STATE OF LOUISIANA v. HAROLD BUTLER JR (2026)

The defendant, Harold A. Butler, Jr., was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape of a juvenile under thirteen (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4); and molestation of a juvenile by use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2.¹ He pled not guilty to the charges and proceeded to trial in February 2024. During the first trial, the defendant's lead attorney was suspended from the practice of law, and the trial court ordered his co-counsel to represent the defendant during the remainder of trial.² This court granted the defendant's writ application, reversed the trial court's ruling, and ordered a mistrial. State v. Butler, 2024-0109 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/8/24), 2024 WL 493258 (unpublished).

Following a second jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for new trial and sentenced him to consecutive terms of life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count one and twenty years at hard labor on count two. The defendant now appeals, alleging the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions, because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his guilty verdicts and (2) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS

In 2017, sixteen-year-old T.M.³ disclosed to her boyfriend that her grandmother's husband, the defendant, had raped her. T.M.’s boyfriend informed T.M.’s mother, G.M., about the allegation, and G.M. then reported the matter to the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (“JPSO”). An investigation by the JPSO revealed some of the sexual misconduct occurred while the family was residing in St. Tammany Parish, and the JPSO made a referral to the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office. Shortly after T.M. made her disclosure, other members of the defendant's family came forward with allegations against him. S.M., the defendant's youngest stepdaughter, reported the defendant had raped her numerous times when she was a teenager attending Fontainebleau High School in Mandeville. The defendant's wife notified him of T.M.’s allegations, and he immediately fled Louisiana. The defendant was subsequently arrested in Texas by the U.S. Marshals and extradited back to Louisiana to face trial in St. Tammany Parish. He was convicted of aggravated rape of T.M. and molesting S.M. when she was a juvenile.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

In his first assignment of error, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts.⁴

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460; see also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B). When the issues on appeal relate to both the sufficiency of the evidence and one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the entirety of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). When addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, consideration must be given to the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence which was erroneously admitted, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Id.

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Figueroa, 2024-0739 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/23/25), 417 So.3d 795, 799-800, writ denied, 2025-00809 (La. 12/9/25), 422 So.3d 301. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984).

On count one, the defendant was charged with committing aggravated rape of T.M. between January 25, 2013, and January 24, 2014. At the time of the commission of the offense, aggravated rape was defined as a rape committed where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because the victim is under the age of thirteen years. See La. R.S. 14:42. Lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense. Id. Emission is not necessary, and any sexual penetration, when the rape involves vaginal or anal intercourse, however slight, is sufficient. See La. R.S. 14:41(B).

On count two, the defendant was charged with committing molestation of a juvenile upon S.M. between March 12, 2008, and March 11, 2009. At the time of the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 14:81.2(A) defined molestation of a juvenile as:

the commission by anyone over the age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons, with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person, by the use of force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation, threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. Lack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense.

It is well-settled that, if found to be credible, the testimony of the victim of a sex offense alone is sufficient to establish the elements of the offense, even where the State does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Lilly, 2012-0008 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 111 So.3d 45, 62, writ denied, 2012-2277 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 386. Likewise, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Lilly, 111 So.3d at 61. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a factfinder's determination of guilt. Figueroa, 417 So.3d at 799.

At trial, L.M., the defendant's wife, testified the defendant was twenty-one years old when they married and moved in together in 1993, and she had six children by then. Four of her daughters lived in the house she shared with the defendant.⁵ Those were G.M., La.M., Gr.M., and S.M., in order of oldest to youngest. L.M. said the defendant was verbally abusive during their relationship, frequently cursing and threatening her. When the family was living in Jefferson Parish, L.M. worked a full-time catering job at the airport, and her shift typically lasted from 4:00 a.m. to 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. L.M. testified her children were left in the control and supervision of the defendant while she was working. According to L.M., G.M. and La.M. ran away to their aunt's house when G.M. was fourteen years old. L.M. said her daughters did not want to return home and told her they hated the defendant, but she brought them back home. L.M. testified La.M. later told her about things the defendant had been doing to her. G.M. also disclosed to her mother that the defendant had been abusing her but the defendant denied any wrongdoing. L.M. described the defendant's demeanor as “very nervous,” and he raised his voice during the conversation. L.M. testified she did not believe her daughters’ claims at the time because she and the defendant were sexually active and he had helped raise her children since they were little. When La.M. was a teenager, she got pregnant and L.M. took her to get an abortion. L.M. said she eventually learned the defendant was the father of the baby.

After Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, the family relocated to Houston for a time. There, L.M. found the defendant in her thirteen-year-old daughter's bedroom, which she testified concerned her. She observed S.M. sitting on her bed while the defendant was standing close to her. When L.M. yelled, S.M. profusely apologized and the defendant said nothing had happened. Again, however, L.M. did not report the conduct to law enforcement, nor did she kick the defendant out of the house. The family moved to Hammond for about a year before settling down in St. Tammany Parish for ten years. While in St. Tammany Parish, L.M. worked full-time at McDonald's, and the defendant was the only adult in the house while she was working. Years later, L.M., her children, her grandchildren, and the defendant moved back to Jefferson Parish. L.M. testified one day she walked outside her house and saw G.M., her granddaughter T.M., and a woman talking. When she asked G.M. who the woman was later that day, G.M. said the woman was from the “child protection” services and informed L.M. that the defendant had been molesting and raping T.M. L.M. said she called the defendant while he was at work and told him about the investigation. According to L.M., the defendant did not return home after work and moved to Texas. L.M. testified the defendant later came back to get her and she went with him to Texas.

On cross-examination, L.M. admitted she had never seen the defendant sexually or physically abuse her children. L.M. testified G.M. did not tell her anything was happening to her, though she had the opportunity to do so without the defendant knowing. On redirect examination, L.M. testified the defendant did not want her daughters to date at all, and though she wanted the girls to become more independent, the defendant wanted them to stay in his house.

G.M., who was forty years old at the time of trial, testified she was eight years old when her mother began dating the defendant. G.M. said the defendant moved into their house in Jefferson Parish when S.M., her youngest sibling, was a few months old. She recalled that when her mother left for work, she and her siblings were usually sleeping and the only adult in the house was the defendant. When G.M. was about twelve years old, the defendant began abusing her while her mother was at work. According to G.M., the defendant got into her bed and touched her breasts and buttocks over her clothes, and his actions escalated to him vaginally raping her. G.M. testified the defendant often threatened her, and she was scared of him. G.M. said she and La.M. ran away when she was about fourteen years old, and she told her aunt about the sexual abuse. G.M. later told her mother that the defendant had been raping her after her mother brought them home. G.M. testified her mother stayed with the defendant after her disclosure, and she did not tell anyone else about the sexual abuse because her mother did not protect her. G.M. said the defendant did not continue to sexually abuse her after her disclosure to her mother, and she thought he stopped altogether.

G.M. had her first child, T.M., when she was sixteen years old. When the family moved to St. Tammany Parish, G.M. and her three children lived in the same house as her mother, the defendant, Gr.M. and her daughter, and S.M. G.M. testified other family members lived in the house for short periods. They later moved back to Jefferson Parish. G.M. said T.M.’s boyfriend texted her one day and said the defendant had been abusing her. When she asked T.M. about it, T.M. said it was true. G.M. brought T.M. to the nearest police station to report the sexual abuse and an investigation by the JPSO ensued. The defendant left and did not return to the house and her mother left about a week later.

La.M., who was thirty-six at the time of trial, testified the defendant began inappropriately touching her when she was five or six years old. As she got older, the abuse progressed with the defendant making her perform oral sexual intercourse on him. La.M. said he vaginally raped her when she was eleven years old, and the rapes occurred regularly until she was sixteen. When she was fourteen years old, La.M. got pregnant with the defendant's child and had an abortion with her mother's permission. La.M. testified she did not disclose the abuse to anyone other than her mother and her aunt because she was scared of the defendant.

Deon Spain, L.M.’s sister, confirmed that G.M. and La.M. had run away to her house in 1995. Spain said both girls disclosed to her that the defendant had been raping them, and she called the police. The police came to her house but G.M. and La.M. did not speak to the officers. Spain testified L.M. and the defendant were at her house when the police were there.

S.M., who was thirty-one years old at the time of trial, testified the defendant was her former stepfather whom she had known all her life.⁶ S.M. claimed the defendant started inappropriately touching her when she was in the fifth grade. The inappropriate touching slowly progressed to sexual intercourse. According to S.M., the defendant would come into the room she shared with Gr.M. early in the morning before school and would bring her into his bedroom so he could have vaginal and oral sexual intercourse with her. S.M. said the defendant would have sexual intercourse with her regardless of whether others were in the house. She claimed the sexual abuse occurred regularly for years, including the period in which the family lived in St. Tammany Parish. S.M. testified she did not disclose the abuse until T.M. came forward with her allegations.

Twenty-three-year-old T.M. testified the defendant was married to her grandmother and she called him “Grandpa.”⁷ T.M. recalled an instance when she was home alone cleaning and the defendant instructed her to sit on the couch. T.M. testified the defendant pulled down her shorts, turned her on her stomach, and vaginally penetrated her. This occurred in early 2013 when she was twelve years old. She claimed the defendant would frequently bring her in his bedroom and rape her. The defendant tried to force T.M. to perform oral sex on him and to anally penetrate T.M. but was unsuccessful because she “moved too much.” T.M. testified she saw the defendant call S.M. into his bedroom like he frequently did to her, and she “figured” he was also sexually abusing S.M. T.M. did not disclose the sexual abuse until she told her then-boyfriend while living in Jefferson Parish.

Dr. Neha Mehta, the medical director of the Audrey Hepburn CARE Center at Children's Hospital, was accepted as an expert in child abuse pediatrics. Dr. Mehta testified T.M. visited the CARE Center on October 19, 2017, and she provided a clear and detailed history of sexual abuse. Dr. Mehta testified there were no physical findings or injuries on T.M.’s body to confirm she had been raped, but she said that was not uncommon.

After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defendant testified in his own defense. He said he married twenty-seven-year-old L.M. when he was twenty years old and, by then, she had six children. He denied raping any of L.M.’s children or grandchildren. The defendant claimed he had only recently learned that La.M. had an abortion as a teenager and said no one had previously alleged he was the father. The defendant also denied fleeing to Texas to avoid apprehension by the police. Instead, he testified that he and L.M. decided to relocate to Texas for him to find a better paying job. The defendant testified he “had no idea” anyone was looking for him until he was extradited back to Louisiana in January 2018.

On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain either conviction because there was no medical or physical evidence to corroborate the allegations. He contends that aside from T.M. and S.M.’s testimony, the evidence was “unclear” as to whether he had sexual intercourse with either of them. The defendant alleges his stepdaughters “conspired to bring these allegations against him simply to portray him as a pedophile.” We disagree.

We find the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant raped T.M. when she was under the age of thirteen. See La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4). T.M. testified about the time the defendant raped her in early 2013 when she was twelve years old. She recalled, in detail, how the defendant pulled down her shorts, turned her on her stomach, and vaginally penetrated her in the living room. T.M. said on other occasions, the defendant brought her in his bedroom and raped her. The testimonial evidence clearly established the defendant vaginally raped T.M. As noted above, the victim's testimony alone is sufficient to establish the elements of a sexual offense, if found to be credible. Lilly, 111 So.3d at 62. T.M. made independent, consistent, and detailed statements regarding the defendant's acts of sexual misconduct, which the jury found credible. In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.

We also find the evidence was sufficient to find the defendant molested S.M. when she was a juvenile. See La. R.S. 14:81.2(A). As applied in this case, the essential elements of the crime of molestation of a juvenile are: (1) the defendant was over the age of seventeen; (2) the defendant committed a lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of a child under the age of seventeen; (3) the defendant was more than two years older than the victim; (4) the defendant had the specific intent to arouse or gratify either the victim's sexual desires or his own sexual desires; and (5) the defendant committed the lewd or lascivious act by use of influence by virtue of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. See State v. Terry, 47,425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 11/21/12), 108 So.3d 126, 142, writ denied, 2012-2759 (La. 6/28/13), 118 So.3d 1096. S.M. testified the defendant, her stepfather, started inappropriately touching her when she was in the fifth grade, and he raped her shortly thereafter. S.M. detailed how the defendant frequently came into the room early in the morning before school and brought her into his bedroom so he could have vaginal and oral sexual intercourse with her. Such sexual abuse occurred repeatedly for years. S.M.’s testimony alone established all of the elements of molestation of a juvenile.

Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant fled after learning of the investigation in order to avoid apprehension. The evidence showed the defendant did not return home following T.M.’s disclosure, and he left the state until he was apprehended in Texas. Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate consciousness of guilt and, therefore, are circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. State v. Earl, 2015-1383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/6/16), 2016 WL 3146011, *8 (unpublished), writ denied, 2016-1329 (La. 12/5/16), 213 So.3d 393.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of aggravated rape of a victim under the age of thirteen and molestation of a juvenile. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court “violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial when it denied defense counsel the right to cross-examine a State's witness, prevented counsel from impeaching the testimony of a witness and it questioned counsel's competence in open court.” Thus, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. We will address each argument in turn.

First, the defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to allow him to recross examine G.M. after “she responded to a question that she did not fully explain during her direct or cross examination.”

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 611 provides, in pertinent part:

D. Scope of redirect examination; recross examination. A witness who has been cross-examined is subject to redirect examination as to matters covered on cross-examination and, in the discretion of the court, as to other matters in the case. When the court has allowed a party to bring out new matter on redirect, the other parties shall be provided an opportunity to recross on such matters.

Permitting recross examination of a witness is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice, the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. When no new issues are raised on redirect examination, recross examination is not proper. See State v. Maize, 94-0736 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 500, 513, writ denied, 95-1894 (La. 12/15/95), 664 So.2d 451.

During redirect examination, the State asked Gr.M. the following:

Q. [Defense counsel] asked you multiple times, are you aware that the defendant pled not guilty.

A. No. I didn't know he pled not guilty.

Q. But initially you asked why?

A. Yes. Why would he plead not guilty?

Q. Why was that your response to her question?

A. Because I know he done [sic] it to my sisters, for a fact, a hundred percent.

Q. Even though he didn't do it to you?

A. Yes.

Defense counsel asked to recross examine Gr.M. on the basis that the State raised a different issue. The trial court disagreed with defense counsel's claim. The defendant's arguments on this issue fail for two reasons. First, the redirect questions did not involve new matters but were only a clarification of previous testimony. Gr.M. was asked if she was aware the defendant pled not guilty to the charges by defense counsel on cross-examination. The redirect questions by the State were only clarifying that fact. Thus, we find there were no new matters covered on redirect that would have entitled the defendant to recross examination. Furthermore, the defendant has failed to allege or show any prejudice suffered as a result of his being denied the right to recross examine Gr.M.

Next, the defendant claims in his assignment of error that the trial court “prevented counsel from impeaching the testimony of a witness[.]”. However, the defendant has failed to fully develop or support his argument, include citations or references to the record, or cite any legal authority regarding his claim. All assignments of error and issues for review shall be briefed. A mere statement of an assigned error in brief without argument or citation of authority does not constitute briefing. State v. Jarvis, 2021-1181 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/25/22), 340 So.3d 1137, 1142. This court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error that has not been briefed. See Uniform Rules of Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). As the defendant failed to develop or support the argument, we consider it abandoned. See State v. Wetzel, 2024-05 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/23/25), 417 So.3d 603, 613.

Finally, the defendant argues he was denied a fair trial due to the trial court's hostility to defense counsel and its attack on the competency of counsel. Essential to the concept of a fair trial is the requirement of complete neutrality on the part of the presiding judge. A trial judge's disparaging remarks or intemperate criticism of defense counsel may constitute reversible error when such remarks adversely influence and prejudice the jury against the defendant. However, in order to constitute reversible error, the effect of the improper comments must be such as to have influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. State v. Musso, 2014-0738 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/23/14), 2014 WL 7331944, *6 (unpublished); State v. Johnson, 438 So.2d 1091, 1101-02 (La. 1983).

During defense counsel's cross-examination of Gr.M., the State lodged several objections on the basis that counsel's questions had been asked and answered. The trial court ruled on an objection, and then defense counsel asked the court: “Can you do something about [c]ounsel's mumbling?” The trial court recessed the jury, excused the witness, and the following exchange took place:

THE COURT:

Look, with the jurors out, ․ I'm starting to get the impression, have you ever been diagnosed with Tourette's Syndrome?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Are we being recorded?

THE COURT:

Yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

Your Honor —

THE COURT;

I want to know.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

I have watched him give leading questions.

THE COURT:

I asked you a question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

And I've watched him stand up to —

THE COURT:

I'm asking you a question.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

No, sir. But I have the right to speak out when somebody is not following any rules. He doesn't stand up when he makes an objection. He sits and mumbles so that I can hear what he's saying and the jury can hear what he's saying but you didn't even know that he objected.

․

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:

I apologize, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I'm going to start overruling his objections just so you can ask the question as many times as you want and get the same answer every time if you think that plays to the jury.

But you know, I've never said this, this seems like most of your questions are cold deposition. You obviously have not retained the knowledge that you don't ask a question to anything you don't already know the answer to.

And that's 90 percent of your questions. So I'm going to let you proceed the way you think is fit, unless I've got to really, really — just in the interest of saving some time.

You can bring your witness back in and get her on the stand. All right. Let's bring our jurors back in, please.

In his brief, the defendant argues this was “an offensive discussion to have on the record,” which the State agrees. The State notes, “It is perhaps most offensive to people who actually have Tourette's Syndrome, since the spontaneous utterance of socially inappropriate and derogatory remarks—technically known as coprolalia—occurs very rarely in persons with Tourette's Syndrome yet occupies an exaggerated role in the public imagination.”

We agree the trial court's comments were wholly improper and offensive. However, in order to constitute reversible error, the effect of the improper comments must be such as to have influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Musso, 2014 WL 7331944 at *6. In this case, the trial court's comments were made outside the presence of the jury and, therefore, cannot have influenced the jury or contributed to the verdict. Additionally, prior to deliberations, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard any impression the court may have given regarding its opinion of any fact in the case or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 3 85 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects after the trial court imposed the defendant's sentences, it advised the defendant any application for post-conviction relief must be filed “within three years of [his] sentence becoming final.” The prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief is two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A); State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to correctly advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications that seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. State v. Garnett, 2023-1324 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/31/24) 2024 WL 2794636, *1-2 (unpublished). Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The indictment alleged the aggravated rape (count one) was committed between January 25, 2013, and January 24, 2014, and the molestation of a juvenile (count two) was committed between March 12, 2008, and March 11, 2009. We use the version of the statutes in effect at the time of the commission of the crimes. See State v. Sugasti, 2001-3407 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 518, 520-21.

2.   See In re Panagoulopoulos, 2023-01566 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 739 (per curiam).

3.   We use the initials of the victims and the victims’ family members to protect their identities. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

4.   The question of the legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not by a motion for new trial. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 790 n.3 (en banc), writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177. The defendant filed a motion for new trial but failed to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. However, the failure to file a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Washington, 421 So.2d 887, 889 (La. 1982).

5.   L.M.’s two oldest children did not live with her.

6.   S.M. testified her date of birth was March 12, 1992.

7.   T.M. testified her date of birth was January 25, 2001.

WOLFE, J.