STATE OF LOUISIANA v. EZRA MADRIGAL EZRA JOSEPH MADRIGAL (2026)

Defendant appeals his conviction for first degree rape and his sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 17, 2017, Ezra Joseph Madrigal (“Defendant”) was charged by bill of information with one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile, in violation of La.R.S. 14:81(H)(1). The offense date was October 3, 2017.

On April 16, 2019, Defendant was charged by bill of indictment with one count of first degree rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:42(A)(4); again, with an offense date of October 3, 2017. Immediately prior to the commencement of trial, the bill of indictment was amended, revising the date of the offense as occurring between January 1, 2017, and October 10, 2017; listing the victim's initials as “L.T.”¹ ; and specifying the victim's date of birth as September 14, 2005.²

The State's first witness at Defendant's jury trial was Maegan d'Autremont (“Ms. d'Autremont”), formerly a forensic interviewer for the Children's Advocacy Network in Alexandria, Louisiana. Ms. d'Autremont testified that she worked for the Children's Advocacy Center from 2016 to 2022, during which time she estimated she conducted around 800 interviews. She noted that she interviewed the victim, L.T., twice: once in 2017 and once in 2019. Ms. d'Autremont testified that the October 2017 interview occurred as part of the Children's Advocacy Network's mobile unit, a large bus the agency used to conduct interviews outside of its main office in Alexandria, Louisiana. At that time, State's Exhibit 1, identified as the video of Ms. d'Autrement’s first interview with L.T., was viewed by the jury.

In the video, L.T. stated he was twelve years old. L.T. told Ms. d'Autremont about his two older brothers before noting that he also spent time playing games and playing outside with Defendant who he stated was twenty-three years old. L.T. stated that he was starting his first year of homeschooling but had not started yet. He noted the delay in starting was because he had not gotten a laptop for his schoolwork yet, which he indicated Defendant was getting for him.

When he was initially asked if anyone had ever touched him, L.T. recognized what the question meant but stated that it had never happened to him. When Ms. d'Autremont brought the conversation back to Defendant, L.T. stated they liked to go outside and play catch, hide-n-seek, and games on the phone. According to L.T., the electricity at Defendant's house was turned off, and Defendant was living with L.T.’s family. L.T. stated he had previously been to Defendant's house and that they had played in the woods and on the PlayStation. L.T. stated that he and both of his brothers would sometimes go to Defendant's house. He also noted that sometimes he went with Defendant to Defendant's mother's house.

L.T. stated Defendant had been suspended from his job ³ because the engines on some of the trucks were not working, and it was Defendant's responsibility to make sure they were running. He told Ms. d'Autremont that Defendant was a firefighter. According to L.T., he sometimes went to the fire station with Defendant and helped wash the firetrucks and “run the engines.” He stated that the last time he went to work with Defendant, they washed two of the trucks. L.T. stated there was nothing unfun or that he did not like to do when he visited Defendant. Asked if anything had happened which made him uncomfortable or that he felt should not have happened, L.T. replied, “No.” Although L.T. noted he would tell his mother or the cops if something had happened, he stated he had not told them about anything.

Ms. d'Autremont stepped out of the room to speak with law enforcement. She returned after about four minutes, during which time L.T. sat still on the couch, bouncing his feet. L.T. stated that Defendant had not been living with them for long. L.T. told Ms. d'Autremont that he slept on two pads on the floor of his eldest brother's room while his other brother slept on the couch. L.T. stated Defendant slept on the floor in L.T.’s mother's bedroom. L.T. noted that everyone slept separately. L.T. again denied anything happened that made him feel unsafe.

Ms. d'Autremont testified she conducted a second interview of L.T. two years later, in April 2019, at the Children's Advocacy Network's main office in Alexandria, Louisiana. At that time, State's Exhibit 2, identified as the video of Ms. d'Autremont’s second interview with L.T., was viewed by the jury.

In the video, L.T. stated he was thirteen years old. L.T. told Ms. d'Autremont that he lived with his mother and one of his brothers. L.T. stated that he knew why he was at the interview, but when Ms. d'Autremont asked him to tell her about it, he responded that he would rather be asked questions. Ms. d'Autremont asked if L.T. could say anything about why he was at the interview, and he responded, “molest.” L.T. clarified that he meant someone had touched him “in wrong places.” He further specified he was referring to his “behind” which he used for “the bathroom.” He stated the person touching him was Defendant. Ms. d'Autremont asked L.T. to tell her about Defendant, and he responded that he didn't like talking about Defendant.

