R.S. 47:1621 applied, it would not support mandamus because the City ceased collecting the unconstitutional charges more than a decade ago. It maintains that there are no current collections of the particular imposition from which to make a refund and, therefore, payment would necessarily come from the general fund.

The City similarly distinguishes Watson. It emphasizes that Watson involved the express constitutional requirement in La. Const. art. I, § 4(B)(1) that just compensation be “paid” when property is taken or damaged. The City argues that Article VII, § 3(A), which directs the Legislature to provide a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax, contains no comparable express requirement obligating the City or its Director of Finance to satisfy this judgment.

Relying upon La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C), La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2), Newman Marchive P'ship, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 07-1890 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 1262, Hoag v. State, 04-0857 (La. 12/1/04), 889 So.2d 1019, Crooks v. State Through Dep't of Nat. Res., 22-00625 (La. 1/27/23), 359 So.3d 448, and Mellor v. Par. of Jefferson, 22-01713 (La. 9/8/23), 370 So.3d 388, the City argues that judgments against a political subdivision are payable only from funds appropriated for that purpose. It contends that an order compelling payment from the general fund usurps the authority of the political branches and violates the separation of powers.

The City also represents that it allocates $2 million each year for judgments and pays judgment creditors chronologically according to the dates their judgments become final. It argues that the writ improperly places Plaintiffs ahead of other judgment creditors and overrides the Director of Finance's discretion in administering those funds. Finally, the City disputes Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the Benn-Abbey litigation. See Benn-Abbey v. City of New Orleans, CDC Case No. 2013-6929. It maintains that the successful taxpayers in Benn-Abbey paid under protest and that their payments were held in escrow, permitting a refund without recourse to the general fund or an additional appropriation.

Plaintiffs respond that La. Const. art. VII, § 3(A) requires “a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax paid by a taxpayer.” They contend that this constitutional guarantee supplies the specific exception necessary to overcome the general appropriation requirements of La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2).

Plaintiffs rely upon Watson for the rule that a specific constitutional or statutory provision may make payment ministerial and operate as a de facto appropriation. They argue that Watson did not require both a constitutional mandate and an implementing payment statute because the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation was independently sufficient. In their view, an unsatisfied tax refund judgment likewise does not provide the “complete” remedy or “prompt recovery” required by Article VII, § 3(A).

Plaintiffs acknowledge that La. R.S. 47:1621 does not apply to this local ad valorem tax litigation. They rely upon Jazz Casino, however, for the broader principles that a tax refund returns money the government lacked authority to collect, that tax refund obligations are constitutionally distinct from ordinary tort and contract judgments, and that the government may not defeat a mandatory refund obligation by invoking separation of powers. Plaintiffs argue that the City cannot rely upon the absence of a statutory refund procedure when the class fell within a procedural gap that this Court recognized earlier in this litigation. See Fransen, 02-2384, p. 9, 862 So.2d at 148.

Plaintiffs distinguish Crooks, Mellor, and the cases involving ordinary tort or contract judgments because none involved a constitutional provision specifically guaranteeing recovery of an illegal tax. They also dispute the City's “head of the line” argument, maintaining that taxpayers seeking restitution of unconstitutional tax exactions are not similarly situated to ordinary judgment creditors. They emphasize that the class has waited more than twenty years for reimbursement.

As to Benn-Abbey, Plaintiffs contend that the City paid only after the taxpayers instituted mandamus proceedings. They dispute the City's assertion that the funds remained in escrow and argue that, in any event, the City cannot defeat the constitutional guarantee by failing to segregate the funds it collected. Plaintiffs seek affirmance and, relying upon Watson, contend that the district court may establish a reasonable plan for payment since the Constitution does not prescribe the precise time and manner of satisfaction.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In its sole assignment of error, the City contends that the district court committed legal error in issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the Director of Finance to pay the April 4, 2024 judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court's judgment granting or denying mandamus is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, and its factual findings are reviewed for manifest error. Cooley v. Williams, 22-0564, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/23), 358 So.3d 127, 129; Downtown Dev. Dist. of City of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 18-0726, pp. 26-27 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/8/19), 272 So.3d 917, 935. When, however, the ruling turns upon the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and whether those provisions impose a ministerial duty, the controlling legal questions are reviewed de novo. Watson, 24-00055, p. 10, 387 So.3d at 507; Crooks, 22-00625, p. 2, 359 So.3d at 450.

