STEPHEN LENSING v. LOUISIANA REHABILITATION SERVICES THE LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION AND SUSANA SCHOWEN IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE LOUISIANA WORKFORCE COMMISSION (2026)

A state agency seeks review of a district court judgment that reversed the decision of the Assistant Secretary of the Louisiana Workforce Commission, reinstated the decision of an impartial hearing officer, and ordered the state agency to purchase plaintiff/appellee an all-terrain vehicle for use on his farm, in accordance with the federal Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701, et seq. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, Stephen Lensing, is a 63-year-old farmer who operates SKL Farms near Lake Providence, Louisiana. Mr. Lensing sustained a spinal cord injury in 1991 when another driver crashed into his truck, permanently impairing his mobility and rendering him a quadriplegic from the chest down. Despite the challenges presented by his disability, Mr. Lensing has been a farmer for over forty years and he currently farms over 2600 acres. As part of his farming operations, he must traverse muddy or unstable ground to reach plows, wells, and other locations. Mr. Lensing cannot reach some of these locations by using his truck. Further, Mr. Lensing's manual wheelchair cannot traverse this type of ground.

Louisiana Rehabilitative Services (“LRS”) is a state agency that administers Louisiana's vocational rehabilitation services to eligible people with disabilities with the goal of preparing those individuals for gainful employment and sustaining that employment. Mr. Lensing is a consumer/participant in LRS's vocational rehabilitation program. To assist with his farming operations, Mr. Lensing applied to LRS requesting LRS purchase him a 2023 Can-Am side-by-side all-terrain utility vehicle (sometimes hereinafter “ATV”). According to Mr. Lensing, LRS had previously purchased him a side-by-side modified for use with hand controls. Mr. Lensing testified the side-by-side has never been registered or licensed.

LRS referred Mr. Lensing to MKS Consultants, LLC for a worksite evaluation. Michael K. Shipp, a Driver Rehabilitation Specialist for MKS, found that Mr. Lensing “needs to obtain an all-terrain vehicle in order to continue to perform the tasks necessary for farm operations.”¹

Despite Mr. Shipp's recommendation, LRS denied Mr. Lensing's request because it determined the ATV is a “vehicle,” and LRS is prohibited from purchasing “vehicles or real estate” by 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 115(B)(3)(a).

Mr. Lensing sought review of LRS's decision with an impartial hearing officer. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 722(c)(5)(A) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(C). The impartial hearing officer determined the “ATV is not a vehicle” within the meaning in the Administrative Code, noting “a definable difference between a van, truck, or sedan and an off-road vehicle [like an ATV].” The impartial hearing officer found that “[i]t is clear Mr. Lensing needs modification to continue farming and an ATV is an integral part of the assistance required.” The impartial hearing officer further indicated that “[i]f consumer needs are denied because of a strict policy whose definition is incomplete, then that decision becomes arbitrary.” As such, the impartial hearing officer concluded LRS was required to purchase Mr. Lensing the ATV.

LRS appealed the impartial hearing officer's decision to the Assistant Secretary of the Louisiana Workforce Commission. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 722(c)(5)(D) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(D). On review, the Assistant Secretary found “the term ‘all terrain vehicle [ATV]’ must be taken at face value and considered a vehicle.” Because LRS does not purchase vehicles, the Assistant Secretary concluded LRS “cannot supply Mr. Lensing with an ATV,” and overturned the impartial hearing officer's decision.

Mr. Lensing sought judicial review in the district court. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 722(c)(5)(J) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(E). Mr. Lensing named LRS, the Louisiana Workforce Commission, and Susana Schowen, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Louisiana Workforce Commission, as defendants. Mr. Lensing urged that the Assistant Secretary's decision affirming LRS's “refusal to purchase the requested modified side-by-side should be overruled under the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act because the refusal is arbitrary and capricious, is based on an error of law, and is not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence. See La. R.S. 49:978.1(G).” Following a hearing, the district court signed a judgment on May 8, 2025, reversing the Assistant Secretary's decision, reinstating the impartial hearing officer's decision, and ordering LRS to provide the ATV to Mr. Lensing without further delay.

Due to an issue with the May 8, 2025 judgment's decretal language, the district court signed an amended judgment on December 16, 2025 that corrected the prior judgment's deficiencies. Also, on February 12, 2026, the district court issued written reasons for its judgment.

LRS, the Commission, and Ms. Schowen, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Commission, (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred to as “LRS”) have filed the instant appeal. In its assigned errors, LRS asserts: 1) the district court erred in finding the Assistant Secretary must defer to the fact finding of the impartial hearing officer; 2) the district court erred in not basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence standard of review; and 3) the district court erred in not determining that the Assistant Secretary's decision was correct and Mr. Lensing's request for a side-by-side ATV must be denied.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The administrative process begins with review by an impartial hearing officer, and any party aggrieved by the impartial hearing officer's ruling can seek review from the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Workforce Development. 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(C) and (D). The Assistant Secretary “may not overturn or modify a decision of an impartial hearing officer, or part of such a decision, that supports the position of the applicant/client unless the assistant secretary determines, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the decision of the impartial hearing officer is clearly erroneous on the basis of being contrary to the state plan, the Rehabilitation Act (including regulations implementing the Act) or any state regulation or policy that is consistent with the federal requirements specified in the Act.” 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(D)(3).

Following the exhaustion of administrative remedies, suit may be filed in the district court. See Johnson v. State Dept. of Social Services, 2005-1597 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 943 So.2d 374, 378-79, writ denied, 2006-2866 (La. 2/2/07), 948 So.2d 1085. On review of the administrative decision under the standards set forth in 29 U.S.C.A. § 722(c)(5)(J)(ii) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(E), the district court should determine whether the agency's decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, giving “due weight” to the conclusion reached in the State's due process hearing. Johnson, 943 So.2d at 379. This “rather unusual statutory standard” is more deferential than de novo review, and requires the district court to refrain from substitution of its own notions of sound policy for those of the state authorities. Id., citing Reaves v. Missouri Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 422 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2005).

If no additional evidence is introduced during the course of the district court proceedings, as is the case here, the standard of appellate review in this court is de novo. See Johnson, 943 So.2d at 379-80, and Reaves, 422 F.3d at 681.

LAW

The federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq., as amended, authorizes funding to states to provide services to persons with disabilities so that they may obtain and sustain employment. The Rehabilitation Act expressly provides that its purpose is “to empower individuals with disabilities to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, independence, and inclusion and integration into society, through [,among other things,] statewide workforce development systems ․ [and] programs of vocational rehabilitation[.]” See 29 U.S.C.A. § 701(b)(1)(A). Through the Rehabilitation Act, federal grants are used to assist states in funding vocational rehabilitation services for people with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 702(a)-(b), 723(a). Although state participation in the program is voluntary, a participating state must fully comply with the federal guidelines and regulations governing the Rehabilitation Act. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1537, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981).

Louisiana participates in the federal program and agreed to “observe and comply with all requirements of [the federal] act.” LSA-R.S. 23:3001. Louisiana's program is administered by LRS. 67 LAC Pt. VII, §§ 101, 103.

The Rehabilitation Act requires the state to develop individualized written rehabilitation programs in consultation with each handicapped person,² and to “set forth the terms and conditions, as well as the rights and remedies” for the provision of services to each participant. Schornstein v. New Jersey Division of Vocational Rehabilitation Services, 519 F.Supp. 773, 778 (D.N.J. 1981), affirmed by, 668 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1982).

LRS is required to provide certain vocational rehabilitation services to its participants. Vocational rehabilitation services “are any services described in an individualized plan for employment necessary to assist an individual with a disability in preparing for, securing, retaining, or regaining an employment outcome that is consistent with the strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed choice of the individual[.]” 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a). The vocational rehabilitation services LRS is required to offer pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a) include, among other things, “occupational licenses, tools, equipment, and initial stocks and supplies” and “rehabilitation technology, including telecommunications, sensory, and other technological aids and devices[.]” See 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a)(12) and (14) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 117(A)(12) and (14). LRS is also required to offer transportation services pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a)(8), 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 117(A)(8). Transportation means travel and related expenses that are necessary to enable an applicant or eligible individual to participate in a vocational rehabilitation service, including expenses for training in the use of public transportation vehicles and systems. 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(c)(56).

LRS regulations, however, expressly exclude the purchase of “vehicles or real estate.” See 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 115(B)(3)(a). Based on the foregoing regulation, LRS denied Mr. Lensing's request that it purchase him the ATV. Herein, the parties dispute whether LRS's decision violates the Rehabilitation Act.

DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that Mr. Lensing qualifies for and receives vocational rehabilitation services.³ Moreover, LRS obtained an assessment from Mr. Shipp, who recommended that LRS, through its “job accommodation program,” purchase Mr. Lensing “an all-terrain vehicle with appropriate modifications for vehicle access, wheelchair transport and driving controls he needs for access to his property and to perform his job tasks.” However, as noted above, LRS denied the request because its regulations prohibit it from purchasing “vehicles or real estate.” Of note, “vehicle” is not defined in the applicable state regulations governing LRS nor in any LRS publication.

On appeal, LRS contends that the term “vehicle” is not ambiguous and LRS and the Assistant Secretary properly determined that an all-terrain utility vehicle is a vehicle, as implied in its name. LRS maintains that this is further illustrated by LSA-R.S. 32:299.3(A)(1), which defines a “utility terrain vehicle” and authorizes same to be driven over certain designated roads to mean “any recreational motor vehicle designed for and capable of travel over designated roads, with a minimum width of fifty inches but not exceeding seventy-four inches and a minimum weight of at least seven hundred pounds but not exceeding three thousand five hundred pounds.” LRS maintains that the ATV sought by Mr. Lensing herein is specifically designed for and capable of travel over certain designated roadways. Accordingly, LRS maintains that the ATV is a “vehicle” that it is prohibited from purchasing.

LRS also contends the district court erred when it failed to determine the administrative record supported the Assistant Secretary's reversal of the impartial hearing officer's decision. Pertinently, LRS notes that both federal and state regulations provide the Assistant Secretary with authority to reverse the findings of the impartial hearing officer if the impartial hearing officer's ruling would violate a state regulation. Because the regulation precludes LRS from purchasing a “vehicle,” LRS maintains that the impartial hearing officer's decision, if implemented, would require LRS to violate its own regulation. Accordingly, LRS asserts the district court should have affirmed the Assistant Secretary's ruling.

In opposition, Mr. Lensing contends that the impartial hearing officer made a proper factual determination that the ATV was not a “vehicle” that LRS was prohibited from purchasing. Specifically, Mr. Lensing avers that the impartial hearing officer examined evidence that: 1) the ATV would not necessitate registration, title, or a license plate; 2) LRS previously purchased Mr. Lensing an off-road side-by-side ATV modified, which LRS does not dispute; 3) Mr. Lensing will use the ATV to address his significant difficulty maneuvering farmland due to his disability; 4) other state regulations and policies define vehicles and motor vehicles in ways that may not include the ATV ⁴ ; and 5) neither the LRS Technical Manual nor any other provision in the LRS regulations define vehicle. As such, Mr. Lensing contends that the Assistant Secretary should not have reversed the impartial hearing officer's decision because it was not clearly erroneous or contrary to the state plan in accordance with 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 107(D)(3).

We note that nothing “gives a participating state discretion to prohibit under all circumstances the provisions of goods or services listed in [29 U.S.C.A.] § 723(a).” See Marshall v. Switzer, 10 F.3d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1993). “Moreover, whatever discretion states may have in providing services is limited by Title I's pervasive policy of tailoring the provision of services to meet the individual needs of each client.” Marshall, 10 F.3d at 929-30; See also Scott v. Parham, 422 F.Supp. 111, 113 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Both the language and legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act make clear that participating states are required to develop programs designed to meet the particular needs of each qualified handicapped person. Schornstein, 519 F.Supp. at 778. In Schornstein, the court held that the agency's blanket policy denying interpreter services to all deaf students “completely contradicts the Act's requirements which ensure individualization of programs for handicapped individuals.” Id. at 779.

We recognize that at least one court has found that a state can categorically exclude vehicle purchases and such is not violative of the Rehabilitation Act where the vehicle is intended to be used for transportation. In Gaynor v. R.I. Dept. of Human Services, 1993 WL 853877 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1993)(unpublished), a plaintiff, who received vocational rehabilitation services, sought judicial review of an administrative decision to financially assist her in purchasing a handicap accessible van. Akin to Louisiana's regulation, Rhode Island's policy prohibited it from purchasing “Vehicles for individual clients[.]” Gaynor, 1993 WL 853877 at *4 (unpublished). The court found that Rhode Island's policy comported with the Rehabilitation Act because “[n]o federal law specifically mandates the purchase of vehicles upon the request of an eligible recipient.” Id. Even so, the Gaynor plaintiff cited Schornstein and urged that the van fell within the definition of “equipment” and “other goods and services,” which plaintiff urged could not be categorically denied and required an individual assessment under Schornstein's rationale. Id. at *5. However, the Gaynor court distinguished Schornstein, noting that the state provided transportation services (as required by 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a)(8)) and merely restricted the purchases of vehicles for private use; by contrast, in Schornstein, “no other comparable services were offered to qualified recipients of benefits in that case.” Gaynor, 1993 WL 853877 at *5. The court found that “as long as an eligible recipient's transportation needs are met, [the state] has not violated the individual's right to receive services.” Id. The court noted that plaintiff therein had even previously “utilized transportation services by DHS to get to employment interviews[.]” Id. Further, the court noted that “[t]ransportation is a supportive service enabling a client to receive the benefits of other [vocational rehabilitation] services.” Id. at *7. See also Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, 683 F.Supp.2d 201, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff'd, 602 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2010)(“[F]ederal regulations make clear that ‘[t]he purchase and repair of vehicles, including vans’ is a transportation service, whereas only vehicle ‘modification would be considered a rehabilitation technology service.’ ” 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(c)(56)(i).) See further Jameson v. Vesid, 2012 WL 1077464 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)(unpublished)(Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities (“VESID”) properly denied purchase of a limousine for an individual's business where “VESID'S ․ Transportation Policy ․ limits VESID funding for vehicle use and prohibits VESID from purchasing or leasing vehicles for the recipient's transportation as part of the vocational rehabilitation services facilitating the recipient's IPE [Individualized Plan for Employment].”)

As noted by the district court in its reasons for judgment, LRS's denial “was based primarily on the terminology contained in the phrase ‘all-terrain vehicle,’ without substantive regulatory analysis.” Similarly, in reversing the impartial hearing officer's recommendation that LRS purchase the ATV, the Assistant Secretary merely found “the term ‘all terrain vehicle [ATV]’ must be taken at face value and considered a vehicle.” Because LRS does not purchase vehicles, the Assistant Secretary concluded LRS “cannot supply Mr. Lensing with an ATV,” and overturned the impartial hearing officer's decision. While an ATV does fall within the broad category of a “vehicle” as implied by its name, the inquiry does not end there. This is especially true here where the ATV was not intended to be used for transportation as envisioned by 29 USCA § 723(a)(8), but rather to assist Mr. Lensing in sustaining employment despite his disability. The district court properly recognized that the Assistant Secretary's “categorical application of the vehicle exclusion, without individual consideration of Mr. Lensing's employment needs, conflicts with federal regulations requiring that vocational rehabilitation services be tailored to the needs identified in the individualized plan for employment.”

For eligible individuals, LRS, as required by 29 U.S.C.A. 721(a)(9), develops an IPE. 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 111(A). If additional data is necessary, LRS is required to “conduct a comprehensive assessment to determine the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed choice, of the eligible individual, including the need for supported employment.” 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 111(B). The IPE must also contain specific information, including “the specific employment goal” and the “specific vocational rehabilitation services ․ needed to achieve the employment goal, including as appropriate, the provision of assistive technology devices and assistive technology services[.]” 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 113(D)(1).

LRS contracted with Mr. Shipp to perform a worksite evaluation for Mr. Lensing. Mr. Shipp indicated that since sustaining an injury in 1991, “Mr. Lensing has continued to perform various work tasks, in some cases with modifications to his farm equipment for access and operation[, including] grab bars, platforms, hand controls, etc.” Mr. Shipp also noted that Mr. Lensing drives a pickup truck using hand controls and an adaptive steering device.

Mr. Shipp indicated that “[d]ue to decreases in functional status and increase in the amount of acreage he is farming, Mr. Lensing is no longer able to safely and efficiently move throughout his work environment and supervising and inspecting the necessary work.” Mr. Shipp noted that: Mr. Lensing is unable to use his manual wheelchair on uneven surfaces, such as his fields and gravel areas. Mr. Shipp then specifically addressed each of the seven items of the checklist provided by LRS in its Technical Assistance Manual (Part 412.06:111; E). Mr. Shipp indicated Mr. Lensing wanted to “[p]erform general work tasks, supervise employees, and travel throughout the farm environment.” Mr. Lensing needed to “transport materials to/from various locations (seed, fertilizers, tools, etc.)[;] inspect installation and performance of irrigation systems, fencing etc.[; and] supervise planting, treating and harvesting of various crops[.]” However, Mr. Shipp noted that Mr. Lensing was: 1) unable to perform safe and efficient transfers to/from a vehicle; 2) unable to walk on uneven ground, such as fields; 3) unable to operate the foot pedals of a vehicle; and 4) unable to transport a manual wheelchair about the property. Mr. Shipp recommended “Mr. Lensing should obtain an all-terrain vehicle with appropriate modifications for vehicle access, wheelchair transport and driving controls he needs for access to his property and to perform his job tasks” and indicated it “should be provided by LR[S] through [its] job accommodation program.”

LRS is required to provide, among other things, “occupational․ tools [and] equipment” and “rehabilitation technology․including․technological aids and devices[.]” See 29 U.S.C.A. § 723(a)(12) and (14) and 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 117(A)(12) and (14). LRS publishes further policy guidance as to the administration of the program through its “Chapter 4 Technical Assistance & Guidance Manual.” The Technical Assistance Manual expressly defines the “rehabilitation technology” LRS may offer to include “assistive technology devices.” See also 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(c)(6) and (45). An “assistive technology device” is defined as “any item, piece of equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially, modified or customized, or fabricated, that is used to increase, maintain, or improve functional capabilities of individuals with disabilities.” See also 29 U.S.C.A. 3002(4). The Technical Assistance Manual then provides that such “assistive technology devices” may include, among other things, “Wheelchairs and Other Seating Systems,” including “powered and/or manual mobility systems.”

The purpose for which Mr. Shipp recommended the ATV was to specifically assist Mr. Lensing in his farming operations where other powered mobility systems were not feasible. LRS has pointed to no other comparable equipment that Mr. Lensing could otherwise utilize to meet these needs. Moreover, Mr. Lensing has been farming for decades and LRS had previously purchased him a similar ATV in the past. Although LRS notes the ATV at issue could be used on designated roadways, we recognize that such use is statutorily-limited, and Mr. Shipp did not recommend the ATV for that purpose. See LSA-R.S. 32:299.3. Further, Mr. Lensing averred the ATV at issue does not necessitate registration, title, or a license plate, which LRS did not rebut. As noted by the district court, under the specific circumstances herein, the ATV “is more analogous to assistive mobility technology than to a traditional motor vehicle intended for public roadway use.” Cf. Gaynor, 1993 WL 853877, Wasser, 683 F.Supp.2d 201, Jameson, 2012 WL 1077464 at *2.

The district court also noted the regulations “must be construed in a manner consistent with the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act, which seeks to maximize employment, economic self-sufficiency, and independence for individuals with disabilities.” See 29 U.S.C.A. § 701(b). The independent hearing officer properly considered the state regulation in connection with the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and Mr. Lensing's specific IPE, whereas the Assistant Secretary merely applied a categorical exclusion without consideration of the IPE as required by the Rehabilitation Act. Considering the LRS regulation in light of the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act and Mr. Lensing's IPE, we find no error in the district court's ruling. LRS's assignments of error are without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's December 16, 2025 judgment. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $5,641.00 are assessed to appellants, Louisiana Rehabilitation Services, the Louisiana Workforce Commission, and Secretary Susana Schowen, solely in her official capacity.

AFFIRMED.

I would reverse the trial court's judgment and reinstate the decision of the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Workforce Development. I find the trial court erred by overturning the decision of the Assistant Secretary and reinstating the Impartial Hearing Officer's (IHO's) decision because the IHO's decision authorizing the purchase of the all-terrain vehicle for Mr. Lensing was contrary to Louisiana's state regulation that prohibits Louisiana Rehabilitation Services from purchasing vehicles. See 67 LA ADC Pt VII, § 115(B)(3)(A). See also 67 ADC Pt VII, § 107(D)(3). I find that the requested all-terrain vehicle is a prohibited vehicle under the regulation.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to LRS, Mr. Shipp is not employed or otherwise affiliated with LRS in any other capacity.

2.   The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992, and the amendment changed “handicapped person” to “individual with a disability.” See H.R. 5482, 102nd Cong. (1992). For ease of reference, we will use the former term when such is used in the cited source.

3.   LRS's regulations provide that a person is eligible for vocational rehabilitation services if the person “has a physical or mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment;” “requires vocational rehabilitation services to prepare for, secure, retain, regain, or advance in employment;” and “can benefit in terms of an employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services.” 67 LAC Pt. VII, § 109(A).

4.   The impartial hearing officer noted that LSA-R.S. 32:781(5) defines “motor vehicle” to mean “any motor-driven vehicle required to be registered[.]” However, the impartial hearing officer indicated that no evidence was presented that required any ATVs to be registered with the state.

McCLENDON, C.J.

Greene, J. dissents and assigns reasons.