ROBERTS v. FURR (2026)

In the instant case, plaintiff challenges the trial court judgment granting defendant's reconventional demand ¹ declaring that a rent to own agreement is terminated for plaintiff's default of his obligations under the agreement. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment granting the defendant's reconventional demand and terminating the rent to own agreement.²

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 14, 2024, Tobias Roberts filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Civil Injunction” naming as defendants Donnis Furr, Russell Furr, and Rita Furr. According to the petition, Mr. Roberts entered into a “Rent to Own Agreement” (“the agreement”) with Donnis Furr on November 2, 2017, for property in Bogalusa, Louisiana, with Mr. Roberts required to pay $400.00 a month. In accordance with the agreement, Mr. Roberts paid rent to Donnis's brother, Russell at his address in West Virginia.

On February 8, 2024, Donnis signed an “Act of Donation” whereby she donated her interest in the Bogalusa property to her sister, Rita. Mr. Roberts contended that after the donation of the property to Rita, Russell no longer accepted rental payment, informed him to pay Rita directly, and Rita refused to accept payment. He further contended that Rita attempted to change the terms of the agreement by requiring $700.00 a month for rent and no option to purchase. Mr. Roberts sought a judgment declaring that “Donnis Furr donated said property to Rita Furr subject to the Rent to Own Agreement between [Mr. Roberts] and [Donnis] and that the terms and conditions of the rent to own agreement shall be adhered to by all parties.”

Rita answered the petition and filed a reconventional demand. In her reconventional demand, Rita contended that Mr. Roberts was in breach of the agreement for non-compliance with its terms because of untimely rental payments, not providing proof of renter's insurance, and not properly maintaining the property. Rita sought a judgment terminating the agreement.

The matter came before the court for a hearing on February 20, 2025, and after considering the evidence, the trial court signed a judgment on March 31, 2025, which included its factual findings. The trial court determined that the agreement provided for a month-to-month lease subject to an option to purchase, and subject to either party terminating the agreement by written notice. Further, the trial court found no provision in the agreement that gives a credit for the monthly lease payment on the purchase price. Finally, the court found that Mr. Roberts was in default of the agreement finding that the “evidence supports [Rita's] claims that Mr. Roberts failed to timely pay his monthly rent, failed to timely provide proper proof of renters insurance and failed to properly maintain the condition of the subject premises.” The trial court “award[ed] judgment on the Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment declaring that [Donnis] donated the property to [Rita] subject to the Rent to Own Agreement” and “award[ed] judgment on the Reconventional Demand in favor of [Rita] and against [Mr. Roberts], declaring that the Rent to Own Agreement is terminated.”

It is from this judgment that Mr. Roberts appeals, contending the trial court erred in stating there was no renter's insurance when it was not requested to be produced, in asserting there were damages to the property without evidence or pictures, in deeming the agreement was a month-to-month lease with an option to purchase when it was titled “Rent to Own,” and in finding Mr. Roberts failed to timely pay rent when Rita refused to accept the rent.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A trial court's factual determinations made after a bench trial are reviewed with the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review. Hall v. Folger Coffee Co., 2003-1734 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 90, 98. This standard precludes the setting aside of a trial court's finding of fact unless that finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Id. In matters of credibility, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings, as the trial court is in the best position to view the witnesses’ demeanor. Compton v. Chatman, 2021-0706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 341 So.3d 581, 586, writ denied, 2022-00527 (La. 5/3/22), 337 So.3d 154. When conflicting testimony exists, this court cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility evaluations and reasonable factual inferences. Id.

In interpreting the lease, we begin from the well-settled premise that contracts have the effect of law for the parties, and the interpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties. Lobell v. Rosenberg, 2015-0247 (La. 10/14/15), 186 So.3d 83, 88-89; La. Civ. Code arts. 1983 and 2045. The reasonable intention of the parties to a contract is to be sought by examining the words of the contract itself, and not assumed. Lobell, 186 So.3d at 89. When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. Common intent is determined, therefore, in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain, and popular meaning of the words used in the contract. When a clause in a contract is clear and unambiguous, the letter of that clause should not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, as it is not the duty of the courts to bend the meaning of the words of a contract into harmony with a supposed reasonable intention of the parties. Lobell, 186 So.3d at 89. However, even when the language of the contract is clear, courts should refrain from construing the contract in such a manner as to lead to absurd consequences. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. The words of a contract must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. Civ. Code art. 2047. Moreover, a contract provision that is susceptible to different meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders the provision effective, and not with one that renders it ineffective. La. Civ. Code art. 2049. Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. Civ. Code art. 2050; Lobell, 186 So.3d at 89.

The agreement between Mr. Roberts and Donnis provides that the tenant will pay to the landlord a monthly rent of $400.00 for the term, and “Rent will be payable in advance and due on the 1st day of each month during the Term.” The “Term” provision provides, “Landlord agrees to lease to Tenant, and Tenant agrees to lease from Landlord, the Premises for a term beginning on November 01, 2017 and continuing month-to-month until either Landlord or Tenant terminate this Agreement by providing the other Party with proper written notice of termination. The Term is subject to the Option to Purchase the Premises given to Tenant by Landlord as more particularly herein.” The option to purchase provision provides “Landlord hereby grants Tenant the Option to Purchase the Premises “AS IS.” The total purchase price for the Premises will be $50,000.00[,]” and the option term period commences on November 1, 2017, and expires on May 31, 2028. The agreement also contains the following provision:

Default. In the event of any default under this Agreement, Landlord may provide Tenant a notice of default and an opportunity to correct such default. If the default is Tenant's failure to timely pay rent ․as specified in this Agreement, Landlord may terminate this Agreement by giving a thirty (30) day written notice to Tenant. If Tenant fails to correct the default, other than a failure to pay rent ․, Landlord may terminate this Agreement by giving a thirty (30) day written notice. After termination of this Agreement, Tenant shall forfeit the credit, if any, Tenant would have received if Tenant exercised the Option to Purchase and closed on the Premises.

The agreement further provides, “[i]f at any time the tenant/buyer defaults on payments as per this agreement, the option to buy the house and the property․will be rescinded.”

The agreement is a month-to-month agreement that allows either party to terminate the agreement with proper written notice of termination, and the clear language of the agreement does not allow any credit for payments made if the agreement is terminated for default. The evidence shows that several of Mr. Roberts’ payments were made after the due date provided for in the agreement. While there was conflicting testimony of Mr. Roberts and Rita regarding whether she refused to accept his payments, the trial court determined that “the evidence supports [Rita's] claims that Mr. Roberts failed to timely pay his monthly rent[.]” We cannot disturb the trial court's reasonable credibility determinations and factual inferences. We sympathize with Mr. Roberts because his testimony reveals that the timeliness of him paying the rent prior to Rita owning the property was accepted by Donnis and there were no issues prior to Rita becoming the owner of the property. However, under the clear language of the agreement, we find no error in the trial court's factual finding that Mr. Roberts did not timely pay the monthly rent and defaulted on the agreement. Therefore, we affirm the trial court judgment terminating the rent to own agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court terminating the rent to own agreement is affirmed. All costs of the appeal are assessed to Mr. Tobias Roberts.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While plaintiff named three defendants in his petition, only one of the defendants filed a reconventional demand.

2.   The judgment also granted plaintiff's declaratory judgment. That portion of the judgment was not challenged on appeal.

HESTER, J.