SOILEAU v. ROBICHAUX MIZE WADSACK RICHARDSON WATSON LLC (2026)

In this suit for unpaid wages filed pursuant to the Louisiana Wage Payment Act, La. R.S. 23:631, et seq., plaintiff Christina Soileau appeals the trial court's judgment awarding unpaid wages and attorney fees. Defendant Robichaux, Mize, Wadsack, Richardson, & Watson, LLC, answered the appeal, also challenging the award of unpaid wages. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By letter dated September 20, 2022, the law firm Robichaux, Mize, Wadsack, Richardson & Watson, LLC (“Robichaux Mize”) offered Christina Soileau employment as an associate attorney with a base salary of $110,000. According to the letter, the position involved working full-time in the firm's litigation department under managing partner Matthew M. Mize. The letter also stated that if she accepted the offer, she would be eligible to participate in the law firm's incentive bonus program beginning January 1, 2023. The bonus program afforded associate attorneys the opportunity to earn an annual bonus that was determined by calculating twenty percent of the fees “earned and collected” by the attorney that exceeded three times the attorney's annual base salary. Soileau accepted the employment offer on September 21, 2022.

Soileau began working for the firm on October 10, 2022. The firm assigned Soileau over a hundred hurricane claims to prepare for mediation. After completing her first full year at the firm, in February 2024, Soileau e-mailed Mize seeking to discuss her 2023 bonus payment. Mize requested that she provide him with information about her cases that settled in 2023, which Soileau provided on February 23rd. Mize and Soileau briefly discussed the bonus on March 1st. According to Soileau, Mize told her that he usually allocates 30% to the handling attorney but decided to increase Soileau's allocation to 40% because the number seemed low when he ran the numbers. Mize did not tell her an exact figure during the discussion.

On March 15th, Mize informed Soileau that he had calculated the amount of her bonus and offered to either text her the number or discuss it with her the following day. Soileau replied that Mize could text her the number or she could meet with him during the latter part of the next day. Mize did not respond. On March 20th, Soileau sent Mize another message asking him to text her the amount of the bonus. Mize did not respond. However, on March 21st, Soileau received an incentive bonus payment in the amount of $22,500, which was well short of what she expected. Soileau was terminated the following day.

By letter dated April 18, 2024, Soileau, through counsel, wrote Mize asserting that the total fees she “earned and collected” totaled $1,963,864, and that accordingly, Robichaux Mize owed her an additional $304,272.80 in unpaid wages. The letter also stated that it was a formal demand for payment under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act (“LWPA”), La. R.S. 23:631, et seq. Robichaux Mize responded to the demand letter by providing documentation explaining how it calculated the bonus award. No additional sums were paid in response to the demand letter.

On July 22, 2024, Soileau filed a Rule to Show Cause against Robichaux Mize claiming that the law firm violated La. R.S. 23:631 and La. R.S. 23:632 by failing to pay Soileau for wages due after demand. Soileau claimed she was entitled to recover unpaid wages, statutory penalties, attorney fees, and costs, and she invoked her right to a summary proceeding pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2592 and La. R.S. 23:631(B).¹ In response, Robichaux Mize filed exceptions raising the objections of prematurity, no right of action, and no cause of action; pled affirmative defenses; and requested sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 863.²

The trial on the wage claim was held January 7, 2025.³ Soileau and Mize testified at trial and documents were accepted into evidence. After hearing arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement and gave the parties an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs. Both parties filed post-hearing briefs that included proposed damages calculations for the trial court to consider.

In a judgment signed February 28, 2025, the trial court awarded Soileau $18,759.13 in unpaid wages; declined to impose penalty wages; and awarded reasonable attorney fees. However, the trial court did not fix the attorney fees in the judgment; instead, the trial court ordered Soileau's counsel to submit an affidavit of reasonable attorney fees and costs for the court to review. The trial court also issued written reasons for judgment.

Soileau appealed the judgment, and Robichaux Mize answered the appeal.⁴ The record lodged in this Court on October 2, 2025. After the appeal lodged, Robichaux Mize filed a motion to dismiss, contending the appeal was premature because the judgment did not set attorney fees and costs. Soileau opposed the motion and moved to supplement the record with the trial court's October 13, 2025 judgment setting attorney fees and costs. This Court denied the motion to supplement on January 5, 2026. After her motion to supplement was denied, Soileau filed a request for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss Appeal

Robichaux Mize seeks to dismiss the appeal on grounds the February 28, 2025 judgment is not final and appealable. Specifically, Robichaux Mize contends the judgment is not final because it did not set forth the amount of attorney fees awarded by the court. Instead, Robichaux Mize contends it is a partial judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) that is not immediately appealable because the judgment was not designated as final.⁵ However, Soileau argues that the judgment is final and appealable because it resolved all substantive issues in the case. Soileau also points to La. C.C.P. art. 2088(A)(10) and Article 2088’s 2021 Revision Comment (a) as additional evidence the appeal should not be dismissed.

A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. A final judgment is appealable in all causes in which appeals are given by law. La. C.C.P. art. 2083. The judgment before this Court awarded Soileau $18,759.13 in unpaid wages; declined to impose penalty wages; and awarded reasonable attorney fees but stated the fees and costs would be determined at a later date:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Christina Soileau brought a well-founded suit in which she was successful and recovered unpaid wages. Consequently, she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees under La. R.S 23:632; the Court has no discretion. As such, Mrs. Soileau's counsel should submit to the court for review an affidavit of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Once the Court has reviewed the affidavit, an order will be issued awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

This was a judgment on the merits because it disposed of all matters before the trial court with the exception of setting attorney fees and costs.⁶ See Gurney as Trustee of Gurney Family Trust v. McCoy, 2024-0382 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/13/24), 405 So.3d 940, 944-45, writ denied, 2024-01511 (La. 2/25/25), 401 So.3d 661.

This final judgment determination is also supported by La. C.C.P. art. 2088(A)(10). Article 2088(A)(10) provides in pertinent part that the trial court retains jurisdiction over those matters not reviewable under the appeal, including the right to set and tax costs and attorney fees. The Louisiana Legislature amended Subparagraph (A)(10) in 2021 to add attorney fees to the list of matters over which the trial court retains jurisdiction to set and tax after an appeal has been taken. See 2021 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 259. According to the Revision Comments, the amendment means an appellate court would not have to dismiss an appeal in order to allow the trial court to set the amount of attorney fees while the appeal was pending. See 2021 Revision Comment (a), La. C.C.P. art. 2088. Instead, when a judgment for costs and attorney fees is rendered after a final judgment on the merits, the costs judgment is a separate, final appealable judgment. See Gurney, 405 So.3d at 946.⁷ Because the judgment before us disposed of all matters before the court with the exception of setting attorney fees and costs, the judgment is final and appealable. Accordingly, we deny Robichaux Mize's motion to dismiss.⁸ See La. C.C.P. art. 2088(A)(10). See also Gurney 405 So.3d at 945.

Request for Reconsideration of Order Denying Soileau's Motion to Supplement the Record

On January 5, 2026, this Court denied Soileau's unopposed motion to supplement the record. Soileau subsequently filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the Court's order denying that motion. In her original motion to supplement, Soileau sought to supplement the record with the trial court's October 13, 2025 judgment setting the amount of attorney fees and costs that Robichaux Mize must pay.

Under La. C.C.P. art. 2164, this Court shall render any judgment that is just, legal, and proper upon the record on appeal. The record on appeal is that which the trial court sends to the appellate court and includes the pleadings, court minutes, transcript(s), jury instructions, judgments, and other rulings, unless otherwise designated. Parent v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 2021-0897 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/22), 341 So.3d 804, 806. Appellate review is limited strictly to the record as it existed at the time the underlying judgment was rendered. Cortez v. Cortez, 2011-1485 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/29/12), 2012 WL 1079201, at *2. Substantive post-judgment events, facts, and judgments are not a part of “the record on appeal.” See Rathe v. Rathe, 2017-1326 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/21/18), 256 So.3d 1001, 1007-08 (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 2164).

Soileau appealed the February 28, 2025 judgment. The judgment Soileau seeks to supplement into the record was signed on October 13, 2025 -- after the judgment on appeal was signed February 28, 2025 and after the appeal lodged in this Court on October 2, 2025. In its January 5th order denying Soileau's motion to supplement, this Court directed Soileau to the longstanding legal precept that appellate review is limited strictly to the record as it existed at the time the underlying judgment was rendered. See Cortez, 2012 WL 1079201, at *2.

In her request for reconsideration, Soileau asks the court to find that La. C.C.P. art. 2132 permits the court to supplement the record with the subsequently-rendered judgment setting costs and attorney fees (“costs judgment”). However, Article 2132 only allows the record to be supplemented after lodging if the record is incorrect, contains misstatements, irregularities or informalities, or if it omits a material part of the trial record. See La. C.C.P. art. 2132. Soileau has not shown that the record contains any of these deficiencies. A post-judgment costs judgment is not the type of supplementary material envisioned by La. C.C.P. art. 2132. See Strawn v. Superfresh, 98-1624 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 757 So.2d 686, 688 n. 2. Instead, it is apparent that Soileau requests supplementation so that she can obtain review of the post-judgment costs judgment in conjunction with this appeal. See Soileau's December 2, 2025 Joint Request for Extension of Briefing Deadlines. This is not permitted. A judgment for costs and attorney fees rendered after the final judgment on the merits is a separate, appealable judgment. See Price v. City of Ponchatoula Police Dept., 2012-0727 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/12), 111 So.3d 1053, 1055. The Request for Reconsideration lacks merit. Accordingly, we deny the Request for Reconsideration.⁹

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Soileau assigns error to: (1) the trial court's reduction of her incentive bonus payment to account for the fee split between Robichaux Mize and the Pandit Law Firm; (2) the trial court's reduction of her incentive bonus payment to 40% of the attorney fees earned on the cases assigned to her; and (3) the trial court's denial of her request for penalty wages. Soileau also seeks an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. In answer to the appeal, Robichaux Mize challenges the trial court's judgment awarding unpaid wages that included fees distributed to the firm in 2024 in the calculation of Soileau's bonus.

DISCUSSION

The Legal Framework: Claims under the Louisiana Wage Payment Act

The Louisiana Wage Payment Act, La. R.S. 23:631, et seq., is designed to compel the prompt payment of earned wages upon an employee's discharge or resignation. Dial v. East Baton Rouge Parish Council on Aging, Inc., 2024-1310 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/25), 426 So.3d 1047, 1059. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:631 requires employers to pay employees the amount then due under the terms of employment no later than fifteen days from the date of the termination of employment. In the event the amount owed is disputed, La. R.S. 23:631(B) grants the employee the right to file an action to enforce a wage claim and proceed via summary procedure under La. C.C.P. art. 2592.

Louisiana Revised Statute 23:632 states that employers who fail or refuse to comply with La. R.S. 23:631 shall be liable to the employee for penalty wages. However, where there is a good faith question of whether the employer actually owes wages to the discharged employee, the employer's resistance to payment of wages does not warrant the imposition of penalty wages. Schuyten v. Superior Systems, Inc., 2005-2358 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 98, 101. To prove entitlement to penalty wages, the employee must prove that: (1) wages were due and owing, (2) the employee made demand for payment at the usual place of payment, and (3) the employer failed to pay upon demand. Dial, 426 So.3d at 1059. Louisiana Revised Statute 23:632 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. Haber v. Ocean Canyon Properties, Inc., 2017-1472 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/18), 251 So.3d 454, 458.

The employee in this case claims she is owed wages under her employer's incentive bonus program. For purposes of La. R.S. 23:631, wages are any amounts due under the terms of employment, which are earned during a pay period. Locke v. MADCON Corp., 2022-0630 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/22), 360 So.3d 519, 526-27, writ denied, 2023-00095 (La. 4/4/23), 358 So.3d 866. Bonuses paid as part of an incentive plan to encourage longevity or production may be called “bonuses” but are more in the nature of commissions and are considered wages. Russo v. OnPath Federal Credit Union, 23-537 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/29/24), 388 So.3d 1274, 1279.

The burden of proof rests upon the employee to show by a preponderance of the evidence the facts which establish the employee's claim for unpaid wages and penalty wages under La. R.S. 23:631 and 23:632. See Calamia v. Core Laboratories, LP, 17-635 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/18), 249 So.3d 1038, 1042.

Interpretation of the Incentive Bonus Program: Fee Splits and Fee Allocations

Soileau's Assignments of Error No. 1 and No. 2

Soileau's first two assignments of error challenge the trial court's interpretation of the incentive bonus provision contained in her employment contract with Robichaux Mize. The contract provided that Soileau could earn a bonus each year in an amount equal to 20% of the “fees that are earned and collected by you” in a calendar year that are in excess of three times your annual base salary:

The parties dispute how to interpret the contractual provision regarding the “fees that are earned and collected by you[.]”

Soileau contends the trial court erred by reducing the “starting point” for the calculation of her bonus by the fees Robichaux Mize paid its co-counsel and by allocating the fees among the Robichaux Mize attorneys who performed work on her files. According to Soileau, the incentive bonus provision of the contract was unambiguous and the trial court should have calculated her bonus by including all fees the firm “earned and collected” in cases that settled while she was assigned as the handling attorney. In support, Soileau points out that the plain language of the contract does not include any reference to fee splits or fee allocations, and the contract also does not define the terms “earned” and “collected.” She also asserts that any ambiguity should be construed against Robichaux Mize as the drafter of the contract.

Robichaux Mize counters that it would be absurd and defy common sense to accept Soileau's argument that she is entitled to include fees earned by another law firm in the calculation of her bonus. Rather, Robichaux Mize contends that Soileau could only earn a fee credit off of fees she earned and collected for Robichaux Mize, not the other law firm. Also, Robichaux Mize contends that Soileau's bonus cannot be based upon 100% of the fees collected by Robichaux Mize in every file assigned to her, regardless of whether she actually “earned” the fees collected. Robichaux Mize contends Soileau did not earn all of the fees collected by Robichaux Mize on the files assigned to her because other Robichaux Mize attorneys also performed work on those files. Accordingly, Robichaux Mize contends the trial court properly excluded those sums from the calculation of Soileau's bonus.

Interpretation of the Incentive Bonus Program

A contract between parties is the law between them. Hampton v. Hampton, Inc., 97-1779 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1185, 1189. Courts are bound to give legal effect to agreements according to the true intent of the contracting parties. Kenner Industries, Inc. v. Sewell Plastics, Inc., 451 So.2d 557, 558 (La. 1984). The intent is to be determined by the words of the contract when they are clear, explicit, and lead to no absurd consequences. See Mah 2012 Family Trust No. 1 v. Red Stick Studio Development, LLC, 2024-1260 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/25), 2025 WL 2673600, at *10, citing La. C.C. art. 2046.

In cases in which the contract is ambiguous, the agreement shall be construed according to the intent of the parties. Hampton, 713 So.2d at 1189, citing La. C.C. art. 2045. Intent is an issue of fact which is to be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances. Hampton, 713 So.2d at 1189. A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the contract, and other contracts of a like nature between the same parties. Hampton, 713 So.2d at 1189, citing La. C.C. art. 2053. Where a doubtful provision cannot be otherwise resolved, that provision must be interpreted against the party who furnished its text. SRG Baton Rouge II, L.L.C. v. Patten/Jenkins BR Popeye's, L.L.C., 2023-1204 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/31/24), 391 So.3d 73, 80, citing La. C.C. art. 2056.

The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Cannata's Supermarket, Inc. v. Kevin Gros Offshore, L.L.C, 2022-1281 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 2023 WL 3862580, at *5. However, where factual findings are pertinent to the interpretation of a contract, those factual findings are not to be disturbed unless manifest error is shown. Hampton, 713 So.2d at 1190.

The record reflects that Robichaux Mize is a law firm located in Lake Charles, Louisiana, that handles a high volume of hurricane cases. Matthew M. Mize is a managing partner in the firm. Mize testified at trial that he met Raj Pandit of the Pandit Law Firm several months after Hurricane Laura. Because Pandit was experienced handling first party hurricane claims and Robichaux Mize was taking on a high volume of hurricane cases, his firm decided to start working together with the Pandit Law Firm on all of their first-party hurricane files. The firms agreed to split the fees 50-50 in the cases they jointly handled.

Mize testified that Soileau was hired to be a handling attorney that worked under him. Handling attorneys were expected to keep the client informed, timely gather and send opposing counsel the data and documents necessary for opposing counsel to prepare their reports, and get sufficient authority from the client to hopefully settle the case at mediation. Soileau testified at trial that her job duties also included preparing the initial disclosures, handling the initial settlement conferences, drafting the settlement demands and position papers, and preparing the case for mediation.

Mize testified that Soileau was not the only attorney who worked on the files assigned to her. Mize testified that he was still involved in the cases he assigned to Soileau. For instance, he usually handled the mediations and settlement negotiations. Mize was also the originating attorney who obtained the hurricane files for the firm. Mize knew that other attorneys in the firm prepared the petitions in the cases assigned to Soileau because Soileau was not hired until after the petitions were filed.

Regarding the firm's incentive bonus program, Mize testified that his firm implemented the program before he began working at the law firm. Mize testified that when he was paid an incentive bonus from the firm, it was not based on 100% of the firm's fee. Mize also testified that the firm had never allocated 100% of the fees to an associate who worked on a file simply because the file was assigned to that associate. It was always based on the actual work done by the attorney being evaluated. Mize also testified that it was always the managing partner overseeing the associate who made the decision. Mize pointed out that the use of the term “fee credits” in the contract was intended to convey that the associate attorney's bonus would be based upon work done by that attorney. According to Mize, he explained that the fee would be allocated when he interviewed Soileau for the position.

Mize testified that he calculated the amount of Soileau's bonus by asking his office manager to calculate the fees Robichaux Mize collected in the cases that settled in 2023 that were assigned to Soileau. In the calculation of Soileau's bonus, Mize did not include fees that were collected in 2024 from cases that settled in 2023. Mize then allocated one-third of the fee to Soileau and used that number to calculate Soileau's bonus. However, Mize testified that he instructed his office manager to increase Soileau's bonus to $22,500, even though the number he initially calculated was less than that amount.

Soileau testified that Raj Pandit of the Pandit Law Firm conducted her initial interview for the associate attorney position at Robichaux Mize. According to Soileau, she had no idea what the relationship was between the Pandit Law Firm and Robichaux Mize at the time. When she later interviewed with Mize, he told her that it would be very easy for her to meet the qualifications to earn the bonus because of the volume of cases they had. Soileau understood the bonus to mean that, in the cases assigned to her that settled, she would get credit for the attorney fee portions of the settlement amounts.

Soileau testified that she always understood her bonus would come from Robichaux Mize and not the Pandit Law Firm. Soileau also testified that she was never informed her bonus would be subject to a fee split with the Pandit Law Firm. According to Soileau, she only learned that the calculation of her bonus would be subject to the fee split with the Pandit Law Firm after she began working for the firm.

On the issue of the fee split, the trial court determined that the exclusion of the term “fee split” from the incentive bonus provision rendered the contract ambiguous as to the parties’ intent regarding the effect of the fee split on the calculation of Soileau's bonus. Because of the ambiguity, the trial court considered the customs and practices in the trade or business to determine whether Robichaux Mize's allocation of fees to the fee split with the Pandit Law Firm was proper. The trial court then accepted Mize's testimony about the 50-50 fee split agreement his firm reached with the Pandit Law Firm. The trial court found Soileau's testimony claiming she was unaware of the fee split with the Pandit Law Firm was not credible considering the evidence adduced at trial regarding Soileau's own interactions with Pandit. The trial court thus determined that Soileau was not entitled to calculate her incentive bonus based upon 100% of the fees collected from the files she worked on as handling attorney because, as a standard business practice, a portion of those fees must be split with the Pandit Law Firm. The trial court also found that Soileau's interpretation would create absurd results given the customs and practices of any law firm with a fee splitting arrangement.

After a de novo review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the incentive bonus provision is ambiguous because it does not address the impact that any fee split agreements would have on the calculation of Soileau's bonus. We also find that the trial court did not err in its determination that the incentive bonus should not include the fees paid to the Pandit Law Firm because to find otherwise would create absurd results. Words susceptible of different meanings must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the object of the contract. La. C.C. art. 2048. Allowing Soileau to calculate her bonus based upon fees that were earned and collected by another firm does not conform to the object of the incentive bonus in this contract. As Mize testified, the incentive bonus was intended to be based upon work done by Soileau -- not work done by attorneys at the Pandit Law Firm.

Regarding the allocation of fees among the attorneys who worked on Soileau's files, the trial court found that the exclusion of the term “allocation” from the incentive bonus provision also rendered the contract ambiguous as to the parties’ intent on this issue. Accordingly, the court considered the customs and practices as generally understood in the particular trade or business to determine whether Robichaux Mize's allocation of the fees collected by the firm was proper. The court then accepted Mize's unrebutted testimony explaining how other attorneys including himself worked on the files assigned to Soileau. The court also found that it would be clearly contrary to the customs and practices of any Saw firm if Soileau received credit for 100% of the fees earned by the firm on the files assigned to her. Further, the trial court found it would be absurd if associate attorneys could possibly out-earn their supervisors and superiors. The trial court thus found this was not the intent of the parties.

However, the trial court did not find credible Mize's testimony downplaying the amount of work performed by Soileau on her cases. The trial court pointed out that Robichaux Mize did not dispute Soileau's summary of her job duties. Because the allocation of fees owed to Soileau was doubtful under the terms of the agreement and because the contract was drafted by Robichaux Mize, trial court determined that Soileau should be allocated more than one-third of the fee, as suggested by Robichaux Mize, and she should instead be allocated 40% of the fees.

After a de novo review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the incentive bonus provision is ambiguous because it does not address the impact fee allocations would have on the calculation of Soileau's bonus. We also find that the trial court did not err by considering the customs and practices of law firms to decide that Soileau's bonus calculation should account for the allocation of fees among the attorneys who worked on her files. One of the best ways to determine what the parties intended in a contract is to examine the method in which the contract is performed, particularly if performance has been consistent for a period of many years. Intent is an issue of fact which is to be inferred from all of the surrounding circumstances. Amitech U.S.A., Ltd. v. Nottingham Const. Co., 2009-2048 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/29/10), 57 So.3d 1043, 1058, writs denied, 2011-0866, 2011-0953 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1036, 1043.

At trial, Mize testified about the customs and practices his firm historically used to calculate the incentive bonus for associate attorneys. Mize testified that his firm had never allocated 100% of the fees to an associate who worked on a file simply because the associate was assigned to that file. It was always based on the actual work done by the attorney being evaluated. Mize also testified that the use of the term “fee credits” in the contract was intended to convey that the associate's bonus would be based upon actual work done by that attorney. This testimony supports the trial court's decision to consider the fee allocation in the calculation of Soileau's bonus. We thus affirm the trial court's interpretation of the bonus incentive provision that determined Soileau could not include the fees paid to the Pandit Law Firm or the fees earned by other attorneys on her files in Soileau's bonus calculation.

Interpretation of the Incentive Bonus Program: Fees Distributed in 2024

Robichaux Mize's Assignment of Error

In its answer, Robichaux Mize contends the trial court erred by including funds distributed to it in 2024 in the calculation of Soileau's 2023 bonus. The contract provided in pertinent part that Soileau could earn a bonus each year in an amount equal to 20% of the “fees that are earned and collected by [Soileau] during the calendar year[.]”

At trial, Mize testified that he believed the fee had to actually be received by the firm during the applicable year to be included in the bonus. Mize further testified that, in his mind, “collected” meant the time when the firm actually collected the fee. However, Soileau testified that she believed she was entitled to include fees from cases that settled in 2023 regardless of whether the fees were distributed in 2024. When asked by the trial court about his position, Mize admitted that he would not have a problem including those fees in the calculation of Soileau's bonus.

The trial court determined that the contractual provision was ambiguous as to the parties’ intent regarding when a fee is “earned and collected” by the associate attorney. The trial court thus considered the customs and practices as generally understood in the particular trade or business to determine when the fee was collected by the associate attorney.

To this end, the trial court considered Mize's testimony acknowledging that it can take months before the fee gets transferred from the firm's trust account to its operating account. The trial court also considered Mize's testimony about fee distributions delayed by mortgage companies that must endorse the settlement checks and send them back to the law firm. Considering this testimony, the trial court found that Soileau had no control over when a payment was distributed to a client. The trial court thus found that a common-sense interpretation of the provision meant that the fee was “earned” prior to distribution. The trial court also found that Robichaux Mize's suggested interpretation would lead to absurd consequences if the amount “earned and collected” did not include fees from cases that settled during the calendar year simply because administrative delays prevented the fees from being distributed earlier. The trial court thus included the fees from cases that settled in 2023 but were not distributed until 2024 in the calculation of Soileau's bonus.

After a de novo review of the evidence, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the incentive bonus provision is ambiguous because it does not clarify when a fee is “earned and collected” by the associate attorney. We also agree that interpreting the provision in the manner Robichaux Mize suggests would lead to absurd consequences when the object of the contract is considered. See La. C.C. art. 2048. Since the incentive bonus was intended to be a merit-based award for work done by Soileau in 2023, Soileau should not be deprived of fees she earned in 2023 because administrative delays prevented the distribution of those fees until 2024. See also Schuyten, 952 So.2d at 98 (finding that an employee earned his commission pursuant to La. R.S. 23:634 where only the collection of the fee was outstanding and collection was beyond the control of the employee). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's decision to include the fees Soileau earned from cases that, although settled in 2023, were not distributed until 2024 in the calculation of Soileau's bonus, and affirm the trial court's award of $18,759.13 in unpaid wages.

Penalty Wages under La. R.S. 23:632

Soileau's Assignment of Error No. 3

Soileau also assigns error to the trial court's judgment declining to impose penalty wages. In order for the employer to be held liable for penalty wages, the employer's action must have been motivated through bad faith, or the employer must be found to have acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner given the circumstances. DiVittorio v. Seale & Ross, PLC, 2022-0392 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/22), 360 So.3d 841, 849. Here, the trial court found that Robichaux Mize paid Soileau an incentive bonus based upon its interpretation of the incentive bonus program provision. Although the bonus was insufficient, the trial court noted that a bonus was paid as agreed. Thus, the trial court found that Robichaux Mize had a good faith, reasonable basis for resisting the substantial and unreasonable payment demanded by Soileau.

We find no manifest error in this determination. Mize testified that he “truly tried to fairly allocate the amount of fees that I thought was very reasonable based on the work that [Soileau] did.” Mize's testimony about why he decided to allocate one-third of the fee to Soileau and why he excluded fees that were distributed in 2024 from the calculation of Soileau's bonus reasonably supports the trial court's good faith determination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision not to impose penalty wages. Because we have not found any merit in Soileau's appeal, we decline to award Soileau any attorney fees or costs of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Robichaux, Mize, Wadsack, Richardson & Watson, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Appeal is denied. Christina Soileau's Request for Reconsideration and Joint Request for Extension of Briefing Deadlines is denied. The February 28, 2025 judgment is affirmed. Robichaux, Mize, Wadsack, Richardson & Watson, LLC's answer to the appeal is denied. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Christina Soileau and Robichaux, Mize, Wadsack, Richardson & Watson, LLC.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED; MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED; JOINT REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF BRIEFING DEADLINES DENIED.

While I find the language of the contract to be clear and unambiguous, I concur with the majority's denial of the relief sought in Ms. Soileau's appeal. However, I dissent to the extent that I would grant some of the relief sought by appellee in its answer. The language of the contract requires the fees be “earned and collected by [Ms. Soileau] during the calendar year.” As such, in calculating her bonus, Ms. Soileau is not entitled to fees collected until 2024, although earned in 2023.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2592 provides in pertinent part that summary proceedings may be used for trial or disposition of matters in which the law permits summary proceedings to be used. La. C.C.P. art. 2592(13). Under La. R.S. 23:631(B) of the LWPA, the employee “shall have the right to file an action to enforce such a wage claim and proceed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 2592.”

2.   The dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity contended the incentive bonus money was not due until December 31, 2024. The peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no right and no cause of action disputed that Soileau was entitled to recover 100% of the fee collected by the firm on every file upon which Soileau worked. The affirmative defenses alleged deficiencies in the quality of Soileau's work, Soileau's limited scope of work on the files, and disputed her calculation of the “earned and collected” fees. Robichaux Mize requested sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 863 on grounds that Soileau knew her action was based upon improper allegations of fact and claiming that she filed suit before the incentive bonus was due. Soileau opposed the exceptions and request for sanctions.

3.   The trial court heard arguments on Robichaux Mize's exceptions and overruled them before the trial commenced.

4.   Although Soileau's April 28, 2025 motion for appeal improperly stated that she was taking a devolutive appeal from the trial court's written reasons, entitled “Judgment with Written Reasons,” instead of the judgment signed the same date, we will treat the motion as if it were properly taken from the trial court's judgment. Soileau's brief clearly indicates she intended to appeal the trial court's actual judgment. See Riedel v. Fenasci, 2018-0539 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/18), 270 So.3d 795, 800. Appeals are favored in law, and, under these facts, the mistake constitutes a mere technicality. See Lewis v. Louisiana State Judicial Review Board, 2018-0204 (La App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 264 So.3d 1208, 1211, writ denied, 2018-1856 (La. 1/28/19), 263 So.3d 427.

5.   At the time this appeal was taken, La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) provided:(1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.(2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915 was recently amended and no longer contains this language. See Acts 2025, No. 250, § 3. According to the Editor's Notes, the amended provisions to Article 1915 “shall have prospective application only and shall not apply to appeals and supervisory writs filed prior to” August 1, 2025. Because this appeal was taken in April 2025, the version of Article 1915(B) cited above applies to this case.

6.   While the trial court did not explicitly award costs in the judgment, La. C.C.P. art. 1920 provides that costs shall be paid by the party cast unless the judgment provides otherwise.

7.   Robichaux Mize cites the Louisiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Citizens for a New Louisiana, 2024-00945 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 397 So.3d 842, to suggest otherwise. However, Jones dealt with a judgment granting a special motion to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971, which is not present in this case. Also, the judgment at issue in Jones did not award of attorney fees, whereas the judgment before us awards reasonable attorney fees to be set at a later date. We note that Davis v. Benton, 2003-0851 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 874 So.2d 185, the earliest case cited by Jones on the issue of a judgment granting a motion to strike, involved a judgment that was “silent as to the issue of attorney's fees[.]” (Emphasis added). The Davis court determined that the judgment granting the special motion to strike in that case was a partial judgment because it did not grant the defendant all of the relief for which he prayed. In contrast, the judgment before this Court disposed of all matters before the court with the exception of setting attorney fees and costs.

8.   Robichaux Mize also briefly argues the appeal should be dismissed because the record was lodged after the extended return date. This argument lacks merit. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2161 provides that an appeal shall not be dismissed because of any irregularity, error, or defect unless it is imputable to the appellant. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2126 provides that an appeal shall not be dismissed because the record is untimely lodged if the appellant has paid the appeal costs. See La. C.C.P. art. 2126(G). See also Marcum v. Inter-Ocean Insurance Co., 402 So.2d 222, 223 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1981). The appeal costs have been paid in this case. Also, Robichaux Mize has not alleged that the untimely lodging was due to any fault of Soileau.

9.   On December 2, 2025, Soileau's counsel filed a Joint Request for Extension of Briefing Deadlines asking this Court to establish deadlines that would allow the parties to brief any issues raised by the subsequently-rendered costs judgment. However, as stated above, this Court will not review the subsequently rendered costs judgment in conjunction with this appeal. The Joint Request for Extension of Briefing Deadlines is denied as moot.

GREENE, J.

McClendon, C.J. concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.