STATE v. ADAMS (2026)

In this application for supervisory review, the State of Louisiana seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C), as amended by 2025 La. Acts No. 393, § 1, effective August 1, 2025 (“Act 393”), is substantive and, thus, can only be applied prospectively. Act 393 amended La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C) to provide a presumption of prejudice on a defendant's failure to act on an application for post conviction relief (“PCR”) within two years of filing.¹ The State urges that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C), as amended, is procedural and, thus, should be applied retroactively to Defendant's PCR application, which was originally filed in 1994. For the reasons herein, we grant the writ, grant the relief requested, and make it peremptory.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 13, 1989, a Lafayette Parish grand jury indicted Defendant-Respondent, Ryan M. Adams, on two counts of first degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30. On March 11, 1991, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to the reduced charges of second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. On November 26, 1991, the sentencing court ordered Defendant to serve two consecutive life sentences at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, and suspension of sentence. On appeal, this court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. State v. Adams, (La.App. 3 Cir.) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, 565 So.2d 926 (La.1990).

On November 18, 1994, Defendant filed a PCR application, which the State answered on July 23, 1997. At the September 2, 1997 hearing on the application, Defendant, who was unrepresented, requested that counsel be appointed to represent him, which request was denied. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the application. Upon Defendant's application for supervisory review, this court granted Defendant's writ application, vacated the trial court's ruling, and remanded the matter for a new hearing, with counsel appointed to represent Defendant. State v. Adams, 97-1484 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/21/98) (unpublished opinion).

On September 30, 1998, Defendant's appointed counsel moved for a continuance, which was granted without date. After years of no action on the application, Defendant, now represented by different counsel, filed a Motion to Reset on July 28, 2025, seeking to reset the previously continued PCR hearing. The motion to reset was granted on July 31, 2025, with the matter currently set for hearing on September 16, 2026.

On June 23, 2026, the State filed a Motion to Determine Applicable Law for [PCR] Hearing, arguing that the 2025 amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C), which places a rebuttable presumption of prejudice on the defendant in a dismissal hearing if two or more years pass without any action on the application, was procedural and should be applied retroactively. Defendant responded by asserting that the amendment was substantive in nature and, thus, should only apply prospectively. At the June 24, 2026 hearing on the matter, the trial court held that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C), as amended by Act 393, constituted a substantive change in the law, which would only be applied prospectively.

On July 23, 2026, the State filed the instant writ application seeking supervisory review of the trial court's ruling. On review, it argues that “the trial court erroneously ruled that the 2025 amendment to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 and its presumption of prejudice for failure to take any affirmative steps in post conviction relief case for over twenty-six (26) years was a substantive change to the law and therefore not retroactive[.]” (Case changed to sentence case.)

DISCUSSION

We first note that PCR proceedings, though conducted following the exhaustion of appeal rights in criminal cases, are essentially civil proceedings. “Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature.” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–57, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994 (1987). While La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.6 provides that the State's avenue for relief from the grant of a PCR application is by appeal, the trial court has not yet ruled on the merits of Defendant's application. The trial court's ruling, declaring the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art 930.8 to be a substantive change and to have prospective application only, is an interlocutory ruling that is not appealable but which can be considered on supervisory review. Alex v. Rayne Concrete Serv., 05-1457 (La. 1/26/07), 951 So.2d 138. We, thus, choose to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to review this matter. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2201.

Here, the State argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the 2025 amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C), and its presumption of prejudice for Defendant's failure to take any affirmative steps in his PCR application for over twenty-six years, was a substantive change to the law and, therefore, not retroactive. The State maintains that the amendment is procedural and, thus, retroactive. We agree.

At the time Defendant filed his PCR application in 1994, La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(B) provided the State with the ability to seek dismissal of a PCR application if it was unable to respond thereto due to events beyond its control:

An application for post conviction relief which is timely filed, or which is allowed under an exception to the time limitation as set forth in Paragraph A of this Article, shall be dismissed upon a showing by the state of prejudice to its ability to respond to, negate, or rebut the allegations of the petition caused by events not under the control of the state which have transpired since the date of original conviction, if the court finds, after a hearing limited to that issue, that the state's ability to respond to, negate, or rebut such allegations has been materially prejudiced thereby.

Up until the effective date of Act 393, the provision remained the same. At that time, the provision was moved to Paragraph (C), and the legislature added following language to the end of the provision:

When the petitioner fails to timely seek a hearing that is allowed by law or fails to pursue claims for a period of two years after filing an application, the delay caused by inaction shall be presumed as prejudicial. The petitioner shall bear the burden of rebutting the presumption of prejudice. A final judgment dismissing an application based upon prejudice shall be a final adjudication of state post conviction claims in the application for purposes of exhaustion of state court remedies and federal habeas corpus proceedings.

The trial court, in its oral ruling, held that the amendment was a substantive change in the law, and because the original PCR application was filed and pending before Act 393's effective date, Defendant had a vested right to apply the statue as it was previously written. Accordingly, it held that the presumption of prejudice provided by Act 393 did not apply to Defendant's PCR hearing.

We disagree with the trial court's ruling and find that the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C) is procedural in nature and applies to hearings or proceedings taking place on or after August 1, 2025. Louisiana Civil Code Article 6 provides that “[i]n the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only[ ]” while “[p]rocedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary.” As noted above, PCR proceedings are civil in nature. Pennsylvania, 481 U.S. 551.

In Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1063 (La.1992), the supreme court set out “a two-fold inquiry[ ]” for determining whether a law is substantive or procedural under La.Civ.Code art. 6. “First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retroactive or prospective application[,]” and if so, “our inquiry is at an end.” Id. at 1063. “If the legislature did not, we must classify the enactment as substantive, procedural or interpretive.” Id. In this instance, we find no contrary directive from the legislature in Act 393 requiring only prospective application of the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art 930.8(C). Thus, we look to determine whether the amendment is substantive, procedural, or interpretive.

In Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 714, 723 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142, 114 S.Ct. 2165 (1994), the supreme court set forth the distinctions between substantive, procedural and interpretive laws:

Substantive laws establish new rules, rights, and duties or change existing ones. Procedural laws prescribe a method for enforcing a substantive right and relate to the form of the proceeding or the operation of the laws. Interpretive laws merely establish the meaning the interpreted statute had from the time of its enactment.

In Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 97-785, p. 8 (La. 12/12/97), 705 So.2d 724, 728 (alteration in original), the supreme court noted that “[a]lthough La. R.S. 1:2, which provides that ‘[n]o section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so stated,’ appears to conflict with C.C. art. 6, La. R.S. 1:2 has been limited to apply only to substantive and not procedural or interpretive legislation.” Here, Act 393's provision of a presumption of prejudice in the State's motion to dismiss a PCR application for non-action over a course of time is merely a procedural or interpretive change to the law as to what is considered a prejudicial delay. We further note that the presumption is rebuttable at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, not absolute.

In In re Succession of Crawford, 04-977, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 642, 648 (footnote omitted), writ denied, 05-2407 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So.2d 511, the first circuit held that an amendment to a law concerning evidentiary matters and burden-shifting in civil proceedings are procedural, not substantive, and are to be applied retroactively:

[T]he 2003 amendment to Article 1482 altered the burden of proof with respect to the issue of testamentary capacity, eliminating the “burden-shifting” language. The amendment was procedural in nature, inasmuch as it concerns an evidentiary matter, and is, therefore, entitled to retroactive application. See Succession of Duboin, 94-446 (La.App. 3rd Cir.11/2/94), 649 So.2d 617, 619. Therefore, the law in effect on the date of trial governs the standard of proof, even though the will was executed and the testatrix had died prior to the amendment. Id. at 619.

In Davies v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36,498, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/23/02), 830 So.2d 462, 465, writ denied, 02-2855 (La. 1/31/03), 836 So.2d 70, the fifth circuit held that changes to the burden of proof are procedural changes to be applied retroactively:

A statute changing the burden of proof is procedural and is to be applied retroactively. See Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 97-0785 (La.12/12/97), 705 So.2d 724. Thus, we find that under the facts of this case, Davies had to overcome the statutory presumption regarding her CTS by a preponderance of the evidence, and the WCJ applied the wrong burden of proof.

While a procedural amendment to the law is to be applied retroactively as per La.Civ.Code. art. 6, it cannot be so applied if it affects vested rights. Cheron v. LCS Corr. Servs., Inc., 04-703 (La. 1/19/05), 891 So.2d 1250. Here, the amendment contained in Act 393 does not affect vested rights and does not deprive Defendant of his cause of action or right to maintain his already-filed PCR application. The change only affects the burden of proof to be applied therein. The State can already argue prejudice as a reason for dismissal because of the lapse of time. The amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C) simply shifts the burden of proof after applying a presumption of prejudice.

Having found the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C) to be procedural and retroactive, it applies to PCR hearings held after its effective August 1, 2025, including Defendant's scheduled hearing.

DECREE

The application of the State of Louisiana for supervisory writ is granted and made peremptory, providing that the amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(C) provided for by 2025 La. Acts No. 393, § 1 applies to the pending PCR application and the hearing set for September 16, 2026.

WRIT GRANTED, RELIEF GRANTED, AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Another portion of Act 393 also enacted La.Code Crim.P. art. 927.1, providing, in part, for the dismissal of applications for post-conviction relief based on abandonment if two or more years passes without any action thereon. The State does not challenge the retroactivity of that provision in this action.

KYZAR, Judge.