GREEN v. GARCIA VICTOR (2026)

Relators, Reginald Green and the remaining plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), seek supervisory review of two interlocutory judgments rendered in this lengthy Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act litigation. In No. 2026-C-0493, Plaintiffs challenge the May 5, 2026 judgment granting in part Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC's (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to prohibit Plaintiffs from calling witnesses or introducing exhibits at trial. In No. 2026-C-0494, Plaintiffs challenge the April 23, 2026 judgment granting Defendants’ second motion to compel discovery. For the reasons that follow, we grant both writ applications, but deny relief.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2016, Plaintiffs, twenty-six taxicab drivers, filed suit against individual transportation providers who use the Uber application. The petitions, as amended, alleged that the defendants’ transportation practices violated municipal and state regulatory requirements and constituted unfair trade practices. Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC were added as defendants in 2021.

Pursuant to a February 18, 2026 status conference, the parties agreed to an amended case management order – signed on February 27, 2026 – requiring Plaintiffs to file final witness and exhibit lists by February 27, 2026, complete fact discovery by March 31, 2026, and comply with the remaining pretrial deadlines.

Plaintiffs filed preliminary witness and exhibit lists on January 15, 2025; however, they did not file final lists by the February 27, 2026 deadline. On March 4, 2026, Plaintiffs advised the district court and opposing counsel that they intended to rely on their preliminary lists because they asserted that no changes were required. Thereafter, Defendants moved to prohibit Plaintiffs from calling any witness or introducing any exhibit at trial; the individual Uber-driver defendants adopted that motion and sought a protective order. Following a March 20, 2026 hearing, the district court rendered a written judgment on May 5, 2026.

The May 5, 2026 judgment prohibited Plaintiffs from calling a witness or introducing an exhibit not included in their preliminary lists; prohibited Plaintiffs from calling the attorneys identified in those lists as trial witnesses; prohibited Wesley Pfeiffer (“Mr. Pfeiffer”), listed as a fact witness, from offering opinion testimony; and prohibited Plaintiffs from calling expert witnesses because no expert identified on the preliminary list had produced an expert report in accordance with the case management order. Plaintiffs timely sought review of that judgment in No. 2026-C-0493.

The second writ application concerns discovery propounded in August 2024. On April 7, 2025, the district court granted Defendants’ first motion to compel and ordered specified discovery responses. Defendants subsequently identified asserted deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ written responses and document production, requested a discovery conference, and filed a second motion to compel on October 13, 2025. After a March 12, 2026 hearing, the district court rendered an April 23, 2026 judgment directing Plaintiffs to provide complete written responses and all responsive, non-privileged documents to Uber's first interrogatories and requests for production. Plaintiffs sought review of that judgment in No. 2026-C-0494. Pursuant to Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate writ applications Nos. 2026-C-0493 and 2026-C-0494, this Court consolidated both writ applications on July 21, 2026.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A well-established principle in the jurisprudence is that the [district] judge has broad discretion in regulating discovery matters.” Ley v. GEICO Casualty Co., 2025-0070, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/8/25), 421 So.3d 232, 235. “As such, an appellate court will not disturb a lower court's ruling on a discovery matter absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.” Id.

DISCUSSION

In their writ application in No. 2026-C-0493, Plaintiffs assert (1) it was error for the district court to prohibit Plaintiffs from calling any attorney identified on the witness and exhibit list; (2) the district court wrongly ruled that a fact witness cannot offer opinion testimony at trial under any circumstances, without first considering the factors articulated in code of evidence article 701; and (3) the district court erred in ruling that Plaintiffs cannot call any expert witness at trial, given that Plaintiffs identified Mr. Pfeiffer as a witness and timely provided an expert report for Mr. Pfeiffer. Additionally, in their writ application in No. 2026-C-0494, Plaintiffs assert (1) the district court wrongly granted the second motion to compel considering that Plaintiffs gave Defendants everything in their possession; and (2) the district court wrongly ordered the Plaintiffs to produce all documents by March 16, 2026, when discovery cut-off was two weeks away and Plaintiffs already produced all documents in their possession.

I. No. 2026-C-0493: May 5, 2026 Judgment

A Attorney witnesses

Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by prohibiting every attorney identified on their preliminary witness and exhibit lists from testifying. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 508 protects against compelled lawyer testimony intended to elicit client information acquired in the course of representation and requires a contradictory hearing before the issuance of a subpoena or order within the article's scope. Likewise, La. C.C.P. art. 1452(B) governs the deposition of counsel of record.¹ Neither provision creates a blanket disqualification applicable to all persons who happen to be lawyers.

Nevertheless, the record reflects that the listed attorneys were identified only as fact witnesses, without a particularized description of the testimony Plaintiffs intended to elicit. The district court expressed concern that the required procedures had not been followed and that the anticipated scope of testimony had not been established. Given the absence of a developed record concerning the testimony sought from these witnesses and the potential privilege and work-product concerns, Plaintiffs have not shown that the district court abused its discretion in precluding their testimony at this stage.

B. Mr. Pfeiffer's lay-opinion testimony

Next, Plaintiffs argue that the district court's ruling improperly imposed a blanket prohibition on opinion testimony from Mr. Pfeiffer, the former Deputy Director of Ground Transportation Services & Enforcement and former Taxicab Bureau Administrator of the Taxicab and For-Hire Vehicle Bureau for the City of New Orleans. On Plaintiffs’ preliminary witness and exhibit lists, Plaintiffs identified Mr. Pfeiffer as a fact witness, not as an expert witness. Plaintiffs maintain that they provided Defendants with Mr. Pfeiffer's expert report, yet the preliminary witness and exhibit lists does not specifically reference Mr. Pfeiffer's report.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 701 provides, “If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Whether a lay witness’ testimony satisfies La. C.E. art. 701 depends on the witness's personal knowledge, the basis for the inference, and the helpfulness of the testimony. See Haynes v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2023-0678, pp. 18-19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/24), 399 So.3d 626, 640-41.

The present record, however, contains no testimony, proffered or otherwise, or other evidence establishing that any opinion testimony Mr. Pfeiffer may offer would arise from his personal observations, investigation, or perceptions. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that his anticipated testimony satisfies La. C.E. art. 701. On this record, Plaintiffs have not established an abuse of discretion in the limitation imposed by the district court.

C. Expert testimony

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Mr. Pfeiffer should be permitted to testify as an expert because Defendants allegedly received his expert report. The preliminary witness list identified Mr. Pfeiffer as a fact witness, not an expert. The report was not included with the exhibits contained in the record, and the record does not establish when, if ever, it was served on Defendants or otherwise authenticated. The report attached to Plaintiffs’ opposition to the second motion to compel bears a July 10, 2024 date, but the record does not establish its timely disclosure as an expert report. In these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the case management order and excluding untimely or inadequately disclosed expert testimony. See In re Succession of Holzenthal, 2012-0211, pp. 8-9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/12), 101 So.3d 81, 87.

II. No. 2026-C-0494: April 23, 2026 discovery judgment

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting the second motion to compel because they had already produced all materials in their possession and because the production deadline preceded the discovery cutoff. Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ responses remained materially deficient despite the April 7, 2025 order compelling discovery and subsequent efforts to obtain complete responses through a Rule 10.1 conference.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1422 states, in pertinent part:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

The district court possesses broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters. Hamilton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2022-0106, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/9/22), 351 So.3d 829, 835; Fat Catz Music Club, Inc. v. Fountain Servs. of La., Inc., 2020-0586, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/21/21), 365 So.3d 664, 671.

The materials provided with the application support the district court's determination that Plaintiffs’ responses did not fully address the interrogatories and production requests. The discovery sought includes information bearing on Plaintiffs’ alleged damages, the factual basis of their claims, and documents related to their operations. Plaintiffs offered no competent evidence showing that the stated deficiencies had been cured or that the requested information was unavailable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not shown that the district court abused its discretion in ordering complete written responses and production of responsive, non-privileged documents.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ writ applications in No. 2026-C-0493 and No. 2026-C-0494 are granted, but relief is denied.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1452(B) states, “No attorney of record representing the plaintiff or the defendant shall be deposed except under extraordinary circumstances and then only by order of the district court after contradictory hearing.”

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott