PERSON v. WASHINGTON III (2026)

This is an appeal from the August 18, 2026 judgment, which disqualified Edward R. Washington, III (“Mr. Washington”) from the candidacy of Judge, Division “F” in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 6, 2026, Mr. Washington executed a sworn Notice of Candidacy Form, which provided, in part:

9) If I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, I have filed my federal and state income tax returns, have filed for an extension of time for filing either my federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

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14) All the statements contained herein are true and correct.

On August 13, 2026, Darryl Person (“Mr. Person”) filed a Petition Objecting to the Candidacy of Mr. Washington, alleging that Mr. Washington falsely certified on his Notice of Candidacy Form that he was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return for the previous five years as required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv). Mr. Person asserted that Mr. Washington was required to file a state tax return for the past five years, and his failure to do so was grounds for disqualification.

The matter proceeded to trial on August 17, 2026. Mr. Person testified, and he presented the testimony of William J. Vanderbrook (“Mr. Vanderbrook”), who was qualified as an expert certified public accountant. Mr. Washington, appearing in proper person, testified on his own behalf.

Testimony of Mr. Person

Mr. Person testified that he is a registered voter residing in Orleans Parish. He identified his Petition Objecting to Candidacy, which included Mr. Washington's Notice of Candidacy Form, a public record request to the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”), and the LDR's response to the request. The LDR's response shows that Mr. Washington did not file Louisiana state tax returns for 2021, 2023, and 2024. The petition and attachments thereto were then introduced at trial.

Testimony of Mr. Washington

Mr. Washington testified that he received a notice of tax assessment from the LDR dated June 9, 2026, in the amount of $681.00 for taxes due in 2023. On June 12, 2026, he responded by email asking if any taxes were due for any other years, specifically 2022 and 2024. On June 15, 2026, the LDR responded:

In response to your email, our records indicate that a balance was assessed for the 2023 tax period due to no return being on file. The balance is $678.11 for the 2023 period and there are no other balances due for the account. The account also does not show a return on file for the 2024 tax period. To reverse the balance you must file a return, you may also accept the assessment and pay the balance.

Mr. Washington stated that it was his understanding, based on the information provided, that there was no requirement to file a tax return once he paid the 2023 tax assessment.

Mr. Washington was also questioned regarding his income for the years in question. He testified that in 2022, when he turned sixty, he began receiving a city pension between $30,000 and $40,000 per year.

Mr. Washington also testified that he still practiced law as an LLC, handling a limited amount of cases. He stated that he generally charges $250 per hour, approximately $1,000 for a simple succession, and $250 to prepare a will. Counsel for Mr. Person introduced various court filings where Mr. Washington acted as counsel of record between 2022 and 2024. Mr. Washington was shown a printout from the Orleans Parish Civil District Court wherein he acknowledged his participation in the legal matters therein list.

Mr. Washington acknowledged that he earned self-employment income of more than $400 in both 2023 and 2024. However, he did not introduce his federal tax returns for those years.

Testimony of Mr. Vanderbrook

Mr. Vanderbrook testified that paying an assessment, as Mr. Washington did for the 2023 tax year, is not the same thing as filing a tax return. Mr. Vanderbrook stated that Louisiana law imposes an obligation to both file a tax return and pay taxes. He explained that in Mr. Washington's case, the fact that there was a tax assessment means he would have had more than $12.550 in income because the first $12.550 is not taxed. Mr. Vanderbrook explained that this fact alone proves Mr. Washington had an obligation to file a return. Regarding the 2024 tax year, Mr. Vanderbrook stated that Mr. Washington would not have received a tax assessment because the LDR had yet to receive his return. It did not necessarily indicate, as suggested by Mr. Washington, that he did not owe taxes for 2024 or have to file a tax return.

Mr. Vanderbrook testified that Louisiana law specifically imposes an obligation to both file a tax return and pay taxes. Mr. Vanderbrook further testified that Mr. Washington's municipal retirement of approximately $30,000 alone would have required him to file a federal tax return. He also stated that self-employment earnings over $400 after expenses would trigger a self-employment tax and the obligation to file a federal tax return.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court ruled in favor of Mr. Person, disqualifying Mr. Washington as a candidate based on his failure to file his state tax returns for the tax years 2023 and 2024.¹ This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In election cases, as in other civil cases, appellate courts review trial courts’ factual findings under a manifest error standard and legal findings under a de novo standard.” Suarez v. King, 2021-0458, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/3/21), 366 So.3d 315, 318 (citing Ellison v. Romero, 2020-0376, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/20), 365 So.3d 1, 3). This Court reiterated this standard of review in Thomas v. Griffin-Clark, 2025-0449, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/25/25), 417 So.3d 1250, 1253 (alterations in original), as follows:

“Appellate courts review a [district] court's findings of fact under the manifest error or clearly wrong standard.” Henry v. Bell, 2023-00543, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So. 3d 566, 569 (citing Smith v. Charbonnet, 2017-0634, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055, 1058-59). “Regarding issues of law, the standard of review of an appellate court is simply whether the court's interpretative decision is legally correct.” Id. “[I]f the decision of the [district] court is based upon an erroneous application of law rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.” Id.

DISCUSSION

In Collins v. Chambers, 2024-01005, pp. 3-4 (La. 8/20/24), 390 So.3d 1282, 1284-85, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the fundamental principles at stake in election contests and the applicable burden of proof as follows:

We begin from the well-settled and indisputable proposition that there is nothing more fundamental to our society than the ability of our electorate to choose its leaders. Becker v. Dean, 2003-2493 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So. 2d 864, 869. Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. Landiak v. Richmond, 2005-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535, 541. The party on which the burden of proof rests must establish a prima facie case. If that party fails to carry his burden of proof, the opposing party is not required to present any countervailing evidence. On the other hand, once the party bearing the burden of proof has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to present sufficient evidence to overcome the other party's prima facie case. Id. at 542.

The requirements to qualify as a potential candidate are set forth in La. R.S. 18:463, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1)(a) A notice of candidacy shall be in writing and shall state the candidate's name, the office he seeks, the address of his domicile, his telephone number, his electronic mail address, and the parish, ward, and precinct where he is registered to vote․

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(2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:

(i) That he \has read the notice of his candidacy.

(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying.

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(iv) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

La. R.S. 18:492 sets forth the grounds for disqualification of an election candidate. It provides, in pertinent part:

A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:

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(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

On appeal, Mr. Washington asserts eight assignments of error.  ² However, the crux of Mr. Washington's argument is that the trial court erred in finding that his certification regarding his obligation to file state tax returns for the preceding five years was false.

Based on the record before us, we find that Mr. Person carried his burden of proof pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7). In connection with a public records request, Mr. Person produced documentary evidence from the LDR that there was no record that Mr. Washington filed a state tax return for 2021, 2023, and 2024. This Court has considered such evidence to be sufficient for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. See Henry v. Bell, 2023-00543, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So.3d 566, 570 (citations omitted). The burden then shifted to Mr. Washington to rebut the evidence and prove that the information contained in his Notice of Candidacy was true and correct. We find that Mr. Washington failed to meet that burden.

Mr. Washington admitted that he did not file state tax returns for 2023 and 2024. He also did not file any requests for an extension to file a return for those years. In fact, Mr. Washington testified that he “forgot” to file his 2023 state tax return.

Mr. Washington maintains that the LDR's response to his email demonstrated that his account for 2023 was current. He stated that he paid the 2023 assessment and considered his tax obligation for that year to be met. It is evident from his testimony that Mr. Washington took the LDR's response to mean that he was not required to file a state tax return for that year. Mr. Washington is mistaken in this regard—the email does not state that Mr. Washington was relieved of his obligation to file a return. Further, as Mr. Vanderbrook testified, Louisiana law imposes an obligation to both file a tax return and pay a tax assessment.

Mr. Washington's evidence concerning his failure to file a 2024 tax return was even more lacking. He produced no documentary evidence concerning his 2024 state taxes, i.e., he received no tax assessment from the LDR, or a statement indicating that his account was current for that year.

Regarding Mr. Washington's income, Mr. Vanderbrook testified that the income threshold requiring the filing of a state tax return is $12.550.³ Mr. Vanderbrook also testified that the threshold for requiring the filing of a federal tax return to report self-employment income is $400. The documentary evidence, along with Mr. Washington's own testimony, demonstrates that he had a yearly income beyond the filing threshold, requiring him to file a federal tax return. Moreover, Mr. Washington did not introduce his 2023 or 2024 federal income tax returns.

Further, as stated above, Mr. Washington conceded he failed to file his 2023 and 2024 state tax returns. La. R.S. 47:101(A)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll individuals required to file a federal individual tax return shall be required to file an individual income tax return.” The evidence establishes that Mr. Washington was required to file federal income tax returns for tax years 2023 and 2024. Correspondingly, he was also required to file a state tax return for those years. See Henry, 2023-0543, p. 2, 371 So.3d at 574-75 (Chase, J., concurring) (recognizing that when a candidate is required to file a federal tax return, under La. R.S. 47:101, “a Louisiana tax return is also required.”).

Considering the record before us, we find that Mr. Person established a prima facie case to disqualify Mr. Washington based on his failure to file his 2023 and 2024 state tax returns. The burden then shifted to Mr. Washington to prove that the information contained in the Notice of Candidacy Form was true, including that he was not required to file either federal or state tax returns for the preceding five years. Mr. Washington failed to meet that burden. The only documentary evidence introduced by Mr. Washington to show he was not required to file his 2023 and 2024 state tax return was the email communication from the LDR. Mr. Washington was not justified in relying solely on the LDR email as his basis for failing to file his state tax returns. Accordingly, we are compelled to find that the district court did not manifestly err in determining that Mr. Washington failed to file state tax returns for 2023 and 2024, and thus, falsely certified his compliance with Louisiana's tax-filing requirements.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's August 18, 2026 judgment disqualifying Mr. Washington as candidate for Judge, Division “F” in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court.

AFFIRMED

I dissent from the majority because the evidence adduced at trial proved that, more likely than not, Edward Washington (“Washington”), the candidate in this case, did not falsely certify that he was not required to file an income tax return for the years 2023 and 2024.¹

There is no doubt that Washington was legally required to file a tax return for the tax years in question. He conceded that point at trial and in argument before this court. The controlling statute and recent jurisprudence tell us that the requirement to file is not the issue. The issue is whether the certification in the notice of candidacy is false.2

We are cautioned to read this statute strictly in order to provide the electorate the widest selection of candidates. Deal v. Perkins, 22-1212, p. 14 (La. 8/1/22), 347 So. 3d 121, 131. In addition to serving the public interest, the statute calls for strict construction because it is punitive in nature. It risks depriving a candidate of an opportunity to seek public office when he is qualified under the standards of the Louisiana Constitution. La. Const. art V, § 24. This means that we must demand strict proof that a candidate's certification is false.

In Towbin v. Fuller, 26-0296, p. 3 (La. 3/11/26), 429 So. 3d 715, 717, on reconsideration, 2026-00296 (La. 3/31/26), 431 So. 3d 356, the Supreme Court held that, “the inquiry [into falsehood] is temporal and objective and asks whether, at the moment of signing, a candidate possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to attest to compliance.”³ Stated differently in the same opinion, Justice Griffin noted, “What is required is objective evidence establishing that, at the time the candidate certified to having filed all tax filings or extensions, the candidate's sworn belief in subsequent delivery was justified.” Id. at 2026-00296, p. 3, 429 So. 2d at 717.⁴

Adapting the Towbin decision to this case, our court must decide whether Washington possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to declare that he was not required to file a Louisiana income tax return for the years 2023 and 2024. To prove that his belief was reasonable, Washington primarily relied on a June 15, 2026, email from the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”), which reads, in pertinent part that,

The balance is $678.11 for the 2023 period and there are no other balances due for the account. The account also does not show a return on file for the 2024 tax period. To reverse the balance you must file a return, you may also accept the assessment and pay you must file a return, you may also accept the assessment and pay the balance.

(emphasis added).

Washington, who readily admitted to being unskilled in tax matters, understood the email to mean that he had the option of paying the balance due per the LDR's assessment ⁵ or filing a return only if he wished to challenge the assessment.

The LDR email was written in response to Washington's inquiry by email asking, “I received a Notice of Proposed Tax Due for my 2023 tax return. I was writing to find out if there were any taxes due for any other year, specifically 2022, and 2024.” At the time Washington wrote to LDR, he was contemplating his candidacy for this judgeship and knew that he would be required to certify the completeness of his income tax filings. The question he asked LDR did not solicit the information that he needed for the purpose of the required certification. Showing further proof of his shortcomings in the field of tax law, he thought that no return would be due if no taxes were owed. As a result, he paid the assessment for 2023 and did nothing regarding 2024 as he understood that no tax was due for that year.⁶

In addition to the written query, Washington also showed evidence that he engaged LDR in a roughly seven-minute-long phone call in which he got the same information, according to his testimony.

This court must determine whether Washington's failed effort to determine whether he needed file a tax return gave him a sufficient and reasonable basis to believe that he was not required to file a tax return. I dissent from the majority because I believe that it did satisfy that test as announced in the Towbin decision.

Tax law is complex. In practice, it is typically left to those attorneys who confine their work to this field alone so that they can study its nuances and keep abreast of developments. It appears from the record and from Washington's own admission that he was confused about his filing obligation. That happens to many taxpayers and may even have happened to some of us on the court. In order to be disqualified, a candidate's certification must be false, i.e., intentionally deceitful. Here, it appears that the candidate was incorrect in his beliefs. However, nothing in the record convinces me that he was false or deceitful in his certification․merely wrong.

The statute seems designed to achieve two objectives: First, it seeks to exclude from public office those who do not pay their taxes; and second, it tests the candidate's honesty about filing. In this case, there is no suggestion that Washington owes any taxes. Washington's honesty is shown in his testimony where he willingly admitted his error in failing to file necessary returns and his weakness of knowledge in the workings of income tax law.

Both objectives of the statute here are satisfied. I would therefore reverse the trial court and order Washington's name to be included on the ballot.

I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the district court's judgment sustaining Darryl Person's objection to the candidacy of Edward R. Washington III (“Washington”) and maintain Washington's candidacy for Judge, Division F, Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. This appeal presents an unusual circumstance not clearly addressed by the Election Code, namely how a court should evaluate a candidate's tax certification when, before qualifying, the candidate sought account specific guidance from the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”), completed the payment course the LDR expressly prescribed for 2023, and relied upon the same response concerning the absence of any identified balance or prescribed action for 2024.

I apply the sufficient knowledge framework I first articulated in Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135 (Lobrano, J., concurring), subsequently applied in Towbin v. Fuller, 26-0152 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/26), ––– So.3d ––––, 2026 WL 642409 (Lobrano, J., dissenting), and most recently applied in Debose v. Marine-Lombard, 26-0592 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/22/26), ––– So.3d ––––, 2026 WL 2456647 (Lobrano, J., concurring). This inquiry is temporal and objective. The framework does not permit a candidate to rely upon an unsupported subjective belief or professed good faith. It asks whether, at the time the candidate executed the sworn Notice of Candidacy, the candidate possessed sufficient knowledge, grounded in objectively reasonable circumstances, to certify compliance with the Election Code. In other words, it asks whether the candidate possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to attest to compliance at the moment of signing. Debose, 26-0592, p. 4 ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2456647 (Lobrano, J., concurring); Nixon, 15-1036, 176 So.3d at 1142 (Lobrano, J., concurring). The inquiry is temporal because the candidate's knowledge is measured at the moment of certification, not through information acquired afterward. Debose, 26-0592, p. 1 (Lobrano, J., concurring); Nixon, 15-1036, 176 So.3d at 1142 (Lobrano, J., concurring).

The inquiry is objective in two related but distinct respects. First, it requires objective evidentiary support. First, the candidate's subjective belief, standing alone, is insufficient. The certification must be supported by competent evidence or objectively verifiable circumstances independent of the candidate's good faith. Second, the court must evaluate those circumstances under a standard of reasonableness. The question is not merely what the candidate actually believed, but whether a reasonable candidate possessing the same material facts, and having undertaken the inquiry reasonably called for under the circumstances, could have had a sufficient basis to attest to compliance. This standard does not demand certainty or impose agency verification requirements through hindsight. It simply requires merely an objectively justified basis for the certification at the time it was made. By requiring objective justification without imposing hindsight verification, this standard preserves the heavy burden placed upon one who seeks to remove a candidate from the ballot and requires any remaining doubt as to whether the certification was false to be resolved in favor of candidacy. See Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541-42; Towbin v. Fuller, 26-00296, p. 1 (La. 3/11/26), 429 So.3d 715, 715.

Justice Griffin's concurrence in Towbin discusses both components of this objective inquiry. She explained that “[w]hat is required is objective evidence establishing that, at the time the candidate certified to having filed all tax filings or extensions, the candidate's sworn belief in subsequent delivery was justified.” Towbin, 26-00296, p. 3, 429 So.3d at 717 (Griffin, J., concurring) (quoting Lumar v. Lawson, 20-0251, p. 16 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/10/20), 301 So.3d 1243, 1256), on reconsideration, 26-00296 (La. 3/31/26), 431 So.3d 356. Although Justice Griffin addressed the filing alternative, her analysis concerned the truthfulness of the candidate's certification and whether the candidate's knowledge at qualification had an objectively reasonable or justifiable basis.

