STATE IN INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

The juvenile, S.A., was alleged delinquent by petition in juvenile court based on one count of second degree battery, a violation of La.R.S.14:34.1.¹ S.A. was fourteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. S.A. denied the allegation but later entered a no contest response to the reduced charge of simple battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:35. Following a disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed S.A. to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) for six months, suspended the commitment, and placed S.A. on active supervised probation for one year. As a special condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered S.A. to pay restitution in the amount of $3,714.28.

S.A. now appeals, asserting three assignments of error challenging the validity of both the no contest response and the restitution order. For the following reasons, we affirm the adjudication, disposition, and restitution order.

FACTS

Because S.A. entered a “nolo contendere response” to the amended charge of simple battery, the facts were not fully developed in this case. See La. Ch.C. art. 856(A)(4). According to the petition, the factual basis provided by the District Attorney's office, and the facts adduced at the disposition and restitution hearings,² on or about October 11, 2023, S.A., another juvenile, B.L., and the victim, Z.P., were engaged in a fight on a school bus going to or coming from St. Tammany Junior High School. The victim sustained serious bodily injuries, which resulted in the dispatch of and subsequent bill for an ambulance.

NO CONTEST RESPONSE

In his first assignment of error, S.A. argues that his no contest response was constitutionally infirm because it was wrongly treated as a guilty plea.³ Specifically, S.A. contends the plea form and plea colloquy were defective because they included explicit recitations of and admissions to the facts of the offense.

At the outset, we note that S.A. did not file a motion to withdraw his no contest response, nor did he object at any point during the plea colloquy. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has permitted constitutionally infirm guilty pleas to be withdrawn after sentencing by way of appeal or post-conviction relief. See State v. Dixon, 449 So.2d 463, 464 (La. 1984). Further, this court has reviewed claims of constitutionally infirm pleas on appeal even in the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 2024-0805 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/30/25), 417 So.3d 901, 905. Thus, we find S.A. is not prohibited from challenging the constitutionality of his no contest response by means of this appeal.

At the adjudication hearing on December 17, 2024, S.A. was sworn in, and the juvenile court began its Boykin 4 colloquy with S.A. The juvenile court asked S.A. for his date of birth, age, and level of education. The juvenile court then advised S.A. of his Boykin rights (right to an adjudication hearing, right against compulsory self-incrimination, and right of confrontation) and his right to an appeal and explained that by pleading no contest, he would be waiving his rights. S.A. stated he understood those rights and that he was waiving those rights by pleading no contest. The juvenile court informed S.A. of the charge against him and of the maximum disposition he could receive, to which S.A. stated he understood. The State then provided a brief factual basis for the charge. The juvenile court subsequently determined there was a factual basis for the adjudication.

Thereafter, the juvenile court inquired of defense counsel whether S.A. intended to enter a no contest plea, to which defense counsel responded affirmatively. When the juvenile court asked S.A. whether he was entering a no contest plea, S.A. stated, “Yes, sir.” The juvenile court then reviewed the plea form, specifically noting S.A. was pleading no contest rather than guilty as the title on the form implied.⁵ Defense counsel and S.A. confirmed their signatures were on the form. Subsequently, the juvenile court found S.A.’s no contest plea was freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

A plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to an admission of guilt and is treated as a guilty plea since there are no specific procedures regarding plea agreements in delinquency proceedings in the Children's Code. La, C.Cr.P. art. 552(4)⁶ ; State v. Gordon, 2004-0633 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 896 So.2d 1053, 1061, writ denied, 2004-3144 (La. 4/1/05), 897 So.2d 600. The due process requirements of Boykin are applied in juvenile adjudications. See State in Interest of Lucas, 543 So.2d 634, 636 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989). Due process requires, as a prerequisite to a plea's validity, that the plea be a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of known rights. There must be an affirmative showing in the record that the juvenile was informed of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers and that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; State ex rel. J.W., III, 2009-0656 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/14/09), 2009 WL 3011210, *2 (unpublished); State in Interest of H.N., 2015-173 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/3 0/15), 171 So.3d 1242, 1247.

There is no absolute right to withdraw a previously entered guilty plea. Evans, 417 So.3d at 904. The withdrawal of a guilty plea must be predicated on legal cause; that is, on a showing made by the defendant that his plea bargain was constitutionally infirm, creating a legal defect that nullifies the agreement between the parties. Evans, 417 So.3d at 904. A guilty plea is constitutionally infirm when it is not entered freely and voluntarily, if the Boykin colloquy was inadequate, or when a defendant is induced to enter the plea by a plea bargain or what he justifiably believes was a plea bargain and that bargain is not kept. A constitutionally infirm guilty plea may be set aside either by means of an appeal or post-conviction relief. Evans, 417 So.3d at 904-05.

Following our review of the record, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding S.A.’s no contest response was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. The juvenile court referred to the response as a no contest plea multiple times throughout the Boykin colloquy. When reviewing the plea form with S.A., the juvenile court emphasized it was a no contest plea rather than a guilty plea. On the plea form itself, defense counsel wrote “Best Interest Plea” above the questions to be answered by S.A. Nevertheless, as noted supra, a no contest plea is treated as a guilty plea. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 552(4); Gordon, 896 So.2d at 1061. The juvenile court extensively questioned S.A. and advised him of his constitutional rights and the consequences of pleading no contest. S.A. stated he understood and was willingly waiving those rights by pleading no contest. Accordingly, S.A.’s response was not constitutionally infirm, and the plea colloquy was not defective.

RESTITUTION ORDER

In the two remaining assignments of error, S.A. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution in this case and that the amount of restitution is excessive because he is a student and is indigent. S.A. further contends that his written opposition to restitution and arguments during the restitution hearing preserved the issue for appeal where a contemporaneous objection is not required for the denial of a written motion or opposition.⁷

On January 13, 2025, prior to the disposition hearing, S.A. filed an “Opposition to Restitution” alleging the “evidence show[ed] that the alleged victim was the one who started the fight and, therefore, should not be entitled to restitution.” On the morning of the disposition hearing, February 25, 2025, S.A. filed a “Memorandum Opposition to Reimbursement.”⁸ The State requested a continuance contending that it had just received the memorandum the previous afternoon. The juvenile court denied the continuance and advised the parties that it was “not considering” the opposition to an award of restitution. The juvenile court then proceeded with the disposition hearing, where it committed S.A. to OJJ for six months, suspended the commitment, and placed S.A. on active supervised probation for one year. As a special condition of probation, the OJJ officer testified that restitution was “up to” the court.⁹ The juvenile court then reset the matter for another hearing on the issue of restitution.

At the restitution hearing on April 22, 2025, the State and S.A. stipulated that if the victim and/or his mother were called to testify, they would testify that the only remaining unpaid medical bill was to Acadian Ambulance in the amount of $3,714.28. This bill was for treatment rendered to the victim on the date of the offense, October 11, 2023. S.A. argued against restitution, claiming that the victim started the fight by spitting in someone's face, that the victim then bit S.A. in the face, and that S.A. responded in self-defense. As proof of that allegation, S.A. offered a partial video of the fight. S.A. further argued he would not be able to pay restitution since he is an unemployed teenager. In response, the State noted the victim was attacked by two individuals, which resulted in serious injuries, a metal plate in his face, and a subsequent bill to Acadian Ambulance.

After considering all of the evidence, the juvenile court found restitution appropriate and ordered S.A. to pay the amount of the outstanding medical bill, i.e., $3,714.28. In its ruling, the juvenile court noted S.A. was removed from the fight but ultimately “reengaged ․ and pounded” the victim multiple times. S.A. did not file a second objection to the award of restitution, a motion to modify the disposition, or a contemporaneous objection at the hearing.