L.T. stated that he went to the fire station with his buddy Steven Bordelon one day, which is how he met Defendant. L.T. stated that no one else was present at the fire station that day. L.T. noted he was twelve years old when he met Defendant. He stated that nothing made him feel uncomfortable the first time he met Defendant. According to L.T., the first time Defendant touched him inappropriately was at Defendant's house, in Defendant's bed, when Defendant “stuck his thing in it.” L.T. described the situation as he was sitting on the same bed, with his back against the wall, while Defendant was lying down on the bed on his back. L.T. stated that Defendant stuck his penis into L.T.’s behind. According to L.T., Defendant just “flipped [L.T.] over and put it in.” L.T. claimed that he tried to stop Defendant, but “he got mad.” L.T. clarified that he tried to push Defendant off him but could not. According to L.T., Defendant started screaming when L.T. tried to push him off. L.T. stated he “couldn't understand” what Defendant was screaming.

L.T. told Ms. d'Autremont he did not remember much of what happened after Defendant put his penis in L.T.’s behind but noted that it “hurt.” L.T. stated that Defendant “just quit when he wanted to.” According to L.T., he went home after Defendant stopped; he did not remember seeing or hearing anything when Defendant stopped. L.T. stated that after Defendant flipped him over, he pulled off L.T.’s shorts. L.T. also noted that, the same day, Defendant made L.T. touch Defendant's penis with his hand. He stated Defendant physically forced him to touch Defendant's penis. L.T. stated he was able to take his hand away from Defendant. He believed the hand incident occurred before Defendant took L.T.’s shorts off. According to L.T., this first occasion took place at Defendant's home in Turkey Creek while Defendant's wife was in the house. L.T. noted the incident took place at night, and that Defendant and his wife slept in different rooms.

The next occasion that L.T. could remember something happening with Defendant was about three weeks after the first assault. L.T. said the second time was the same situation, same time, same location. L.T. described the bed as a king-sized bed with blankets on it. L.T. said he and Defendant were watching television while lying in the bed. L.T. stated that again, Defendant just flipped him over and put his penis inside L.T. L.T. described it as painful, noting that Defendant eventually stopped. L.T. stated they had been watching “some kind of cop show” prior. Afterwards, L.T. stated he went to sleep on the couch at Defendant's house while Defendant stayed in bed. Again, L.T. stated that Defendant's wife was asleep in her bedroom.

When asked if anything had ever happened somewhere other than Defendant's bedroom, L.T. stated it happened in the bathroom at Defendant's house. This time, L.T. stated Defendant's wife was at work. According to L.T., he and Defendant were in the bathtub together. L.T. could not remember how he and Defendant were positioned but he stated Defendant put his penis in L.T.’s “butt.” He noted they were both naked in the tub. He said that it stopped when Defendant wanted to stop. L.T. stated that afterwards, he called his mom, and she came to pick him up from Defendant's house. L.T. noted he was still twelve years old. He stated he did not want to stay at Defendant's house anymore.

L.T. stated that on another day, the cops arrested Defendant. L.T. did not know how law enforcement got involved but noted he did not speak to Defendant again. He noted that he saw the cops arrest Defendant at L.T.’s house. L.T. stated there were no other times that anything happened aside from the two times in the bedroom and the one time in the bathroom, all which occurred at Defendant's house. He specifically denied that anything ever happened at the fire station. L.T. stated that Defendant told him “don't tell” about the incidents. Ms. d'Autremont asked L.T. to identify on anatomical diagrams where Defendant touched him, and L.T. circled the “butt.” He then identified that Defendant used his penis to touch L.T.

Ms. d'Autremont testified that she had done multiple interviews with juvenile boys, noting they are not always forthcoming in their initial interviews. She testified it was not abnormal for a juvenile male not to disclose abuse during an initial interview.

The State's next witness was Chief Bobby Guilbeau (“Chief Guilbeau”) of the Ward Five Fire Protection District of Evangeline Parish. Chief Guilbeau testified that he had held that position for nineteen years and oversaw eleven part-time firefighters and another forty volunteers. He noted that Defendant joined the fire department as a volunteer in June 2013 before becoming a full-time employee in November 2014. Defendant's employment ended in October 2017. According to Chief Guilbeau:

There was reason to believe with Mr. Madrigal's work performance and his ethics that uh we were having issues [with] his daily activities. So, with the board's approval we put cameras in there [on October 2, 2017,] to figure out exactly what he was and was not doing during the day.

According to Chief Guilbeau, he installed seven cameras, two in the “classroom” and five in the “apparatus bay” or garage. The cameras looked like smoke alarms and motion sensors, were all motion-activated, and recorded onto a hard drive. According to Chief Guilbeau, he reviewed footage from the cameras on October 4, 2017; at that time, he filed a report with the Department of Child and Family Services before taking the unedited camera footage to law enforcement. He then identified State's Exhibit 4, a video taken from the fire station, which was viewed by the jury. Chief Guilbeau also identified State's Exhibit 5, another video taken from the fire station, which was subsequently viewed by the jury.  ⁴

The first video, identified as State's Exhibit 4, was recorded on October 3, 2017, and begins with Defendant sitting in a chair with his feet propped up on the frame of a window in the “classroom” of the fire station. L.T. was curled up in the fetal position on top of Defendant, with L.T.’s head resting on Defendant's chest. L.T. eventually grabbed Defendant's hair and forced his head down towards L.T.’s face in an apparent kiss. L.T. continued touching Defendant's hair and face while stretching his legs, all while lying on top of Defendant. L.T. eventually got off of Defendant, then turned and sat on Defendant's lap with his back to Defendant. L.T. can be seen hugging Defendant while Defendant sat in the chair, looking at his phone. L.T., with his back to the camera, appeared to pull down his pants while dancing; Defendant reached toward L.T., L.T. bent over and Defendant rolled back in the chair, seemingly laughing.

L.T. then sat on Defendant's lap again, looking at Defendant's phone. L.T. stood in the doorway for a bit before picking up and playing with a poster-style shipping tube. Defendant and L.T. then spent a few minutes watching a video on Defendant's phone. Defendant and L.T. then walked off screen, returning thirty minutes later, given that the time stamp jumps from 2:28 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Defendant and L.T. returned to the room only to leave again through a doorway right under the camera. Thirteen minutes later, Defendant returned to the classroom through a different door than the one he and L.T. left through and immediately looked at the camera. With L.T. behind him, Defendant looked directly into the camera. L.T. then brought Defendant the rolling chair he had been sitting in earlier, and Defendant stood on the chair to look into the camera. Defendant then rolled the chair across the room and stood in it to look at something in the opposite corner of the room. Chief Guilbeau testified that what Defendant was looking at was the second camera in the classroom.

The second video, identified as State's Exhibit 5, showed a car pull up to the fire station at 7:00 p.m. on October 4, 2017. At 7:15 p.m., L.T. approached the door of the station, unlocked it, and walked in with Defendant turning the lights on behind him. Both L.T. and Defendant were barefooted when they entered the classroom. They then headed through a door which Chief Guilbeau identified as leading to the bathroom. According to Chief Guilbeau, the bathroom “has a shower, commode, and double sinks; like what's common in most restrooms that were built in the ‘70's.” Both L.T. and Defendant came back out of the room after a minute and went back outside. When the two returned, Defendant had an extra shirt, and L.T. had a full change of clothes in his arms as they returned to the bathroom. Two minutes later, Defendant walked out of the bathroom and back outside wearing the shirt he was carrying when he entered the bathroom. Defendant returned carrying a bottle with a blue liquid in it.

Roughly fourteen minutes later, at 7:35 p.m., L.T. walked out of the bathroom in different clothing, carrying the clothes he wore into the bathroom, and Defendant exited the bathroom right behind him. They turned off the lights and left the fire station. At 7:43 p.m., an older male entered the fire station, presumably Chief Guilbeau.

The State then called Captain Richard McMurray (“Captain McMurray”), the Chief of Patrol for the Evangeline Parish Sheriff's Office. Captain McMurray noted that he worked for the Turkey Creek Police Department from 2017 to 2018. Captain McMurray recalled that he was working patrol for the Turkey Creek Police Department in October 2017 when he was approached by Chief Guilbeau about possible indecent behavior at the fire station. Captain McMurray testified that at the time the videos were taken from the fire station, L.T. was twelve years old and Defendant was twenty-three years old. Captain McMurray testified that he obtained an arrest warrant for Defendant; thereafter, he interviewed Defendant, had a phone dump conducted on Defendant's phone, and set up a meeting between L.T. and the Children's Advocacy Network. Captain McMurray then identified State's Exhibit 7 as his interview with Defendant after Defendant's October 10, 2017 arrest. The interview was then played for the jury.

In his October 2017 interview, Defendant stated that he met L.T., whom Captain McMurray referred to simply as a “juvenile,” through a friend who was working at the fire department. Defendant claimed he was trying to be a big brother to L.T. Defendant stated that L.T. had been living at Defendant's house and that he had been feeding and clothing L.T., whom he claimed lacked supervision. Defendant stated that he had “just become homeless” because he and his wife were getting divorced. Defendant claimed he got L.T. set up for homeschool because L.T. “was getting bullied at school.” He noted that L.T. was going to the fire station with him because he had nowhere else to go. He stated that L.T. would help him with work around the station and watch Netflix. Defendant learned he was suspended on the day Chief Guilbeau called law enforcement. He claimed he had no idea what was on the camera or what was going on.

Defendant described how L.T. laid on top of him in the chair at the fire station, to which law enforcement asked, “And that was okay?” Defendant then claimed that L.T. found his father after he committed suicide as a young boy and that he was just a child seeking affection. Defendant said he “loved the little dude” and that L.T. was his best friend. Defendant claimed he would “do anything in [his] power to keep [L.T.] out of harm's way.” Defendant claimed he had helped L.T.’s family on multiple occasions, including bailing L.T.’s mom out of jail. Asked if his relationship with L.T. had caused a rift with his wife, Defendant said, “Apparently; she is the jealous type.” He then claimed she was jealous of him helping take care of his cousin and some boys who lived in Pine Prairie.

Defendant noted that for about two weeks he had been living with L.T.’s family during the week and with his mother on weekends. According to Defendant, when he stayed with L.T.’s family, he and L.T. would sleep in L.T.’s mother's bed. He also claimed that one of L.T.’s brothers slept in the bed with them on more than one occasion. Asked if he had ever done anything “inappropriate” with L.T., Defendant said no. He then admitted that there were a few occasions where L.T. tried to give him a kiss or “peck” on the lips, calling it “almost like a fatherly thing.” He denied it being sexual or romantic in any way. Defendant claimed that he told L.T. it was not appropriate for L.T. to kiss him on the lips. Defendant denied that L.T. ever exposed himself to Defendant. He then claimed that he brought L.T. to the fire station to shower because he was worried about L.T. after a prior incident where L.T. fainted; he claimed the shower curtains were up, and he did not look at L.T. Defendant stated that he was a firefighter and emergency medical responder (“EMR”), although he noted that his EMR certification had lapsed. He then claimed that L.T. showed him a mark on his body, near his testicles, that Defendant told him they would get a doctor to examine.

Defendant claimed that he had been making decisions for L.T. to help “ease the load” on his mother, who was also dealing with L.T.’s brothers, who were sixteen and seventeen years old; Defendant claimed the oldest brother had been staying at Defendant's house for a while before his power and water were turned off. Defendant claimed he did not keep all of the brothers because the two eldest frequently got into fistfights. Defendant claimed he brought L.T. to the fire station to shower because they were still living at Defendant's house with no running water. After law enforcement pointed out that Defendant said they had been living with L.T.’s mother for two or three weeks but he said they were at Defendant's house the week before the interview, Defendant claimed he and L.T. had been back-and-forth between the two homes. Defendant maintained the only “inappropriate” thing that occurred between him and L.T. was L.T. giving him a peck on the lips.

Defendant acknowledged there was no legal paperwork making him a guardian for L.T. He denied L.T. ever touched him inappropriately. Defendant stated that L.T. danced or gyrated with his hips towards Defendant as a joke because L.T. saw it on a television program. According to Defendant, L.T. noticed the mark by his testicles the week prior, and when he showed it to Defendant, Defendant touched the spot to see if anything would come out of it. He claimed that L.T. moved his own testicles out of the way but that L.T. then moved his hand and let his testicles hit Defendant's hand as he was checking the mark. The audio then ended just short of the twenty-five-minute mark, as agreed by counsel prior to trial.

Captain McMurray testified that his investigation revealed there was no biological or legal relationship between Defendant and L.T. Furthermore, he concluded inappropriate behavior with a juvenile occurred, although he “could not confirm anything past that.” On cross-examination, Captain McMurray confirmed that Defendant maintained that he never did anything inappropriate with L.T.

The State's next witness was Marcus Aucoin (“Mr. Aucoin”), an investigator for the Evangeline Parish District Attorney's Office. Mr. Aucoin testified he first met L.T. in April 2019, in advance of L.T. testifying before the grand jury. Mr. Aucoin noted that prior to testifying, L.T. disclosed new information to him about what had happened with Defendant, which led Mr. Aucoin to schedule L.T.’s second interview with the Children's Advocacy Network. He confirmed on cross-examination that the disclosure occurred immediately before L.T. testified at the grand jury hearing.

The State then called L.T., who testified he was nineteen years old at the time of trial and lived in Virginia. L.T. testified that he first met Defendant at Chicot Fire Station while with his friend Steven; L.T. was eleven years old at the time. He noted that Defendant “flashed [him] and Steven one time.” L.T. stated he and Defendant kept hanging out, and eventually L.T. moved into Defendant's home. L.T. testified he moved in with Defendant because his uncle was threatening to kill his mother. He also noted that his mother was selling drugs at the time. According to L.T., Defendant's home had a bedroom on each side of the house, with the living room, kitchen, and laundry room in between. L.T. stated that he initially slept on the couch in the living room; however, he later moved into the second bedroom. He noted that Defendant slept with him most of the time, both on the couch and in the second bedroom.

L.T. testified living with Defendant was “alright until everything started happening,” which he clarified meant giving oral sex to Defendant. According to L.T., it happened many times. L.T. testified Defendant initiated the oral sex and that it would end when Defendant ejaculated in L.T.’s mouth. He noted this started when he was eleven years old; he also stated Defendant performed oral sex on him, also beginning when L.T. was eleven years old. L.T. testified this occurred at Defendant's house and at the fire station. According to L.T., Defendant's wife was usually in her bedroom when the oral sex occurred in the other bedroom. When asked why he did not stop it, L.T. replied, “I was only eighty-five pounds, what am I supposed to do?”

L.T. testified that Defendant also had anal sex with him, starting shortly after the oral sex began, noting Defendant would pull L.T.’s pants down and stick his penis in L.T.’s “butt.” He testified the anal sex ended with “[Defendant] cumming in my butt.” L.T. testified that sometimes he would “jerk [Defendant] off” just so Defendant would not have his penis in L.T.’s “butt” anymore. L.T. described that after anal sex, he would go to the bathroom and “poop out cum and blood.” According to L.T., he tried pushing Defendant off of him a few times, but Defendant would get mad. At least once, Defendant choked him and hit him on the head.

L.T. testified the anal sex stopped when he and Defendant moved in with L.T.’s mother after Defendant's water was turned off; he noted they slept together in his mother's bed. L.T. acknowledged that he did not disclose anything in his first forensic interview, stating that he “was young and didn't want to talk about it.” L.T. identified himself and Defendant in State's Exhibit 4 and noted that he had shown Defendant his penis on the video. He also acknowledged that Defendant was suspicious of cameras in the fire station and that he noticed them in the video.

L.T. also identified himself and Defendant in State's Exhibit 5. According to L.T., both he and Defendant were in the shower together. L.T. testified that was not

the first time he and Defendant showered together at the fire station. He stated Defendant lied about bailing L.T.’s mother out of jail. L.T. also testified that he lived with Defendant for approximately a year, and that he was eleven and twelve years old during that year while Defendant was twenty-three years old.

On cross-examination, L.T. was asked why he never disclosed that Defendant performed oral sex on him during his interviews, to which L.T. replied, “Because I didn't want to tell about it. I just gave them what they needed to know.” When pressed about not disclosing information during his interviews, L.T. stated, “Maybe I didn't want to. It was a sensitive conversation, and I was young.”

L.T. clarified that Defendant flashed both L.T. and Steven, who was eighteen, the first time L.T. met Defendant. L.T. testified that sexual things began with Defendant about a month after meeting him, noting that by that time, L.T. was already living with Defendant. He stated he did not leave Defendant's house because he did not want to go home. L.T. noted that his brother had found their father after he hung himself in the closet when L.T. was young.

L.T. testified that he did not want to testify but that he had to do it. He noted he was twelve years old during his first forensic interview and thirteen years old during his second. He stated he did not want to talk about the abuse when he was twelve and thirteen years old and that he felt he had to testify “[b]ecause it ain't right what he done [sic] and for the other kids.” The State then rested its case in chief.

The defense called Rebecca Madrigal (“Mrs. Madrigal”), Defendant's mother, as its first witness. Mrs. Madrigal testified that she first met L.T. a couple months after Defendant met him, noting he became “like a family friend” and that L.T. went to her house roughly once a week. Mrs. Madrigal testified that L.T. attended a predeployment party for two of her sons and that he flew to Arizona with her family to attend a quinceañera for Mrs. Madrigal's step-granddaughter. Mrs. Madrigal testified that she asked L.T. if anything had happened to him and he told her no one was touching him. Mrs. Madrigal acknowledged that she did not know what Defendant and L.T. did at the fire station or Defendant's home.

Defense counsel then called Amanda Madrigal Rue (“Ms. Rue”), Defendant's sister. She testified she met L.T. in April or May of 2017 when Defendant brought him to a family gathering. She noted they met on multiple occasions. Ms. Rue testified she never saw L.T. shy away from Defendant. Like Mrs. Madrigal, Ms. Rue testified that she did not know what happened between Defendant and L.T. at Defendant's home. Ms. Rue testified that she did not know if Defendant's ex-wife was jealous of him spending time with minor boys.

Defendant then took the stand. Defendant testified that he met L.T. through his friend Steven Bordelon, who was a volunteer at the Chicot Fire Station. He denied flashing L.T. and Steven. Defendant claimed that Steven brought L.T. to the station whenever Steven went and eventually L.T. went to Defendant's home a few times. He claimed L.T.’s mother called him one day, told him her brother was threatening to shoot up her house, and asked Defendant to take L.T. away from the house. According to Defendant, he first met L.T.’s mom while picking Steven up to go to the fire station. Defendant testified that the first time L.T. slept at his house, L.T. slept on the couch, and Defendant initially slept in his bedroom; however, L.T. woke him up during the night and asked Defendant to sleep in the living room because L.T. was having nightmares. Defendant claimed they slept on opposite parts of a sectional sofa. Defendant testified that when he called L.T.’s mother to take L.T. home, she asked Defendant to keep L.T. for a few more nights because she did not think it was safe yet.

Defendant noted that, at the time, he, his wife Brianna, his sister, and his sister's boyfriend were all living at the house. Defendant testified that Brianna was okay with L.T. staying with them if that was what was safest for him. According to Defendant, he contacted L.T.’s mother every few days, and she kept telling him it was not safe for L.T. to return home. Defendant testified he and L.T. continued sleeping on separate portions of the sectional sofa until his little sister moved out, at which time he had bunk beds put into the second bedroom. Defendant testified L.T. claimed he was scared when Defendant was in a separate bunk, so they slept in a bunk bed together, facing opposite directions. Defendant claimed their bodies did not touch.

Turning to the fire station videos, Defendant claimed that when L.T. pulled his pants down, his underwear was still up, and “[n]o genitals, no skin was shown, other than what appeared to have been a bug bite.” Defendant claimed L.T.’s genitals might have hit his hand through underwear but that there was no skin-to-skin contact. He acknowledged that L.T. reached up and kissed him on the lips twice in the video but claimed he spoke with L.T. and his mother later and told him it was not appropriate. Defendant claimed that L.T.’s mother expressed L.T. was just an affectionate child. Defendant acknowledged noticing the cameras in the classroom; he noted the cameras looked like smoke detectors, and he claimed he was close to them because he was wiping cobwebs off them. He claimed his job included vehicle maintenance and cleaning the station.

After denying ever touching L.T. inappropriately, Defendant claimed he brought L.T. into his life so quickly because he felt L.T. needed better guidance and Defendant was just trying to lead L.T. “in a better direction.” Defendant testified he had a very loving childhood and felt that was something L.T. did not have. Defendant then testified he never performed oral sex on L.T., L.T. never performed oral sex on him, and he never had anal sex with L.T.

Defendant denied taking a shower when L.T. was showering at the fire station, testifying that he “stepped out into the apparatus bay and changed in the corner in there while we had the shower curtain pinned up.” He claimed he wanted to be close because L.T. had passed out earlier that day, and he was worried about leaving him alone. Defendant could not give a reason why L.T. would drive down from Virginia to testify and lie about Defendant, claiming, “I just wanted what was best for him.” Defendant then stepped down and both the defense and the State rested.

At the end of trial on April 3, 2025, the jury unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged. On May 19, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Post Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, asserting the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and a Motion for New Trial, asserting his conviction was “contrary to the law and/or the evidence in that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” his guilt. The motions, filed in open court prior to sentencing, were both denied, and Defendant waived sentencing delays. The trial court then imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Defendant now appeals, raising two errors:

I. When viewed under the Jackson v. Virgina, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] committed the offense of first degree rape of L.T., a child under the age of thirteen.

II. The trial court impinged upon [Defendant]’s equal protection rights when it denied [Defendant]’s Baston[5] challenges to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from serving as jurors in this case.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

Defendant argues the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. He alleges L.T.’s multiple statements were inconsistent such that this court should disregard the jury's credibility determination because of those inconsistencies.

Defendant also argues that the State's use of peremptory challenges to remove at least two African Americans from the jury panel were racially motivated. He contends the trial court erred in not thoroughly evaluating whether the State's purported reasons for exercising the questioned peremptory challenges against Christina Edward and Mary Lemalle were race neutral.

STATE'S POSITION

The State argues the jury viewed L.T.’s interviews and trial testimony, as well as Defendant's interview and trial testimony. The State contends that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of first degree rape was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State also argues it provided valid race-neutral reasons in support of its peremptory challenges. Thus, it contends the trial court rightly denied Defendant's Batson challenges to its use of peremptory challenges to exclude Christina Edward and Mary Lemalle from serving as jurors in this case.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there are no errors.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

In his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that under the Jackson standard “the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant] committed the offense of first degree rape of L.T., a child under the age of thirteen.” Defendant's entire argument is a question of credibility, as he asserts that L.T. was not a credible witness, and without L.T.’s testimony, the State could not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment of error lacks merit.

The analysis for insufficient-evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

As noted by this court in State v. F.B.A., 07-1526, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/28/08), 983 So.2d 1006, 1009 (alteration in original), writ denied, 08-1464 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138:

Furthermore, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction “[i]n the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence.” State v. Dixon, 04–1019, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/05), 900 So.2d 929, 936. The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, and the determination of the credibility of that witness, in whole or in part, is left to its sound discretion and “will not be re-weighed on appeal.” Id. at 936.

Additionally, in State v. Williams, 19-718 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/20), 298 So.3d 326, writ denied, 20-644 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So.3d 649, this court addressed a defendant's claim that because a codefendant gave multiple different statements to law enforcement, which were inconsistent with her trial testimony, the appellate court should disregard the jury's credibility determination and decision to believe her and convict the defendant. This court stated:

Defendant contends that Mrs. Gordon's testimony is internally inconsistent and thus “is insufficient to establish that Mr. Williams was part of a robbery.” We suggest this argument lacks merit. The story Mrs. Gordon testified to at trial was not internally inconsistent and lacked any serious internal contradictions. Instead, as evidenced by Defendant's summary of Mrs. Gordon's story, the only contradiction[ ] within Mrs. Gordon's testimony was the fact that her trial testimony was different from her prior statements[.]

Id. at 341–42.

As previously noted, Defendant was convicted of first degree rape in violation of La.R.S. 14:42(A)(4), which defines first degree rape as a rape occurring “[w]hen the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense.” In the instant case, the State must prove Defendant raped L.T. when he was under the age of thirteen. Under La.R.S. 14:41(A), rape is defined as “the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse with a male or female person committed without the person's lawful consent.” As Defendant was only charged with a single count, the State had to prove that, on one occasion prior to September 4, 2018, the date on which L.T. turned thirteen years old, Defendant had anal or oral sexual intercourse with L.T.

L.T. testified that, beginning when he was eleven years old and continuing for nearly a year, Defendant forced L.T. to perform oral sex on Defendant, Defendant performed oral sex on L.T., and Defendant forced L.T. to engage in anal sex. As noted above, it is the purview of the jury to determine witness credibility, and this court will not disturb that determination unless there are internal contradictions or the testimony irreconcilably conflicts with physical evidence. As is often the case in delayed disclosure situations, there is no physical evidence in the present case. There is, however, video of Defendant and L.T. at the fire station in which L.T. kissed Defendant and appeared to show Defendant his genitals. Video from the next day shows Defendant and L.T. both going into the bathroom together and exiting in different clothes.

Defendant puts forth no reason to dismiss the jury's credibility determination aside from his claim that L.T. has given multiple accounts of what happened. Defendant's argument is that because L.T., who was twelve years old when Defendant was arrested, disclosed different information as time went on, L.T. is obviously lying. We note that all of the inconsistencies Defendant points out in L.T.’s statements were disclosed to the jury. Furthermore, the jury saw Defendant take the stand and testify on his own behalf. After hearing L.T.’s interviews and testimony and Defendant's attempts to explain the relationship between himself and L.T., the jury chose to believe L.T. by finding Defendant guilty of first degree rape. Defendant's contention that L.T.’s testimony was “internally inconsistent” fails to actually highlight internal inconsistencies. Simply put, there is no reason for this court to disturb the jury's determination that L.T. was more credible than Defendant. As such, the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his second and final assignment of error, Defendant contends “[t]he trial court impinged upon [Defendant]’s equal protection rights when it denied [Defendant]’s Batson challenges to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from serving as jurors in this case.” Specifically, Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), to the State's use of peremptory strikes against Christina Edward and Mary Lemalle.⁶ For the reasons that follow, this assignment of error lacks merit.

This court has previously laid out the following standard of review on a Batson challenge:

A defendant's Batson challenge to a peremptory strike requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensive reason, the second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the prosecutor, but the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.

State v. Andrews, 24-295, pp. 26–27 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/11/24), 404 So.3d 770, 790.

The defendant in Andrews challenged the denial of Batson challenges for four prospective jurors, contending the State's reasons for challenging the jurors were not race-neutral. Those reasons included a disagreement on whether a juror said he would hold the State to a higher standard, a juror the State perceived as more responsive to the defense, and a juror with health complications. The court stated:

Louisiana courts have recognized a plethora of race-neutral explanations for challenging prospective jurors. In State v. Jacobs, 09-1304 (La. 4/5/10), 32 So.3d 227, reh'g granted in part on other grounds, 09-1304 (La. 6/18/10), 37 So.3d 994, the State peremptorily challenged a prospective juror due to his medical issues after defense counsel declined to jointly challenge the juror for cause. The Louisiana Supreme Court held the State's explanation for challenging the potential juror was race neutral. Id. at 231. In State v. Parker, 04-1017 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/29/05), 901 So.2d 513, writ denied, 05-1451 (La. 1/13/06), 920 So.2d 235, the State challenged a prospective juror after she was more receptive to the defense. The fifth circuit stated, “perceived hostility, lack of interest and unresponsiveness are race-neutral reasons for excluding potential jurors. State v. Duplessy, 03-185 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/29/03), 853 So.2d 77, 82, writ denied, 03-2416 (La. 2/6/04), 865 So.2d 739.” Id. at 523.

After reviewing the reasons offered by the State for each of the potential African American jurors peremptorily struck, we find the trial court did not err in finding that the reasons provided by the State were race-neutral and there was no intentional discrimination. Accordingly, we find Defendant's assignment of error lacks merit.

Id. at 798–99.

As noted by Defendant in his brief, this court grants great deference to a trial court's credibility determination regarding the validity of race-neutral reasons for peremptorily removing a juror. As previously noted, Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Edward and Ms. Lemalle were removed for race-neutral reasons. Accordingly, we will look at the interaction between the attorneys and those jurors.

Ms. Edward gave the following introduction during voir dire:

My name is Christina Edward. I'm 37. I'm single. I have one child. I'm a phlebotomist at the hospital. Uh, I have no spouse. Hum, my highest level of education is trade school graduate. Hum, well I have two people, my uncle was convicted of felony and -- well my son is on probation for a felony charge. Hum, I have no religious beliefs that would interfere with rendering a verdict. Hum, personal hardship, hum I'm a type 1 diabetic hum and no immediate family members work in the law, and I don't know any of these attorneys or parties.

Ms. Edward clarified that her son was convicted of a felony drug charge a few months before the trial, that he was prosecuted by the District Attorney's Office of Evangeline Parish, and that she felt he was “absolutely” treated fairly. She also noted that she had an uncle who was convicted of a felony drug charge and served time, although that was roughly two decades prior. When asked if her family being prosecuted would make her more likely to vote one way or the other, Ms. Edward responded with a simple, “No.”

As noted by Defendant in brief, the State's race-neutral reason for removing Ms. Edward was that “her kids have been prosecuted by this DA's office.” The trial court denied the Batson challenge and moved on with jury selection. Although Defendant contends Ms. Edward did not display any prejudice, the Andrews court explicitly stated that race-neutral reasons do not have to be persuasive or plausible, they simply need to be race-neutral. A prosecutor's perception that a potential juror may be antagonistic to the State based upon her child's recent prosecution is a race-neutral reason, regardless of defense counsel's disagreement. Finally, the trial court is vested with great discretion on Batson challenges, and we find Defendant puts forth no evidence that the court was wrong in finding the State's reason to be race-neutral.

Ms. Lemalle introduced herself as follows:

My name is Mary E. Lemalle. Age 71. Married. Children, four children. Occupation, retired from Wal-Mart. Spouse name is Eddie William. Spouse occupation, he's a nurse at the VA hospital and a veteran at the same time. My education of mine, is high school and my husband education is college. Hum, no conviction. Nothing is gonna stop me from telling the truth or listen to anybody (unintelligible) Hum personal hardship. Immediate -- no immediate family uh in law enforcement and I don't know any of the parties.

After another potential juror noted that children might not disclose sexual abuse out of fear of losing their home, Ms. Lemalle started talking about a niece:

I had a little niece, she's eight years old and she was going through a complicated same thing. Her mama and her mama's boyfriend and the boyfriend -- the mama would take over for the boyfriend (inaudible) so he pull on her and he jerked her and tried to catch her, so then she came to hous[e] -- my -- the house and she say she needed to say something because she was getting to be depressed. It ages on a child. So, she poured out (inaudible) me but then I called her daddy, her daddy lived in New Orleans and then, so then he took [her] right away and so he took the child out of the mom house.

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

Okay.

BY JUROR #127, MARY ETHEL LEMALLE:

So the dad and the police -- you know --

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

Yes ma'am.

BY JUROR #127, MARY ETHEL LEMALLE:

But then brought her to my daughter house, so that's where she live now so she happy.

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

I got you.

BY JUROR #127, MARY ETHEL LEMALLE:

Yeah, but she held it in for all these years until she just had to tell me.

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

So, Ms. Lemalle, hum sometimes children just keep stuff to themselves. Would you agree with that.

BY JUROR #127, MARY ETHEL LEMALLE:

She was afraid.

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

She was afraid?

BY JUROR #127, MARY ETHEL LEMALLE:

She was afraid. Afraid like I say, it wasn't like the mama was (unintelligible) then the boyfriend, but then her daughter, and that's what she said to have a daughter that always lie, but then the daughter wasn't lying because I seen the bruises and I went and talked to (unintelligible), but then we took the child out to give her a better life.

BY THE STATE, MR. HESNOR:

Thank you for that Ms. Lemalle. I appreciate your cand -- hum does anyone think it's unusual for the victim of sex abuse to not report it? Can you raise your hands if you agree with that?

Ms. Lemalle later stated that she was previously on a jury; when she was asked what the verdict was, she began rambling about the details of the case until defense counsel cut her off to specifically ask if the jury's verdict was guilty or not guilty.

The State then challenged Ms. Lemalle for cause, stating “She was clearly not responding to the answers -- uh questions asked of her.” The trial court disagreed with the State's assessment and denied the challenge for cause, finding “she went into a lot of detail about some of [the questions], but you opened that door.” Defense counsel argued that he believed all of the State's peremptories were used against black people; the State reiterated its reasoning from the challenge for cause, and the trial court denied the Batson challenge.

In Andrews, 404 So.3d 770, this court, citing a fifth circuit case, explicitly stated that perceived unresponsiveness was a race-neutral reason to remove a juror. While Defendant contends Ms. Lemalle was not being unresponsive, and the trial court presumably agreed when it denied the challenge for cause, the perception remains a valid, race-neutral reason to use a peremptory strike. Ms. Lemalle's answers involved extensive narratives to the point that even defense counsel had to cut her off when she failed to answer a “guilty or not guilty” question. Given the above, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in finding the State's reason for removing Ms. Lemalle was race-neutral or finding Defendant failed to prove a pattern of discrimination.

DECREE

Defendant's conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W), we will refer to the minor victim in this matter by his initials.

2.   Trial began on March 31, 2025, with voir dire. The presentation of evidence started the following day.

3.   Defendant was employed by the Ward Five Fire Protection District of Evangeline Parish.

4.   There is no audio for either State's Exhibit 4 or 5.

5.   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 1016 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).

6.   We note that when defense counsel subsequently raised a Batson challenge to the State's use of a backstrike on Ms. Keyonna Frugé, the State noted it had used three of its seven peremptory challenges against white potential jurors thus indicating Ms. Edward and Ms. Lemalle were the second and third African Americans challenged. It is unclear, however, how many of the other potential jurors were African American.

JONATHAN W. PERRY JUDGE