The lead opinion in Clark v. Bridges, provides additional Supreme Court guidance. It rejected the categorical premise that a candidate must possess formal confirmation from the LDR before executing a Notice of Candidacy. The opinion explained that testimony from reasonably reliable third parties may furnish an objective basis for the candidate's knowledge and concluded that “the objective evidence confirms that transmission, the operative event, was successful.” Clark, 23-00237, pp. 8-9, 356 So.3d 990, 994-95, 994 n.6. Clark thus demonstrates that “objective” does not mean that the candidate must produce a particular form of governmental verification. It means that the certification must rest upon competent evidence or objectively verifiable circumstances, in addition to the candidate's assurance, that furnished a reasonable basis to attest to compliance when the Notice of Candidacy was executed. The inquiry and ultimate determination therefore rests on the objective basis for the candidate's certification at the time it was made.

Louisiana Revised Statute 18:492(A)(7) authorizes an objection when a candidate “falsely certified” the tax filing information required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv). “The statutory focus is therefore the truthfulness of the certification made at a defined point in time, that is, when the candidate executed the Notice of Candidacy.” Debose, 26-0592, p. 2, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2026 WL 2456647 (Lobrano, J., concurring).

Louisiana Revised Statute 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) requires a candidate, except one seeking election as United States senator or representative in Congress, to certify that “for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.”

The certification is written in the disjunctive. Unlike the statement that “a return was filed”, the statement that a candidate “was not required to file” necessarily calls for an assessment of legal and agency status as well as the totality of the circumstances. The Election Code does not expressly address the application of this certification when a candidate's initial filing duty existed for the tax in question, but, before qualification of the candidate for election, the LDR exercised its authority described in La. R.S. 47:1562(A) by calculating Washington's tax, penalty, and interest from federal information and then advised that the candidate that he could either file a return to reverse the determined tax balance or accept the return made by the LDR and pay the balance due and with the LDR prescribing no further balance or corrective action. That omission is central to this appeal. Indeed, Person acknowledges that “Louisiana courts have not yet squarely addressed what evidence a candidate must produce when claiming that no return was required” and describes the issue as “sui generis.”

The ambiguity in this case does not result from the district court's determination that Washington initially had a duty to file his 2023 and 2024 Louisiana returns. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that an initial filing duty existed. The unresolved question, detailed fully below, is whether his later certification was “false” given the LDR's account specific assessment and guidance, and Washington's resulting payment.

The totality of the circumstances regarding the 2024 tax year also support Washington's position that his certification that no return was required was objectively reasonable. Although the LDR's response to Washington's express inquiry regarding 2024 prescribed no action for that year, the absence of a balance does not, standing alone, establish that no return was required, and the Election Code does not explain what further inquiry or documentation a candidate must obtain after receiving such an account specific response from the LDR.

Neither La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) nor La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) expressly addresses that circumstance. The statutes do not state whether payment under an account specific LDR instruction must be disregarded when determining the truthfulness of a later election certification. Nor do they require a candidate to obtain a formal ruling, release, waiver, or other verification from the LDR before relying upon the “not required to file” alternative.

The Louisiana Supreme Court recently confronted a comparable statutory ambiguity in Towbin. The Court found La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) “ambiguous as applied to the unique facts and circumstances” presented there. Towbin, 26-00296, p. 1, 429 So.3d at 715. Mindful that “[t]here is nothing more fundamental to our society than the ability of our electorate to choose its leaders,” the Court resolved the statutory doubt in favor of candidacy and the electorate's widest possible choice. Id. (quoting Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 6 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869). Towbin applied the statutory text to the particular circumstances and resolved the remaining doubt in favor of allowing the candidate to run.

I likewise find La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) and La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) ambiguous as applied to Washington's circumstances. A later judicial determination that Washington remained subject to a filing obligation does not, by itself, establish that his earlier election certification was false. Where the Election Code does not prescribe how the certification applies to an account specific LDR determination, instruction, and completed payment, the controlling question remains whether competent, objectively verifiable circumstances known at qualification supplied Washington with sufficient knowledge and a reasonable basis to certify compliance. The Election Code's silence and ambiguity cannot be filled by imposing the most restrictive possible interpretation or by creating a formal verification requirement that the Legislature did not enact. Any remaining doubt must be resolved in favor of candidacy and the electorate's right to choose. See Towbin, 26-00296, p. 1, 429 So.3d at 715-16; Landiak, 05-0758, pp. 6-7, 899 So.2d at 541.

