STATE OF LOUISIANA v. MARTIN HURTADO (2026)

Martin Hurtado was indicted by an Orleans Parish Grand Jury for second-degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1; criminal mischief, a violation of La. R.S. 14:59; and resisting a police officer with force or violence, a violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1.

Defendant pled not guilty to all of the charges, and various motion hearings were held prior to the trial date of September 11, 2023. On the day trial was set, the state and defendant negotiated a plea agreement pursuant to which the defendant pled guilty to the lesser count of manslaughter on Count Two. Defendant was sentenced to forty-years imprisonment, and Counts One and Three were dismissed. The defendant executed a plea form; and the district court conducted a colloquy with the defendant, who acknowledged that he had reviewed the plea form with his attorney and did not have any questions. According to the plea of guilty form, the defendant waived his right to appeal. However, during the September 11, 2023 plea colloquy, the district court, rather than advising him that he waived his right to appeal, advised him that he had “30 days to appeal this conviction and two years in which to seek post-conviction relief.” At the conclusion of the colloquy, the district court stated that it found the defendant's plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered.

The district court thereafter heard victim impact testimony from one witness and a sentencing hearing was set for October 6, 2023. At the sentencing hearing, the state read into the record a letter from the victim's widow, Barbara Sorenson, who had witnessed her husband's murder, and the district court imposed the agreed-upon sentence of forty years. The state did not provide a factual basis for the defendant's plea. The victim impact statements of Mrs. Sorenson, the victim's wife for over fifty years, and Austin Sorenson, the youngest son of the victim, David Sorenson, reflect that the defendant killed David Sorenson, a visitor to New Orleans, in his hotel room.

The affidavit for the defendant's arrest reflects that on December 1, 2022, the defendant entered the New Orleans Avenue Plaza Hotel on St. Charles Avenue and took an elevator to the sixth floor. He knocked on all of the doors on the floor. A fire alarm was pulled, and several visitors exited their rooms. The defendant then knocked on the Sorenson's door. Mrs. Sorenson, who had been awakened by the alarm, opened the door. The defendant forced his way into the room and beat Mr. Sorenson to death.

On December 27, 2024, the defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief, in which he requested an out-of-time appeal and a motion for an out-of-time appeal. On January 8, 2025, the district court granted the application and motion.

DISCUSSION

No errors patent were discovered.

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant asserts that his guilty plea “is legally infirm and constitutionally invalid.” He asserts, first, that the district court failed to explain the elements of manslaughter before he pled guilty to that crime. He also asserts that he was not properly advised of his privilege against self-incrimination because while he was advised that had he proceeded to trial and refused to testify that the court would not be allowed to hold it against him, he was not advised that the jury would not be allowed to hold it against him. This “legally insufficient guilty plea procedure,” the defendant claims, entitles him to having his plea vacated.

Initially, the state maintains that the defendant's appeal should be dismissed because it was not served with the post-conviction pleadings filed in the district court. Citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 927(A), the state asserts that it was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to the application in the district court because it was not ordered to answer the petition by the district court. Citing State v. Jefferson, 2024-0724, pp. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/25), 415 So. 3d 989, 997, the state further asserts that remanding the matter to the district court “would only prolong the delay without serving any useful purpose.”

As to the substance of the defendant's assertions, the state contends, first, that because the defendant was represented by counsel, the district court would have presumed that his counsel had explained the nature of the charge in sufficient detail that he had notice of what his plea asked him to admit. The state also contends that the defendant's plea form demonstrates that he was adequately Boykinized and any “slip of the tongue during the recitation [did] not render [the defendant's] plea unconstitutional when viewed in light of the record as a whole.”

OUT-OF-TIME APPEAL

In State v. Jefferson, 2024-0724, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/30/25), 415 So. 3d 989, 996-97 this Court recently explained the proper procedure for seeking an out-of-time appeal:

“The motion for an appeal must be made no later than:․[t]hirty days after the rendition of the judgment or ruling from which the appeal is taken.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 914(B)(1). “The appropriate procedural remedy for a defendant seeking to exercise his right to appeal after his conviction and sentence become final is a timely-filed application for post-conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art[s]. 924-930,[8].” State v. Harrison, 2017-0054, pp. 28-29 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/21/18), 239 So.3d 406, 424 (citation omitted).

La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A) provides:

No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of Article 914 or 922․

In Jefferson, supra, pp.8-9, 997, this Court noted:

It is undisputed that Mr. Jefferson's motion was filed outside of the thirty-day deadline set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 914. Nonetheless, his motion for appeal was filed within the two-year period set forth in La. C.Cr.P. arts. 924-930.8 for the filing of an application for post-conviction relief. Furthermore, our review of the record does not suggest that Mr. Jefferson intended to waive his constitutionally protected right to appeal his convictions and sentences. Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424. Our jurisprudence affords great latitude to an appellate court's consideration of an out-of-time appeal. See Counterman, 475 So.2d at 339; Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424. We therefore find that delaying this matter to remand to the district court “would only prolong the delay without serving any useful purpose.” State v. S.J.I., 2006-2649, p. 1 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So.2d 483; Harrison, 2017-0054, p. 29, 239 So.3d at 424 (finding that remanding such a matter would be a waste of time and judicial resources). As such, we will consider the merits of Mr. Jefferson's appeal and the State's motion to dismiss is denied.

Similarly, in this case, the defendant's motion was filed outside of the thirty-day deadline set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 914. However, his motion for appeal and post-conviction application were filed within the two-year period set forth in La. C.Cr.P. arts. 924-930.8 for the filing of an application for post-conviction relief.

As such, the defendant's post-conviction application, in which he seeks an out-of-time appeal, will be considered timely filed.

PLEA

In State v. Clues-Alexander, 2021-00831, p. 6 (La. 5/13/22), 345 So. 3d 983, 987 (per curiam), the Supreme Court set forth the terms for appellate review where a defendant has plead guilty “unconditionally without reservation”:

Appellate review is confined to the question of whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, or should have been permitted to be withdrawn as involuntarily and unknowingly made․ See State v. Spain, 329 So.2d 178 (La. 1976); State v. Knighten, 320 So.2d 184 (La. 1975); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (“[An unconditional] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea ․”).

Our review, then, is limited to whether the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, as well as to errors patent. In this case, the defendant has raised the sole question of whether his plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered.

The defendant claims, first, that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the district court failed to inform him of the elements of the crime of manslaughter.

La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. In a felony case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and determining that he understands, all of the following:

(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.

Courts have held that La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A)(1) does not require the district court to read and explain to defendants all of the elements of the offense before accepting a guilty plea. See State v. Mitchell, 23-225, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 379 So. 3d 127, 133-34 (The district court was not required to read and explain to the defendant all elements of vehicular homicide to ensure he understood nature and elements of offense before accepting guilty plea, and thus guilty plea did not violate statute governing court's duties during the plea colloquy.); State v. Hicks, 42,427, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So. 3d 307, 313 (“The test for the validity of a guilty plea does not depend upon whether or not the district court specifically informed the accused of every element of the offense.”).

In State v. Ford, 2002-1394, 2002-1642, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/16/03), 846 So. 2d 98, 99-100, the defendant, who pled guilty to five counts of armed robbery and was sentenced on each count to serve twenty-five years imprisonment concurrently, contended that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of La. C.Cr.P. art. 556.1 in determining whether he understood the charges against him. In rejecting the defendant's assertion, this Court stated:

At the guilty plea hearing in the instant case, the trial court informed the defendant that he was pleading guilty to one count of armed robbery in case 395-385 and to four counts of armed robbery in case 396-322. The trial court also informed him of the mandatory minimum and maximum sentence for the offenses and the penalties for subsequent offenses. Furthermore, the trial court personally questioned the defendant regarding the waiver of his Boykin rights. Notably, the defendant, who was represented by counsel at the time of his plea, failed to complain that he did not understand the charges against him.

Ford, 2002-1394, 2002-1642, p. 4, 846 So. 2d 100-101.

In State v. Howard, 11-1155, p. 2 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 91 So. 3d 564, 567, the defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter and thereafter filed an Anders brief. The Fifth Circuit conducted an independent review of the record and in so doing, examined the plea colloquy and found his plea knowingly and intelligently entered:

Further, pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter, in violation of LSA–R.S. 14:31. During the guilty plea colloquy, he was advised of and waived his Boykin rights, including his right to a jury trial, his right to confrontation, and his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant was also advised of these rights by means of the Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Constitutional Rights form. Defendant initialed next to each of these rights and signed the form, indicating that he understood that he was waiving these rights by pleading guilty.

Howard, 11-1155, pp. 5-6, 91 So. 3d at 569.

In this case, the transcript of the colloquy and the waiver of rights form reflect that the defendant was advised of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers and witnesses against him and to call witnesses on his behalf, his privilege against self-incrimination and his waiver of those rights by pleading guilty. The district court also advised the defendant of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalty provided by law. The defendant affirmatively indicated during the colloquy his understanding of the rights, his waiver of them, and his lack of any questions.

In the waiver of rights form, the defendant initialed next to the paragraph setting forth each of each of these rights and indicated his understanding that he was waiving those rights. He initialed next to the section setting forth the sentencing range in his case therefore demonstrating that he understood his sentence would be forty years imprisonment. Most relevant to the defendant's claim, he initialed next to the following statement:

My attorney has explained the elements of the offenses to which I am pleading guilty. I understand those elements and am satisfied with the explanation and representation.

The defendant agreed that he reviewed the form with his attorney and understood the terms and the conditions of his plea agreement. As such, we conclude that this assignment is without merit.

The defendant also claims that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the district court failed to inform him that, had he proceeded to trial and refused to testify, the jury would not be allowed to hold it against him.

The defendant initialed next to the following:

[By pleading guilty,] I understand that I am giving up the following rights:

4. to testify myself at trial, if I chose to do so; or to remain silent if I chose not to testify, and not have my silence held against me, or considered evidence of my guilt.

These acknowledgements by the defendant illustrate that he was adequately advised of his waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination. This assignment is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Judge Daniel L. Dysart