STATE v. JENKINS (2026)

Torin J. Jenkins’ appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a stolen firearm. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the unanimous decision of the jury.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Torin Jenkins was charged by an Orleans Parish Grand Jury indictment with second degree murder, obstruction of justice, felony possession of a firearm (two counts), possession of a stolen firearm and resisting an officer. After a five-day trial the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a stolen firearm. The jury could not reach a verdict as to counts one, two and three and the court declared a mistrial.

On May 15, 2025, the trial court imposed concurrently-running sentences of five years imprisonment for illegal possession of a stolen firearm (count five) and twelve years imprisonment (plus a $1,000.00 fine) for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count four). It is from this judgment that the defendant appeals.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Testimony at the trial was provided by several witnesses. New Orleans Police Department Officer Raychel Willey testified that on June 20, 2021, she stopped the vehicle driven by defendant as he was traveling the wrong way on a one-way street. After stopping the vehicle, Officer Willey asked defendant and his passenger, Ranchel Jacks whether there were any firearms in the vehicle, which both denied. Officer Willey could smell “a heavy presence of marijuana inside the car.” She asked the occupants for identification and discovered that Ms. Jacks had an outstanding arrest warrant. At that point, she called for assistance and Ms. Jacks was removed from the vehicle and arrested. In connection with Ms. Jacks's arrest, her purse (which contained marijuana) was seized and in so doing, Officer Willey noticed a firearm under the passenger seat. Officer Willey removed the firearm and defendant Jenkins was ordered to exit the vehicle. Officer Willey then “ran” the serial number on the firearm taken from the vehicle and it was reported stolen.

Ranchel Jacks testified that she was a passenger in the car with the defendant who was her boyfriend and the father of her child. Jacks admitted on the stand that during an interrogation conducted after the arrest, she stated that defendant “gave [the gun] to me” and had told her that he obtained the weapon “from an ex-girlfriend.”

Pauline Peters testified that she purchased a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber pistol sometime between 2017 to 2018. Ms. Peters further stated that she knew defendant, describing him as an “ex” with whom she had a relationship from 2016 to 2019. Ms. Peters testified that defendant was aware that she owned a firearm, explaining that “he brought me to get it.” Ms. Peters kept the gun in a closet, but noticed, after she and defendant “broke up,” that the gun was missing. Upon realizing that the gun was gone, she “texted” defendant, requesting that he return the weapon. Defendant responded – “No, B.” Thereafter, she reported the weapon stolen because “I knew I wasn't going to get it back.” She stated that she reported that the firearm had been stolen so that she would “be protected[;] so it don't [sic] fall on me.”

Don Newsome testified that he was the custodian of records for Smart Communications “which is the inmate telephone company at the Orleans Parish jail.” Mr. Newsome authenticated a phone call placed by defendant while incarcerated. The recording of the jail call, state exhibit 38, reflects that defendant attempted to discourage his girlfriend, Ms. Jacks, from testifying at trial regarding the traffic stop. He told her that she could come to court but did not “have to take the stand.”

ERRORS PATENT

Upon review of the record, we find two errors patent. First, the trial court did not adhere to the twenty-four-hour sentencing delay, however, if defendant expressly waives the delay the sentence may be imposed immediately, and any error in the failure to abide by the sentencing delay is considered as harmless. After the hearings on the motions for post-verdict acquittal and new trial the court asked defendant if he was ready for sentencing to which his counsel replied, “Yes, Judge.” We find this to be a harmless error. See State v. Robinson, 2021-0254, pp. 21-22 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/22), 336 So.3d 567, 580 (“Defendant waived the twenty-four hour sentencing delay when he stated that he was ready for sentencing following the denial of his motion for a new trial.”); State v. Pierre, 99-3156, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/25/01), 792 So.2d 899, 903 (“[D]efendant impliedly waived the required twenty-four hour delay when defense counsel responded in the affirmative when the trial judge inquired whether he was ready for sentencing. [Citation omitted.]”).

The second error patent was the trial court's failure to specify that defendant's sentence for his conviction of felon in possession of a firearm was to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as required by law. See La. R.S. 14:95.1(B).

This Court has applied the following analysis when statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing:

“[P]aragraph A of La. R.S. 15:301.1 provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, they are contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court.” State v. Wyatt, 2011-0219, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/22/11), 83 So.3d 131, 143 (citing State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790). Accordingly, “this Court need take no action to correct the trial court's failure to specify that the defendant's sentences be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence” because it is statutorily affected. State v. Wyatt, 2011–0219, p. 20, 83 So.3d at 143 (citing La. R.S. 15:301.1(A)).

State v. Dominick, 2013-0270, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 250, 252.

This error is harmless. La. R.S. 15:301.1 is explicit that where there are statutory restrictions, they are imposed, whether or not they are recited by the sentencing court.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the defendant raises the following assignments of error: (1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting the State's February 4, 2025 ballistics report, which was disclosed only after trial commenced and after the defense committed to its theory before the jury; (2) Whether the cumulative effect of late disclosures, repeated continuances, and denial of defense motions deprived Mr. Jenkins of his constitutional rights to a fair trial, effective assistance of counsel, and due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and La. Const. art. I, [Sections] 2 & 16; and (3) Whether the trial court erred in prematurely granting a mistrial in lieu of allowing the jury to return and deliberate when eight out of twelve jurors wanted to return, in violation of defendant's right to a complete trial and exposure to double jeopardy.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1

Defendant argues that he was unduly prejudiced by allowing the State to introduce the ballistics report which was dated February 4, 2025. Although the report was admitted over defendant's objection it had no relevance as to defendant's convictions. This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2

Defendant argues that the “cumulative effect of late disclosures, repeated continuances, and denial of defense motions” deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. As the Louisiana Supreme Court observed in State v. Brown, 2018-01999, pp. 117-18 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So.3d 199, 284:

This Court has held “the combined effect of the incidences complained of, none of which amounts to reversible error [does] not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.” State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544–45 (La. 1988), quoting State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123, 137 (La. 1982), appeal dismissed, 461 U.S. 950, 103 S.Ct. 2419, 77 L.Ed.2d 1309 (1983). Although the Court has often reviewed cumulative error arguments, it has never endorsed them. Instead, the Court has consistently found that harmless errors, however numerous, do not aggregate to reach the level of reversible error. See, e.g., State v. Strickland, 93-0001, pp. 51-52 (La. 11/1/96), 683 So.2d 218, 239; State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La. 2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364 (unpub'd app'x.); State v. Tart, 94-0025, p. 55 (La. 2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116, 164; State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544–45 (La. 1988) (citing State v. Graham, 422 So.2d 123, 137 (La. 1982); State v. Sheppard, 350 So.2d 615, 651 (La. 1977)). Other courts treating the issue have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mullen v. Blackburn, 808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (court rejects cumulative error claim and finds that “twenty times zero equals zero”); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1303 (Miss. 1994) (finding no “near errors” and so rejecting cumulative error analysis).

Here, the only error specified by defendant was the admission of the late ballistics report without allowing the defendant a continuance in order to obtain an independent expert to review and help prepare for cross examination. As addressed above, defendant was not convicted of the crime for which the ballistics report was required or relevant. This assignment is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 3

Defendant asserts that the trial court's granting of a mistrial on multiple counts violated his protection against double jeopardy rendering any subsequent retrial unconstitutional. Defendant objected to the Court's ruling on the mistrial however, he failed to seek a stay and emergency writ relief in accordance with the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. Article 775.1.

In State v. Lewis, 2019-0448, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/12/20), 292 So.3d 945, 951, writ denied, 2020-00389 (La. 6/22/20), 297 So.3d 760, a case factually similar to the matter at hand, this Court reasoned:

La. C.Cr.P. art. 775.1 provides:

If a judge orders a mistrial, then upon motion of either the state or the defendant, the court shall order an automatic twenty-four-hour stay of all proceedings in which either the state or the defendant may take an emergency writ application to the appropriate reviewing courts with appellate jurisdiction, including the Louisiana Supreme Court. The jury shall not be released pending the stay unless both the state and defendant agree to release the jury.

Our Court in State v. Copelin, 16-0264 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/7/16), 206 So.3d 990, 1000, writ denied, 17-0047 (La. 9/29/17), 227 So.3d 286, held that a defendant failed to preserve for review the issue of whether the district court erred by unnecessarily granting mistrial without his consent, such that retrial violated double jeopardy, where defendant failed to request a twenty-four hour automatic stay of proceedings to preserve the status quo pending an appellate court's ruling on the issue under La. C.Cr.P. art. 775.1.

In Copelin, our Court described the necessity to invoke the automatic stay provision as follows:

By imposing an automatic stay when invoked, Article 775.1 precludes a trial court from simultaneously granting a mistrial and dismissing the jury and thereby depriving the aggrieved party from seeking appellate review. Indeed, the apparent purpose for enacting Article 775.1 was to create a procedural device for the aggrieved party to preserve the status quo pending an appellate court's ruling on the issue. An aggrieved party's remedy is not to seek reconsideration of the issue before the trial court; rather, their remedy is to request a twenty-four hour automatic stay of the proceedings—thereby delaying the release of the jury—in order to file an emergency writ application with the appropriate appellate court and, if necessary, the Louisiana Supreme Court.

* * *

Contrary to Mr. Copelin's contention, if he had invoked Article 775.1, the district court could not have simultaneously granted a mistrial and discharged the jury. If he had invoked Article 775.1, it would have resulted in an automatic stay; the district court would have been mandated to instruct the jury that its ruling granting the mistrial was not final.

Copelin, 16-0264, pp. 14-15, 206 So.3d at 1000.

We find that defendant waived the instant challenge to the trial court's granting of a mistrial due to his failure to seek emergency review pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 775.1. See also State v. McClebb, 2024-0522, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/16/24), 400 So.3d 215, 219, writ denied, 2024-01225 (La. 10/4/24), 394 So.3d 271.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Judge Daniel L. Dysart

JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT