RANDY LEFKOWITZ RANDAL SCOTT v. LOUISIANA RENAISSANCE FESTIVAL LA RENFEST LLC (2026)

In this contract dispute, the appellant, Randy Lefkowitz p/k/a Randal Scott (“Scott”), appeals the portion of a judgment that denied, in part, his request for injunctive relief and granted the appellee, Louisiana Renaissance Festival a/k/a La-Renfest, LLC (“Renfest”), declaratory judgment. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Since 2000, Scott has been an annual exhibitor and performer at the Louisiana Renaissance Festival (the “festival”), operating the “Robin Hood Archery” booth (the “archery booth”). The archery booth is a partially covered structure with three walls where visitors of the festival can pay a fee to participate in archery activities. In 2001, Richard Hight, one of the owners of Renfest, approached Scott about investing in Renfest, which was financially struggling. Scott, who has been involved with Renaissance festivals for over 40 years, agreed to invest $15,000.00 in Renfest. On January 30, 2001, Scott and Renfest entered into an agreement (the “2001 agreement”) wherein Scott agreed to loan Renfest $15,000.00 and Renfest agreed to repay the principal sum of the loan, plus “1.5% of the profits [Renfest] makes during the ten year period from 2006 through 2015.” Renfest additionally “guarantee[d] [Scott] that the total money paid out to [Scott] over the period of this contract will be a minimum of $150,000.”

On January 5, 2011, Scott and Renfest entered into another agreement (the “2011 agreement”) after Renfest failed to make payments under the 2001 agreement. The 2011 agreement expressly terminated the 2001 agreement. The 2011 agreement states that Renfest will pay Scott the sum of $19,800.00 within 15 days and provides that “[Renfest] shall, for as long as [Scott] owns the archery booth at the Louisiana Renaissance Festival, not charge any fees, costs, commissions or incidentals as long as [Scott] chooses to maintain and operate such archery booth.”

Following the 2011 agreement, Scott continued to operate the archery booth at the festival, but was required to pay annual fees until 2015, when, according to Scott, he “did yet another reinvestment.” On March 23, 2017, Scott entered into another agreement with Renfest (the “2017 agreement”). The 2017 agreement established a monthly payment plan for Renfest to repay Scott a total of $103,031.13 over a three-year period beginning in 2017 and ending in 2019. The 2017 agreement provides that “[t]his agreement also includes all fees for Robin Hood Archery waived, as long as Randal Scott owns [CHOOSES TO OWN AS PER AGREEMENT ¹ ] Robin Hood Archery.”

After execution of the 2017 agreement, Scott was not required to pay fees or commissions for the operation of the archery booth. At some point after 2019, Scott began signing lease agreements in order to participate as an exhibitor at the festival. On August 18, 2023, Scott signed an “Exhibitor Lease Agreement” (the “2023 lease”), which states it is “entered into on the date payment is made in full or the date signed and countersigned” and is “valid for the 2023 festival season.” The 2023 lease does not specifically define the term “festival season,” but notes that the festival is open to the public on November 4-5, 11-12, 18-19, and 24-26, and December 2-3, and 9-10, 202,3, and is open on November 14, 15, and 16, 2023, for school field trips. The 2023 lease notes that the archery booth is classified as “[p]ermanent” and the booth fee “is currently $0.00 per year.” The 2023 lease contains the following pertinent provisions:

Removal of an Exhibitor: If it is determined that it is in the best interest of [Renfest] to remove an Exhibitor from future participation in the festival, the Exhibitor will be notified in writing. This decision by [Renfest] will be effective immediately for businesses that are classified as Temporary or Semi Permanent. Businesses whose structure is classified as Permanent will be given 18 months to sell the building. The Exhibitor may lease the building to any festival approved merchant for up to two seasons. If the building has not been sold after 18 months, [Renfest] reserves the right to deem the structure an Abandoned Structure. [Renfest] may assume ownership and lease the building to another merchant, use or destroy the building as it sees fit; Compensation to the owner being at the sole discretion of [Renfest].

* * *

Miscellaneous: This Agreement and its referenced documents contain the entire understanding between the parties with respect to [Renfest's] and Exhibitor's participation, and no oral agreement or other representations shall be binding upon either party hereto. Unless specifically stated otherwise this contract supersedes any prior contract issued by [Renfest]․

Additional Provisions: The following special provisions (if any) are included as part of this contract.

Must fill out contract – no festival fees – pays for own insurance ACTION NEEDED: The roof needs repair. The left and right walls are rotting, need repair and fresh paint.

In January 2024, Scott received a letter from Renfest notifying him that he was being removed from future participation in the festival and had approximately two weeks to coordinate removal of his property from the festival grounds. On March 28, 2024, Scott filed a petition for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction, alleging the 2011 agreement and the 2017 agreement granted him the right to maintain the archery booth without the requirement of paying annual fees for as long as he owned it. Scott alleged that Renfest's January 2024 letter “repudiates the [2011 agreement] and [the] 2017 agreement because being deprived of the right to participate in the festival as an exhibitor is also a repudiation or breach of the right he bargained for to exhibit annually without the requirement of paying annual fees.” Scott alleged that his interest in the archery booth is a real property right and the destruction of the booth and his exclusion from the festival will cause him irreparable injury, and loss or damages. Scott requested the issuance of a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction to prevent Renfest from destroying, removing, or relocating his property, including the archery booth, or disqualifying Scott as an exhibitor at the festival. On April 19, 2024, the trial court signed the draft order attached to Scott's petition, granting Scott's request for a temporary restraining order prohibiting Renfest from destroying or removing his property, including the archery booth, and disqualifying Scott as an exhibitor, and issuing a rule to show cause and setting a hearing for June 24, 2024 regarding Scott's request for a preliminary injunction.

In response to Scott's petition, Renfest filed an answer and reconventional demand wherein Renfest sought declaratory judgment that the 2023 lease is the controlling contract between Scott and Renfest. Renfest requested that its motion for declaratory judgment be set for a hearing pursuant to a rule to show cause order. However, the record on appeal does not contain an order setting Renfest's request for declaratory judgment for hearing or trial.

On June 24, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Scott's request for injunctive relief. At the hearing, Scott testified and documentary evidence was admitted.² There was no discussion or argument regarding Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment and no indication from the record that the motion was being heard at the June 24, 2024 hearing. Following argument, the trial court found that the 2023 lease supersedes the 2011 agreement and the 2017 agreement, and allows Renfest to exclude Scott from participation in the festival. However, the trial court also found, pursuant to the terms of the 2023 lease, Scott should have been afforded 18 months to remove the archery booth.

On July 19, 2024, the trial court signed a written judgment that reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [Renfest's] motion for declaratory judgment recognizing the August 2023 Exhibitor Lease Agreement as the controlling contract is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction is granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's request to enjoin [Renfest] and its agents, servants, and employees from disqualifying him as an exhibitor in the festival is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [Renfest] and its agents, servants, and employees are enjoined, prevented and restrained from destroying, removing and relocating any and all property owned and built by the Plaintiff, including Scott's permanent structure, until December 24, 2025.

From this judgment, Scott appeals, arguing the trial court erred by denying his request for preliminary injunctive relief and granting Renfest declaratory judgment.³

RULE TO SHOW CAUSE

On May 20, 2026, this Court, ex proprio motu, issued a rule to show cause order noting its examination of the record revealed that the trial court granted Renfest's request for declaratory judgment following the June 24, 2025 hearing, but that the record did not contain an order setting Renfest's request for declaratory judgment for hearing or trial. This Court explained that a suit for declaratory judgment is an ordinary action, not a summary proceeding, and that while in some cases the merits of an action may be decided during an interlocutory proceeding, the parties must expressly agree to submit the case for final decision at the hearing on the rule for a preliminary injunction. See City of Baton Rouge v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Social Services, 2007-0005 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/14/07), 970 So. 2d 985, 995. This Court noted the record in the instant matter reveals that there was no stipulation between the parties agreeing to dispose of Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment during the preliminary injunction proceeding. This Court ordered the parties to show cause by briefs why the issue of whether the trial court legally erred by granting Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment without a full trial under ordinary process should not be addressed by this Court sua sponte. See Thompson v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 2015-0477 (La. 10/14/15), 181 So. 3d 656, 665. The parties filed briefs and orally argued the issue.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Scott raises four assignments of error related to the trial court's July 19, 2024 judgment.⁴ However, our determination that the trial court legally erred by denying Scott's request for injunctive relief and granting Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment without a trial on the merits is dispositive of this appeal. Accordingly, we pretermit consideration of Scott's assignment of errors.

Injunctive Relief

As stated, the trial court's July 19, 2024 judgment denied in part and granted in part Scott's Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction. The judgment denied Scott's “request to enjoin [Renfest] from disqualifying him as an exhibitor in the festival” and granted his request for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Renfest from “destroying, removing and relocating any and all property owned and built by [Scott], including Scott's permanent structure, until December 24, 2025.”

An injunction shall be issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 3601(A). A preliminary injunction is an interlocutory judgment designed to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a trial on the merits. Stevens Construction & Design, L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Fire Protection District No. 1, 2019-0431 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/16/20), 295 So. 3d 954, 957-58 (en banc), writ denied, 2020-00977 (La. 11/4/20), 303 So. 3d 650. A preliminary injunction is issued in summary proceedings incidental to the main demand for permanent injunctive relief. Concerned Citizens for Proper Planning, LLC v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2004-0270 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So. 2d 660, 664. Generally, a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must show that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue and must show entitlement to the relief sought; this must be done by a prima facie showing that the party will prevail on the merits of the case. Id.

Whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Singleton v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 2022-0667 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 353 So. 3d 164, 177. A trial court enjoys considerable discretion in determining whether injunctive relief is warranted, and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. This standard is based upon a conclusion that the trial court committed no error of law and was not manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong in making a factual finding necessary to the proper exercise of its discretion. Id. If a trial court's decision was based on an erroneous interpretation or application of law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion, such an incorrect decision is not entitled to deference. Id.

The principal demand of the permanent injunction is determined on its merits only after a full trial in an ordinary proceeding, in which the party seeking injunctive relief must carry its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by a prima facie showing. See Singleton, 353 So. 3d at 174, 176. Nevertheless, parties may agree to consolidate the trial on the merits of a permanent injunction with the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Moore v. iDream Enterprises, Inc., 2022-0418 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/14/23), 380 So. 3d 625, 630, writ denied, 2024-00067 (La. 3/5/24), 380 So. 3d 569 (citing Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 2003-2220 (La. 4/14/04), 875 So. 2d 22, 29). However, the parties must expressly agree to submit the case for final decision at the hearing on the rule for a preliminary injunction. Otherwise, even though the summary hearing on the rule for a preliminary injunction may tentatively decide merit issues, the trial court must decide the principal demand for a permanent injunction on its merits only after a full trial under ordinary process. City of Baton Rouge, 970 So. 2d at 995.

The general rule is that an injunction will issue only in its prohibitory form. Concerned Citizens, 906 So. 2d at 664. However, a mandatory injunction is one that commands a party to perform a specific action. City of New Orleans v. Board of Directors of Louisiana State Museum, 98-1170 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So. 2d 748, 756. A mandatory preliminary injunction has the same basic effect as a permanent injunction. Moore, 380 So. 3d at 630-31. Given that mandatory injunctions and prohibitory injunctions have different procedural rules and evidentiary burdens, we have recognized that “as a matter of law, it is not possible to issue a mandatory preliminary injunction.” Id. at 631 (quoting Deshotels v. White, 2016-0889 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/16/17), 226 So. 3d 1211, 1218 (en banc), writ denied, 2017-1565 (La. 12/5/17), 231 So. 3d 628). In other words, a mandatory injunction cannot, as a matter of law, be a preliminary injunction. Moore, 380 So. 3d at 631.

In Plauche v. City of New Orleans, 2024-0576 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/25), 414 So. 3d 1055, 1057, 1062-63, the plaintiff appealed the denial of his request for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the City of New Orleans (the “City”) from enforcing local ordinances that would allegedly interfere with his ability to use his property. The Fourth Circuit, sua sponte, found that the trial court legally erred by considering the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction to be prohibitory rather than mandatory. Id. at 1062. The court noted that the plaintiff used language in his pleadings and in argument before the trial court, and in his briefs filed on appeal, to characterize his requested injunctive relief as prohibitory. Id. However, the court, noting Louisiana is a fact pleading state, looked to the substance of the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. Id. at 1063. In doing so, the court found that the plaintiff sought to have the City renew or restore licenses previously granted to the plaintiff that had expired. In other words, the court found the plaintiff was not seeking to maintain the status quo, and the plaintiff's prayer for injunctive relief was “in actuality a command that the City issue [the licenses] to him[.]” Id. at 1064. Therefore, the plaintiff sought “mandatory injunctive relief disguised as a request for a preliminary injunction.” Id. Accordingly, the court vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id.

In Saer v. New Orleans Regional Physician Hosp. Organization, 14-856 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/25/15), 169 So. 3d 617, 620, the plaintiff appealed the denial of his request for preliminary injunction, arguing the trial court erred by finding his request was for mandatory injunctive relief. The plaintiff noted that he had requested prohibitory relief to prevent the defendant from terminating its contract with the plaintiff pending a trial on the merits of his petition. Id. The Fifth Circuit found the trial court properly considered the plaintiff's request to be one seeking mandatory injunctive relief. Id. at 621. In doing so, the court noted that the plaintiff did not seek to preserve the status quo because at the time he filed suit, the defendant had already terminated the contract. The court explained that if the trial court had granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, the defendant would have had to “do something” – reinstate the terminated agreement. The court pointed out that the status quo would be preserved “only if the [a]greement remained terminated.” Id. at 621. See also, Limousine Livery, Ltd. v. A Airport Limousine Service, L.L.C., 2007-1379 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/12/08), 980 So. 2d 780, 786 (finding although styled as a request for a preliminary injunction, request that defendant reinstate member of limited liability company and undo the sale of other members’ interests in the limited liability company was actually a request for a mandatory injunction).

As discussed, Scott made two requests for injunctive relief in his petition. The first request for injunctive relief—prohibiting Renfest from removing or destroying Scott's archery booth—was clearly a request for a prohibitory injunction and therefore was properly considered at the June 24, 2024 rule to show cause hearing. However, we find Scott's second request for injunctive relief actually sought to require Renfest to allow Scott to participate as an exhibitor at the festival. Scott alleged in his petition that pursuant to the January 2024 letter, he has been “disqualified” from participating in Renfest in derogation of his rights as stated in the 2011 agreement and the 2017 agreement. Scott prayed for a preliminary injunction “restraining” Renfest from “disqualifying him as an exhibitor in the festival[.]” Although couched as prohibitory in nature, Scott actually sought injunctive relief requiring Renfest to allow him to exhibit at the festival. See Saer, 169 So. 3d at 621. Clearly, as Scott was disqualified as an exhibitor pursuant to the January 2024 letter, he was not seeking to maintain the status quo. Had the trial court granted his requested relief, Renfest would have been required to allow Scott to participate in the festival. Therefore, the substance of this request was for a mandatory injunction. As discussed, a mandatory injunction cannot be a preliminary injunction. See Moore, 380 So. 3d at 631. Thus, Scott's request that Renfest be required to allow him to participate in the festival was a request for a permanent injunction.

As noted, unless the parties expressly agree to consolidate the trial on the merits of a permanent injunction with the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the principal demand for a permanent injunction is determined on the merits only after a full trial in an ordinary proceeding, where the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Singleton, 353 So. 3d at 174. The record of this matter contains no indication that the parties stipulated to such an agreement at the June 24, 2024 hearing, which was scheduled pursuant to Scott's request for a rule to show cause hearing. At the hearing, there was no discussion regarding the type of injunctions at issue and the trial court did not indicate that it would consider Scott's request for permanent injunctive relief. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to deny Scott's request for a permanent injunction, the merits of which can only be determined following a full trial under ordinary process. See City of Baton Rouge, 970 So. 2d at 995; see also Zachary Mitigation Area, LLC v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 2016-1675 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/17), 231 So. 3d 687, 692 (holding trial court was “without authority” to deny the plaintiff's request for permanent and mandatory injunction without a trial on the merits).

Declaratory Judgment

As discussed, Renfest requested that its motion for declaratory judgment be set for a hearing pursuant to a rule to show cause, but the record does not contain an order setting the motion for hearing. Furthermore, Renfest did not file a memorandum in support of its motion for declaratory judgment before the June 24, 2024 hearing. There was no mention of the motion for declaratory judgment at the hearing, and the minutes corresponding to the June 24, 2024 hearing do not indicate that Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment was heard that day.⁵ Nonetheless, the trial court granted Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment in its July 19, 2024 judgment. Like a demand for permanent injunctive relief, a motion for declaratory judgment must be determined by ordinary proceeding. City of Baton Rouge, 970 So. 2d at 995 (citing In re Melancon, 2005-1702 (La. 7/10/06), 935 So. 2d 661, 665). Therefore, the trial court erred by granting Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment. As we find Scott was deprived of his right to a trial on the merits, we vacate the portions of the trial court's July 19, 2024 judgment granting Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment and denying Scott's request to enjoin Renfest from disqualifying him as an exhibitor at the festival.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the portion of the trial court's July 19, 2024 judgment that granted Louisiana Renaissance Festival a/k/a La-Renfest, LLC's motion for declaratory judgment “recognizing the August 2023 Exhibitor Lease Agreement as the controlling contract[.]” We further vacate the portion of the July 19, 2024 judgment that denied Randy Lefkowitz p/k/a Randal Scott's request for injunctive relief, specifically “to enjoin [Louisiana Renaissance Festival a/k/a La-Renfest, LLC] and its agents, servants, and employees from disqualifying [Randy Lefkowitz p/k/a Randal Scott] as an exhibitor in the festival[.]” The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Louisiana Renaissance Festival a/k/a La-Renfest, LLC.

VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The bracketed portion of the language from the 2017 agreement was a handwritten notation.

2.   During the hearing, the trial court admitted the following items into evidence: (1) the 2001 agreement; (2) the 2011 agreement; (3) the 2017 agreement; (4) the 2023 lease; (5) photographs of the archery booth; and (6) email correspondence between Scott and an employee of Renfest regarding the 2023 lease. Although Scott testified that he received the January 2024 letter from Renfest providing him with notice of his exclusion from the festival, the letter was not admitted into evidence at the hearing.

3.   Scott did not assign error to the portion of the July 19, 2024 judgment wherein the trial court granted, in part, his request for a preliminary injunction and prohibited Renfest from destroying, removing, or relocating the archery booth and his property until December 24, 2025.

4.   Scott's assignments of error are as follows:1. The trial court erred by failing to enforce the 2011 [agreement] and 2017 [agreement], the promises of which [Renfest] intentionally drafted into the 2023 [lease].2. The trial court erred by permitting [Renfest] to exercise a termination at-will clause from an expired contract to remove him as an exhibitor, despite the 2011 [agreement] and 2017 [agreement] which permit Scott to exhibit as long as he chooses to own his booth.3. The trial court erred by permitting [Renfest] to exercise a termination at-will provision to terminate a contract of long duration without showing of good faith.4. The trial court erred by denying Scott injunctive relief.

5.   Renfest argues Scott should have objected to consideration of its motion for declaratory judgment at the June 24, 2024 hearing or should have filed a dilatory exception of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding. This argument is untethered from the procedural history of the case. As discussed, there is no indication from the record that Renfest's motion for declaratory judgment was set for hearing on June 24, 2024 or that Scott had notice it would be heard. Thus, Scott had no reason to file an exception of unauthorized use of a summary proceeding prior to the hearing.

BALFOUR, J.