SAVOIE v. LANDRIEU CONCRETE AND CEMENT INDUSTRIES LLC RLH LLC (2026)

In this personal injury action, Defendants, Wilbert Bartholomew, Landrieu Concrete and Cement Industries, LLC (“Landrieu”), RHL Investments, LLC (“RHL”), and Clear Blue Specialty Insurance Company (“Clear Blue”), appeal the jury's award of damages to the plaintiff, Sherry Savoie. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's rulings and the jury's damages award to the plaintiff.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 24, 2018, Ms. Savoie, while operating her 2005 Lexus RX 330 in the westbound turning lane of Veterans Memorial Boulevard, attempted to make a left turn on to Fleur de Lis Drive. At the same time, Mr. Bartholomew, driving a cement truck owned by his employer, Landrieu Concrete, was traveling westbound in the lane to the immediate right of Ms. Savoie when he attempted to execute a left turn. As a result, Mr. Bartholomew struck Ms. Savoie's vehicle, causing her to suffer physical injuries to her lumbar and cervical spine, right shoulder, and chest. The accident occurred in Orleans Parish.

Ms. Savoie filed a petition for damages against Mr. Bartholomew, Landrieu Concrete, and their insurer, Clear Blue, alleging that Mr. Bartholomew was negligent and that Landrieu Concrete was also negligent in its hiring, training, and supervision of Mr. Bartholomew. Following an eight-day jury trial, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants finding that both Bartholomew and Landrieu Concrete were negligent, and further awarding Ms. Savoie $1,819,600 in damages. Defendants have not appealed the liability portion of the verdict but instead limit their appeal to damages.

DISCUSSION

Defendants assign as errors the Court's ruling allowing testimony by the Plaintiff's treating physician and life-care planner regarding an updated surgery recommendation made shortly before trial, and the amounts of general and special damages awarded by the jury.

“A trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.” Ackers v. Douglas, 24-0033, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/16/24), 399 So.3d 656, 667, writ denied, 24-1129 (La. 11/27/24), 396 So.3d 454 (citations omitted). As a general rule, trial courts are afforded great discretion concerning the admission of evidence, and their decisions to admit or exclude evidence should not be reversed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of their discretion. Medine v. Roniger, 24-3436, p. 6 (La. 7/2/04), 879 So.2d 706, 711 (citations omitted).

An appellate court applies the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review when confronted with a challenge to an award of special damages. See Caruso v. Chalmette Refining, LLC, 16-1117, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/28/17), 222 So.3d 859, 865. “The appellate court must first conclude that no reasonable basis exists for the trial court's award and secondly, that the award is clearly wrong.” McCloskey v. Higman Barge Lines, Inc., 18-1008, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/19), 269 So.3d 1173, 1178 (citations omitted).

“The standard of review applicable to a general damages award is the abuse of discretion standard.” CD v. SC, 22-00961, p. 4 (La. 6/1/23), 366 So.3d 1245, 1249 (citations omitted). The role of the appellate court in reviewing general damage awards is not to decide what it considers to be an appropriate award but rather to review the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. Id. Vast discretion is accorded to the trier of fact in fixing general damage awards. Id. The trier of fact is afforded much discretion on assessing the facts and rendering an award because it is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and see the evidence firsthand. Id. “In the assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.” See La. C.C. art. 2324.1.

Defendants maintain that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony from the plaintiff's treating physician and life care planning expert concerning a recommendation for surgery and the costs associated therewith. Appellants submit this constituted a “trial by ambush” and that it tainted the jury's verdict. Specifically, appellants complain that shortly before trial they received notice that the plaintiff's treating physician was recommending new surgeries, which included a lumbar disc fusion and possible artificial disc replacement. Dr. Dietz prepared a report setting forth his findings and recommendations. The basis of the objection was that the testimony was based on an MRI conducted in April of 2025, and an examination performed by Dr. Dietz on May 8, 2025, both of which came after the cutoff date for expert reports and the discovery deadline. Citing La. C.C.P. Articles1428 and 1551, defendants argued that the new surgery recommendations from Dr. Dietz caused Mr. Capielano to “abandon” his previous analysis and increase his estimated amount of costs for treatment. The trial court excluded the introduction of the MRI report and the report prepared by Dr. Dietz after the May 8, 2025 visit; however, it allowed Dr. Dietz to testify regarding that visit as well as his new surgery recommendations. Mr. Capielano was allowed to testify as to new calculations based upon the newly furnished recommendations of Dr. Dietz from the witness stand.

We feel the trial court was well within its discretion in allowing the testimony. The evidence reflects that Ms. Savoie was followed for the injuries she sustained in the accident for a period of over 6 years before trial. During the course of that period of time, she received treatment that included therapy, multiple epidural steroid and joint injections, an L5-S1 discectomy on June 11 2020, and continuous pain medications. As early as June 2021, Dr. Dietz was of the opinion that Ms. Savoie would require a lumbar fusion and that within 20 years of the fusion would require an adjacent – level fusion. Although her pain improved at times, she was never asymptomatic. The MRI performed in April prior to trial revealed her condition had worsened and the fusion surgery was required.

Ms. Savoie's was a fluid, evolving situation and not such that it could have been cut off or suspended due to a trial setting. Defendants were well aware that Ms. Savoie's condition was dynamic and was not improving. Based upon this information, it is not reasonable for the defendants to claim they were “ambushed” by the surgical recommendation. While discovery cutoffs and trial scheduling deadlines are important, they must be balanced against a litigant's right to present their entire medical picture to the trier of fact.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr, Dietze and Mr. Capielano to testify about Ms. Savoie's surgery recommendations. In order to show that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were erroneous, the defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the evidentiary ruling was erroneous but also that ruling affected a party's substantial right. Pierre v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 24-0236, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/24), 400 So.3d 223, 233. “The determination is whether the error, when compared to the record in its totality, has a substantial effect on the outcome of the case.” Id. Here the plaintiff sustained a serious, debilitating injury which persisted and worsened over a period of six years from the date of the accident. She was never pain free, asymptomatic or discharged from treatment. To the contrary, she was under active treatment for a back condition which continued to worsen and develop over time. Based on our review of the record in the instant case, the defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that the trial court's admission of this evidence was erroneous.

After hearing all the evidence presented by both parties, the jury awarded Ms. Savoie $1,050,000.00 in general damages. The defendants contend that this Court should lower the general damages award to $350,000.00. Vast discretion is afforded the jury in fixing general damage awards. See La. C.C. art. 2324.1; see also Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC, 23-00170, p. 5 (La. 10/20/23), 379 So.3d 636, 641. In reviewing an award of general damages, the first inquiry is whether the trier of facts abused its discretion in assessing the amount of damages. Id. at 644. To evaluate this issue, an appellate court is to include a consideration of prior awards in similar cases, as well as the particular facts and circumstances of the case under review. Id. If an abuse of discretion is found, the court is to then also consider those prior awards to determine “the highest or lowest point which is reasonably within that discretion.” Id. The holding in Pete v. Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., LLC does not require this Court to “inextricably anchor current awards to past jurisprudential awards.” Stauder v. Shell Oil Co., 22-0593, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/24), 409 So.3d 1, 6. “To find otherwise would usurp the jury's role to determine the amount of damages based on the particularized circumstances presented before the jury.” Id.

Ms. Savoie told the jury that she was at a “a hundred percent” before the collision giving rise to this action. She further testified that her life was “totally changed” thereafter. Before the collision, she had no limitations and was deeply involved with her grandchildren. She spent Saturdays at City Park “playing and having a good time” with her eldest grandson. Now, she is unable to carry her grandchildren without pain and cannot actively play with them. She is relegated to watching them play from afar and is required to take a chair with her wherever she goes in order to sit due to unbearable pain.

As a result of the injuries sustained in the accident, Ms. Savoie has had to undergo a number of invasive procedures, including rhizotomies, SI joint injections, epidural steroid injections, and a lumbar discectomy. Following the lumbar discectomy, Ms. Savoie moved in with her daughter for a month, spent a week bedridden, and required assistance to use the bathroom. Ms. Savoie testified that following the procedure, she “couldn't move ․ couldn't do anything,” and that her daughter and seven-year old grandson “basically had to do everything for [her].” The jury also heard testimony that Ms. Savoie suffered other injuries and will need to undergo three additional surgeries – an SI fusion, an anterior lumbar interbody fusion, and an adjacent level fusion.

Considering the above, the general damages award is fully supported by the evidence. In light of Ms. Savoie's injuries, past medical treatment, and recommended future medical treatment, the award is not excessive. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the jury's award of general damages.

The defendants also contend that Ms. Savoie failed to meet her burden of proving future medical expenses when she failed to introduce any economic testimony to reduce the claimed amounts to present value. Defendants maintain that discounting awards for future special damages prevents overcompensation of the plaintiff by reducing the future costs award to a present value.

On the first day of trial, the trial court heard the defendants’ omnibus motion in limine, which included a request to exclude Ms. Savoie's future medical damages as unadjusted to present value. The trial court ordered the defendants to address the issue of adjusting the future medical costs to present day value through cross-examination of Ms. Savoie's life-care planning expert. The record does not reveal any testimony from Mr. Capielano regarding future medical costs driven by inflation or other cost increasing projections. He simply testified as to the total cost for the surgeries and related treatment. Counsel for the defendant did not examine those costs in detail, but instead asked only Mr. Capielano whether the future costs would be zero if he adopted the testimony of the defense medical expert, who stated that surgery for Ms. Savoie was not required. The assignment of error has no merit.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that future medical damages must be established with some degree of certainty, but that due to their necessarily speculative nature, the “exact value of the necessary expenses” need not be in the record for the factfinder to award future medical expenses. Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 09-1869, p. 13 (La. 3//16/10), 31 So.3d 996, 1006.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm evidentiary rulings of the Court and the jury award of damages in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Sherry Savoie.

AFFIRMED

Judge Daniel L. Dysart