Louisiana jurisprudence addressing the “not required to file” alternative confirms that nonfiling and false certification are not synonymous. In Nocito v. Bussey, 20-00986 (La. 8/15/20), 300 So.3d 862, the candidate stipulated that he had not filed a 2019 tax return, but testified that he had no taxable income and therefore was not required to file. The stipulation was the only evidence offered during the objector's case to establish a prima facie case. On rebuttal, the objector introduced material from the candidate's Facebook page and the Southern Charm Bar and Bistro website, as well as documents concerning the NOLA Auto Group and 2KB's LLC. The Supreme Court concluded that these materials were not evidence of income and did not contradict the candidate's testimony that he had no taxable income. Accordingly, the Court held that proof of nonfiling, “with nothing more,” was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of false certification, that the burden had been improperly shifted to the candidate, and that his candidacy must be reinstated. Id., 20-0986, p. 3, 300 So.3d at 863.

By contrast, Irvin v. Brown disqualified a candidate who admitted that his business had made “some money” and received compensation and who produced no documentary evidence showing that filing was unnecessary. 17-0614, pp. 6-7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/28/17), 367 So.3d 640, 643-44. In Henry v. Bell, the majority also ordered disqualification. 23-0543 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So.3d 566. I dissented because, unlike the candidate in Irvin, Bell submitted documentation supporting his claim that he was not required to file and because Irvin did not address whether such documentary evidence was sufficient. I further concluded that, particularly after Nocito, Irvin should not be applied as a categorical burden shifting rule. Henry, 23-0543 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So.3d 566, 573 (Lobrano, J., dissenting). Importantly, neither Irvin nor Henry involved La. R.S. 47:1562(A), an account specific LDR response, and documented taxpayer action such as that presented in the case sub judice.

The material facts are substantially undisputed. Before qualifying on August 6, 2026, Washington contacted the LDR to resolve his Louisiana tax obligations. On June 9, 2026, the LDR issued Washington a Notice of Proposed Tax Due for 2023 in the amount of $681.66, which accounted for $441.00 in tax, $154.35 in penalties and fees, and $86.31 in interest, after determining Washington's liability from federal information. On June 12, 2026, Washington inquired of the LDR whether “there were any taxes due for any other year, specifically 2022, and 2024.” The LDR responded in writing on June 15. As to the assessed balance, the LDR stated, “[t]o reverse the balance you must file a return, you may also accept the assessment and pay the balance.” As to 2024, the LDR stated, “[t]he account also does not show a return on file for the 2024 tax period,” but also advised that “there are no other balances due for the account.” The June 15 response did not issue a 2024 assessment, set a filing deadline, or direct Washington to file a 2024 return. On July 1, Washington paid $681.66, the exact amount the LDR had assessed. The LDR communications and Washington's payment all preceded qualification by at least five weeks. Defendant Exhibits D-1, D-3, D-4, and D-5, including the LDR communication, call log, Notice of Proposed Tax Due, and payment receipt, were admitted without objection. They constitute substantive, objective evidence of the information Washington possessed and the action he completed before qualifying.

Washington agreed that no Louisiana returns had been filed for 2023 and 2024, but he did not expressly concede at trial that La. R.S. 47:101(A)(1) required him to file those returns. The district court made that legal and factual determination. Relying upon the expert's testimony concerning the $12,500 income threshold and the $400 self-employment threshold, the court found that Washington earned amounts exceeding the applicable thresholds and therefore was required to file returns for both years. Even assuming that determination was correct as a matter of tax law, it did not resolve the distinct question presented under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7): whether Washington falsely certified his status when he later executed the Notice of Candidacy. The district court treated proof of the underlying filing duty and historical nonfiling as dispositive without separately determining whether the objective circumstances known to Washington furnished a sufficient and reasonable basis for his certification.

The statutory scheme does not squarely address these circumstances. Neither La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) nor La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7) requires a candidate to obtain an LDR certificate, formal determination or release, public records response, or other agency confirmation before qualification. Nor does either provision direct a court to disregard an account specific LDR communication and the candidate's documented action in response to it. Such evidence is not independently dispositive, but it is relevant under the sufficient knowledge standard. Its presence or absence cannot be converted into an additional statutory prerequisite to candidacy.

As I observed in Clark v. Bridges, “[t]he judiciary should not be in the business of imposing additional requirements on candidates where the legislature has not done so.” 23-0093, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/15/23), 358 So.3d 550, 559 (Lobrano, J., dissenting), rev'd, 23-00237 (La. 2/22/23), 356 So.3d 990; see also Debose, 26-0592, p. 6, ––– So.3d at –––– (Lobrano, J., concurring). In reversing this Court and reinstating the candidacy, the Supreme Court's lead opinion expressly stated that the dissents of Judges Lobrano and Dysart had “properly analyzed the applicable statutory and regulatory language.” Clark, 23-00237, p. 10, 356 So.3d at 995 n.9.

“The judicial power to interpret election law does not include the power to supplement the statutory qualifications for candidacy.” Debose, 26-0592, p. 6, ––– So.3d at –––– (Lobrano, J., concurring). If the Legislature determines that a candidate in Washington's circumstances remains subject to disqualification unless a return is separately filed, notwithstanding the LDR's assessment, account specific communication, and Washington's documented payment, it may say so expressly. It may distinguish between satisfaction of an assessed tax liability and satisfaction of the certification required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv). It may also require every candidate to obtain formal verification or release from the LDR before qualifying and prescribe the form, timing, and legal effect of that verification or release. Unless and until it does so, courts should not incorporate those additional categorical requirements into the sufficient knowledge standard. The judicial inquiry remains one based upon the wording of the statutes and the totality of the objectively reasonable circumstances known to the candidate when the Notice of Candidacy was executed.

Because the district court treated the initial filing duty and historical nonfiling as dispositive, without applying the temporal and objective sufficient knowledge inquiry to the LDR communication and Washington's documented response, it applied an erroneous legal standard. When legal error materially affects the outcome and interdicts the factfinding process, the resulting determination is not entitled to deference. Toups v. Kauffman, 16-0248, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/23/16), 204 So.3d 1044, 1049; S.J. v. Lafayette Par. Sch. Bd., 09-2195, p. 13 (La. 7/6/10), 41 So.3d 1119, 1128. Because the record is otherwise complete, this Court must conduct an independent de novo review. S.J., 09-2195, p. 13, 41 So.3d at 1128.

Under that review, Washington's certification rested upon more than an unsupported assertion of subjective belief. The reasonableness of his understanding must be evaluated in light of both the source and the wording of the information he received. The June 15 response was not generic tax information. It was an account specific communication from the agency charged with administering Louisiana's tax laws, issued after review of Washington's account. The LDR knew that no 2023 or 2024 return was on file, had obtained federal information sufficient to calculate Washington's 2023 liability, and expressly addressed both years in its response.

As to 2023, the wording of the LDR's response reasonably presented two alternative courses of action. It stated: “To reverse the balance you must file a return, you may also accept the assessment and pay the balance.” A reasonable recipient could understand this language to mean that filing was necessary if the taxpayer wished to contest or reverse the assessment, while acceptance and payment without the necessity of filing constituted the alternative course for resolving it. The communication did not state that Washington must pay the assessment and also file a return. It did not identify any additional filing deadline or warn that payment would leave a separate corrective act outstanding. Washington selected the payment course and paid the precise amount assessed before qualifying. Washington documented payment of the assessment, and the record contains no further LDR instruction before he executed his Notice of Candidacy.

The informal advice disclaimer does not make Washington's reliance objectively unreasonable. The disclaimer establishes that the email was not a formal ruling, did not bind the LDR in future tax administration, and could not support estoppel. Washington does not contend otherwise. The disclaimer does not dismiss the communication, alter its wording, or deprive it of evidentiary value in determining what Washington reasonably understood before qualifying. Reasonable reliance for purposes of evaluating the truthfulness of an election certification does not require that the agency communication possess the force and effect of law. Nor does it require Washington's interpretation ultimately to prevail in a later tax controversy. The relevant question is not whether a court may later reach a different legal interpretation, but whether Washington's interpretation was objectively reasonable when he executed the Notice of Candidacy.

The expert's testimony does not resolve this question. He testified generally that payment and filing are distinct obligations and that payment of an assessment does not ordinarily eliminate a filing duty. He was not asked to interpret the LDR's account specific wording or whether a reasonable recipient could understand it as Washington did. Nor could his tax law opinion supply the court's legal conclusion concerning whether Washington falsely certified under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7).