A motion to modify the judgment of disposition pursuant to Louisiana Children's Code article 909 is analogous to a motion to reconsider sentence filed by an adult defendant ¹⁰ See La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1; State in Interest of A.N., 2018-01571 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 969, 975; State v. J.R.S.C., 2000-2108 (La. 6/1/01), 788 So.2d 424, 424-25 (per curiam) (noting the sole difference between the two respective motions “is that the juvenile may file his motion to modify the judgment of disposition at any time while the disposition is in force, whereas an adult offender's motion to reconsider sentence must be filed within 30 days of original sentencing unless the trial court enlarges that time period”). In adult criminal cases, objections to a sentence or a motion to reconsider sentence filed before the sentence is imposed is generally premature.¹¹ See State v. Cook, 2011-2336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12), 2012 WL 2061518, *2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2012-1463 (La. 1/11/13), 106 So.3d 548.

While a failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence generally precludes a defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal, see La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(E), the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor[,]” City of Baton Rouge v. Schmieder, 582 So.2d 1266, 1270 (La. 1991) (quoting State v. Vanderpool, 493 So.2d 574, 575 (La. 1986)); see also State v. Sims, 2019-1602 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/2/20), 312 So.3d 616, 620 (noting that although the State did not state a contemporaneous objection, it “made it known” that it believed the motion at issue should be denied).¹²

On review, we are reminded that the provisions of the Children's Code “shall be liberally construed to the end that each child and parent coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall be accorded due process and that each child shall receive ․ the care, guidance, and control that will be conducive to his welfare.” In addition, the Children's Code provisions “shall be construed to ․ secure simplicity in procedure [and] fairness in adjudication and administration.” La. Ch.C. art. 102; J.R.S.C., 788 So.2d at 424. A juvenile court can consider a motion for modification of disposition at any time while the disposition is still in force. See La. Ch.C. art. 909; State in Interest of D.D., 2024-0651 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/18/24), 2024 WL 4523901, *1 (unpublished). Moreover, the Children's Code favors review of dispositions. See State ex rel. N.H., 2008-2464 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/09), 11 So.3d 27, 30.

In the instant matter, we liken S.A.’s opposition to restitution to a motion for modification of disposition. Considering the underlying circumstances, we find that S.A.’s objections to the award of restitution set forth in his opposition, memorandum in support thereof, and oral objections presented at the restitution hearing adequately preserved this issue for appeal. The arguments were raised by S.A. below and thus are not raised for the first time in this appeal. See Sims, 312 So.3d at 620.

Validity of the Restitution Order

We now turn to S.A.’s contention that juvenile court manifestly erred in awarding restitution. Louisiana Children's Code article 899(B)(2)(c) provides that after adjudication of a misdemeanor-grade delinquent act, the court may, as a condition of probation, impose a requirement that the child make reasonable restitution to any victim for any personal or property damage caused by the child in the commission of the delinquent act. It is within the juvenile court's vast discretion to impose restitution as a condition of probation. See State in Interest of N.J., 2020-0056 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/24/20), 312 So.3d 295, 298, writ denied, 2021-00479 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 322.

S.A. contends on appeal that given the “paucity of the evidence” before the juvenile court, it was “powerless to determine who was the first aggressor”; and thus, it abused its discretion in ordering restitution as a condition of S.A.’s probation. S.A. contends that the evidence presented supports his version of the events, i.e., that the “victim” spat in another child's face, then bit S.A. when he came to his friend's aid, elevating the altercation into violent “fisticuffs.” S.A. argues that the victim was the one who started the fight and never retreated.

In awarding restitution, the juvenile court found that based on the school records and video surveillance of the altercation, S.A. “was actually removed from the fight, then he reengaged the fight and pounded – not punch[ed] one time but pounded” the victim while another child was still trying to attack the victim. The juvenile court further found that S.A. “took a very, very aggressive position and hit this person multiple times and that he was already removed from the fight and then he reengaged the fight[.]” Based on its findings, the juvenile court determined that an award of restitution was appropriate.

After a thorough review of the evidence, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering S.A. to pay restitution for expenses incurred as a condition of his probation. See State in Interest of L.J.G., 2021 WL 824454 at *3-4. We are not convinced that the juvenile court failed to consider the victim's role in the fight or the claim of self-defense.

Reasonableness of the Restitution Order

Finally, S.A. contends on appeal that the amount of the award of restitution, $3,714.28, was unreasonable and constitutionally excessive considering that (1) he had no funds to fulfill the obligation; (2) he was a fifteen-year-old student at the time of the hearing; and (3) and his skill set allowed him to earn minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. S.A. argues that in order to complete the payment in the remaining ten months of his probation, he would be required to work 512 hours when he was only permitted by law to work three hours per day or eighteen hours per week while school was in session, making completion of the restitution unrealistic and unreasonable. See La. R.S. 23:214(A).

Louisiana Children's Code article 899(B)(2)(c) requires that the amount of restitution be “reasonable.” The reasonableness of the restitution must be calculated in light of the juvenile's ability to pay. State in Interest of B.A., 2012-659 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/19/12), 104 So.3d 833, 836. In a juvenile matter, the reasonableness of the amount of restitution is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Int. of N.J., 312 So.3d at 298.

We find no evidence in the record that would suggest the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding restitution in the amount of $3,714.28. At both the disposition hearing and the restitution hearing, counsel for S.A. argued that restitution should not be awarded at all based on S.A.’s theory of self-defense, which the juvenile court and this court found to be meritless. Counsel for S.A. also argued that S.A. does not have the ability to pay restitution if restitution was to in fact be ordered. Counsel for S.A. stated, “To order [S.A.] ․ to make restitution means he's going to probably fail because he doesn't have the ability to earn the money to pay it․ [F]or $3,000, to pay it in four months, that's a lot of money, which I don't think he can afford to pay.” Nevertheless, the juvenile court chose to impose restitution in the amount of $3,714.28, the total outstanding balance of the victim's ambulance bill and the only remaining unpaid medical bill.

The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. Brumfield v. Village of Tangipahoa, 2021-0082 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/21), 340 So.3d 221, 227. Generally, an abuse of discretion results from a conclusion reached capriciously or in an arbitrary manner. Quality Environmental Processes, Inc. v. IP Petroleum Company, Inc., 2016-0230 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 219 So.3d 349, 375, writ denied, 2017-00915 (La. 10/9/17), 227 So.3d 833. The word “arbitrary” implies a disregard of evidence or of the proper weight thereof. A conclusion is “capricious” when there is no substantial evidence to support it or the conclusion is contrary to substantiated competent evidence. Quality Env't Processes, 219 So.3d at 375. We cannot say the juvenile court's restitution order is arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, we find affirm the juvenile court's restitution order.¹³

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the adjudication, disposition, and restitution order are affirmed.

ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; DISPOSITION AFFIRMED; RESTITUTION ORDER AFFIRMED.

Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that restitution is a reasonable form of rehabilitation. State in the Interest of D.B., 2013-1364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/14), 137 So.3d 1282, 1288. Further, the public interest as well as the interest of the child is served by teaching him that he will be held morally and financially responsible for his acts. See State in the Interest of D.M.G., 90-1080 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/91), 579 So.2d 525, 528. As pointed out by the State, the condition of probation requiring a juvenile to make restitution establishes an obligation of effort rather than support. Specifically, a juvenile's probation may be revoked only if the court, after a hearing, concludes that the juvenile has not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070, 76 LEd. 2d 221 (1983); see also State ex rel Harrison v. Jeane, 91-2444 (La. 4/23/93), 617 So.2d 482. Accordingly, I concur as to the restitution and otherwise agree.

Although I would affirm the adjudication and disposition, to the extent that the majority affirms the amount of the award of restitution, I dissent.

I acknowledge that requiring a juvenile to account for a portion of the reasonable and direct consequences of his crime is an acceptable form of rehabilitation. See State in Interest of L.J.G., 2021 WL 824454 at *3. However, while Louisiana Children's Code article 899(B)(2)(c) allows the court to impose restitution as “deemed in the best interests of the child and the public,” it specifically requires that the amount of restitution be “reasonable.” The reasonableness of the restitution must be calculated in light of the juvenile's ability to pay. State in Interest of B.A., 2012-659 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 12/19/12), 104 So. 3d 833, 836.

The record reveals that S.A. was fourteen years of age in October of 2023 at the time of the offense, was in the 8th grade, and was enrolled in special education classes in school. By the time of the restitution hearing, S.A. was fifteen years of age and, as pointed out by S.A.’s counsel, he had four months of his probation remaining to pay restitution in the amount of $3,714.28. Thus, in four months, S.A. would have to find gainful employment that would allow him to earn sufficient funds to satisfy the restitution award, while at the same time pursuing his education, which restricted his ability to work to three hours per day or 18 hours per week. See La. R.S. 23:214(A). The record does not establish what resources were otherwise available to the juvenile.

In ordering S.A. to pay the amount of $3,714.28 in restitution, the juvenile court did not examine S.A.’s ability to pay or available resources. In the absence of such a determination I am unable to determine whether this award is “reasonable.” See La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c); State in Interest of B.A., 104 So. 3d at 836.¹ Accordingly, I would vacate the award of restitution and remand this matter to the juvenile court with instructions to examine S.A.’s ability to pay and available resources and to set a reasonable amount of restitution in accord with La. Ch.C. art. 899(B)(2)(c).²

I agree with the majority's decision to affirm S.A.’s adjudication and disposition. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's decision to affirm the amount of the restitution. For reasons set forth below, I would vacate the award of restitution and remand this matter to the juvenile court to address why S.A. was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3,714.28, the entire amount due to Acadian Ambulance Service, when the record on appeal shows that S.A. and another juvenile B.L. both engaged in a fight with the victim, Z.P., which resulted in Z.P. being gravely injured.

Louisiana Children's Code article 899(B)(2)(c) provides that after adjudication of a delinquent act, the court may, as a condition of probation, impose a requirement that the child make reasonable restitution to any victim for any personal or property damage caused by the child in the commission of the delinquent act. (Emphasis added). Requiring a juvenile to account for a portion of the reasonable and direct consequences of his crime is an acceptable form of rehabilitation. State in Interest of L.J.G., 2020-0927 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/4/21), 2021 WL 824454 at *3. (Emphasis added). It is within the juvenile court's discretion to choose an appropriate amount of restitution. State in Interest of N.J., 2020-0056 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/24/20), 312 So.3d 295, 298.

Under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, where two juveniles were involved in fisticuffs with the victim, Z.P., I find that the amount of restitution S.A. was ordered to pay is not reasonable restitution as required under La. Ch. Code art. 899(B)(2)(c). The record on appeal reflects that counsel for the State indicated, “the State offers a stipulation that if․ [Z.P.’s] mother [was] called to testify, she would testify that the only remaining balance unpaid is the amount due to Acadian Ambulance Service of $3,714.28 for the date of service․” Counsel for the juvenile responded, “No objection, Your Honor. I would stipulate that if called, that would be the amount that's currently owed.” Neither S.A. nor his counsel stipulated that S.A. alone was responsible for the entire amount due to Acadian Ambulance Services. Instead, counsel for S.A. stipulated that if called, Z.P.’s mother would testify that the amount due to Acadian Ambulance Services was $3,714.28.

Notably, the record on appeal is silent as to whether B.L., the other juvenile involved in the altercation, was cast with any costs resulting from Z.P.’s injuries. Therefore, under these circumstances, I find the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering S.A. to pay restitution in the amount of $3,714.28.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the interest of protecting the identity of the juveniles involved in this matter, we refer to the juveniles only by their initials. See La. Ch.C. art. 412; La. R.S. 46:1844(W); Uniform Rules, Courts of Appeal, Rule 5-2.

2.   In matters of juvenile delinquency, the law speaks in terms of dispositions, not sentences. See La. Ch.C. art. 892, et seq.

3.   Louisiana Children's Code article 856 provides that the child may answer the petition by entering a response of nolo contendere. If, in its discretion, the court accepts such response, the court shall further inquire to determine whether there is a factual basis for adjudication, and it may then adjudicate the child delinquent. La. Ch.C. art. 856(A)(4).

4.   Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

5.   The plea form is titled, “WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ADMISSION (PLEA OF GUILTY) AND NOTIFICATION OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TIME DELAYS[.]” The individual entering the plea must initial next to the statements, indicating their understanding of their constitutional rights. Several questions mention admitting to the allegations of the petition.

6.   In the absence of specific procedures governing and regulating delinquency proceedings in the Louisiana Children's Code, the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction shall proceed in accordance with the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. See La. Ch.C. art. 803; State in Interest of D.D., 2023-0754 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/26/24), 383 So.3d 1000, 1004 n.3, aff'd, 2024-00254 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 319.

7.   The State on appeal agrees with S.A. that the issues were preserved for review based on S.A.’s written opposition. However, it argues S.A.’s claim lacks merit because his objection to the amount of restitution is premature and speculative.

8.   Therein, S.A. reiterated the claim in his opposition that the victim was not entitled to restitution because S.A. acted in self-defense. He further argued that, should the juvenile court order restitution, “the amount should be limited to the pecuniary loss of the victim and that which the child is able to pay.”

9.   During the hearing, a probation and parole officer with OJJ presented a predisposition report along with the agency's recommendations for disposition, including conditions of probation. One of the special conditions of probation recommended included restitution. The juvenile court subsequently adopted the recommendations of OJJ and made them an order of the court. S.A. and his parent signed the conditions of probation on February 25, 2025.

10.   Louisiana Children's Code article 909, entitled “Modification authority; in general[,]” provides as follows:Except as provided for in Article 897.1, after the entry of any order of disposition, the court retains the power to modify it, including changing the child's legal custody, suspending all or part of any order of commitment, discharging conditions of probation, or adding any further condition authorized by Article 897(B) or 899(B). It may also terminate an order of disposition at any time while it is still in force.

11.   Our Supreme Court recently recognized the differences between the “non-criminal” nature of juvenile proceedings and purely criminal proceedings for adults, which includes the great disparity between juvenile dispositions and adult sentences, the juvenile court's flexibility in the adjudication and disposition, and the juvenile system's focus on rehabilitation and individual treatment rather than punishment. See State in Interest of D.D., 2024-00254 (La. 6/27/25), 413 So.3d 319, 330.

12.   In Schmieder, the Supreme Court found that, in the interest of fairness, the trial court can exercise its discretion in excusing the failure to file a written motion to quash and that the oral motion preserved the right to appeal. See Schmieder, 582 So.2d at 1272; Sims, 312 So.3d at 620 n.2.

13.   We note that probation may not be revoked for inability to pay. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070, 76 L.Ed. 2d 221 (1983).

1.   Cf. State in Interest of N.J., 312 So. 3d at 298 (restitution of $3,229.15 was not an unreasonable amount to place on an eighteen-year-old defendant); State in Interest of B.A., 104 So. 3d at 836 (restitution award of $5,805.00 was excessive); State in Interest of L.J.G., 2021 WL 824454 at *4 ($5,13 8.13 in restitution was not an unreasonable burden to place on seventeen-year-old juvenile defendant).

2.   I am not aware whether S.A. remains on probation and if any amounts were tendered towards the initial award of restitution.

EDWARDS, J.

McClendon, C.J. agrees in part and concurs in part for reasons assigned Miller, J. dissenting in part with reasons. Fields, J. dissenting in part with reasons.