CHELSEA MAY v. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY HOMESTATE COMPANIES BLUE SKY HOSPITALITY SOLUTIONS LLC DBA (2026)

In this consolidated matter, Plaintiff seeks review of the workers’ compensation court's September 3, 2025 judgment denying her supplemental motion for partial default judgment, motion to compel further discovery responses, and motion for sanctions, and its September 29, 2025 judgment granting her employer's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her claim with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff-Appellant Chelsea May filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation (“Form 1008”) with the Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”) against her employer, Blue Sky Hospitality Solutions, LLC, and its insurer, and Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies (collectively, “Defendants-Appellees”). Plaintiff alleged therein that she suffered a compensable mental injury caused by workplace stress and a hostile work environment that existed from June 17, 2024, through her termination on July 14, 2024. Defendants denied her claim on the basis that it was noncompensable because her mental injury did not result from a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary event as required under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act (“LWCA”).

Plaintiff's Interlocutory Motions and Writ Application

On September 3, 2025, the OWC heard several motions filed by Plaintiff, including a supplemental motion for partial default judgment, a motion to compel further discovery responses, and a motion for sanctions. In a written judgment issued the same day, the OWC denied Plaintiff's motions. In its reasons, the OWC judge explained that she denied Plaintiff's motion for default because Defendants had answered the disputed claim, denying compensability; therefore, the claims were to be determined at a trial on the merits. Moreover, as it relates to Plaintiff's discovery motion and request for sanctions, the OWC judge held that:

[T]he discovery issue was addressed at the July 18, 2025 hearing. Defendant produced discovery and Claimant was advised to provide information regarding deficiencies. This matter was heard by the Court today, as noted above. The Court does not assess sanctions or evidentiary penalties at this time. Failure to provide the privilege log by September 12, 2025 may result in sanctions and/or penalties.

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a writ application with this Court seeking supervisory review of the September 3, 2025 judgment.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Appeal

While the writ application was pending, the OWC judge heard Defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's case on the basis that she could not satisfy the requirements for a compensable claim under the LWCA. Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition, which was stricken from the record. Consequently, Plaintiff failed to submit competent summary judgment evidence in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the facts set forth below are drawn from the evidence submitted by Defendants in support of their motion, which consists primarily of Plaintiff's Form 1008 and the documents she submitted in support of that claim.

In her Form 1008, Plaintiff alleged that she is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because she sustained a compensable mental injury arising from workplace stress and a hostile work environment. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by Blue Sky Hospitality Solutions, LLC as the Human Resources Director for the Marriott Metairie at Lakeway hotel in Metairie, Louisiana. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that “between June 17, 2024 to July 14, 2024, [she] suffered an extreme and constant amount of harassment, discrimination, isolation, personal defamation, and wage theft,” and that “[w]hen reported to the corporate office as per the company's policy [she] was terminated via email two [sic] after [she] submitted a complaint by the owner[.]”

Plaintiff attached to her Form 1008 a request for immediate payment of indemnity benefits in which she alleged multiple forms of workplace misconduct. She alleged discrimination, claiming that she was “subjected to unlawful discrimination based on [her] race (Black) and gender (female),” and that the “discrimination manifested in disparate treatment, exclusion from decision-making processes, and being held to different standards than non-black and male colleagues, retaliation, hostile work environment, pay discrimination, FMLA interference, defamation, and wrongful termination.” She also alleged retaliation, claiming that “after reporting discriminatory comments made by a corporate executive, [she] experienced a pattern of retaliatory actions, including harassment, isolation, undermining of [her] authority, and ultimately, termination.” She further alleged a hostile work environment was created by the new General Manager by “avoiding and isolating [her] spreading false information about [her] performance, making inappropriate inquiries about [her] FMLA leave, and tampering with [her] pay records.”

In addition, Plaintiff alleged pay discrimination, claiming that wages were “deliberately [withheld] without justification, while male colleagues had their time records falsified to receive payment for time they did not work.” She alleged FMLA interference, claiming that she was “harassed and provided with misinformation regarding [her] FMLA leave and [her] private medical information was shared inappropriately.” She also alleged defamation, claiming that “false and damaging statements were made about [her] character and performance to colleagues, undermining [her] professional reputation.” Finally, she alleged wrongful termination, claiming that she “was terminated without a legitimate reason, shortly after filing a formal complaint of discrimination and harassment.”

Plaintiff also attached a timeline of events to her Form 1008. Although the Form 1008 identifies the relevant period as extending from June 17, 2024 through July 14, 2024 (i.e., the date of her termination), the attached timeline spans a broader period, beginning on May 8, 2024, and ending on December 14, 2024. Within that timeline, Plaintiff referenced various conversations, correspondence, complaints, and documents that she contended demonstrated “a culture of discrimination within the company, disregard for employees’ concerns, lack of transparency and communication, retaliation against [her] and another employee, harassment and hostile work environment, privacy violations and FMLA interference, lack of support from senior management, wage theft, and disregard of company policies.”

Additionally, Plaintiff attached records from Dr. James Owens to her Form 1008. In a note dated September 26, 2024, Dr. Owens stated that Plaintiff presented with complaints of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and anxiety. According to the note, Plaintiff had been diagnosed with ADHD four years earlier and had been receiving treatment from another physician; however, she reportedly lost her job and health insurance, and her treating physician did not accept Medicaid. Dr. Owens additionally stated that Plaintiff had “experienced excessive and uncontrollable worry occurring more days than not for at least six months, about a variety of topics such as work performance, personal relationships, and everyday responsibilities.” The note further reflects that Plaintiff reported being “wrongfully terminated after being harassed for months at work.” Plaintiff also identified financial instability as a stressor, explaining that she had been fired two days after buying a new car.

Dr. Owens subsequently reported that Plaintiff participated in a telehealth appointment on October 3, 2024, during which she was evaluated for generalized anxiety disorder (“GAD”), ADHD, and possible post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Plaintiff expressed concern that she may have developed PTSD as a result of “employment issues in the last 6 months,” and Dr. Owens reported that Plaintiff met the criteria for PTSD following her exposure to a traumatic event that had occurred more than one month earlier.

Following a hearing on September 29, 2025, the OWC granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's Disputed Claim for Compensation with prejudice. A written judgment was signed the same day, and Plaintiff subsequently appealed. In her reasons for judgment, the OWC judge explained the ruling, in part, as follows:

The law requires that proof in a mental-mental workers’ compensation claim consist of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment. In the instant case, Claimant has made allegations of wrongful termination and discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, pay discrimination, FMLA interference, [and] defamation that occurred over a period of time. The facts show that she also had excessive and uncontrollable worry occurring more days than not for at least six months, about a variety of topics such as work performance, personal relationships, and everyday responsibilities. Thus, based on the facts, evidence, and applicable law, this Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact that Claimant has not suffered a workers’ compensation mental injury as set forth in La R.S. 1021(8)(b).

(Emphasis added).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court to review the September 29, 2025 judgment.

Consolidation of Matters and Assignments of Error

By order dated January 27, 2026, this Court consolidated Plaintiff's writ application and appeal for review. Oral argument was held on May 5, 2026. The matter was then submitted for decision.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In her writ application, Plaintiff raises four assignments of error relating to the trial court's September 3, 2025 denial of her motions for default, discovery, and sanctions. In her appeal, Plaintiff raises fifteen assignments of error relating to both the trial court's September 29, 2025 ruling granting summary judgment and its September 3, 2025 interlocutory rulings. Because the issues and assignments of error are interrelated, we will address them together below.

Standard of Review

On review before this Court, the issue is whether the trial court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. As in other civil matters, we review summary judgments in workers’ compensation cases de novo, applying the same criteria as the trial court—whether there are no genuine issues of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966; Longo v. 700B8, LLC, 24-1262 (La. 2/19/25), 400 So.3d 913, 914, reconsideration denied, 24-1262 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So.3d 212; Zatarains & Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Rodney, 24-128 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/24), 409 So.3d 965, 973, writ denied, 25-94 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 570. De novo review generally “involves examining the facts and evidence in the record, without regard or deference to the judgment of the trial court or its reasons for judgment.” Neville v. Redmann, 22-175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/31/22), 356 So.3d 568, 577 (quoting Cutrone v. Eng. Turn Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 19-896 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So.3d 1209, 1216), writ denied, 23-126 (La. 4/4/23), 358 So.3d 861.

The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2); Millet v. Moran Foods, LLC, 23-227 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/13/24), 384 So.3d 1074, 1076. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment “shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). If the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial, then the movant's burden on summary judgment “does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out the absence of factual support for one or more essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1); Longo, 400 So.3d at 914–15. In response to the movant's well-pled motion, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B); Millet, 384 So.3d at 1076.

The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists requires reference to the substantive law applicable to that case. Hacienda Holding Co., LLC, v. Home Bank, 20-189 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 309 So.3d 435, 445. The plaintiff “may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Longo, 400 So.3d at 915 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 967(B)); see also Darr v. Marine Elecs. Sols., Inc., 11-908 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So.3d 527, 533, writ denied, 12-1442 (La. 10/8/12), 98 So.3d 860.

Once the movant has properly supported a motion for summary judgment, “the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion.” Longo, 400 So.3d at 915 (citing Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging Inc., 08-528 (La. 12/2/08), 995 So.2d 1184, 1187). “Mere conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation will not support a finding of a genuine issue of material fact,” and “such inferences, allegations, and speculation are not sufficient to satisfy the opponent's burden of proof.” Palowsky v. Campbell, 22-592 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/14/23), 378 So.3d 226, 236 (citing Sears v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 06-201 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/18/06), 943 So.2d 1219, 1228, writ denied, 06-2747 (La. 1/26/07), 948 So.2d 168), writ denied, 24-94 (La. 6/5/24), 385 So.3d 1161. “The purpose of this procedural tool is to cut through the meaningless and unsupported allegations, thus getting at the heart of the issues before a trial court and allowing an expedited judgment, if worthy of such.” Simon v. Fasig-Tipton Co. of New York, 524 So.2d 788, 791 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988), writs denied, 525 So.2d 1048, 1049 (La. 1988).

Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act

To recover benefits under the LWCA, an employee must establish that she sustained a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. La. R.S. 23:1031(A). A mental injury caused by mental stress is compensable if the following requirements of La. R.S. 23:1021(8)(b) and (d) are met:

(b) Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.

․

(d) No mental injury or illness shall be compensable under either Subparagraph (b) or (c) unless the mental injury or illness is diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria as established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders presented by the American Psychiatric Association.

(Emphasis in original); see also Charles v. S. Cent. Indus., 96-883 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So.2d 706, 708. The “clear and convincing” standard is a heavier burden of proof than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard normally applied in civil cases, but less than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard applied in criminal cases. In re L.M.M., Jr., 17-1988 (La. 6/27/18), 319 So.3d 231, 244 n.13 (citing Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 442 (La. 1976)). To prove a matter by clear and convincing evidence means to demonstrate that the existence of a disputed fact is highly probable, i.e., much more probable than its nonexistence. Id.

The purpose of the LWCA is “[t]o provide for the timely payment of temporary and permanent disability benefits to all injured workers who suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the course and scope of their employment as is provided in this Chapter.” La. R.S. 23:1020.1(B)(1); see also Paul v. Jefferson Par. Pub. Sch. Sys., 13-132 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/3/13), 121 So.3d 190, 195. This law is “to be interpreted so as to assure the delivery of benefits to an injured employee in accordance with this Chapter.” La. R.S. 23:1020.1(C)(1); see also Paul, 121 So.3d at 195. The LWCA is remedial in nature, and in interpreting its statutes, the courts must keep in mind the policies and purpose behind the workers’ compensation laws. Paul, 121 So.3d at 195. To give effect to its intent, its provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant. Id. Despite the liberal construction of the statute, the claimant's burden of proof is not relaxed. Martin v. Olsten Indus. Servs., 98-463 (La. 9/18/98), 718 So.2d 404, 406. Reviewing courts must analyze claims of disability caused by mental conditions with the utmost caution, given the nebulous characteristics of mental conditions and the possibility that symptoms may be easily feigned. Charles, 683 So.2d at 709.

The foundational interpretive rule governing La. R.S. 23:1021(8)(b) was established by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Partin v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 01-1560 (La. 3/11/02), 810 So.2d 1118. There, the Court held that whether workplace stress is “sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary” must be evaluated under an objective standard rather than from the employee's subjective perspective. Id. at 1125. The focus is on the nature of the stress itself, not the employee's belief that the underlying conduct was unfair, wrongful, or particularly upsetting. Id. In that case, an employee alleged she suffered a compensable mental injury when her employer demoted her for lack of managerial skills after eighteen years of employment. The Court disagreed, finding that a personnel action is not necessarily extraordinary just because the employee perceives it to be unfair. The Court explained:

In this case, Claimant personally found her demotion to be extraordinary and unexpected because she did not know that the bank was displeased with her management skills and she was quite settled in her career. Yet by its nature, a demotion for failing to satisfactorily perform one's job creates stress that is neither unexpected nor extraordinary in the usual course of employment at a bank. That is not to say that a demotion could not be handled in such a way that would make it unexpected or extraordinary. For example, if an employer used violence in demoting an employee, it would perhaps cause stress that is unexpected and extraordinary. In addition, an event such as a robbery would perhaps cause stress that is unexpected and extraordinary at a bank, regardless of how it is conducted. In this case, however, the bank explained to Claimant that it was demoting her to teller because she lacked managerial skills, and it is undisputed that the bank did so in a calm and professional manner. Such a situation does not create stress that is unexpected or extraordinary in the usual course of employment at a bank.

Id. at 1126. “Considering simply the nature of the stress itself,” the Court concluded that the employee's mental injury was not compensable under the LWCA because it was neither unexpected nor extraordinary. Id.

Since Partin, Louisiana courts of appeal, including this Court, have uniformly applied this objective standard and have found relatively few categories of work-related events sufficient to constitute a “sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary” stressor under the LWCA. The cases that have recognized qualifying events share a common thread: they involve sudden, acute threats to physical safety, or traumatic violent occurrences that are wholly outside the ordinary risks of the claimant's particular employment. For example, in Jeansonne v. Wick Pub. Co., 94-462, (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/94), 646 So.2d 1212, writ denied, 94-2963 (La. 2/3/95), 649 So.2d 405, this Court held that an employee was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits after an argument with her supervisor. The employee alleged a mental injury caused by her supervisor yelling at her. Id. at 1216. This Court found there were no threats and that the incident did not constitute the type of “extraordinary stress” contemplated by the workers’ compensation statute. Id. Although the claimant argued she was particularly susceptible to emotional distress, we held that her subjective susceptibility was irrelevant. Id. Citing Bryant v. Giani Inv. Co., 626 So.2d 390, 392–93 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-89 (La. 3/18/94), 634 So.2d 852, this Court explained that a claimant's individual sensitivity has no bearing on whether the stress was “extraordinary” for purposes of a mental injury claim. Id.

Similarly, in Favorite v. La. Health Care Auth., 98-721 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 725 So.2d 556, the employee alleged mental injury arising from harassment, verbal reprimands, and abusive language from her supervisor. In that case, the evidence showed that the supervisor was hostile toward women and verbally abusive to other employees. Id. at 558. This Court emphasized that discrimination statutes were not relevant to the workers’ compensation analysis, which was governed by La. R.S. 23:1021, and, although the trial court found an “established pattern and practice of verbal abuse and profane language” that was “appalling, insensitive and wrong,” it concluded that the conduct was not sudden, unexpected, or extraordinary. Id. On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court, holding that although the supervisor's behavior was reprehensible, the claimant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that her injury resulted from the type of sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress required by the statute. Id. We explained that a claimant is not entitled to compensation merely because a mental injury is related to general workplace conditions or incidents occurring over an extended period of time; rather, the injury must be precipitated by an unexpected and unforeseen event occurring suddenly. Id.

Analysis

Defendants moved for summary judgment on the issue of the compensability. They argued that no genuine issue of material fact exists because Plaintiff's alleged mental injury developed gradually, over an extended period of time, as opposed to suddenly, as required under the LWCA. Accordingly, Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law finding Plaintiff's claim noncompensable and dismissing it with prejudice. As stated above, summary judgment “shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). As the mover, Defendants bear the burden of proof of their motion; however, since Defendants will not bear the burden of proof at trial, they need only point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to Plaintiff's claim. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

Here, Defendants pointed to an absence of factual support for an essential element of Plaintiff's claim, namely, that her alleged mental injury is compensable under the LWCA. In her Form 1008, Plaintiff alleged that between June 17, 2024, and her termination on July 14, 2024, she was subjected to ongoing harassment, discrimination, isolation, personal defamation, and wage theft by the hotel's newly hired general manager. According to Plaintiff, the general manager engaged in a continuous pattern of mistreatment during the weeks preceding her termination, resulting in a mental injury caused by workplace stress and a hostile work environment. Plaintiff submitted medical records reflecting that she was later diagnosed with PTSD, which she attributes to these events. Defendants denied compensability on the grounds that the alleged mental injury did not result from a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress as required by La. R.S. 23:1021(8).

Significantly, there is no genuine dispute regarding the underlying facts alleged by Plaintiff. Instead, the dispute concerns whether those facts satisfy the legal requirements for a compensable mental injury claim under the LWCA. Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, her claim is based upon repeated instances of workplace conflict, harassment, discrimination, and stress occurring over the course of approximately four weeks and culminating in her termination. By their nature, these allegations describe a gradual and ongoing course of conduct, not a sudden event. Nor do Plaintiff's allegations establish the type of extraordinary stress contemplated by the statute. Although she may have experienced the alleged conduct as deeply distressing, the relevant inquiry is not whether she subjectively perceived the events as extraordinary. The question is whether the alleged stress resulted from a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary occurrence within the meaning of La. R.S. 23:1021(8). The allegations of persistent workplace harassment, interpersonal conflict, discrimination, and termination over a period of several weeks do not satisfy that standard as a matter of law.

Upon our de novo review, we find that Plaintiff failed to produce factual support sufficient to establish that she will be able to meet her burden of proving a compensable mental injury at trial. Because the alleged facts, even if accepted as true, do not constitute a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress under the LWCA, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's September 3, 2025 judgment denying Plaintiff's supplemental motion for partial default judgment, motion to compel further discovery responses, and motion for sanctions, and we affirm the trial court's September 29, 2025 judgment granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's claim with prejudice.

AFFIRMED

FIFTH CIRCUIT

101 DERBIGNY STREET (70053)

POST OFFICE BOX 489

GRETNA, LOUISIANA 70054

www.fifthcircuit.org

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER

JUDE G. GRAVOIS

MARC E. JOHNSON

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

JOHN J. MOLAISON, JR.

SCOTT U. SCHLEGEL

TIMOTHY S. MARCEL

JUDGES

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK

LINDA M. TRAN FIRST DEPUTY CLERK

MELISSA C. LEDET DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL STAFF

(504) 376-1400

(504) 376-1498 FAX

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT AND CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE OPINION IN THE BELOW-NUMBERED MATTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 2-16.4 AND 2-16.5 THIS DAY AUGUST 20, 2026 TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT, COUNSEL OF RECORD AND ALL PARTIES NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL CLERK OF COURT

25-CA-576

C/W 25-C-491

E-NOTIFIED

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 7 (CLERK)

HON. SHANNON BRUNO BISHOP (DISTRICT JUDGE)

KATHERIN C. KOVACH (APPELLEE)

MAILED

CHELSEA MAY (APPELLANT)

POST OFFICE BOX 52

ARABI, LA 70032

FREDERICKA HOMBERG WICKER JUDGE