The evidence concerning 2024 is less direct, but the same communication was unclear as to what, if anything, Washington was expected to do. The LDR expressly acknowledged that no 2024 return was on file, stated that “there are no other balances due for the account,” and prescribed no filing, payment, deadline, or corrective act for that year. A statement that no balance is due does not establish that a return is required. Nevertheless, the LDR's express acknowledgment of the missing 2024 return is significant. Because the LDR knew the return was absent, identified specific action for 2023, and identified none for 2024, a reasonable recipient could understand that the Department had identified no additional action then required concerning 2024.

At minimum, the record creates substantial doubt concerning whether Person carried his burden of proving false certification for either year. Election laws must be interpreted to promote rather than defeat candidacy and to afford the electorate the widest possible choice. Any doubt concerning a candidate's qualifications must be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run. Landiak, 05-0758, pp. 6-7, 899 So.2d at 541.

For these reasons, I agree with Chief Judge Belsome that the district court's judgment should be reversed and that Washington's candidacy for Judge, Division F, Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans should be maintained.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the Written Reasons for Judgment, the trial court determined that Mr. Person “failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Mr. Washington was required to file a Louisiana tax return for the 2021 tax year.”

2.   Mr. Washington asserts that following assignments of error:1. The district court erred by deciding only the propositions Washington admitted—that Louisiana returns for 2023 and 2024 were not filed and were initially required—without deciding the contested statutory element: whether Washington “falsely certified” his status at qualification after following LDR's written instructions, guidance, and account-specific practice.2. The district court erred by failing to give legal effect to LDR's June 15, 2026 email, which offered filing a 2023 return to reverse the assessment or accepting and paying the assessment, acknowledged no 2024 return, prescribed no 2024 filing, and confirmed no other balance due.3. The district court erred by disqualifying Washington without an express or supportable finding that his certification was false, rather than an honest and reasonable understanding of LDR's directions.4. The district court erred by refusing to apply, by analogy, the settled reasonable-cause and good-faith principles recognized in United States v. Boyle, Navaid v. Commissioner, and Louisiana tax-penalty jurisprudence to the distinct statutory term “falsely certified.”5. The district court erred by construing ambiguous tax and sanction provisions against the taxpayer and candidate, contrary to Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Wooley and the rule that tax statutes and penalty statutes are strictly construed against the government and against the sanction.6. The district court erred by failing to construe the Election Code to promote candidacy and preserve the electorate's widest possible choice, as required by Landiak and Clark v. Bridges.7. The district court legally erred by relying on an expert's unsupported $12,500 Louisiana filing threshold, allowing expert testimony to supply legal conclusions reserved to the court, misapplying La. R.S. 47:44.1, and supplementing the evidence with the court's own educational background and personal experience as a tax filer.8. The judgment and reasons contain material misidentifications of the parties, candidate, and judicial division, and should be reversed or corrected.

3.   Mr. Person introduced Internal Revenue Service Publication 501 providing that the required income threshold for a single person under the age of 65 was $12,550 in 2023 and $14,600 in 2024.

1.   The statute requires that the candidate certify that he filed both state and federal income tax returns for the previous five years. It is certain that Washington filed all his federal income tax returns for the relevant years. The majority agreed with the trial court's finding that Washington was not required to file a Louisiana income tax return for 2021 because he lived in Nevada that year. I agree with that portion of the majority's decision. Washington filed a Louisiana return in 2022, therefore, that year is not at issue. The only years that are in question in this proceeding are 2023 and 2024.

2.   While the word, “false” has many meanings, the definition that most closely matches the usage here is found in Merriam Webster's online dictionary as follows: 2a: intentionally untrue [e.g.] false testimony.

3.   The Towbin decision was based on a plurality of opinions with three concurrences and three dissents. The quotation above comes from Justice Piper Griffin's concurrence which was quoting from a dissent by Judges Lobrano and Jenkins of this court.

4.   Justice Griffin quoting Lumar v. Lawson, 20-0251, p. 16 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/10/20), 301 So.3d 1243, 1256.

5.   An assessment is issued by LDR when a taxpayer files a federal return but fails to file a state income tax return. In those instances, LDR calculates the amount of tax due based on the income shown on the federal return and, in effect, sends a bill to the taxpayer for that amount plus a fine for failing to file the state return. Paying an assessment is not the same as filing a return.

6.   During 2023 and 2024, Washington's primary source of income was a retirement pension from the City of New Orleans and, for some part of that time, Social Security retirement benefits. Both of these sources of income are exempt from income taxation in Louisiana. La. R.S. 11:1735A and La. R.S. 47:44.2.

Judge Karen K. Herman

BELSOME, C.J. DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS. LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS