FAUBOURG MARIGNY IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION INC THOMAS DOUGLASS BARBARA LAFLEUR JEFFREY SEYMOUR AND LESLEY SEYMOUR v. NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL (2026)

This appeal arises out of a zoning issue. Appellants, Faubourg Marigny Improvement Association, Inc. (the “Association”); Thomas L. Douglass (“Mr. Douglass”); Barbara Lafleur (“Ms. Lafleur”); Jeffrey Seymour (“Mr. Seymour”); and Lesley Seymour (“Ms. Seymour”) (collectively, the “Appellants”), seek to appeal ¹ the district court's November 18, 2025 judgment.² For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of allowing Appellee-Intervenor, 621 Elysian Fields Group, LLC (“621 EFG”), to file a motion for new trial solely on the issue of rendering a judgment that properly names all parties cast in judgment, the relief granted and that contains the precise and specific decretal language required by La. C.C.P. arts. 1918 and 1951.³

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

621 EFG owns a contiguous piece of immovable property that encompasses the municipal addresses 613-621 Elysian Fields Avenue, 2221 Chartres Street, and 2210 Royal Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70117 (the “Property”). In the hopes of commencing construction of a hotel on the Property, on October 16, 2024, 621 EFG submitted a Land-Use Request Application for a Conditional Use Permit to the New Orleans City Planning Commission (the “CPC”), requesting a Conditional Use Permit to construct a hotel in excess of 10,000 square feet in a HMC-2 Marigny/Tremé/Bywater Commercial District. The proposed hotel would encompass 92,421 square feet. In addition, 621 EFG requested variances from the New Orleans Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (the “CZO”) as follows: (1) a variance of 24 feet above that which is permitted in the underlying zoning district; (2) a variance of from the maximum Floor Area Ratio (“FAR”) regulations contained in the CZO of approximately .81; and (3) a waiver to accommodate approximately thirty (30) off-street parking spaces.

After considering the application and conducting a public hearing, the CPC recommended to deny the permit, and relayed that decision to the New Orleans City Council (the “City Council”). At a regularly scheduled meeting on February 27, 2025, the City Council allowed CPC staff members to present their findings and entertained 30 minutes of questions from the public. In a unanimous vote, the City Council approved the hotel project, but did not approve the height waiver and compromised on the FAR. Following, on May 7, 2025, Appellants jointly filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Judicial Review. After an October 10, 2025 hearing, the district court issued a judgment on November 18, 2025. On December 18, 2025, the Appellants timely filed a motion for suspensive appeal, which the district court granted on December 29, 2025, ordering the Appellants to furnish security in the amount of $1,500.00.

According to the City Council's brief to this Court, 621 EFG filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition of Intervention on December 23, 2025. Referencing a January 30, 2026 hearing, on March 3, 2026, the district court granted that motion, ordering that “the Petition of Intervention shall be filed into the record as of December 23, 2025.” Also according to the City Council's brief to this Court, on December 30, 2025, 621 EFG filed an Opposition to Motion for Suspensive Appeal or, Alternatively a Motion to Set Security Bond. In a separate March 3, 2026 judgment, the district court—again referencing a January 30, 2025 hearing—signed an order to convert Appellants’ suspensive appeal to a devolutive appeal and denied 621 EFG's opposition as moot.⁴ This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918(A) codified the elements necessary to formulate a valid final judgment. It provides, in part:

A final judgment in accordance with Article 1841 shall be identified as such by appropriate language; shall be signed and dated; and shall, in its decree, identify the name of the party in whose favor the relief is awarded, the name of the party against whom the relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded.

In Emery v. Ben, we elaborated on that approach:

This Court has previously explained that “[f]or a judgment to be ‘a valid final judgment,’ it must contain ‘decretal language.’ ” In re Benoit, 17-0802, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/18), 244 So.3d 44, 48 (quoting Tsegaye v. City of New Orleans, 15-0676, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/18/15), 183 So.3d 705, 710). “The absence of necessary decretal language means that the judgment is not final and appealable.” Id. “Importantly, for the language of a judgment to be considered ‘decretal,’ it ‘must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied.[’]” Id. (internal citations omitted) “Established jurisprudence requires that a valid judgment be precise, definite and certain.” Id. (citing Input/Output Marine v. Greatbatch Techs., Inc., 10-0477, p. 12 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/29/10), 52 So.3d 909, 915).

“ ‘The decree alone indicates the decision. The result decreed must be spelled out in lucid, unmistakable language. The quality of definiteness is essential to a proper judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Input/Output Marine, 10–0477, p. 13, 52 So.3d at 916). “ ‘The specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without reference to an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment.’ ” In re Med. Rev. Panel of Hurst, 16-0934, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 220 So.3d 121, 124 (quoting Moon v. City of New Orleans, 15–1092, 15-1093, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 190 So.3d 422, 425).

23-0063, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/28/23), 373 So.3d 112, 118-19.

In the matter now before us, we find the November 18, 2025 judgment lacks the necessary decretal language to constitute a valid final judgment. In its entirety, the judgment provides:

Considering the law and evidence the Court finds in favor of the Defendant and against the Petitioners as follows:

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there be judgment in favor of Defendant, the New Orleans City Council and against Petitioner the Faubourg Marigny Improvement Association, Inc.

First, beginning with the caption on the judgment, it is noticeable that the only petitioner's name to appear is that of the Association. Next, in the preamble the district court purports to find against the “Petitioners,” but in the actual decree, the judgment is rendered against only the Association without mention of the other four named petitioners. Finally, it is unclear—without referring to an extrinsic source—what relief is being granted to the City Council. In other words, we find that the judgment does not meet the threshold requirement that it be precise, definite and certain.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1918(A) does provide for the possibility of amending a judgment by directing that “[i]f appealed, a final judgment that does not contain the appropriate decretal language shall be remanded to the trial court, which shall amend the judgment in accordance with Article 1951 within the time set by the appellate court.” Id. However, La. C.C.P. art. 1951 ⁵ is clear that “[a] final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.”

In Mercato Elisio, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, this Court outlined the limitations imposed by La. C.C.P. art. 1951 as first delineated by Bates v. City of New Orleans:

• “Article 1951 contemplates the correction of a ‘clerical error’ in a final judgment, but does not authorize substantive amendments.”

• An amendment that “adds to, subtracts from, or in any way affects the substance of a judgment, is considered a substantive amendment.”

• The substance of a judgment can be altered only by a timely motion for new trial, nullity action, or appeal.

• “The trial judge cannot, on his own motion or on the motion of any party, change a judgment which has been so signed, notwithstanding it was signed in error.”

• “La. C.C.P. art.[ ]1951 does not permit the trial court to substantively alter a final judgment even if the amendment merely expresses the trial judge's actual intention. The trial court's written judgment is controlling, even if the trial judge may have intended otherwise.”

• A trial court's authority on a motion to enforce a final judgment is limited to enforcing its judgment as written.

• Substantive amendments to judgments made without recourse to the proper procedures—a timely motion for a new trial or an appeal—are absolute nullities.

• The remedy generally granted by an appellate court when it finds an improper substantive amendment has been made to a final judgment is to set aside and annul the amending judgment and to reinstate the original judgment.

22-0228, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/21/22), 356 So.3d 505, 510-11 (quoting Bates, 13-1153, pp. 13-14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/26/14), 137 So.3d at 784-85).

The Mercato Elisio Court went on to clarify “that an amendment which ‘adds to, subtracts from, or in any way affects the substance of the judgment’ is considered to be a substantive amendment to a judgment.” Id. at p. 8, 356 So.3d at 511 (quoting Iles v. Ogden, 11-0317, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/5/12), 99 So.3d 1035, 1040-41). “Furthermore, changing the name of a party cast in judgment is a substantive change prohibited by [La. C.C.P. art.] 1951.” Id. (quoting Safeguard Storage Props., L.L.C. v. Donahue Favret Contractors, Inc., 10-0673, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/31/11), 60 So.3d 110, 117). “The general rule is that an amendment to add a party to a judgment is a change of substance, not of phraseology, that can only be accomplished by motion for a new trial or on appeal.” Id. at p. 9, 356 So.3d at 511 (quoting Freeman v. Zara's Food Store, Inc., 16-0445, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/2/16), 204 So.3d 691, 700).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2088 mandates that once a district court grants an order of appeal, it is divested of jurisdiction in that case except for certain narrow exceptions. Pertinent to the case sub judice, that article provides, in part:

A. The jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal, or on the granting of the order of appeal, in the case of a devolutive appeal. Thereafter, the trial court has jurisdiction in the case only over those matters not reviewable under the appeal, including the right to do any of the following:

* * *

(11) Amend a judgment to provide proper decretal language in accordance with Article 1918 or 1951.

Nevertheless, as we just discussed, La. C.C.P. art. 1951 and the jurisprudence would consider amending the district court's judgment to add the clear, specific and precise relief granted and the names of the remaining plaintiffs to be substantive in nature and, therefore, prohibited.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's November 18, 2025 judgment and remand the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of allowing 621 EFG to file a motion for new trial solely on the issue of rendering a judgment that properly names all parties cast in judgment, the relief granted and that contains the precise and specific decretal language required by La. C.C.P. arts. 1918 and 1951.

VACATED; REMANDED FOR LIMITED NEW TRIAL

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Appellants initially sought and were granted a suspensive appeal on December 29, 2025. By a separate order issued on March 3, 2026, the appeal was converted to a devolutive appeal.

2.   We note, as pointed out by Appellee, the Appellants’ brief fails to comply with Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal (“Uniform Rule”), Rule 2-12.4. The Appellants’ brief does not contain a table of contents with page references, nor a table of authorities with references to pages in the brief where authorities are cited, as required under Uniform Rule 2-12.4(A)(l)-(2). The Appellants’ brief also fails to reference the specific page number of the record for each assignment of error as required under Uniform Rule 2-12.4(B)(3). However, our jurisprudence has long held that appeals are favored by our law and must be maintained wherever possible and should not be dismissed for technicalities. See, e.g., Taylor v. Joseph, 24-0461, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/25), 408 So.3d 269, 273. Notwithstanding that principle, we would caution Appellants to comply with the Uniform Rules in future briefing in order to avoid any potential sanctions or penalties.

3.   These codal articles will be more fully discussed, infra.

4.   We note that none of the documents referenced in this paragraph are contained in the record before us. The record does not contain a transcript of the January 30, 2025 hearing, and 621 EFG's petition for intervention and opposition to the motion for suspensive appeal are physically absent. Although physically in the record, the two March 3, 2026 judgments were improperly attached to the City Council's brief to this Court. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rules 2—12.4 and 2—12.5, providing the exclusive list of documents that may be attached to appellate briefs. See also Med. Rev. Panel for Bush, 21-00954, p. 7 (La. 5/13/22), 339 So.3d 1118, 1124 (“Appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, or receive new evidence.”). Nevertheless, because this case is being decided on strictly procedural grounds, none of those documents is pertinent to our review.

5.   The full text of La. C.C.P. art. 1951 instructs:On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation. The judgment may be amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all parties at least five days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received. A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.

Judge Paula A. Brown