YIELDI LLC v. VENICE HOSPITALITY LLC (2026)

This appeal arises from an executory proceeding. Defendant, Venice Hospitality, LLC (“Venice Hospitality”), appeals the November 10, 2025 judgment of the trial court that overruled its peremptory exception to Yieldi, LLC's (“Yieldi”) supplemental and amending petition for executory process, and denied its motion for examination of attorney's fees. For the following reasons, we convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writ, grant the writ, and deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

On January 22, 2021, Venice Hospitality executed a $225,000.00 promissory note in favor of the original lender, Jeffrey Peters, with a collateral mortgage secured by property located at 42600 Highway 23, Venice, Louisiana 70091 (“the property”). The maturity date of the note was January 21, 2022. On May 17, 2023, Mr. Peters endorsed the promissory note and thereafter assigned the collateral mortgage to Yieldi. Venice Hospitality defaulted on the promissory note. On August 15, 2023, Yieldi filed a verified petition for executory process against Venice Hospitality.

On February 20, 2024, Venice Hospitality filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, 24-50214-KMS. Thereafter, Venice Hospitality voluntarily dismissed the bankruptcy proceeding on March 14, 2024.

Shortly thereafter, Venice Hospitality executed a special warranty deed transferring the property to Hospitality Holding of Mississippi, LLC. On March 20, 2024, Hospitality Holding of Mississippi, LLC filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, 24-50381-KMS. On July 2, 2024, the bankruptcy court granted Yieldi relief from the automatic stay, authorizing it to continue the foreclosure proceedings of the property.

On January 14, 2025, Venice Hospitality moved to compel creditor to accept payment, a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the sheriff's sale of the property. On March 18, 2025, the trial court denied Venice Hospitality's motion to compel and dissolved the temporary restraining order. The sheriff's sale was scheduled for May 14, 2025.

On May 12, 2025, Venice Hospitality filed an answer, reconventional demand and a second application for temporary restraining order. On the same date, Venice Hospitality also filed a peremptory exception.² The trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the peremptory exception on July 10, 2025.

On July 29, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment overruling Venice Hospitality's peremptory exception, granting Yieldi fourteen days to amend its petition, and further enjoined the sheriff's sale of the property. Yieldi filed its supplemental and amending verified petition for executory process and a motion to determine reasonableness of attorney's fees. Thereafter, Venice Hospitality filed a peremptory exception to Yieldi's supplemental and amending petition.³ Venice Hospitality asserted in its peremptory exception that it sought to have Yieldi's action declared legally non-existent because the action imposed usurious or unconscionable interest, fees and charges.

The trial court held a hearing on Venice Hospitality's peremptory exception on October 9, 2025, and rendered judgment in open court vacating the temporary restraining order, overruling Venice Hospitality's peremptory exception and denying the motion for examination of attorney's fees. The written judgment was signed on November 10, 2025. Thereafter, Venice Hospitality moved for a suspensive appeal.

DISCUSSION

Yieldi's Motion to Dismiss

First, we address Yield's motion to dismiss the appeal. Yieldi argues that the appeal arises from the trial court's vacatur of a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the property and that the appeal is moot because the property has since been sold at a public auction.

“When all of the legal controversies arising from a judgment become moot, an appellate court effectively lacks jurisdiction as there is no subject matter on which the judgment can operate.” Fid. Bank v. Dowden, 2020-0241, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/7/20), 365 So.3d 521, 525 (quoting Allums v. Allums, 2017-0021, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/31/17), 221 So.3d 191, 193). A justiciable controversy must exist at every stage of the proceeding. Id. As such, “appellate courts will not render advisory opinions from which no practical results can follow.” Succession of Dedais, 2018-0914, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So.3d 1271, 1273 (citation omitted).

The review of the granting or denial of a petition for a temporary restraining order is governed by La. C.C.P. art. 3612, which provides that “[t]here shall be no appeal from an order relating to a temporary restraining order.” Article 3612 establishes a distinction between appellate review of judgments relating to temporary restraining order and preliminary or final injunctions. See La. C.C.P. art. 3612 (B) and (C).

Further, “an injunction may be used to prevent but not to correct a wrong; it cannot be employed to redress an alleged consummated wrong or undo what has already been done.” Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Dep't of Transportation & Dev., 2024-0099, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24), 405 So.3d 695, 701, reh'g denied (Oct. 29, 2024) (quoting Verdun v. Scallon Brothers Contractors, Inc., 263 La. 1073, 1078, 270 So.2d 512, 513 (1972)). “When an appeal is taken from an order denying injunctive relief and the act sought to be enjoined is accomplished pending appeal, the appeal will be dismissed as moot.” Fid. Bank, 2020-0241, p. 7, 365 So.3d 521, 526 (citation omitted).

In this instant matter, the trial court orally ruled to vacate Venice Hospitality's temporary restraining order, and signed the November 10, 2025 judgment that overruled Yieldi's peremptory exception and denied the motion for examination of attorney's fees. The trial court's judgment further indicated that it was designated as final pursuant to the previsions of La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1).⁴

In 2025, the Louisiana Legislature amended La. C.C.P. art. 1915 by Acts 2025, No. 250, § 3, effective August 1, 2025, distinguishing final and interlocutory judgments, and removing the authority of the trial court to designate a partial judgment as final and appealable after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. Section 6 indicates that, “[t]he provisions of 1915 as amended by Section 3 of this Act shall have prospective application only and shall not apply to appeals and supervisory writs filed prior to the effective date of this Act.”

Here, Venice Hospitality filed its motion for appeal on November 14, 2025; therefore, the prior version of La. C.C.P. art. 1915 (B) does not apply, and the possibility of an appeal of a partial judgment does not exist for this case. While Yieldi asserts that the property has since been sold at a public auction, there is no judgment in the record relating to Venice Hospitality's reconventional demand. The record is also devoid of documentation reflecting a writ of seizure and sale of the property. As such, it appears that issues remain between the parties.

Next, we consider whether to convert Venice Hospitality's appeal into an application for supervisory writ. In particular circumstances, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to convert an appeal of an interlocutory judgment that is not immediately appealable into a supervisory writ application. Glazer v. Glazer, 2023-0502, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/3/24), 390 So.3d 765, 768 (citation omitted). “Because the proper procedural vehicle for seeking review of an interlocutory judgment is ordinarily by application for supervisory review, we can-when appropriate-convert the improper appeal to such an application.” Glazer, 2023-0502, p. 4, 390 So.3d at 768 (quoting Perry v. F.H. Myers Constr. Corp., 2023-0064, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/23), 377 So.3d 331, 335). When appellate jurisdiction is lacking, we have converted the appeal to an application for supervisory writ when the appeal was filed within the thirty-day period allowed for the filing of an application for supervisory review. Id.

Venice Hospitality's motion for appeal was filed on November 14, 2025, which is within the thirty-day period to seek supervisory jurisdiction of the appellate court. Therefore, we exercise our discretion to convert the appeal of the November 10, 2025 judgment into an application for supervisory writ. Consequently, Yieldi's motion to dismiss appeal is denied.

We now turn to the merits. Venice Hospitality asserted six assignments of error, to which we narrow to two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in denying Venice Hospitality's peremptory exception, and2) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for examination of attorney's fees.⁵

Peremptory Exception

Venice Hospitality argues that it filed a peremptory exception to have Yieldi's action be declared legally non-existent. Venice Hospitality also asserts that La. R.S. 9:3501 is applicable because Yieldi overcharged interest, which falls within the unclean hands doctrine.

“Our courts look beyond the caption, style, and form of pleadings to determine from the substance of the pleading the nature of the proceeding; thus, a pleading is construed for what it really is, not what it is erroneously called.” Theodore v. Johnson, 2021-0668, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/22), 366 So.3d 211, 214 (citation omitted).

A review of the October 9, 2025 hearing transcript reveals that Venice Hospitality sought a peremptory exception of no cause of action. Specifically, the trial court asked Venice Hospitality whether its objection raised in its peremptory exception was a no cause of action.⁶

“[W]hile ‘[t]he exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action are often confused or improperly combined,’ these ‘are separate and distinct’ objections.” Pri-Tal v. Progressive Prop. Ins. Co., 2024-0531, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/14/25), 414 So.3d 1064, 1075 (quoting Warren v. HDI Glob. Ins. Co., 2021-570, p. 3 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/16/22), 341 So.3d 1249, 1253). The primary distinction between an exception of no right of action and no cause of action lies in the fact that the focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, while the focus in an exception of no cause of action is whether the law provides a remedy against the particular defendant. Pri-Tal, 2024-0531, p. 15, 414 So.3d at 1075 (quoting Downtown Dev. Dist. of City of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 2018-0726, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/8/19), 272 So.3d 917, 924).

Thus, we turn our analysis to whether the trial court erred in overruling Venice Hospitality's exception of no cause of action.

Venice Hospitality argues that the trial court erred in overruling its peremptory exception to Yieldi's supplemental and amending petition for executory process. Venice Hospitality contends La. R.S. 9:3501 is applicable because Yieldi overcharged interest, which falls within the doctrine of unclean hands.⁷ Venice Hospitality asserted that since the promissory note was in default, the maximum interest rate it could be charged was either twenty-one or twenty-two percent.

Yieldi opposed the exception arguing that La. R.S. 9:3501 is inapplicable because the promissory note was made for commercial purposes and pursuant to La. R.S. 9:3509 (A), a limited liability company formed pursuant to the laws of this or any other state may “agree to pay interest in excess of the maximum rate of conventional interest authorized by the laws of this state.” Yieldi conceded that the applicable interest rate for the promissory note was twenty-two percent.

An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on an exception of no cause of action using the de novo standard of review because the exception raises a question of law and the trial court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Doucette v. Eastover Prop. Owners’ Ass'n, Inc., 2024-0585, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/25), 414 So.3d 1162, 1168, aff'd on reh'g (June 17, 2025). “The pertinent inquiry is whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in the plaintiff's favor, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief.” Id. (quoting Ross v. State Through Univ. of La. Sys., 2022-0652, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/13/23), 358 So.3d 162, 165).

First, we consider the application of the unclean hands doctrine.

Unclean Hands Doctrine

“The clean hands doctrine, also referred to as the unclean hands doctrine, is recognized as a defense in Louisiana.” Lakewood Prop. Owners’ Ass'n v. Smith, 2014-1376, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/15), 183 So.3d 780, 792 (Allvend, Inc. v. Payphone Commissions Co., 2000–0661, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/01), 804 So.2d 27, 30). The doctrine recognizes that “[a] person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of action, he must rely in whole or in part, on any illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a part.” Id. Further, “[o]ur court has explained that the unclean hands doctrine ‘denies recovery because courts do not want to aid plaintiffs whose causes of action are based on their own illegal conduct. This would condone and encourage wrongdoing, and allow persons of immoral conscious to profit from their lack of respect for the law.’ ” Lakewood Prop. Owners’ Ass'n, 2014-1376, p. 20, 183 So.3d at 792-93 (quoting Guillie v. Comprehensive Addict. Programs, 98-2605, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/99, 735 So.2d 775, 779).

Here, it is undisputed that discrepancy existed as to whether twenty-four percent was the correct interest rate on the promissory note. As noted above, Venice Hospitality asserted the correct interest rate was between twenty-one and twenty-two percent. Yieldi's supplemental and amending verified petition identified the ongoing interest rate as twenty-two percent. We find that Venice Hospitality has no legal authority to support its argument that the discrepancy of interest rate may be attributed to the application of the unclean hands doctrine. As such, we do not find that the trial court erred in not applying the unclean hands doctrine.

Exception of No Cause of Action

In deciding an exception of no cause of action, a court considers the petition, any attachments to the petition, and any amendments to the petition. Ross, 2022-0652, p. 4, 358 So.3d at 166.

Our review of Yieldi's supplemental and amending verified petition for executory process reveals that Yieldi has a valid cause of action against Venice Hospitality. “Executory proceedings are those which are used to effect the seizure and sale of property, without previous citation and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon evidenced by an authentic act importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases allowed by law.” La. C.C.P. art. 2631. Yieldi alleged that it was the current holder of a promissory note made by Venice Hospitality. Yieldi further alleged that the note was past due and that Venice Hospitality was indebted to Yieldi in the principal amount of $225,000.00, plus note acquisition fees in the amount of $39,732.19, unpaid interest charges of $12,650.00, ongoing interest of twenty-two percent per annum, and $2,400.00 in late fees. Yieldi attached the promissory note, collateral mortgage, and assignment of mortgage and other collateral to its petition. Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in overruling Venice Hospitality's exception of no cause of action.

Denial of Motion for Examination of Attorney's Fees

Next, we turn to the denial of the motion for examination of attorney's fees. Venice Hospitality argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion without an evidentiary hearing or cursory review of Yieldi's timesheets.

An award of attorney's fees is “left to the sound discretion of the trial court and an award should not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” Ambrose v. Generation Holdings, LLC, 2024-0300, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/12/24), 398 So.3d 664, 669 (quoting Kaltenbaugh v. Bd. of Supervisors, S.Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll. at Baton Rouge, 2022-0092, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/24/22), 346 So.3d 823, 832). As a general rule, attorney's fees “are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute or by a contract between the parties.” Markel v. Price, 2023-0704, p. 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/30/24), 391 So.3d 30, 38 (quoting English Turn Prop. Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Short, 16-0460, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/16), 204 So.3d 672, 684).

The promissory note permitted an award of attorney's fees:

The undersigned jointly and severally, promise and agree to pay in the event of default, all closing costs and expenses incurred for the collection of all sums or such larger amount as may be reasonable and just, and also those costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred in any appellate proceeding.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2753(C) states that a claim that the attorney's fees established in the mortgage to be enforced are unreasonable shall not be grounds for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to arrest a seizure and sale. Such claim may only be urged either:

(1) Prior to the sale by means of a rule to show cause filed not later than ten days, exclusive of holidays, prior to the sale, and tried summarily prior to the date of the sale, or

(2) In conjunction with a proceeding seeking a deficiency judgment to satisfy the debt for which the property was sold.

La. C.C.P. art. 2753.

Here, the October 9, 2025 hearing transcript reveals that a summary proceeding occurred on Yieldi's motion to determine reasonableness of attorney's fees. At the hearing Yieldi introduced the affidavit of Heather Weathford, Yieldi's closing coordinator, indicating that Yieldi wired $197,887.52 to Yieldi's prior counsel for attorney's fees and costs associated with the two foreclosure proceedings. Yieldi also introduced the invoice and statement of Jones Walker firm in the amount of $73,539.21, as well as current counsel's affidavit of hourly rate.

Based on the evidence and the record, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and denying the Venice Hospitality's motion for examination of attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Yieldi's motion to dismiss appeal, convert the appeal to an application for supervisory writ, grant the writ, and deny relief.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; APPEAL CONVERTED TO AN APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT; WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

FOOTNOTES

2.   Venice Hospitality did not specify the type of peremptory exception it was filing. The following objections may be raised through a peremptory exception: 1) prescription, 2) peremption, 3) res judicata, 4) nonjoinder of a party, 5) no cause of action, 6) no right of action, 7) discharge in bankruptcy, and 8) the court's lack of jurisdiction. See. La. C.C.P. art. 927.

3.   Venice Hospitality did not specify the type of objection in its peremptory exception.

4.   Prior to is repeal, effective August 1, 2025, La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1) provided:When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

5.   Venice Hospitality lists six assignments of error: 1) The trial court improperly vacated the injunction which was issued on July 10, 2025; 2) The trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to La. C.C.P. Art. 2753(C)(1) before approving/awarding appellee $45,000.00 in attorney's fees; 3) The trial court failed to conduct a full evidentiary hearing relative to excessive interest charged by appellee and note acquisition fees imposed by appellee; 4) The trial court incorrectly failed to apply the “Unclean Hands Doctrine” and deny appellee any interest amounts; 5) The trial court failed to apply La. R. S. 9:3501; and 6) Any errors patent on the face of the record.

6.   The July 10, 2025 hearing transcript reveals that the trial court inquired whether Venice Hospitality was raising an objection of no right of action or no cause of action in its peremptory exception.

7.   Louisiana Revised Statute 9:3501 states “[a]ny contract for the payment of interest in excess of that authorized by law shall result in the forfeiture of the entire interest so contracted.”

JUDGE SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS