LUSCO LUSCO LLC v. SUNU ASSURANCES LIBERIA LTD HMIA LLC AND RYAN SPECIALTY GROUP SERVICES LLC (2026)

In this civil case, Appellant, Lusco & Lusco, LLC (“Lusco”), seeks review of the October 27, 2025 district court judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing its claims against Appellees, insurance brokers Hartwig Moss Insurance Agency, LLC (“HMIA”) and Ryan Specialty Group Services, LLC (“RSG”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This Court efficiently summarized the facts of this case in Lusco & Lusco, LLC v. SUNU Assurances Liberia, Ltd.:

Lusco, a [Louisiana] company in the business of logging and landholding for commercial logging, prepared to lease logging equipment worth $1,878,000.00 to Renaissance, Inc. (“Renaissance”) for use in Monrovia, Liberia.[1] To protect the investment, Lusco sought to obtain insurance to cover the logging equipment from HMIA, an insurance broker. Lusco previously utilized HMIA for all insurance needs.

Initially, HMIA obtained insurance coverage from Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (“Lloyd's”). However, Lloyd's opted not to renew the policy.[2] HMIA then contacted RSG, another insurance broker, to assist with procuring a new policy for Lusco's logging equipment in Monrovia. Finding no viable options, RSG contacted Tradewinds Risk Advisors (“Tradewinds”), a multinational insurance broker, for assistance. Tradewinds contacted Guemas International (“Guemas”), an international insurance broker. Guemas obtained a quote from SUNU Assurances Liberia, Ltd. (“SUNU”). The policy with SUNU was confected for Lusco, effective October 1, 2019.

Once the COVID-19 pandemic began, Liberian authorities restricted who could remain in the country. Forced to leave, Lusco had the logging equipment placed in a secure and guarded location. However, the equipment was allegedly heavily looted and/or stolen. Lusco contacted HMIA in order to file a claim.[3] HMIA facilitated filing the claim, but SUNU denied the claim, stating that fraud or dishonesty on behalf of Lusco was not a compensable loss.

2024-0187, pp. 1-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/4/24), 400 So.3d 1178, 1179-80, writ denied, 24-01359 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 1170. SUNU's denial letter to Lusco, dated April 8, 2021, stated the following:

Re: ASSETS ALL RISKS POLICY NO.: ALR01/6/000021/J19

Having stated in the Claims Investigative Report regarding the above claims, our findings show that:

1. During our claim's [sic] investigation with Ms. Letia Bates, who is the representative for [Lusco] in Liberia, she stated that the facts concerning the above case started between June and July, 2019.

2. For us to establish whether Theft actually occurred there must be a Police Investigation Report on the incident, which was not submitted by [Lusco].[4]

Additional Findings on the above case

1. Jonas Robert (Owner of Renaissance) have [sic] officially written the government of the Republic of Liberia to investigate the fraudulent issues that Mr. [Aaron] George has done to his company (Renaissance Group) without the consent of [SUNU].

2. We were told by Ms. Bates that she was hired as a consultant in February, 2019, and she said that between June and July 2019, that was when Aaron George started to confiscate the company assets.

3. Up to now we have not received any Police Report, establishing whether theft actually occurred on the premises, and

4. Up to now Ms. Letia Bates have [sic] not taken us on the company compound to conduct our investigation survey on the above claims reported.

Technically, the policy does not cover the below policy as per the exclusions:

- Theft of the Assets (properties) was not occasioned by actual forcible and violent entry or exit from the premises by thieves, but rather properties were confiscated by the Insured Staff and Employees stated by Ms. Bates.

- The Policy does not cover any fraud or the dishonesty of any principal, member, partner, director, employee or agent of the Insured, which Jonas Robert is excusing Aaron George of.

Our Position on this Claim is that there is no sufficient evidence provided by the policyholder and So [sic] therefore, the above claims cannot be entertained by SUNU Liberia.

(Emphasis added).

Renaissance's Articles of Incorporation were entered into the district court record. The Articles list Aaron George as an incorporator, shareholder, and registered agent of the corporation. The Articles similarly list Charlie Lusco, the owner and operator of Lusco, as an equal shareholder (via Lusco), an incorporator, and as one of the corporation's directors.

In sum, SUNU's denial of Lusco's claim was based upon: the affiliation between Lusco/Charlie Lusco and Renaissance/Aaron George; the statement by Ms. Letia Bates (Lusco's representative in Liberia) concerning Mr. George's confiscation of Renaissance's assets; and the lack of a police report to establish whether theft actually occurred.

Lusco filed its original Petition for Damages against SUNU, HMIA, and RSG on August 26, 2021, alleging breach of contract as to SUNU and breach of duty as to HMIA and RSG. In its original Petition, Lusco asserted that HMIA and RSG had a duty to determine whether SUNU was “engaged in actual fraud or in an unsound financial condition.” It further asserted that it relied upon HMIA and RSG to “obtain the appropriate insurance from a viable insurer who was not engaged in fraud. However, upon information and belief, the SUNU policy is not a viable or enforceable insurance policy, and SUNU is not a viable insurer.” Moreover, Lusco alleged that “[i]n the event that it is determined the insurance provided by SUNU is not viable and enforceable for any reason, [HMIA and RSG] breached [their] duties, causing damages to [Lusco].”

On April 24, 2025, Lusco filed a First Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages that alleged additional facts and statutory violations and expanded upon its negligence claim by asserting that HMIA and RSG's procurement of the SUNU insurance caused and made them liable for its damages.

On May 17, 2023, HMIA and RSG filed Motions for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of Lusco's claims. Though the district court granted the Motions, this Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court committed legal error and exceeded the scope of La. C.C.P. art. 966(F) by granting summary judgment based upon assertions raised for the first time in HMIA and RSG's reply memoranda.⁵

On remand, HMIA and RSG filed their Second Motion for Summary Judgment on April 3, 2025. In their Motion, Appellees stated:

HMIA and RSG file this Second Motion for Summary Judgment and place Lusco on notice that the motion is based on three arguments: (1) HMIA and RSG did not breach any general duties owed to Lusco; (2) SUNU's policy is not surplus lines coverage, i.e., before procuring the SUNU policy for Lusco, HMIA and RSG did not have a duty to investigate the financial stability of SUNU to determine whether SUNU was financially sound; and (3) Lusco cannot prove causation, i.e., even if there was a breach of duty, that breach was not a cause of Lusco's alleged damages.

The hearing on the Motion took place on October 17, 2025, after which the district court granted the Motion. In its oral reasons, the court stated that the Louisiana Insurance Code does not apply in this case because the insured property was located and used exclusively outside of Louisiana. The court also determined that SUNU's insurance policy did not fall within the bounds of “surplus lines insurance” or insurance “in this State.” Further, the court found that HMIA and RSG did not breach any duty to Lusco and that Lusco could not prove causation. The trial court signed the judgment granting the Second Motion for Summary Judgment on October 27, 2025.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Appellant presents multiple assignments of error:

1. The trial court legally erred in granting summary judgment because HMIA and RSG's placement of insurance with SUNU, an unauthorized and ineligible insurer, violated the Insurance Code.

2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the substantively erroneous conclusion that the Insurance Code does not apply to the SUNU policy based on the location of the insured asset.

3. The trial court legally erred in granting summary judgment because HMIA and RSG breached their duties when they failed to procure lawful coverage and failed to promptly notify Lusco of that failure.

4. The trial court legally erred in granting summary judgment because Louisiana law imposes liability for the full amount of the loss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The appropriate appellate standard of review on a motion for summary judgment is a de novo standard of review.” Broq v. Xavier Univ. of La., 2024-0755, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/1/25), 414 So.3d 905, 906 (citing Guilbeaux v. Lupo Enter., L.L.C., 2021-0053, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/21), 321 So.3d 447, 451).

Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law on the facts before the court.

Id. (quoting Guilbeaux, 2021-0053, pp. 4-5, 321 So.3d at 451-52). The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure sets forth the following regarding the burden of proof for a motion for summary judgment:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

DISCUSSION

We will first address Lusco's fourth assignment of error, wherein it avers that Louisiana law imposes liability upon HMIA and RSG for its losses. The determination of this assignment of error has the potential to be dispositive of Lusco's claim of negligence against HMIA and RSG.

Established Louisiana jurisprudence employs a duty-risk analysis to resolve negligence claims under La. C.C. art. 2315. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032, 1041 (La. 1991). To prevail under a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove five elements:

(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element);

(2) the defendant failed to conform his conduct to the appropriate standard (the breach of duty element);

(3) the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element);

(4) the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and

(5) actual damages (the damages element)[.]

Harris v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., LLC, 2020-0248, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/26/21), 322 So.3d 397, 412 (quoting Roberts, 605 So.2d at 1051).

The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated the following regarding the duty of an insurance agent:

An insurance agent who undertakes to procure insurance for another owes an obligation to his client to use reasonable diligence in attempting to place the insurance requested and to notify the client promptly if he has failed to obtain the requested insurance. The client may recover from the agent the loss he sustains as a result of the agent's failure to procure the desired coverage if the actions of the agent warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly insured in the amount of the desired coverage.

To recover for losses resulting from an insurance agent's failure to procure insurance coverage, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) an undertaking or agreement by the insurance agent to procure insurance; (2) failure of the agent to use reasonable diligence to obtain insurance and to notify the client promptly of the absence of coverage; and (3) actions by the agent which warranted the client's assumption that he was insured in the amount of the desired coverage.”

Prest v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-0513, p. 8 (La. 12/4/12), 125 So.3d 1079, 1085-86 (citations omitted).

Because Lusco would have the burden of proof at trial, HMIA and RSG only had to establish the absence of support for one essential element of Lusco's claim in order to prevail on their summary judgment motion. In the motion hearing, HMIA and RSG alleged that Lusco failed to establish the causation element of its negligence action. At this point, the burden shifted to Lusco to produce factual support sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causation element such that HMIA and RSG would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Lusco alleged that HMIA and RSG violated La. R.S. 22:1562, which states in pertinent part:

A. (1) No insurer or insurance producer shall pay any money or commission or brokerage, or give or allow any valuable consideration or compensation to any person or business entity not duly licensed as an insurance producer, nor to an insurer not licensed to do business in this state, for or because of service rendered or performed in this state in selling, soliciting, negotiating, or effecting a contract of insurance on any property or risks, or insurable interests, or business activities located within or transacted within this state. The prohibition of this Subsection shall not apply with respect to any contract of reinsurance.

․

[E.] (2) Except as provided in Paragraph (3) of this Subsection, any person shall be liable for the full amount of any loss sustained on any contract of insurance made by or through him or it, directly or indirectly, with any insurer not lawfully authorized to transact business in this state, and for any taxes which may become due under any law of this state by reason of such contract. For purposes of this Section, any surplus lines insurer which is approved by the commissioner shall be considered lawfully authorized to transact business in this state.

(Emphasis added). At the hearing on the Motion, Lusco averred that it did not need to prove the causation element of its negligence claim due to its reliance on La. R.S. 22:1562 to establish liability:

I don't have to prove causation. That's the beautiful part about it, it says you are liable – you are liable if you do this bad thing. I'll read it again. Any person shall be liable for the full amount of any loss. I don't know how much clearer that could be. Shall be liable for the full amount of any loss, how – sustained on any contract of insurance made by or through him. Well that's SUNU.

In arguing that the violation of a statute in and of itself imposes liability, Lusco's position amounts to a “negligence per se” argument. However, Louisiana courts reject the negligence per se doctrine. See Burns v. CLK Invs. V, L.L.C., 2010-0277, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/10), 45 So.3d 1152, 1158 (quoting Galloway v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 1994-2747, p. 5 (La. 5/22/95), 654 So.2d 1345, 1347) (“The doctrine of negligence per se has been rejected in Louisiana․ However, statutory violations provide guidelines for civil liability.”). Statutory violation claims still require a duty-risk analysis to establish liability, which includes the need to prove causation, i.e., that the alleged statutory violation caused the plaintiff's loss.

[I]n Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consolidated Government, 615 So.2d 289, 292-93 (La. 1993), the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he violation of a statute or regulation does not automatically, in and of itself, impose civil liability. Civil responsibility is imposed only if the act in violation of the statute is the legal cause of damage to another.” Id. Hence, “a statutory violation must be determined as a legal cause of the accident,” and “the finding of a violation of a statute is only the beginning of a duty-risk analysis.” Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Eustis Eng'g Co., [20]07-0865, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/19/07), 974 So.2d 749, 752.

Ducote v. Boleware, 2015-0764, p. 15 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/16), 216 So.3d 943, 944. Therefore, Lusco indeed must prove that HMIA and RSG's procurement of the SUNU policy was the legal cause of its damages in order to recover under a negligence cause of action.

We must now look at the facts before this Court to determine if Lusco has established a causal connection between HMIA and RSG's procurement of the SUNU policy and its damages.

Only after the motion [for summary judgment] has been made and properly supported does the burden shift from the mover to the adverse party․ Subsequently, “the adverse party [must] produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). “The adverse party may not rely on mere allegations or denials to defeat a motion for summary judgment but must provide specific facts showing that a genuine issue remains for trial, and failure to do so will result in the rendering of the summary judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 967(B).

Studio WTA, LLC v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 2022-0783, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/19/23), 368 So.3d 630, 639 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added).

The claim in Lusco's Petition that SUNU is not a viable insurer and that its policy is not viable and enforceable is a mere allegation. Lusco argues “HMIA and RSG should not have procured insurance from a fraudulent, non-viable insurer” but has failed to offer any evidence illustrating that SUNU is fraudulent or non-viable. Lusco offered nothing in support of this allegation other than the fact that SUNU is an African insurer purportedly not sanctioned by the Louisiana Insurance Code. The fact that SUNU denied its claim does not prove that it is a fraudulent or non-viable insurer. The denial was based on the terms of SUNU's own policy, which did not cover “any fraud or the dishonesty of any principal, member, partner, director, employee or agent of the Insured,” and its factfinding, namely, that the equipment was confiscated by an affiliate of Lusco, the insured. SUNU's denial of Lusco's claim due to the coverage exclusions of its own policy is not evidence that it is a non-viable, fraudulent insurer. This Court does not make a determination whether the insurer was viable or whether it was fraudulent in its action and/or business practices. We only find there is no evidence in the record before the Court to evaluate these allegations. Mere assertions are not enough.

According to the record, HMIA and RSG's choice of insurance provider is not why Lusco's claim was denied. SUNU denied Lusco's claim because Lusco did not prove that its equipment was stolen. To cover losses related to theft, the SUNU policy required the satisfaction of certain conditions, like submitting a police report. However, Lusco did not submit a police report. Moreover, the actions of Lusco's affiliate triggered a policy coverage exclusion. Lusco's own Liberian representative, Ms. Bates, stated to SUNU that Aaron George of Renaissance was confiscating the corporation's assets at that time.

It would stand to reason that no matter what policy HMIA and RSG obtained, Lusco's claim would be denied if it could not sufficiently prove that its equipment was indeed stolen in accordance with the terms of the policy. As such, Lusco cannot prove causation through the facts alleged in this record. It cannot prove why procurement of this specific policy caused its losses. Based on the facts before this Court, there is no reason to believe that SUNU would not have provided coverage if Lusco complied with the requirements of the SUNU policy in proving theft of its equipment.

Seeing as Lusco has failed to present evidence supporting the causation element of its claim, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HMIA and RSG. At this juncture, it is not necessary to examine whether HMIA and RSG breached its duties to Lusco or whether the Louisiana Insurance Code should apply here. Lusco's failure to prove causation at the motion hearing was sufficient grounds to grant summary judgment in favor of HMIA and RSG. Therefore, we pretermit discussion of Lusco's remaining assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HMIA and RSG.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lusco purchased the equipment in Louisiana and financed the equipment through First Bank & Trust in Covington.

2.   Lusco alleged in its First Supplemental and Amended Petition for Damages that HMIA and RSG did not inform it that Lloyd's declined to extend the coverage.

3.   Lusco asserts that it did not learn SUNU was the insurer of its equipment until it contacted HMIA to make a claim on its behalf for the stolen and damaged equipment.

4.   The SUNU policy states:Theft Coverage Extension EndorsementAttaching to and forming part of Policy No.: ALR01/6/000021/J19․1. The policy is extended to cover loss of or damage to your covered Assets/Property specific within the policy schedule caused by theft.․4. In addition to the above, the following documents are needed: (a) Police Report.

5.   Lusco & Lusco, LLC v. SUNU Assurances Liberia, Ltd., 2024-0187, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/4/24), 400 So.3d 1178, 1184-85, writ denied, 2024-01359 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 1170.

Judge Rachael D. Johnson

JENKINS, J. DISSENTS WITH REASONS