SCOTT ADCOX v. TAYLOR SEIDENBACH INC ET AL (2026)

Scott Adcox (“Relator”) seeks supervisory review of the district court's July 16, 2026 ruling denying his motion to reconsider the denial of an expedited trial setting under La. C.C.P. art. 1573. For the reasons that follow, we grant the writ application, however, deny the requested relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Relator filed this asbestos exposure action against Taylor-Seidenbach Incorporation and other defendants on September 19, 2025. He alleges that he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in July 2025. On October 16, 2025, Relator filed an amended and restated petition adding defendants and alleging that he sustained take-home, secondary asbestos exposure through his father, Jimmy Adcox (“Mr. Adcox”). Mr. Adcox's deposition testimony regarding the asserted exposure history was taken between December 2025 and March 2026.

After the parties were unable to agree upon a trial setting, Relator filed a motion for expedited trial date and scheduling order on April 17, 2026. Following a contradictory hearing on May 28, 2026, the district court denied the motion by signed judgment dated May 29, 2026. In written reasons for judgment, the district court found that Relator submitted medical documentation establishing a diagnosis of mesothelioma but had not provided sufficient evidence to support an expedited trial date within the following six months.

Relator did not seek supervisory review of the May 29, 2026 judgment. Instead, on June 10, 2026, Relator filed a motion to reconsider denial of motion for expedited trial date and scheduling order. On July 6, 2026, in support of his motion to reconsider, Relator filed a memorandum and amendment supplementing his request with the affidavit of Dr. Eric R. Presser (“Dr. Presser”), an out-of-state board-certified thoracic surgeon. Dr. Presser stated, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Relator's symptoms and condition would worsen; that he faced a high risk of life-threatening complications; and that there was substantial medical doubt that Relator would survive beyond six months. At the July 16, 2026 hearing, the district court again denied expedited trial preference, generally finding that Relator had not met Article 1573’s standard.

On July 22, 2026, Relator filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory review and a motion to set a return date. The district court signed an order fixing the return date on July 25, 2026. Four days later, Relator filed the present application for supervisory review, together with a request for expedited consideration. This timely writ application followed.

DISCUSSION

Relator maintains that the district court erred in declining to reconsider its May 29, 2026 judgment denying preferential trial scheduling under La. C.C.P. art. 1573. The ruling presented for expedited supervisory review before this Court is the July 16, 2026 denial of Relator's motion to reconsider. A trial court's decision to revise or vacate an interlocutory ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Knighten v. Schwartz, 293 So.2d 494 (La. 1974). Accordingly, our review is confined to whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to revise that interlocutory ruling.

A judgment is interlocutory when it does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action. La. C.C.P. art. 1841. The denial of a motion seeking a preferential trial setting neither determines the merits of the underlying tort claims nor resolves any claim between the parties. Therefore, it is interlocutory. “It is well-settled that prior to final judgment a trial court may, at its discretion and on its own motion, change the result of interlocutory rulings it finds to be erroneous.” Koerner v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 2024-00134 (La. 3/19/24), 381 So.3d 702. This authority is discretionary; it does not create an entitlement to repeated reconsideration of an interlocutory ruling.

A motion styled as a “motion to reconsider” is not a procedural vehicle expressly provided by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. When such a motion seeks relief from any judgment, courts may examine its substance and treat it as a motion for new trial when appropriate. See Harris v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2019-1657, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/3/20), 310 So.3d 211, 214. The codal provisions governing new trials, however, apply to judgments rendered after a trial on the merits; they do not govern interlocutory orders entered during the pendency of the action. Morris v. Transtates Petroleum, Inc., 258 La. 311, 321-22, 246 So.2d 183, 187 (1971) (“The articles regulating new trials (La. Code Civil P. arts. 1971, et seq.) pertain to cases which have been tried on the merits, and the articles have no relation to interlocutory orders․which are only rendered during the course of the proceeding and before final judgment.”).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1972 identifies circumstances in which a new trial shall be granted, including when the verdict or judgment appears clearly contrary to the law and evidence; when material evidence, which could not with due diligence have been discovered before or during trial, is later obtained; and when the jury was improperly influenced or the party was otherwise prevented from obtaining a fair trial. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1973 separately permits a new trial in any case when there is good ground therefor, except as otherwise provided by law. By their terms and purpose, La. C.C.P. arts. 1972 and 1973 address the reopening of a matter tried on its merits; they do not transform an interlocutory case management ruling into a final judgment subject to mandatory or discretionary new trial relief.

Thus, the district court had the authority to revisit its May 29 ruling, but its authority arose from the interlocutory nature of that ruling – not from La. C.C.P. arts. 1972 or 1973. The appropriate procedural means to seek renewed consideration of a denied interlocutory motion is to re-urge the motion itself, with the supporting evidence and procedural safeguards applicable to that motion. See Magallanes v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2009-0605, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/14/09), 23 So.3d 985, 988-89. The district court may then determine, on an appropriately developed record, whether the requested interlocutory relief is warranted.

Here, Relator's motion to reconsider was filed after the district court had denied the original request for preferential scheduling. The later-filed declaration of Dr. Presser was submitted in support of the request to reconsider. Relator contends that the declaration supplies the medical proof required by La. C.C.P. art. 1573. The district court, however, was not required to regard a later-created declaration as a basis for vacating its prior interlocutory ruling through a motion to reconsider, rather than through a renewed motion for preferential scheduling.

This disposition is limited to the July 16, 2026 ruling denying reconsideration. We express no opinion regarding a procedurally proper renewed motion for preferential scheduling supported by medical documentation and presented in accordance with the governing procedural rules. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Relator's request for preferential scheduling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Relator's writ application, however, the requested relief is denied.

WRIT GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott