STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MANUEL NELSON (2026)

Relator, Manuel Nelson (“Nelson”), seeks supervisory review of the district court's February 27, 2026 ruling, which denied Nelson's application for post-conviction relief from two convictions of second degree murder. He argues that, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), his right to a fair trial was violated when Respondent, State of Louisiana (the “State”), failed to disclose certain supplemental police reports and when new evidence of police corruption was uncovered after his conviction, appeal and subsequent post-conviction relief applications.¹ For the reasons that follow, we grant Nelson's writ application, reverse the ruling of the district court, vacate Nelson's convictions and sentences and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL HISTORY

Nelson directly appealed his convictions to this Court, and in State v. Nelson, the underlying facts giving rise to this case were recounted as follows:

On July 10, 1994, at around 2:30 a.m., in the 3700 block of North Dorgenois in the Florida Housing Project, Edward Elbert “Little” Wynn [(“Little Wynn”)] was shot several times by two assailants. The autopsy revealed that the victim had eighteen gunshot wounds entering from the front and back and from the base of his neck, down his torso and through his extremities. Although the toxicology report indicated a high level of alcohol and the presence of cocaine, the cause of death was from the gunshot wounds.

On July 16, 1994, at around 9:30 a.m., in the 3800 block of North Dorgenois in the Florida Housing Project, William Henry “Peewee” Jones [(“Peewee Jones”)] was shot several times by two assailants. The autopsy revealed that the victim had fifteen gunshot wounds entering from the front and back. The toxicology report from this autopsy likewise revealed a high level of alcohol and the presence of cocaine, but the cause of death was from the gunshot wounds, several of which would have been immediately fatal.

Mary Jenkins [(“Jenkins”)] witnessed the July 10 murder. She was alerted by someone who told her that her son was arguing with two men. She then observed the two defendants shooting the victim. After the shooting stopped and the defendants left the scene, she saw that the victim was not her son. She recognized both defendants. She knew them as “Sonny” [(Nelson)], who grew up with her son, and “Lawrence” [Peters (“Peters”)], who lived in the area. Jenkins did not immediately notify the police that she witnessed the first murder because she was frightened. Subsequently, she heard [Nelson] bragging to people downstairs from where she was staying, as to how he killed “Peewee,” (the July 16 victim). Jenkins then went to the Homicide Division and identified both perpetrators from photographic line-ups and made a statement.

Valerie Robair [(“Robair”)] testified that she witnessed both murders. In the case of the July 10 murder, Robair was unable to sleep and so was looking out of her front window when she observed the victim standing next to a car talking to some people for a few minutes. The defendants told the victim to get off the car. The car pulled away and the defendants opened fire on the victim. After the victim fell to the ground, the perpetrators continued shooting. Although Robair recognized the perpetrators, she was afraid to notify the police. In the case of the July 16 murder, Robair had just stepped outside with a drink of water and her four-year-old had followed her outside. She observed the victim get out of a red car and walk around the building. When he came back to the front, the defendants started shooting. Again the defendants continued shooting the victim after he fell to the ground.

Robair knew both of the defendants. [Nelson] went to school with her son and [Peters] lived in the area. Following the July 16 murder, Robair called Crimestoppers to report that she had witnessed the murders and knew the perpetrators. She was presented with a photographic lineup from which she recognized defendant Nelson, but was afraid to sign her name to the photograph. At the time of that interview, Homicide [Det.] Mims did not have a photographic line-up of Peters. Robair only knew Peters by his first name, but called Det. Mims when she saw Peters on the street. She advised Det. Mims of Peters's location, a clothing description and a physical description, which included tattoos of a cross and teardrops on his face.

Mary Gonzales, sister of the July 16 victim, Peewee Jones, advised the police after the shooting that her brother's vehicle was missing. The vehicle was subsequently located in the 3200 block of North Dorgenois, six blocks from the shooting. The driver's door had a bullet hole, grazings and blood on it. [Det.] Mims interviewed Tyrone Smothers [(“Smothers”)] and Leroy Adams [(“Adams”)], who drove the vehicle the six blocks and parked it. Smothers and Adams admitted witnessing the shooting but denied seeing the face of either shooter. The other eyewitnesses did not identify Smothers, Adams or another named suspect, Elliot Montana, as the shooters.

As to both shootings, the eyewitnesses saw no actions by the victims against the shooters. The witnesses further saw no weapons in the hands of the victims, nor were weapons found on the scene.

The ballistics report, which was entered into evidence by stipulation because the ballistics expert was unavailable, indicated that the shell casings at both scenes were fired by two weapons; and the casings at the first scene were fired by the same weapons as the casings at the second scene.

Danielle Johnson testified for defendant Nelson that she and Nelson were walking to the store on July 16 when they heard the gunshots. They then went to the scene to see what happened. She further testified that she and Nelson were asleep in bed when the July 10 murder occurred.

Kenneth Alford and Giselle Robinson testified for defendant Peters that they were with Peters on July 10, from 10:00 p.m. until 4:30 a.m. the next day, at Club Rumors. The witnesses testified to being with Peters on Sunday evening, July 10. The murder of Peewee Jones occurred at 2:30 a.m. on July 10, early Sunday morning.

96-0883, pp. 1-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/97), 705 So.2d 758, 760-61.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 6, 1994, a grand jury indicted Nelson, charging him with the second degree murder of Little Wynn on July 10, 1994, and with the second degree murder of Peewee Jones on July 16, 1994. On August 17, 1995, a jury found him guilty as charged on both counts, and he was sentenced on October 17, 1995 to two life sentences. In his subsequent appeal, Nelson asserted that the State withheld Brady material, including a supplemental report that indicated that one of the eyewitnesses initially told the police that she did not see one of the murders, but then later testified she had seen both. This Court rejected this and Nelson's other unrelated claims and affirmed his convictions and sentences. State v. Nelson, 96-0883 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/17/97), 705 So.2d 758. The Supreme Court denied his subsequent writ. State v. Nelson, 98-0197 (La. 6/5/97), 720 So.2d 677.²

In writ 99-K-3376, filed pro se jointly by Nelson and his codefendant Peters, the defendants argued that joint representation by the same counsel rendered counsel ineffective because of a conflict of interest. In support of one of the grounds for this claim, the defendants attached a police report concerning Jones’ murder. The district court denied the defendants’ claims, and on review, this Court denied writs. State v. Peters & Nelson, 99-2066 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/24/99), writ denied, 99-3376 (La. 6/16/00), 764 So.2d 959.  ³

In 2018, Nelson filed another application for post-conviction relief, again alleging that newly-discovered exculpatory evidence from a fellow inmate cast doubt on his conviction. In partial support, he attached an affidavit from Joshua Kelly (“Kelly”), in which Kelly indicated that when he received documents from his own case from NOPD, they included handwritten notes from Nelson's case that were mistakenly placed in his own case record. However, prior to the district court's ruling, Kelly sent a letter to the court indicating that he was under heavy medication when he purportedly signed the affidavit and did not want to lie about the matter. The district court sustained the State's procedural objection to the claims and denied the application. This Court denied his writ as untimely and repetitive. State v. Nelson, 18-0820 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/17/18), writ denied, 2018-1923 (La. 9/17/19), 278 So.3d 962.

On October 26, 2022, Nelson, with assistance of counsel, filed another application for post-conviction relief, again alleging that the State withheld Brady evidence that undermined the validity of his convictions. During the pendency of this writ in the district court, new counsel enrolled and obtained more documents, including handwritten NOPD notes from the District Attorney's (“DA”) Office. Counsel filed a supplemental application on February 21, 2024. More evidence was disclosed in 2025, including FBI wiretaps and an additional ballistics report. The State initially filed procedural objections, but at a hearing on October 28, 2025, the State withdrew those objections except those that related to a statement by one of the eyewitnesses, which Nelson agreed was not newly-discovered. The district court held a hearing on the merits of the application on January 6, 2026, during which counsel presented argument related to the exhibits included in the present application. The court took the matter under advisement. On February 27, 2026, the district court denied the application, finding that withheld evidence was not material because Nelson failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result had this information been disclosed. Nelson objected and noticed his intent to file a supervisory writ application and the district court set a March 30, 2026, return date, and subsequently granted an extension until May 30, 2026. Nelson timely filed the present writ on May 27, 2026. This Court ordered the State to file an opposition no later than July 10, 2026, and then subsequently granted an extension of time until July 31, 2026. The State's opposition was timely filed.

DISCUSSION

Nelson contends that the district court erred when it found that information withheld by the State was not material because he failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the material probably would have resulted in different verdicts. It is his contention that the withholding of this information undermined confidence in the validity of the second degree murder verdicts.⁴

Standard of Review

“The petitioner in an application for post conviction relief shall have the burden of proving that relief should be granted. The state has no burden of proof in a post conviction relief proceeding.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2. See also State ex rel. Williams v. State, 15-1073, p. 1 (La. 4/22/16), 195 So.3d 433, 434. “We review a [district] court's ruling on an application for post-conviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel. Robinson v. Vannoy, 21-00812, p. 7 (La. 12/13/24), 397 So.3d 333, 348 (citing State v. Henry, 20-0412, p. 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/29/20), 307 So.3d 249, 257). In State v. Duncan, 25-01014, pp. 19-20 (La. 6/29/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1862232, at *12, the Supreme Court recently explained that this standard is to be broken into two components. First, a district court's factual findings based on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses must be given great deference and must not be overturned unless they are not supported by any evidence. Id. By contrast, a district court's legal findings are to be reviewed de novo. Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 11-0915, pp. 13-14 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 553, 563). The Duncan Court concluded: “The same ‘component parts’ analysis applies to our review in post-conviction proceedings.”⁵ Id. (citing State v. Turner, 25-00209, p. 3 (La. 3/6/26), 429 So.3d 179, 182).

Before addressing the merits of this writ application, we will examine the law pertinent to the issue before us.

Brady Violations and Due Process Rights

The prosecution violates a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when it withholds favorable evidence that has been requested by the defense where such evidence is material to the issues of guilt or punishment, whether the prosecutor acted in good or bad faith. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (1963); see also State v. Bright, 02-2793, 03-2796, pp. 5-6 (La. 5/25/04), 875 So.2d 37, 41-42; State v. Fields, 13-1493, p. 36 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/8/14), 151 So.3d 756, 779. Evidence is material if it is needed to impeach the testimony of a witness whose reliability or credibility may determine conviction or acquittal. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985).

To prove materiality, a defendant must show that the withheld evidence resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (1976). The Supreme Court explained in Kyles v. Whitley, a reviewing court need not determine “whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence, he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995) (emphasis added). Affirming that approach, our Supreme Court in Bright cautioned that the reviewing court must not apply an “outcome-determinative test” that weighs the probability of acquittal; rather, the court must determine if the omission of the suppressed evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Bright, 02-2793 at p. 6, 875 So.2d at 42 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434).

In Bright, the State withheld evidence from the defendant that the State's sole witness had prior convictions. There were no other witnesses or physical evidence to tie the defendant to the offense. Yet, the State used evidence of the defense witnesses’ prior convictions to impeach their credibility. On review, the Court found that the State violated the defendant's due process rights, and reversed his conviction and sentence.

In Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 136 S.Ct. 1002 (2016), the defendant, Wearry, was convicted of first degree murder based primarily upon the testimony of the State's star witness, Scott, who testified he was present and witnessed the defendant shoot and run over the victim. Scott did not come forward with this information until two years after the murder, while he was incarcerated on an unrelated conviction for distribution of cocaine, for which he was serving a five-year sentence. Scott presented several different versions of the events leading to the murder. The State's other main witness, Brown, testified that on the night of the murder, he saw the defendant and others together with a man who looked like the victim. At trial, the prosecutor informed the jury that Brown was incarcerated and had not sought a deal in exchange for his testimony. The Court went on to describe that:

Brown acknowledged that he had made a prior inconsistent statement to the police, but had recanted and agreed to testify against Wearry, not for any prosecutorial favor, but solely because his sister knew the victim's sister. The State commented during its opening argument that Brown “is doing 15 years on a drug charge right now, [but] hasn't asked for a thing.” During closing argument, the State reiterated that Brown “has no deal on the table” and was testifying because the victim's “family deserves to know.”

Id., 577 U.S. at 387 (internal citations omitted).

After his conviction, the defendant learned that the State withheld several pieces of evidence. First, it failed to inform the defense that two of Scott's fellow inmates gave information that cast doubt on his credibility:

One inmate had reported hearing Scott say that he wanted to “ ‘make sure [Wearry] gets the needle cause he jacked over me.’ ” The other inmate had told investigators—at a meeting Scott orchestrated—that he had witnessed the murder, but this inmate recanted the next day. “Scott had told him what to say,” he explained, and had suggested that lying about having witnessed the murder “would help him get out of jail.”

Id. at 389-90 (internal citations omitted).

Second, the State failed to inform the defense that Brown twice asked for a reduction in his sentence in exchange for his testimony, in response to which the officers informed him they would speak to the district attorney if he testified truthfully. Finally, the State withheld medical records reflecting that an individual identified by Scott as taking part in the events leading up to the murder could not have physically performed the acts that Scott testified he did.

Although the Louisiana state courts denied relief, the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the withheld evidence violated the defendant's due process rights under Brady in that this evidence undermined confidence in the jury's verdict. The Court noted that the state courts “improperly evaluated the materiality of each piece of evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively,” as required by Kyles. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 394. It further stated that the court erred by “emphasiz[ing] reasons a juror might disregard new evidence while ignoring reasons she might not,” and that the court failed to consider the statements of the two inmates that would have impeached Scott's credibility.

In Jones v. Cain, 14-0226 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/8/14), 151 So.3d 781, writ denied, 14-2148 (La. 6/1/15), 171 So.3d 270, this Court found that evidence the State withheld undermined confidence in the defendant's convictions for armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. The Jones Court first recognized that the salient issue in that case was the identity of the perpetrator, noting that there was an alternate suspect to the defendant. The charges against the defendant arose out of a crime spree that occurred over the course of a few days in the French Quarter neighborhood located in New Orleans. The evidence withheld by the State included: a change in the description of the perpetrator from the time of the offenses to trial, as evidenced by handwritten notes by police officers and police reports that showed the description did not fit the defendant but matched the alternate suspect; an undisclosed statement by the rape victim of a rape that occurred in the Desire Housing Project, in which she relayed that prior to the rape the perpetrator told her he was taking her to his “neck of the woods,” which was where the alternate suspect lived; and evidence of a crime spree by the alternate suspect in the same area and from which similar stolen items were found in the alternate suspect's possession. This Court found that this withheld evidence, both individually and collectively, undermined confidence in the jury's verdicts, and it granted relief.

In contrast, this Court in Fields found that the defendant failed to show that evidence the State withheld—that one of the police officer witnesses had been arrested and charged with forgery in an unrelated case—entitled him to a new trial. During trial, the prosecutor stated that he had no knowledge that the witness had been arrested for forgery and terminated from his employment from the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”). Later during trial, the prosecutor obtained the witness's rap sheet which showed he had been arrested, but the State had refused charges. The prosecutor did not disclose this information, and the defendant was convicted. Citing Kyles and Bright, this Court rejected the defendant's Brady claim, finding that testimony from another officer showed that the defendant was in possession of the drugs for which he was convicted. This Court denied relief to the defendant, finding that “[t]he crucial issue is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, meaning a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Fields, 13-1493 at 37, 151 So. 3d at 779.

Current Post Conviction Application

In Nelson's most recent post conviction application, he presented multiple exhibits to the district court, some of which had been previously presented to the court in earlier applications. However, many of the documents included in this latest application include what Nelson alleges is newly-discovered evidence, some that was uncovered as early as 2022, and some that was not revealed until as late as 2025. Those newly-discovered documents include contemporaneous police notes, supplemental police reports, a previously undisclosed ballistics report, post conviction statements by witnesses and transcripts from FBI wiretaps. Most, if not all, of these documents had been withheld from Nelson prior to and during his trial. In short, the information that can be gleaned from the record now before us reflects:

• Robair—one of the State's star witnesses who testified at trial that she witnessed both murders—initially reported to the police that she had not witnessed the July 10, 1994 murder of Little Wynn because she was asleep at the time of the shooting;

• Two witnesses—Dawanda Robair (“D. Robair”), Robair's daughter, and Jenkins—gave post conviction statements indicating that during the trial Robair was dating the NOPD detective in charge of the investigation into the two homicides, Det. Mims, and the two had a relationship for approximately one year. D. Robair also stated that Det. Mims pressured Robair into identifying Nelson as one of the perpetrators of both crimes;

• A statement from D. Robair recanting her initial statement to police that she had witnessed the murder of Peewee Jones and her photo identification of Nelson as one of the shooters—although she had refused to sign or initial this identification. In her post conviction statement, D. Robair averred that: at the time of the shooting she had been sitting on her back porch with her mother; they did not move to a viewpoint of where Peewee Jones lay until after they heard gunshots; and she had not seen Nelson at the scene on July 16, 1994;

• Another of the State's witnesses, Jenkins—who testified at trial that she was an eyewitness to the July 10, 1994 shooting of Little Wynn—gave a statement in 2020 that she testified under pressure by Det. Mims and after being promised money and housing (she was homeless at the time);

• A letter from the DA's office asserting that the office would pay a deposit and the first month's rent for an apartment for Jenkins;

• An alternate witness account of who was with Little Wynn prior to his murder;

• Reports noting that witnesses reported Peewee Jones, victim of the July 16, 1994 shooting, was killed by a single shooter;

• A ballistics report indicating that all of the bullets recovered during Peewee Jones’ autopsy were all fired from a common gun.

• FBI wiretaps of conversations by and between former NOPD officers Len Davis (“Davis”) and Sammie Williams (“Williams”) that call into question their participation in the investigations and the narrative of events as presented by the State at trial.

Davis and Williams, together with approximately twenty other NOPD officers, were the targets of a highly publicized FBI investigation—Operation Shattered Shield. Pursuant to this investigation, in 1996 Davis was tried and convicted of, among other crimes, having orchestrated the murder of Kim Groves (“Groves”), a Florida Housing Project resident, on October 13, 1994. The killing was ordered because Groves had filed a brutality complaint against Davis with the Internal Affairs Division of NOPD after witnessing her nephew being savagely assaulted by Williams. Davis was sentenced to the death penalty.⁶ Williams, Davis’ partner on the police force, became a cooperating witness for the State and eventually received a five-year-sentence pursuant to a plea agreement. See U.S. v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2010). The two were also involved in providing protection to a drug-trafficking ring. See U.S. v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 1999).

The State, in its opposition filed with this Court, first argues that the district court did not err in its determination that the withheld evidence was not material, quoting from the district court's oral reasons for its ruling. Next, the State points out that Nelson did not attach a full transcript of the August 16 and 17, 1995 trial to his application for post conviction relief without citing any authority that would require him to do so. In fact, as pointed out by Nelson in his reply brief to this Court, La. C.Cr.P. art. 926(A) specifically delineates what documentation is required. That article provides:

An application for post conviction relief shall be by written petition addressed to the district court for the parish in which the petitioner was convicted. A copy of the judgment of conviction and sentence shall be annexed to the petition, or the petition shall allege that a copy has been demanded and refused.

Finally, quoting La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.2, the State simply points out that the burden of proof in a post conviction relief proceeding is entirely on the applicant. As we discussed earlier in this opinion, that article enunciates that “[t]he petitioner in an application for post conviction relief shall have the burden of proving that relief should be granted. The state has no burden of proof in a post conviction relief proceeding.”

With the burden of proof in mind, we find the FBI wiretaps—present in the record in the form of transcripts—provide evidence that would have been material in the trial. First, the initial transcript in the record occurred on July 16, 1994, the day of Peewee Jones’ murder. It reflects that Williams phoned Davis to inform him of the murder having arrived, apparently not in an official capacity, before “5-0” had responded to the shooting. Davis then laments that it happened in the “Florida” as it was likely it would bring a task force. Davis then questioned Williams as to the identity of the shooter, to which Williams replied that he did not know. The next recorded call in the record occurred on that same day between Williams and an unnamed woman. In this call, Williams indicated that the shooter was Nelson. Both the unnamed woman and a woman in the background contradicted this account, responding that Nelson was nearby and started running with others when they heard the shots fired. When the unnamed woman asked how Williams knew that Nelson was the shooter, he replied that Davis had told him.

Next, the record reveals that Nelson was the victim of multiple gunshot wounds on July 18, 1994, just two days after the Peewee Jones shooting. The subsequent wiretap transcript in the record reflects Davis making a phone call to Williams to inform him of the shooting and that Nelson was in the hospital. They both believed the shooter to be someone named Steve. Then, it appears that within the context of the conversation, Williams indicates that Peters, Nelson's codefendant, was solely responsible for the shooting of Peewee Jones. Davis confirms, “Lawrence did the dude by himself?” Williams replies, “Yeah.” Much of the remainder of the conversation indicates that both Davis and Williams had a particular animus towards Nelson.

Additionally, we find the district court erroneously used an outcome-determinative standard, ruling from the bench that Nelson had not proven that there was “a reasonable probability that had the withheld evidence been disclosed, the result of the trial would have been different for [ ] Nelson.” As the Bright Court espoused, the reviewing court must not apply an “outcome-determinative test” that weighs the probability of acquittal; instead, the court must determine if the omission of the suppressed evidence “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Bright, 02-279 at p. 6, 875 So.2d at 42 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434). We conclude that, when reviewing all of the undisclosed evidence as a whole, the cumulative effect of these nondisclosures casts a cloud over the confidence of the verdict. Furthermore, the interjection of Davis and Williams into the investigative process raises the specter of corruption in that process. As we previously outlined, the Wearry Court, guided by Kyles, made it clear that the question of whether withheld evidence constitutes a Brady violation does not consider the effect of each individual piece of evidence; rather, it is the cumulative effect that is determinative of its materiality. Wearry, 577 U.S. at 394.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Nelson's writ application, reverse the district court's denial of Nelson's application for post conviction relief, vacate Nelson's convictions and sentences and remand the matter to the district court for a new trial.

WRIT GRANTED; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL

FOOTNOTES

1.   This Court also received two separate requests to file amici curiae briefs from Innocence & Justice Louisiana and 22 Louisiana Brady Exonerees, and Michael Magner—a former federal prosecutor. We granted those requests and added the briefs to the record now before us.

2.   Peters was also charged with and convicted of these murders. He is not a party to this writ.

3.   In an entirely unrelated subsequent writ, 2004-K-0332, Nelson contended that the district court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the grand jury was improperly constituted, and thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case. This Court denied this writ on March 29, 2004, and the Supreme Court denied writs. State ex rel. Nelson v. State, 2004-1292 (La. 4/8/05), 899 So.2d 6.

4.   In addition to his Brady claims, Nelson's application asserted that he was entitled to a new trial under Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 145 S.Ct. 612 (2025), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (1959), because the State allowed witnesses to testify falsely. However, as noted by Nelson in his application, the district court did not rule on this issue, and thus it is not before this Court. Also, there is no evidence that the Assistant District Attorneys (“ADAs”) at trial were aware of the withheld material included in the present application.

5.   The issue in Duncan was whether the district court erred by granting relief on an actual innocence claim.

6.   Davis’ sentence was commuted to life without parole in 2024 by former President Joe Biden.

Judge Paula A. Brown