LUSCO LUSCO LLC v. SUNU ASSURANCES LIBERIA LTD HMIA LLC AND RYAN SPECIALTY GROUP SERVICES LLC (2026)

I respectfully dissent. I do not find that the record supports the conclusion that HMIA and RSG are entitled to summary judgment on Lusco's negligence claim.

Lusco alleged that HMIA and RSG failed to exercise reasonable diligence in procuring the requested coverage, and that they failed to adequately advise Lusco concerning the replacement coverage.

Louisiana law recognizes that an insurance agent who undertakes to procure insurance owes an obligation to use reasonable diligence in attempting to place the requested insurance and to notify the client promptly if the agent has failed to obtain the requested coverage. Prest v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2012-0513, p. 8 (La. 12/4/12), 125 So. 3d 1079, 1085-86 (quoting Karam v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 281 So.2d 728, 730-31 (La.1973)).

I find that there are disputed factual issues concerning the cause of Lusco's loss and the coverage that reasonably could have been procured. At the summary judgment stage, the court's task is not to determine whether Lusco will ultimately prevail. Rather, we must determine whether there is an existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Carlin v. Clear Blue Ins. Co., 2022-0566, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/8/23), 357 So. 3d 533, 538 (noting that whether a plaintiff will succeed at trial on the merits is irrelevant and an insufficient basis to render a summary judgment against a party).

The majority concludes that HMIA and RSG's procurement of the SUNU policy was not the cause of Lusco's damages since “SUNU denied Lusco's claim because Lusco did not prove that its equipment was stolen.” I do not find that this characterization fully accounts for the record. SUNU's April 8, 2021 denial letter identified multiple grounds for its denial. SUNU stated that Lusco had not provided a police report establishing that theft occurred. The letter also provided that SUNU relied upon an exclusion for fraud or dishonesty, and specifically referenced allegations concerning Aaron George and the confiscation of Renaissance's assets.

The majority reasoned “that no matter what policy HMIA and RSG obtained, Lusco's claim would be denied if it could not sufficiently prove that its equipment was indeed stolen in accordance with the terms of the policy.” The causation inquiry is not whether SUNU would have paid this claim if Lusco had complied with SUNU's policy of submitting a police report. Rather, I find that the causation inquiry is whether the alleged failure to procure the appropriate coverage caused Lusco to sustain a loss that otherwise would have been covered.

Lusco's negligence claim against HMIA and RSG is not premised solely upon the proposition that SUNU improperly denied a claim. Lusco alleged that the brokers failed to procure appropriate and lawful insurance coverage in the first instance. If the brokers breached a duty in procuring the replacement coverage, the relevant causation inquiry necessarily includes whether the coverage they should have procured would have covered Lusco's loss. Those inquiries cannot be answered by assuming that any insurer would have imposed the same conditions and exclusions contained in the SUNU policy.

Lastly, the majority pretermits consideration of whether Louisiana's Insurance Code applies because it concluded that Lusco failed to establish causation. I respectfully disagree that the statutory and surplus line issues should be pretermitted.

Lusco presented evidence that HMIA acknowledged during its corporate deposition that international property insurance ordinarily would require placement through the surplus lines market. Lusco also submitted expert testimony of Suzanne M. Ganier, opining that the placement of the SUNU policy violated Louisiana insurance law.

HMIA and RSG disputed those propositions, contending that SUNU policy was not surplus insurance and that the provisions governing surplus lines placement do not apply. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:435 imposes specific obligations upon surplus-lines brokers, including requirements concerning the financial soundness and eligibility of surplus lines insurers. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1562 likewise regulates transactions involving insurers not lawfully authorized to transact business in Louisiana, subject to statutory exceptions. As such, I find that this dispute bears directly upon the duties HMIA and RSG owed to Lusco and the reasonableness of their conduct.

While the majority finds that Lusco has failed to present evidence supporting the causation element of its claim, I find that sufficient evidence was submitted. Lusco submitted deposition testimony and admissions concerning the procurement of the insurance, evidence concerning the nature of the insurance placement, expert testimony regarding the applicable insurance requirements, and evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the denial of its claim.

Accordingly, I do not find that summary judgment is appropriate. I would reverse the district court's October 27, 2025 judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing Lusco's claims against HMIA and RSG.

JENKINS, J. DISSENTS WITH REASONS