DISCUSSION

Mandamus and the General Protection of Public Funds

“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is directed at a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law.” Crooks, 22-00625, p. 3, 359 So.3d at 450 (citation omitted); see also La. C.C.P. arts. 3861 and 3863. A ministerial duty is one “in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer” and “a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.” Crooks, 22-00625, p. 3, 359 So.3d at 450 (quoting Hoag, 04-0857, p. 7, 889 So.2d at 1024). If the officer retains any discretion concerning whether to perform the act, mandamus will not lie. Id.

La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C) provides:

[The legislature] shall provide a procedure for suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision and provide for the effect of a judgment, but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. The legislature may provide that such limitations, procedures, and effects of judgments shall be applicable to existing as well as future claims. No judgment against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by the legislature or by the political subdivision against which the judgment is rendered.

(Emphasis added.)

The Legislature implemented this provision through La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2), which provides, inter alia, that a judgment against a political subdivision “shall be exigible, payable, and paid only ․ out of funds appropriated for that purpose by the named political subdivision.” These provisions protect the public fisc, prohibit seizure of public funds, and ordinarily leave governmental spending priorities to the political branches. See Newman Marchive, 07-1890, pp. 5-10, 979 So.2d at 1266-69 (holding that a general appropriation to a retained risk fund did not constitute a specific appropriation for the judgment and that disbursement from the fund remained discretionary); Hoag, 04-0857, pp. 4-8, 889 So.2d at 1022-25 (holding that appropriation of funds is ordinarily a discretionary legislative act and that judicial compulsion of such an appropriation through mandamus would impermissibly usurp legislative power).

Unlike Jazz Casino, in which La. R.S. 47:1437(C) specifically authorized mandamus, no statute expressly authorizes mandamus in this proceeding. Plaintiffs therefore must satisfy the general requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 3862. Article 3862 provides, in pertinent part, that mandamus may issue “where the law provides no relief by ordinary means or where the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice.” Because Article XII, § 10(C) prohibits seizure of public funds, Plaintiffs cannot obtain satisfaction of their final judgment through the ordinary processes of execution. They therefore lack an ordinary judicial means of obtaining satisfaction, and the threshold requirement of Article 3862 is satisfied. That conclusion does not, by itself, establish that mandamus is proper. Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the act they seek to compel is a ministerial duty imposed by law, that is, a duty as to which the Director of Finance retains no discretion. See Crooks, 22-00625, pp. 3-5, 359 So.3d at 450-52. Thus, the dispositive question is whether a specific constitutional or statutory provision makes satisfaction of this judgment mandatory notwithstanding the general appropriation rule.

Thus, the general appropriation rule is not absolute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “a specific constitutional or statutorily provided exception will overcome the mandates of La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109 B(2).” Mellor, 22-01713, p. 12, 370 So.3d at 396 (citing Crooks, 22-00625, p. 5, 359 So.3d at 452). When a constitutional or statutory provision makes payment mandatory, the duty is ministerial, and the governing provision operates as a de facto appropriation notwithstanding the general limitations of Article XII, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2). Crooks, 22-00625, p. 4, 359 So.3d at 451; Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 20-01231, pp. 4-7 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 369, 372-74. In that circumstance, the court does not select fiscal policy or exercise legislative power. It enforces an obligation already imposed by positive law. Crooks, 22-00625, p. 4, 359 So.3d at 451. We therefore turn to the constitutional provisions governing recovery of illegal and unconstitutional taxes to determine whether they make satisfaction of this final refund judgment a ministerial duty.

The Specific Constitutional Guarantee of Recovery

Louisiana Constitution Article VII, § 3(A) provides:

The legislature shall prohibit the issuance of process to restrain the collection of any tax. It shall provide a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax paid by a taxpayer.

Louisiana Constitution Article V, § 35 further provides that “[t]he remedies required by Article VII, Section 3(A) of this Constitution shall extend to any unconstitutional tax paid by a taxpayer.”³ Article XII, § 10(C) supplies the general rule governing judgments against public entities, and Articles VII, § 3(A) and V, § 35 specifically address recovery when the government collects an illegal or unconstitutional tax. We read these provisions together so that each is given effect. The City correctly observes that Article VII, § 3(A) directs the Legislature to provide the remedy and that La. R.S. 47:1621 ⁴ and 47:1437 ⁵ , the statutes applied in Jazz Casino, do not govern this local ad valorem tax litigation. The absence of those particular statutes, however, does not end the constitutional inquiry. The class did not bypass an available refund procedure. This Court previously held that the payment under protest provisions then in effect did not extend to the penalties and collection charges paid during the class period and that the City's later procedure did not apply to charges that had already been paid. Fransen, 02-2384, pp. 7-9, 862 So.2d at 146-48. The class pursued the judicial remedy recognized as available and obtained a judgment ordering return of the unconstitutional charges. It subsequently obtained a second judgment fixing the amount of reimbursement. The City did not appeal either judgment, and both are final.

The finality of these judgments does not, standing alone, overcome Article XII, § 10(C) or make their satisfaction a ministerial duty. Crooks likewise involved a final judgment establishing the governmental entity's liability, but mandamus was unavailable because no independent constitutional or statutory provision removed the requirement of an appropriation. Crooks, 22-00625, pp. 4-5, 359 So.3d at 451-52. In the case sub judice, the final judgments conclusively establish that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to the certified class, that the class is entitled to reimbursement, and that the City owes $8,284,084.51. They do not, by their own force, supply an appropriation or authorize mandamus. The remaining question is whether Article VII, § 3(A), as reinforced by Article V, § 35, supplies the specific constitutional exception that removes the City's discretion concerning whether the adjudged recovery will occur. We conclude that it does.

Watson’s reasoning is instructive. Just as the Watson Court found that “[a] judgment for inverse condemnation, left unsatisfied, does not constitute the payment of just compensation,” an unsatisfied judgment ordering reimbursement of an illegal tax exaction does not constitute the taxpayer's “recovery” of that exaction. Watson, 24-00055, p. 18, 387 So.3d at 512. Although Watson arose under a differently worded constitutional provision, its reasoning illuminates the distinction between a judgment fixing liability and attainment of the result the Constitution expressly guarantees. Article I, § 4(B)(1) requires that just compensation be “paid” and Article VII, § 3(A) requires a remedy providing “recovery.” Neither requirement is fulfilled by adjudication alone when the resulting judgment may remain unsatisfied indefinitely.

In the case sub judice, the word “recovery” in Article VII, § 3(A) cannot reasonably mean only entry of a judgment whose satisfaction remains wholly contingent upon future discretionary appropriations. The constitutional text requires a complete and adequate remedy that affords prompt recovery. A remedy is not complete and adequate if it provides no enforceable means of obtaining the adjudged refund, and it does not afford prompt recovery if the taxing authority may defer payment without any enforceable endpoint.

Jazz Casino likewise informs our analysis, although its governing statutes do not apply in the case sub judice. The Supreme Court held that payment of the final tax refund judgment was ministerial because Article VII, § 3(A) and the applicable refund statutes,⁶ operating together, made the refund mandatory, identified the source and timing of payment, and authorized mandamus. Jazz Casino, 16-1663, pp. 7-12, 223 So.3d at 493-97. The Court also distinguished tax refund and expropriation obligations from ordinary tort and contract judgments. A tax refund returns an exaction the government lacked authority to collect, while an ordinary tort or contract creditor seeks payment from funds the public body lawfully collected. Id., 16-1663, pp. 10-13, 223 So.3d at 495-97.

The statutory distinction identified by the City affects the implementation of the duty, but it does not make the constitutionally required recovery optional. In Jazz Casino, the statutes identified the source and timing of payment. In the case sub judice, Articles VII, § 3(A) and V, § 35, as applied to the final reimbursement judgment, remove the City's discretion concerning whether payment must occur.

The City's related reliance on the absence of current collections of the unconstitutional charges is similarly unpersuasive. Because La. R.S. 47:1621 does not apply, its “current collections” requirement does not determine the source of payment in this case. We assume that any funds used to satisfy the judgment are public funds protected from seizure. The absence of current collections or a segregated account affects how the judgment may reasonably be satisfied, not whether the City may leave it unsatisfied indefinitely.⁷

The nature of the challenged charges brings this judgment within the Constitution's tax recovery guarantee and distinguishes this matter from Mellor, which involved regulatory fines imposed through a school bus camera enforcement program. The Supreme Court found no specific constitutional or statutory provision authorizing the district court to require the public entities to remit the disputed funds into the court registry. Mellor, 22-01713, pp. 12-14, 370 So.3d at 396-97. The fines arose from an exercise of police power and did not implicate the Constitution's specific guarantee concerning recovery of illegal taxes as in the case sub judice.

Crooks, Newman Marchive, and Hoag are distinguishable for the same essential reason. Crooks involved a judgment for mineral royalties and no constitutional or statutory provision similar in effect to those applied in Jazz Casino and Lowther. Payment therefore remained subject to legislative appropriation. Crooks, 22-00625, pp. 4-5, 359 So.3d at 451-52. Newman Marchive involved a contract judgment and a general retained risk fund from which officials retained discretion to pay particular claims. Newman Marchive, 07-1890, pp. 6-10, 979 So.2d at 1267-69. Hoag involved an attempt to compel a discretionary legislative appropriation without a specific constitutional or statutory provision making payment ministerial. Hoag, 04-0857, pp. 6-8, 889 So.2d at 1023-25. None involved a final refund judgment governed by constitutional provisions specifically guaranteeing complete, adequate, and prompt recovery of an illegal or unconstitutional tax.

Lowther is more analogous. There, the Supreme Court held that the firefighters stated a cause of action for mandamus because the governing constitutional and statutory compensation provisions imposed a ministerial duty to appropriate the funds necessary to satisfy the final back-wage judgment. Lowther, 20-01231, pp. 4-8, 320 So.3d at 372-74. The Court explained that “[t]he ministerial nature of the duty ․ does not change to a discretionary one simply because” the obligation was confirmed and quantified by a money judgment. Id., 20-01231, p. 7, 320 So.3d at 373-74. Likewise, entry of the final judgment in the case sub judice did not transform a constitutionally protected tax recovery into an ordinary, discretionary judgment debt.

The City's asserted policy of allocating $2 million annually to judgments and paying judgment creditors chronologically does not alter the constitutional character of this obligation. Taxpayers seeking refunds of illegal exactions and employees seeking constitutionally and statutorily protected compensation are not situated in the same manner as ordinary tort and contract judgment creditors. Jazz Casino, 16-1663, pp. 10-13, 223 So.3d at 495-97; Lowther, 20-01231, p. 5, 320 So.3d at 372. The City's administrative payment practices cannot authorize indefinite nonpayment of a final judgment governed by the Constitution's specific tax recovery guarantee.

Nor does mandamus in the case sub judice violate separation of powers. Once positive law makes payment mandatory, a court order compelling performance enforces a preexisting legal obligation. It neither creates an appropriation nor substitutes judicial fiscal policy for that of the political branches. See Crooks, 22-00625, p. 4, 359 So.3d at 451. The practical effect of payment on the public fisc may inform the reasonable time and manner of satisfaction, but it does not confer discretion upon the City to leave the judgment unpaid. See Watson, 24-00055, pp. 18-20, 387 So.3d at 512-14.

The Home Rule Charter assigns the Department of Finance responsibility for collecting City taxes and requires the Director of Finance to approve disbursements of City funds. New Orleans Home Rule Charter § 4-1301(1)(a), (l), and (q); see Downtown Dev. Dist. of City of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 18-0726, p. 21 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/8/19), 272 So.3d 917, 932-33 (quoting New Orleans Home Rule Charter § 4-1301 and describing the Department of Finance's tax-collection and disbursement responsibilities). Those Charter provisions identify the Director of Finance as the official charged with reviewing and approving City disbursements. The Director has no discretion to reconsider the City's conclusively adjudicated liability or the amount owed. The precise duties necessary to implement the payment plan remain for the district court to determine on remand.

We accordingly hold that, once the judgments ordering reimbursement and fixing the amount became final, the City retained no discretion to decide whether the class would receive the constitutionally guaranteed recovery. Under these circumstances, Articles VII, § 3(A), as reinforced by Article V, § 35, provide a specific constitutional exception to the general appropriation rule. The obligation to satisfy the April 4, 2024 judgment is therefore ministerial.

Time and Manner of Satisfaction

The constitutional provisions determine whether the judgment must be satisfied; however, they do not identify an account, prescribe installments, or otherwise establish the precise time and manner of payment. In Watson, the Supreme Court observed that the governing constitutional provision did not delineate the time or manner of satisfaction and remanded for the district court “to tailor a plan for a remedy that ensures satisfaction of the judgment at issue within a reasonable period of time.” Id., 24-00055, p. 20, 387 So.3d at 514. We follow that approach. On remand, the district court shall conduct a contradictory hearing and establish a reasonable schedule and method for full satisfaction of the April 4, 2024 judgment.

CONCLUSION

The April 4, 2024 judgment conclusively determined that the City must reimburse the certified class $8,284,084.51 for unconstitutional charges imposed and collected through its ad valorem taxing authority. Article VII, § 3(A) guarantees a complete and adequate remedy for the prompt recovery of an illegal tax, and Article V, § 35 expressly extends that remedial protection to an unconstitutional tax. Under the circumstances presented, those provisions make satisfaction of the final refund judgment a ministerial duty and supply a specific constitutional exception to the general appropriation requirements of Article XII, § 10(C) and La. R.S. 13:5109(B)(2).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's July 7, 2025 judgment granting Plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandamus. We remand the matter for the district court, after a contradictory hearing, to establish a reasonable schedule and method of payment that ensures full satisfaction of the April 4, 2024 judgment within a reasonable period of time, consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 150-46.3 was subsequently amended by M.C.S., Ord. No. 20957, § 1.

2.   Former La. R.S. 47:2110(A) established a payment under protest procedure for qualifying ad valorem taxes and directed that, if the taxpayer prevailed, the collecting officer “shall refund” the segregated amount. The version effective April 17, 2000, however, deleted the former language extending that procedure to a challenge to “the enforcement of any provision of the tax laws in relation thereto.” 2000 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 74, § 1. This Court therefore held that § 2110, as amended, applied to the base ad valorem taxes, but not to the penalties and additional collection fees assessed in connection with those taxes. Fransen, 02-2384, pp. 7-9, 862 So.2d at 146-48. Accordingly, although § 2110 supplied a mandatory refund procedure for qualifying taxes paid under protest, it did not govern the penalties and collection charges comprising this class.

3.   Article V, § 35 was added by 2019 La. Acts No. 446, § 1, approved October 12, 2019, and effective November 18, 2019. The proposition submitted to the voters described the amendment as protecting taxpayers by “requiring a complete remedy in law for the prompt recovery of any unconstitutional tax paid.” We do not rely upon Section 35 to determine the invalidity of the charges or to establish the City's substantive liability. Those matters were conclusively resolved by final judgments the City did not appeal. We cite Section 35 because it expressly provides that the remedies required by Article VII, § 3(A) extend to unconstitutional taxes.

4.   La. R.S. 47:1621 defines an “overpayment” to include tax, penalty, or interest paid when none was due and directs the Secretary of Revenue to refund qualifying overpayments, including amounts paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law. The statute further provides that refunds be made from current collections of the particular tax and that a refund required by a final, nonappealable judgment be issued within forty-five days. La. R.S. 47:1621(A), (B)(10), and (D)(1), (3). Because § 1621 governs taxes administered by the Secretary of Revenue, it does not apply to the local ad valorem tax charges at issue in this case.

5.   La. R.S. 47:1437 governs the effect and enforcement of a final judgment of the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals. When such a judgment determines that a taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit, the collector must promptly issue it or otherwise comply with the judgment.

6.   In Jazz Casino, La. R.S. 47:1621(D)(1) identified current collections of the particular tax as the source of payment, La. R.S. 47:1621(D)(3) and (4) prescribed when payment must begin, La. R.S. 47:1437(B) required the Secretary to comply promptly with the final refund judgment, and La. R.S. 47:1437(C) expressly authorized mandamus.

7.   The parties offer competing descriptions of the Benn-Abbey litigation, including whether the disputed payments remained in escrow. A district court's disposition in separate litigation is not controlling precedent, and resolution of that factual dispute is unnecessary to our decision. Escrow is one means of preserving funds for a refund, but it is not the source of the constitutional right to recovery. Accordingly, the absence of segregated funds affects the manner in which the judgment may be satisfied, not whether it must be satisfied.

Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano