CHANEL ROBINSON DEBOSE AND JACKSON VOSS v. HON JUDGE JUANA MARINE LOMBARD AND THE HONORABLE CHELSEY NAPOLEON CLERK OF COURT (2026)

This is an election case. Appellant, Judge Juana Marine-Lombard (“Judge Marine-Lombard”), appeals the district court's August 17, 2026 judgment, which granted the Petition for Action Objecting to Candidacy filed on behalf of Appellees, Chanel Robinson Debose (“Ms. Debose”) and Jackson G. Voss (“Mr. Voss”) (collectively, “Appellees”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's judgment and find that Judge Marine-Lombard is qualified as a candidate in the November 3, 2026 election for the seat of Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Judge Marine-Lombard qualified on August 5, 2026, as a candidate for Magistrate of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, the office she currently holds. On August 13, 2026, Appellees filed a Petition for Action Objecting to Candidacy under La. R.S. 18:492(A)(7), alleging that Judge Marine-Lombard falsely certified that she filed her state tax return with respect to tax year 2023, as required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv). The petition alleges at paragraph 9 that a public records request was made to the Louisiana Department of Revenue (“LDR”) on August 10, 2026. The matter came for hearing on August 17, 2026, and testimony was offered by Ms. Debose, Mr. Voss and Judge Marine-Lombard.

Testimony of Ms. Debose

Ms. Debose identified her voter registration card and testified that she had been a registered voter in Orleans Parish since 1989. She further testified that she had requested LDR's record of state tax return filings for Judge Marine-Lombard for the years 2021-2025 and received a response indicating that LDR did not have a record of Judge Marine-Lombard filing a 2023 state tax return.

Testimony of Mr. Voss

Mr. Voss identified his voter registration card and testified that he had been a registered voter in Orleans Parish since 2024.

Testimony of Judge Marine-Lombard

Judge Marine-Lombard testified that she filed her notice of candidacy on August 5, 2026, and certified that for the last five years she filed her federal and state income tax return, filed an application for extension of time for filing either her federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file a federal or state income tax return or both. She said that at the time she signed her notice of candidacy, she believed the certification was true because she files her taxes routinely. According to Judge Marine-Lombard, she did not learn that there was an issue with her 2023 taxes until she heard about the ensuing lawsuit.

Judge Marine-Lombard testified that Ronald Parent (“Mr. Parent”) is her accountant and has been since 2009. Normally, she would send her tax documents to him either through text or email, he would prepare her tax returns, she would sign and return them to him, and he would file them on her behalf. In regards to the 2023 taxes, she testified that she met with Mr. Parent and signed both her 2023 state and federal tax returns at the same time. Judge Marine-Lombard relayed that after Mr. Parent files her taxes, she is usually given a copy; however, there are times when he immediately mails them after she signs and does not give her a copy. After signing both returns, she gave them back to him to be filed. Judge Marine-Lombard said that her federal taxes and state taxes were mailed at the same time and her federal taxes were received. Judge Marine-Lombard confirmed that for the year of 2023, Mr. Parent did not give her a signed copy.

Next, she was shown her 2023 federal tax transcript (the “2023 transcript”) and confirmed that she printed it from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) website. The 2023 transcript reflected that the returns were received on April 23, 2025, and processed on June 30, 2025. She testified that her 2023 federal taxes “got [t]here” but—in hindsight—apparently her state taxes did not. She further testified that because she had been credited with a refund for her 2023 federal taxes—evidenced by an IRS letter that informed her that the refund was being applied to taxes owed for the 2022 tax year—she had no reason to believe that her 2023 state taxes had not also been filed. Judge Marine-Lombard also testified that she filed for an extension for her federal tax returns for the 2023 tax year. She explained that she had certified that the application for an extension of time was filed when she provided her personal financial disclosure in 2024 to the Louisiana Supreme Court, as required by the State of Louisiana. Judge Marine-Lombard stated that the 2023 transcript also indicated that on April 15, 2024, she filed an application for an extension of time to file her 2023 tax return.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court signed a written judgment at 1:24 p.m., which rendered judgment in favor of Appellees and against Judge Marine-Lombard, granting Appellees’ petition to disqualify Judge Marine-Lombard as a candidate for the office of Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court in the election scheduled for November 3, 2026.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Similar to other civil appeals, when reviewing a judgment that sustains an objection to the candidacy of a citizen seeking to run for public office, this Court employs a manifest-error standard of review. Ellison v. Romero, 20-0376, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/11/20), 365 So.3d 1, 4 (citing Smith v. Charbonnet, 17-0634, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055, 1059). That is to say, “[a] district court's findings of fact are reviewed under a manifest error standard of review, while issues of law are reviewed for determination of whether the interpretive decision is legally correct.” Towbin v. Fuller (“Fuller I”), 26-0152, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/26), ___ So.3d ___, ____, 2026 WL 642409 at *3, rev'd, 2026-00296 (La. 3/11/26), 429 So. 3d 715, on reconsideration, 2026-00296 (La. 3/31/26), 431 So. 3d 356 (citing Jefferson Fin. Fed. Credit Union v. New Orleans Libations & Distilling Co., LLC, 22-0123, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/31/22), 351 So.3d 783, 785). “[I]f the decision of the [district] court is based upon an erroneous application of law rather than on a valid exercise of discretion, the decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court.” Id. (quoting Henry v. Bell, 23-00543, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/25/23), 371 So.3d 566, 569).

DISCUSSION

Assignments of Error

Judge Marine-Lombard asserts three assignments of error for our review,¹ which we find can be distilled into one dispositive question: whether the district court's ruling to disqualify Judge Marine-Lombard as a candidate for Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court was manifestly erroneous. Applicable Law

Only very recently our Supreme Court reiterated the longstanding tenet that “ ‘[t]here is nothing more fundamental to our society than the ability of our electorate to choose its leaders[,]’ ” and “that the interests of the state and its citizens are best served when elections laws are interpreted to give the electorate the widest possible choice of candidates such that any doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office[.]” Towbin v. Fuller (“Fuller II”), 26-00296, p.1 (La. 3/11/26), 429 So.3d 715, 715 (per curiam), on reconsideration, 26-00296 (La. 3/31/26), 431 So. 3d 356 (first quoting Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, p. 6 (La. 9/18/03), 854 So.2d 864, 869; then citing Becker, 03-2493, p. 7, 854 So.2d at 869; and then citing Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541). This is why “ ‘[t]he person objecting to the candidacy of a person bears the burden of proof.’ ” Smith v. Charbonnet, 17-0634, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/2/17), 224 So.3d 1055, 1059 (quoting Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135, 1137). However, “[a]lthough Louisiana law favors candidacy, once an objector makes a prima facie showing of grounds for disqualification, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the showing.” Id. (quoting Russo v. Burns, 14-1963, p. 4 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d 1111, 1114).

“Louisiana Revised Statute[s] 18:461[(A)](1), provides that ‘[a] person who desires to become a candidate in a primary election shall qualify as a candidate by timely filing notice of his candidacy, which shall be accompanied ․ by the qualifying fee and any additional fee imposed.’ ” Ellison, 20-0376 at p. 4, 365 So.3d at 4. In order to qualify, a potential candidate must adhere to the steps as enumerated in La. R.S. 18:463. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

A. (1)(a) A notice of candidacy shall be in writing and shall state the candidate's name, the office he seeks, the address of his domicile, and the parish, ward, and precinct where he is registered to vote.

* * *

(2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:

(i) That he has read the notice of his candidacy.

(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying.

* * *

(iv) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress, that for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 18:491(A), “[a] registered voter may bring an action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election for an office for which the plaintiff is qualified to vote.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 18:492 sets forth the grounds for disqualification of an election candidate. It provides, in relevant part:

A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:

* * *

(7) The defendant falsely certified on his notice of candidacy that for each of the previous five tax years he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both as provided in R.S. 18:463(A)(2), or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.

Here, Appellees object to Judge Marine-Lombard's candidacy on the basis that she falsely certified that she had filed a state tax return for the 2023 tax year. It is their contention that the response from the LDR and accompanying affidavit made a prima facie showing that Judge Marine-Lombard falsely certified her compliance with La. R.S. 14:463(A)(2). In opposition, Judge Marine-Lombard avers that the LDR affidavit relied upon by Appellees is ineffective to authenticate what it purports to verify—i.e., that the attached exhibit was in response to an August 7, 2026 request to confirm Judge Marine-Lombard had filed state tax returns for the previous five years, when Ms. Debose declared that she was reliant on a response to an August 10, 2026 request.

Notwithstanding this discrepancy, our review of the LDR affidavit and attached exhibit together with the IRS response letter indicates that it is clear that, according to LDR's records, Judge Marine-Lombard filed state tax returns for 2021, 2022, 2024 and 2025. We find that this is the most significant and pertinent information for our review. Whether the request to LDR was made on August 7 or August 10 is entirely immaterial—the response is the same. As such, we find that the district court did not err in finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of grounds for disqualification, thereby shifting the burden to Judge Marine-Lombard to rebut that presumption.

Turning to her rebuttal evidence, Judge Marine-Lombard argues that the district court erred when it did not consider the full text of La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv). We agree.

The district court, ruling from the bench, reasoned:

The Court understands that the laws governing the conduct of elections must be liberally interpreted, so as to promote, rather than to defeat candidacy.

However, in this particular case, the facts, as has been elicited, show that in this particular case Ms. Lombard was simply under the belief that her accountant put her tax returns in the mail. She believed the taxes were filed.

Without ensuring its delivery, the defendant could not have known whether her 2023 state tax returns were filed when she signed her notice of candidacy. And for those reasons, the Court renders the judgment.

We find this to be error on two discrete bases.

First, as we recited earlier, La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(iv) requires a prospective candidate to certify “that for each of the previous five tax years, he has filed his federal and state income tax returns, has filed for an extension of time for filing either his federal or state income tax return or both, or was not required to file either a federal or state income tax return or both.” (emphasis added). Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:3 instructs, in part:

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.

In the matter now before us, we find the operative word in the statute to be “or”. As explained in La. R.S. 1:9, “[u]nless it is otherwise clearly indicated by the context, whenever the term ‘or’ is used in the Revised Statutes, it is used in the disjunctive and does not mean ‘and/or’ ”. The Cambridge online dictionary defines disjunctive to mean, “expressing a choice between two or more things, where only one is possible.”² In other words, we find that in order to comply with the statute, Judge Marine-Lombard had the choice of providing evidence that she had filed her federal and state tax returns or that she had filed for an extension of time for filing either her federal or state income tax return, or both. In this instance, Judge Marine-Lombard provided documentation to show both that she had applied for an extension for her federal tax return and that the extension had been granted as reflected in the 2023 transcript. The transcript from the hearing reveals that the district court never considered this alternative method of compliance, focusing instead on whether Judge-Marine Lombard filed a 2023 state tax return.

Next, we find the district court erred when it failed to apply the appropriate standard for determining whether a false certification had been made regarding the filing of taxes; rather, it imposed an additional evidentiary hurdle that does not comport with the plain language of the statute or the Supreme Court's most recent jurisprudence. The oral ruling from the district court unequivocally demonstrates that the presiding judge found Judge Marine-Lombard to be credible in her belief that her 2023 taxes had been filed by Mr. Parent. However, the district court found this was insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing made by Appellees, ruling that Judge Marine-Lombard did not provide objective evidence of the delivery of her tax return. In Fuller II, in separate concurring opinions, two of our Supreme Court justices expressly rejected this approach. Chief Justice Weimer highlighted that, when the cumulative evidence was weighed, the fact that the potential candidate was able to demonstrate a good-faith belief that all of the required tax returns had been filed at the time he made the certification in the Notice of Candidacy, precluded a finding that he had intentionally falsely certified that document. 26-00296, pp. 1-3, 429 So.3d at 715-16.

Justice Griffin is even more direct regarding proof of delivery. Noting that, although pursuant to “La. Admin. Code Title 61, pt. I, § 4911(B)(1),³ actual delivery is required to establish the filing date for tax purposes ․ it does not necessarily follow that a candidate must prove actual delivery for purposes of certification in their notice of candidacy.” Id. at p. 3, 429 So.3d at 717 (citing Lumar v. Lawson, 20-0251, p. 16 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/10/20), 301 So.3d 1243, 1256). “The relevant inquiry is whether a candidate could ‘or could not have known’ if his tax returns had been filed at the time he made his certification.” Id. (first quoting Russo, 14-1963, p. 4, 147 So.3d at 1114; then citing Lumar, 20-0251, p. 17, 301 So.3d at 1256). “Thus ․ the inquiry is temporal and objective and asks whether, at the moment of signing, a candidate possessed a sufficient and reasonable basis to attest to compliance.” Id. “Proof of actual delivery of a tax return to the [LDR], while of evidentiary value, is not indispensable to the determination of whether a candidate's certification in his notice of candidacy was truthful.” Id. (citing Crosby v. Cantrelle, 20-0252, p. 11 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/10/20), 301 So.3d 1234, 1242).

At trial, the district court sustained objections to several items of evidence sought to be introduced by counsel for Judge Marine-Lombard; however, all of those items were properly proffered into the record. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 103(A) directs that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ․” “ ‘The [district] court is granted broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings, which are not to be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” Plaquemines Dirt & Clay Co. v. Plaquemines Par. Gov't, 24-0838, p. 32 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/22/25), 421 So.3d 1103, 1123 (quoting Detillieu v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 23-226, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/9/24), 392 So.3d 918, 928). “ ‘The proper inquiry for determining whether a party was prejudiced by a trial court's alleged erroneous ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is whether the alleged error, when compared to the entire record, had a substantial effect on the outcome of the case. If the effect on the outcome of the case is not substantial, reversal is not warranted.’ ” Id. (first quoting Landry v. City of Mandeville, 21-1362, p. 12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/27/22), 342 So.3d 337, 347; then citing La. C.E. art. 103(A)) (other citations omitted).

In this case, considering the proffered evidence in light of the entire record, we find it to have a substantial effect on the outcome of the case. Elicited from those documents is the following:

• On October 11, 2024, Judge Marine-Lombard forwarded her 2023 W-2 form to “rpbestcpa@aol.com”;

• On February 12, 2025, Judge Marine-Lombard sent a text message to “RP/Ron” asking “can we go ahead and file the taxes the way they are for [20]23 even if we have to go back and amend later[?]”;

• On March 15, 2025, Ronald Parent purportedly signed as tax preparer for Judge Marine-Lombard's 2023 Louisiana Resident State tax return;

• On August 14, 2026, Mr. Parent executed a verified affidavit, wherein he identifies himself as Judge Marine-Lombard's accountant; that he prepared her 2023 federal and state tax returns; that he placed each return in separate envelopes and mailed them to their respective offices via USPS, which had been his customary practice for 48 years as a certified public accountant.

When this proffered evidence is weighed with the admitted evidence and testimony—e.g., that Judge Marine-Lombard's 2023 federal return was accepted and a refund applied; that she was due a refund for her 2023 state tax return; that she had more than a twenty-year working relationship with Mr. Parent as her accountant; that the district court judge weighed her credibility and believed that she truly believed that the 2023 state tax return had been filed—we find that through this cumulative and objective evidence Judge Marine-Lombard has demonstrated that when she certified her Notice of Candidacy, she had a good-faith belief that she was being truthful when she certified her Notice of Candidacy.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's judgment and find that Judge Marine-Lombard is qualified as a candidate in the November 3, 2026 election for the seat of Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.

REVERSED 11:35 A.M.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Specifically, Judge Marine-Lombard asserts:(1) The district court applied the wrong legal framework by treating return delivery as dispositive and giving no effect to the separately proved extension alternative.(2) The record did not establish that plaintiff's exhibit 1 qualified for the special “sufficient confirmation” effect of La. R.S. 18:493(B), and without that effect Appellees did not make the showing necessary to shift the burden.(3) The district court excluded corroborating defense evidence and failed to state reasons for excluding proffers 2, 6 and 7.

2.   Cambridge Dictionary (2026) [online] https://tinyurl.com/b8y8jepn (accessed Aug. 20, 2026).

3.   The administrative code provides, in relevant part:Delivery by the United States Postal Service. A return, report or other document in a properly addressed envelope with sufficient postage delivered by the United States Postal Service is deemed filed on the date postmarked by the United States Postal Service.

Judge Paula A. Brown

BELSOME, CJ., CONCURS AND ASSIGNS REASONS LOBRANO, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS LEDET, J., CONCURS FOR THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY JUDGE CHASE JENKINS, J., CONCURS AND ASSIGNS REASONS CHASE, J., CONCURS WITH REASONS ATKINS, J., JOINS THE MAJORITY AND WRITES TO ASSIGN ADDITIONAL REASONS