INVESTMENTS OF CENLA LLC DEBORAH GREER JAMES GREER JR DANIEL WEBB JIM ADAMS DARWIN OLIVER ARRINGTON RICHARD BARDWELL BARFIELD INSURANCE AGENCY LLC JAMES BENEDICT CASSANDRA CARMOUCHE CAYSE COLLISION REPAIR LLC MICHAEL CERAMI DAVID CHESSER SR EMURAL COOK JACK COOPER JR SHERRY DANIELS LATONNIA DOWNS TERESA DREXEL GARY ERMATINGER SANDRA FOUNTAIN PETER GARDNER ANDRE GARSAUD ELLEN GASPARD SUSAN GAUTHIER JOHNNY GILLEY MICHAEL GUILLORY JAMES HODGES JENNIFER LONG DERRICK MALONE INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF RAPIDES INVESTMENTS LLC JAMES METHVIN SHANE MORGAN SANDRA NAGLE ELLIS NICK AMY OVERFIELD MARK PETERSON SANDRA SHIRAH CHARLES SMITH BRIDGET TAYLOR SHERRY TAYLOR NICHOLAS THOMPSON CLYDE TODD JR JOHN TUCKER ANGELA WAGGENER ARTHUR WALLER DENISE WHITE AND RANDY WILKERSON v. BAKER HUGHES GE COMPANY BAKER HUGHES ENERGY SERVICES LLC DRESSER INC DRESSER RE LLC GE OIL GAS LLC GHD SERVICES INC HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES INC STANTEC CONSULTING SERVICES INC AND STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (2026)

In this matter involving groundwater contamination claims raised pursuant to the Louisiana Groundwater Act, La. R.S. 30:2015.1, the Defendant-Appellant—the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (“LDEQ”)—appeals the trial court's judgment that granted Plaintiffs-Appellees’ motion for declaratory relief and ordered the LDEQ to require the parties responsible for the contamination to submit a plan identifying the extent of the contamination in the soil and groundwater. For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Background

This matter arises from a suit originally filed in the Thirty-Fifth Judicial District Court (“35th JDC”) for the Parish of Grant by forty-seven landowners of property located near the former Dresser Industrial Valve Operations Facility (“Dresser Facility”). The Dresser Facility manufactured industrial valves from 1961 to 2016. Chlorinated solvents, including trichloroethene (“TCE”), were used in the former manufacturing process. In 2012, an environmental assessment found that a historical release of contaminants into the soil and groundwater had occurred at the Dresser Facility.

On July 30, 2020, Plaintiffs filed suit against the various past and present owners and operators of the Dresser Facility (the “Dresser Entities”); environmental assessment entities that were retained by the Dresser Entities to perform environmental assessments and remediation of air, soil, and groundwater both on-site and off-site (“Assessment Entities”); and the LDEQ, who Plaintiffs alleged had control and oversight of the environmental assessments and remediation. Plaintiffs filed a first supplemental, amending, and restated petition for damages on January 20, 2023 that named an additional thirty-three plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also filed a second supplemental and amending petition for damages on February 16, 2023, naming an additional three plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that all Defendants caused or contributed to the release and/or migration of hazardous and toxic substances that contaminated or threatened to contaminate useable groundwater.

As to the Dresser Entities, Plaintiffs alleged the Dresser Entities knew or should have known that operations at the Dresser Facility would result in contamination of the soil, surface waters, and groundwater of surrounding properties; concealed and covered up the contamination; and failed to responsibly and timely remove and/or remediate the toxic pollution such that the contaminants have now migrated, spread, and permanently damaged the drinking water and other aquifers underlying their properties. Plaintiffs asserted their damages were caused by the Dresser Entities’ fraud, ill practices, intentional misrepresentations, negligence, strict liability, and wanton and reckless misconduct. Plaintiffs also alleged unlawful subsurface trespass. As to the Assessment Entities, Plaintiffs claimed they were retained by the Dresser Entities to perform environmental assessment and conduct remediation of air, soil, and groundwater, both on-site and off-site. Plaintiffs alleged the Assessment Entities caused and/or contributed to the release and/or migration of hazardous substances and contaminated or threatened to contaminate usable groundwater. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged the Assessment Entities failed to timely and adequately address the contamination by failing to properly evaluate, monitor, and remediate contamination. Plaintiffs further alleged the Assessment Entities contributed to or failed to prevent migration of toxic substances; used inadequate, unsupported, or unauthorized remediation methods; and participated in deficient planning and communication regarding public safety.

As to the LDEQ, Plaintiffs alleged the LDEQ assumed oversight and control of the soil and groundwater contamination investigation in 2012, and knowingly concealed the identification of the groundwater contaminants from Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs further alleged that the LDEQ failed to timely comply with its duty to notify Plaintiffs that a release occurred, which posed a significant risk of adverse health effects to persons whom the LDEQ reasonably determined were likely to be adversely affected by the release. Plaintiffs claimed their damages were caused and/or exacerbated by the negligence, strict liability, wanton and reckless misconduct, and intentional withholding of information by the LDEQ.

Federal Court Proceedings; Proceedings in the 35th JDC

One of the Dresser Entities, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., removed the case to federal district court, asserting that the LDEQ (the only defendant whose presence would prevent diversity jurisdiction) was improperly joined. Plaintiffs filed a motion for remand. Ultimately, this case was remanded to the 35th JDC for the Parish of Grant.

The LDEQ later filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of improper venue and dilatory exception raising the objection of improper cumulation of actions, which the trial court sustained, severing and transferring Plaintiffs’ suit against the LDEQ to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court (“19th JDC”) for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. The claims against the Dresser Entities and the Assessment Entities remained in the 35th JDC for the Parish of Grant. Thus, the LDEQ is the sole defendant in the instant state court proceedings pending in the 19th JDC.

Proceedings in the 19th JDC

On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs requested that the trial court declare that the LDEQ has the right and responsibility to require the responsible parties to perform a statutorily mandated remedial investigation and determine and require an appropriate remedy to bring the contaminated properties into compliance with the LDEQ's Risk Evaluation/Corrective Action Program (“RECAP”) standards, LAC 33.I.1301-1309, and the Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste and Hazardous Substance Site Remediation (“IAS”) regulations, LAC 33:VI.101-1119.

In response, the LDEQ filed an opposition. First, the LDEQ argued that Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief contemplated the use of a summary proceeding; however, because an action for a declaratory judgment must be brought as an ordinary proceeding, the LDEQ contended that Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief constituted the unauthorized use of a summary proceeding.

Second, the LDEQ averred that the relief sought by Plaintiffs was essentially moot because the LDEQ had already directed the responsible parties to perform remedial investigations and had evaluated appropriate remedies. The LDEQ argued that under its oversight, the responsible parties had installed over two hundred monitor wells; taken over two hundred push groundwater samples; and installed vapor monitor points. The LDEQ further argued that the responsible parties had submitted, and the LDEQ had approved, several work plans for the investigation of the contamination. The LDEQ also contended that it had already approved, and the responsible parties implemented, several remedies for the contamination. The LDEQ stated those remedies included the use of in-situ chemical oxidation to address groundwater contamination; a soil vapor extraction system to address soil vapors; and the installation of a surface water interim remedial measure to address surface water issues.

The LDEQ also filed a dilatory exception raising the objection of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding. However, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court ever set the LDEQ's exception for hearing nor ruled on the exception; therefore, the exception is deemed waived.¹

The trial court heard Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief on July 8, 2024. The matter was submitted with argument by the parties’ respective counsel. The parties’ attorneys presented no evidence nor witness testimony to the trial court during the hearing: At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the declaratory relief as sought by Plaintiffs.

On July 25, 2024, the trial court signed a judgment in accordance with its oral ruling. The July 25, 2024 judgment ordered the LDEQ to order the Dresser Entities, or any one of them, as responsible parties, to “submit a plan within 30 days ․ on or before August 7, 2024, identifying the horizontal extent and the vertical extent of chlorinated solvent contamination including, but not limited to, TCE, in the soil and groundwater in, on, and/or around the former Dresser Facility in Pineville[,] Louisiana.” The July 25, 2024 judgment further ordered the Dresser Entities to identify preliminary conclusions and recommendations for further action as contemplated by the Louisiana Groundwater Act, La. R.S. 30:2015.1, and the Louisiana RECAP standards, LAC 33:I.1301-1309.

The LDEQ's Appeal

The next day, the LDEQ filed a motion for appeal and suspension of the July 25, 2024 judgment. The trial court signed an order of appeal on July 30, 2024. In the appeal order, the trial court suspended the July 25, 2024 judgment pending the outcome of the appeal.²

However, also on July 30, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a contradictory hearing on the LDEQ's request for suspension of the July 25, 2024 judgment. The trial court signed an order on August 7, 2024, setting a contradictory hearing for September 4, 2024.³ On August 27, 2024, the LDEQ filed an opposition to Plaintiff's motion for a contradictory hearing.

Following the September 4, 2024 hearing, the trial court signed an order dated September 4, 2024, which vacated the portion of the July 30, 2024 appeal order that had suspended the July 25, 2024 judgment and ordered the LDEQ to comply with the July 25, 2024 judgment by September 30, 2024.

The LDEQ filed a supervisory writ application with this court seeking review of the trial court's September 4, 2024 order. This court granted the LDEQ's writ application and ruled as follows:

WRIT GRANTED. The trial court's September 4, 2024 judgment, which vacated the portion of the appeal order dated July 30, 2024 that had suspended the judgment signed on July 25, 2024, is reversed. The jurisdiction of the trial court over all matters in the case reviewable under the appeal is divested, and that of the appellate court attaches, on the granting of the order of appeal and the timely filing of the appeal bond, in the case of a suspensive appeal. See La. [C.C.P.] art. 2088(A). The suspensive appeal order was granted on July 30, 2024 without the necessity of posting bond or other security. The suspensive appeal seeks review of the trial court's judgment signed on July 25, 2024. Accordingly, the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate its suspensive appeal order as to that ruling. Given this ruling, a stay by this court is unnecessary.

D&J Investments of Cenla, LLC v. Baker-Hughes, 2024-0879 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/24), 2024 WL 4287416, *1 (unpublished writ action).⁴

LAW AND DISCUSSION

On appeal of the July 25, 2024 judgment, the LDEQ assigns two errors to the trial court's judgment.

Assignment of Error 1: Declaratory Judgment

First, the LDEQ avers the trial court erred in hearing a motion for declaratory judgment in a summary proceeding, rather than an ordinary proceeding with a trial on the merits. The record shows Plaintiffs filed a pleading entitled “Motion for Declaratory Relief.” Therein, Plaintiffs prayed that the trial court “render a declaratory judgment finding that the [LDEQ] is required to direct the responsible parties to perform a remedial investigation of the property and select an appropriate remedy to address contamination.”

The function of a declaratory judgment is simply to establish the rights of the parties or express the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done. La. C.C.P. art. 1871, et seq.; MAPP Construction, LLC v. Amerisure Mutual Insurance Co., 2013-1074 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/14), 143 So.3d 520, 528.

Summary proceedings are those which are conducted with rapidity, within the delays allowed by the court, and without citation and the observance of all the formalities required in ordinary proceedings. La. C.C.P. art. 2591; Singleton v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2022-0667 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 353 So.3d 164, 173. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2592 does not list a declaratory judgment as a proceeding that can be brought summarily. Girod Titling Trust v. Hermes Health Alliance, 2024-0201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/1/24), 401 So.3d 716, 720-21.

A claim for declaratory relief is not a summary proceeding; it requires a trial on the merits where each party has an opportunity to present evidence in a form other than verified pleadings and affidavits. See La. C.C.P. arts. 1879 and 2592; MAPP Construction, 143 So.3d at 530-31; Singleton, 353 So.3d at 173. A rule to show cause is not the proper procedural vehicle to request declaratory relief. Girod, 401 So.3d at 721.

Plaintiffs improperly sought declaratory judgment through a motion, instead of through a petition, amended petition, reconventional demand, or other pleading asserting a cause of action for declaratory relief, which is required in ordinary proceedings. See La. C.C.P. art. 1871. See also Couvillion v. James Pest Control, Inc., 98-23 82 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 172, 174, and Girod, 401 So.3d at 720-21. Although Plaintiffs’ counsel argued before the trial court at the July 8, 2024 hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief that Plaintiffs had requested declaratory judgment in their amended petition, we have reviewed the pleadings and the record in its entirety and did not find a cause of action for declaratory relief raised by Plaintiffs against the LDEQ.

Furthermore, the Louisiana Groundwater Act does not provide for declaratory judgment as an enforcement measure under the provisions of that Act. The Louisiana Groundwater Act itself expressly does not create a cause of action for which a party can be liable. See La. R.S. 30:2015.1(I). The Louisiana Legislature expressly specified the Louisiana Groundwater Act to be procedural, not substantive; it is understood “to provide a set of procedures to be followed in litigation wherein the plaintiffs seek ‘to recover damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.’ ” La. R.S. 30:2015.1(B); Robichaux v. State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Hospitals, 2006-0437 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 952 So.2d 27, 39, writs denied, 2007-0567, 2007-0580, 2007-0583 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 503, 504.

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment was improperly raised before the trial court in an improper mode of proceeding.

Assignment of Error 2: Mandatory Injunction

Second, the LDEQ argues the trial court erred by issuing a mandatory injunction without any evidence, at a hearing where Plaintiffs had only moved for declaratory relief, and regarding an issue entrusted to the discretion of the LDEQ as an executive branch agency.

Although not requested by Plaintiffs in their motion for declaratory relief, the trial court's July 25, 2024 judgment granted a mandatory injunction in favor of Plaintiffs and against the LDEQ. The July 25, 2024 judgment ordered the LDEQ to order the Dresser Entities, or any one of them, as responsible parties, to “submit a plan within 30 days ․ on or before August 7, 2024, identifying the horizontal extent and the vertical extent of chlorinated solvent contamination including, but not limited to, TCE, in the soil and groundwater in, on, and/or around the former Dresser Facility in Pineville[,] Louisiana.” The July 25, 2024 judgment further ordered the Dresser Entities to identify preliminary conclusions and recommendations for further action as contemplated by the Louisiana Groundwater Act, La. R.S. 30:2015.1, and the Louisiana RECAP standards, LAC 33.I.1301-1309.

A mandatory injunction commands a party to perform a specific action. Moore v. iDream Enterprises, Inc., 2022-0418 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/14/23), 3 80 So.3d 625, 630-31, writ denied, 2024-00067 (La. 3/5/24), 380 So.3d 569. A mandatory injunction employs an ordinary proceeding and cannot be issued without a hearing on the merits. Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174; Concerned Citizens for Proper Planning, LLC v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2004-0270 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 660, 664. The jurisprudence has established that a mandatory injunction has the same basic effect as a permanent injunction, and therefore may not be issued on merely a prima facie showing that the party seeking the injunction can prove the necessary elements; instead, the party must show by a preponderance of the evidence at an evidentiary hearing that he is entitled to a mandatory injunction. See Singleton, 353 So.3d at 174 n.24; Concerned Citizens, 906 So.2d at 664.

The record shows that Plaintiffs did not request injunctive relief in their motion for declaratory relief, nor did the matter proceed as an ordinary action for permanent injunctive relief. Instead, the issue came before the trial court on a summary hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief. According to the transcript of the July 8, 2024 hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief, no evidence was formally introduced at the hearing sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a mandatory injunction. In order for the court to require remediation, evidence is required to develop, implement, or modify a plan to evaluate and remediate contamination and protect usable groundwater that is “consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people” of Louisiana. La. R.S. 30:2015.1(C). See also, e.g., Barnes v. Dresser LLC, No. 1:21-CV-00024 (W.D. La. July 3, 2025), 2025 WL 1839504, *1 (unpublished). There is no evidence of any plan in the record before us, nor was any evidence of any plan introduced at the July 8, 2024 hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory relief.

Furthermore, the July 25, 2024 judgment directed the LDEQ—an executive branch agency charged with administering and enforcing the Louisiana Groundwater Act—to exercise its regulatory authority in a particular manner and within a judicially imposed deadline. In doing so, the trial court effectively substituted its judgment for that of the LDEQ regarding matters committed to the LDEQ's administrative discretion. See La. R.S. 30:2015.1(K) (providing that “[t]he Department of Environmental Quality shall establish rules and procedures for the receipt, evaluation, and approval or modification of plans for evaluation or remediation.”).

Additionally, the Louisiana Groundwater Act does not provide for the issuance of injunctive relief, in any form, as an enforcement measure under the provisions of that Act. Again, the Louisiana Legislature expressly specified the Louisiana Groundwater Act to be procedural, not substantive; it is understood “to provide a set of procedures to be followed in litigation wherein the plaintiffs seek ‘to recover damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.’ ” Robichaux, 952 So.2d at 39.

Absent a proper evidentiary showing and procedural compliance with the requirements governing mandatory injunctive relief, the trial court lacked a procedural basis to order the LDEQ to undertake specific enforcement actions pursuant to the Louisiana Groundwater Act.

Conclusion

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs improperly sought declaratory relief through a summary proceeding, and because no cause of action for declaratory judgment was asserted by Plaintiffs in the pleadings, the trial court erred in rendering declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Furthermore, because the trial court granted mandatory injunctive relief that was neither requested in the pleadings nor supported by evidence properly offered and introduced at an evidentiary hearing conducted via ordinary proceeding, the July 25, 2024 judgment was improper. Therefore, we vacate the trial court's July 25, 2024 judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Nothing in our ruling should be construed as preventing Plaintiffs from obtaining information from the LDEQ on the status of the implementation of any existing remediation plan or seeking modification of any existing remediation plan in the event Plaintiffs are able to show any existing remediation plan is no longer feasible or requires modification.

DECREE

We vacate the trial court's July 25, 2024 judgment. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiffs-Appellees.

JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A dilatory exception is a procedural device to delay the progress of the action, not defeat it. La. C.C.P. art. 923. All objections that may be raised through the dilatory exception are waived unless pleaded therein. La. C.C.P. art. 926(B). Failure of the party urging the exception to insist upon a hearing and ruling, like the failure to file the exception, is deemed a waiver of the exception. Matter of Succession of Adams, 51,914 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So.3d 1014, 1016. See also Sims v. BFI Waste Services, L.L.C., 2006-1319 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/16/07), 964 So.2d 998, 1004.Further, the LDEQ's exception was not accompanied by a memorandum nor a proposed order requesting that the exception be set for hearing. See La. Dist. Court Rules 9.8(a) and 9.9(b). Louisiana District Court Rule 9.8(a) mandates that all exceptions “shall be accompanied by a proposed order requesting that the exception ․ be set for hearing.” Rule 9.8(a) further states, “[i]f the exceptor ․ fails to comply with this requirement, the court may strike the exception ․, may set the matter for hearing on its own motion, or take other action as the court deems appropriate.”Louisiana District Court Rule 9.9(b) states, in pertinent part:When a party files an exception ․, that party shall concurrently furnish the trial judge and serve on all other parties a supporting memorandum that cites both the relevant facts and applicable law. The memorandum for ․ exceptions ․ shall be served on all other parties so that it is received by the other parties at least fifteen calendar days before the hearing, unless the court sets a shorter time.There is no evidence in the record that the trial court ever set the LDEQ's exception for hearing nor ruled on the exception; therefore, the exception is deemed waived. See La. C.C.P. art. 926(B); Adams, 247 So.3d at 1016.

2.   Notice of appeal was transmitted by the Clerk of Court to the parties on September 27, 2024.

3.   On August 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to supplement the record on the motion for contradictory hearing. Attached to Plaintiffs’ motion was a certified letter dated August 15, 2024, sent by the LDEQ's Remediation Division (“LDEQ-RD”) to a Dresser Entity (Baker Hughes) with a Notice of Deficiencies List. That list detailed specific technical and/or regulatory deficiencies in response to its review of the RECAP Site Investigation Report submitted on its behalf by an Assessment Entity (Santec Consulting Services, Inc.). The LDEQ-RD required the Dresser Entity to respond in writing.

4.   Miller, J., concurring: “Once the trial court's jurisdiction is divested, pursuant to La. [C.C.P.] art. 2088(A), only an appellate court has authority to determine whether a suspensive appeal should be converted to a devolutive appeal.”

EDWARDS, J.