JACQUES DESHOMMES v. THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND PERMITS (2026)

RML

DLD

MGM

This is an administrative case involving the enforcement by the City of New Orleans (the “City”) of its short-term rental (“STR”) ordinances.¹ In February 2025, the City sent to Appellant—Jacques Deshommes (“Mr. Deshommes”)—a notice of hearing (the “Notice”). The Notice cited Mr. Deshommes in his capacity as the owner of 5507 Wickfield Drive in New Orleans, Louisiana (the “Property”).² The Notice cited him with sixteen alleged STR ordinance violations.

Following a hearing, the administrative hearing officer, on March 12, 2025, rendered a judgment finding the City established all sixteen violations. The hearing officer imposed $16,000 in fines—$1,000 per violation—and $125 in court costs. Mr. Deshommes filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the administrative judgment. The trial court added an award of $291 for the City's legal costs, which increased the total judgment to $16,416. This appeal followed. For the following reasons, we modify the judgment to reduce the fine to $14,000, and affirm the judgment as modified.³

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

To place the issues presented in context requires consideration of the following: (i) the City's STR ordinances’ history; (ii) the Property's permit history; (iii) the neighbors’ complaints; (iv) the administrative investigation; and (v) the administrative hearing.

The City's STR ordinances’ history

The City's STR ordinances—first enacted in 2017—have been the subject of a myriad of legal challenges and revisions. A synopsis of those events is provided in Bodin v. City of New Orleans, 804 F.Supp.3d 669, 678-80 (E.D. La. 2025), and Plauche v. City of New Orleans, 24-0576, pp. 1-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/25), 414 So.3d 1055, 1057-59. As a result of a legal challenge to the 2023 version of the City's STR ordinances, a federal district court imposed a stay of the City's enforcement of the ordinances. As this Court recently observed in Plauche, 24-0576, pp. 5-6, 414 So.3d at 1060:

On September 1, 2023, the federal district court granted a preliminary injunction that restrained the City from enforcing any of the 2023 Ordinances until a judicial determination about their constitutionality had been reached. See Hignell v. City of New Orleans, 19-13773 c/w 22-2991, 2023 WL 5751132, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2023). Ultimately, the injunction was lifted on February 28, 2024, wherein the federal district court found that the 2023 Ordinances passed constitutional muster. See Hignell v. City of New Orleans, 19-13773 c/w 22-2991, 23-5000, 2024 WL 838217 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2024).

The stay was in effect from September 2023 through February 2024. According to the City, it did not resume processing and issuing Non-Commercial Short-Term Rental (“NSTR”)⁴ permits until roughly March 2024. Thus, the period of non-enforcement was from September 2023 through March 2024.

The Property's permit history

Over the years, the City has issued a series of STR permits to Mr. Deshommes for the Property. The Property is a single-family residence that has three bedrooms and two bathrooms. According to Mr. Deshommes, he has run the same listing for the Property on the STR platforms since 2019—advertising the Property as a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR. Mr. Deshommes’ Airbnb listing states that he has been a member since 2019.

Before the non-enforcement period (September 2023 through March 2024), Mr. Deshommes had an owner's license, which expired in March 2023, and an operator's license, which expired in January 2024. Under those licenses, Mr. Deshommes was allowed to list the Property as a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR. During the non-enforcement period, Mr. Deshommes was allowed to continue listing and operating the Property as a STR without a permit.

Thereafter, in August and September 2024, Mr. Deshommes applied for new licenses for the Property. As part of the application process, Mr. Deshommes submitted, among other things, a STR-Owner Attestation (the Attestation”), dated October 7, 2024.⁵ The Attestation included, among other representations, a statement that “[t]he Owner has read, understands, and agrees to comply with all legal duties imposed by New Orleans City Code Chapter 26 and the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.”

In October 2024, the City issued new licenses for the Property—an owner's license to Mr. Deshommes on October 9, 2024, and an operator's license to his daughter on October 7, 2024. The new licenses, however, were more restrictive than the previous ones in several respects. The relevant differences here are that the new licenses limited the STR use of the Property to two of its three bedrooms and imposed a maximum guest occupancy of four, as opposed to the previous six.⁶

The neighbors’ complaints

Approximately six months after enforcement of the STR ordinances resumed, the City received two on-line complaints from Mr. Deshommes’ neighbors regarding alleged illegal STR activity at the Property. The two complaints were as follows:

• August 23, 2024 complaint: “This has been an illegal short-term rental for years. I have reported it over and over with no enforcement. Owners live out of state and treat our neighborhood as a cash cow motel.”

• September 3, 2024 complaint: “Illegal rental for many years. Please do something about it!”

According to the City, the neighbors’ complaints sparked an investigation.

The administrative investigation

After receiving the neighbors’ complaints, the City confirmed, by checking the STR platforms, that in August and September 2024—after the non-enforcement period (September 2023 through March 2024)—the Property was being operated illegally as a STR without a permit. Moreover, the City confirmed that after October 2024—when Mr. Deshommes was issued new licenses—Mr. Deshommes continued listing the Property on the STR platforms as a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR. Again, the new licenses imposed a two-bedroom, four-guest occupancy limit.

As a result of the investigation, the City, on February 10, 2025, sent Mr. Deshommes the Notice, setting a March 12, 2025 hearing date. In the Notice, the City informed Mr. Deshommes of sixteen alleged STR ordinance violations. The Notice also informed him of the date on which each violation occurred. The sixteen violations enumerated in the Notice can be grouped into the following three categories based on the particular ordinance alleged to have been violated:

• Two violations—occurring on 8/30/2024 and 9/4/2024—of CCNO § 26-618 (b)(1)—Advertising an illegal short-term rental; and

• Seven violations—occurring on 10/21/2024, 11/9/2024, 12/2/2024, 12/2/2024,7 12/20/2024, 1/11/2025, and 1/31/2025—of CCNO § 26-618 (b)(3)—Excessive guest bedrooms in advertisement; and

• Seven violations—occurring on 10/21/2024, 11/9/2024, 12/2/2024, 12/2/2024, 12/20/2024, 1/11/2025, and 1/31/2025—of CCNO § 26-618(b)(4)—Excessive occupancy in advertising.  8

The administrative hearing

At the hearing, the City's STR Administrator—Celeste Jordan (“Ms. Jordan”)—testified and gave a PowerPoint presentation regarding the evidence her office developed. The evidence included screenshots obtained from a computer program and guest reviews on the STR platforms. The evidence established that Mr. Deshommes continued to accept STR bookings during August and September 2024, after the non-enforcement period, when Mr. Deshommes had no STR permit. During that time, the City received two on-line complaints from Mr. Deshommes’ neighbors.

The City's evidence further established that although Mr. Deshommes obtained licenses in October 2024, the new licenses limited the use of the Property to a two-bedroom, four-guest occupancy STR. Despite these limitations, Mr. Deshommes continued to advertise the Property on the STR platforms as a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR. Particularly, the City established, through screen shots of the STR platforms, that on specific dates such excessive advertising violations were found. Also, on one date (December 2, 2024), Mr. Deshommes was cited twice for the same excessive advertising violations because he was advertising on two STR platforms—Airbnb and Vrbo—on that date. During the hearing, Ms. Jordan checked the Airbnb platform and confirmed that Mr. Deshommes was still advertising the Property on that date (March 12, 2025), as a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR in violation of the limitations of his then existing licenses.

The City also introduced evidence that, on October 4, 2024, the City's inspector—Christina Buie (“Ms. Buie”)—received an email from Mr. Deshommes. In the email, Mr. Deshommes indicated that he had become aware of a violation on the Property and that he was seeking to renew his license. Mr. Deshommes’ email stated:

I am trying to follow up on this violation and understand what the next steps are and how to proceed. With the STR lottery occurring next week [I] would like to clear up if possible. Any assistance would be greatly appreciated.

At the hearing, Ms. Buie testified that she spoke with Mr. Deshommes after receiving his email regarding his license renewal application; she further testified:

[Mr. Deshommes] contacted the office and wanted to know what the steps were to obtain a license. So, therefore, I let him speak with the analyst to find out what the necessary application process was to obtain a license for the [P]roperty and also did inform him that there was an active violation. He wanted to know would the violation case interfere with him obtaining a license, which was no, at the time. So, we received documentation from him in the future in which he obtained the license.

In opposing the City's case against him, the sole evidence Mr. Deshommes presented was his own testimony, which was as follows:

Yes, we do have a short-term rental on Airbnb as well as on V[rbo].

There were several months where we did not have a license in the middle of last year. I think it's from April through September, April through October [2024], something around that time frame that we did not have an active license. We did take the listing down.

The listing somehow kept coming back up, but we did take it down. But it did come back up on the site. As far as the housing listing, the number of bedrooms and individuals that could stay at the house, what they said is correct.

We do have it listed as a three-bedroom house that can hold six individuals. It is technically a three-bedroom home.

Responding to the hearing officer's question whether he had anything else to offer, Mr. Deshommes testified: “[n]o, just trying to go ahead and see about how do we get this thing cleared up and how do we move forward.”

At the close of the hearing, the City requested the maximum fine of $1,000 per violation, court costs, and revocation of Mr. Deshommes’ licenses. Finding the City established sixteen violations, the hearing officer imposed the maximum fine of $1,000 per violation—$16,000 total—plus court costs of $125. Because the Notice did not reflect that the City was seeking revocation, the hearing officer declined the City's request to revoke Mr. Deshommes’ licenses.

DISCUSSION

Standard of review

The City is authorized to regulate public health, housing, and environmental violations. See La. R.S. 13:2575(A). A property owner against whom a fine is imposed for violating the City's regulations has the right to appeal to the trial court. See La. R.S. 13:2575(H). But the statutory provisions are silent as to the standard of review. To fill the gap, “[t]his Court has borrowed the general provisions of the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), La. R.S. 49:950, et seq., as the governing standard of review.” Whipple v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Safety & Permits, 20-0111, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/5/20), 364 So.3d 306, 309 (citations omitted). This standard applies in both the trial court and, on further review, in this Court. “ ‘[A]n appellate court sitting in review of an administrative agency reviews the findings and decision of the administrative agency and not the decision of the [trial] court.’ ” DMK Acquisitions & Properties, L.L.C. v. City of New Orleans, 13-0405, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/18/13), 124 So.3d 1157, 1163 (quoting Clark v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 12-1049, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/12/12), 104 So.3d 820, 827).

Under the APA, the exclusive grounds upon which an administrative agency's decision may be reversed or modified on appeal are enumerated in La. R.S. 49:978.1(G) [previously La. R.S. 49:964(G), renumbered in 2022].⁹ Summarized, the exclusive grounds are as follows:

[Administrative] decisions are subject to reversal or modification only upon two conditions—(1) prejudice to “substantial rights of the appellant” based on (2) findings, conclusions, or decisions that are: [a.] in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; [b.] in excess of the agency's statutory authority; [c.] made according to unlawful procedure; [d.] affected by other error of law; [e.] arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion; or [f.] not supported and sustainable by preponderance of the evidence.

Brandee Ketchum and Andrew Olsan, Louisiana Administrative Law: A Practitioner's Primer, 68 LA. L. REV. 1313, 1369 (2008) (reformatted).

“The proceedings and findings of an administrative agency are presumed to be legitimate and correct.” Mystery House, LLC v. City of New Orleans, 20-0014, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/25/20), 365 So.3d 95, 99 (citations omitted). “The burden of proof is on the appellant to demonstrate any grounds for reversal or modification.” Id.

Assignments of error

On appeal, Mr. Deshommes assigns the following two, interrelated errors:

1. The City failed to provide [Mr.] Deshommes notice and an opportunity to be heard on the alleged violations that were documented for five months before sending a hearing notice on February 10, 2025, depriving [Mr.] Deshommes of due process and violating the City Code.

2. The City's imposition of duplicative fines for the exact same alleged violation, without providing [Mr.] Deshommes of notice and opportunity to be heard until sixteen alleged violations had been documented, is unreasonable and violates Louisiana law.

Mr. Deshommes’ arguments can be divided into a trio of issues. First, the City had a duty to warn him of the violations and, thus, was precluded from imposing duplicative fines. Second, the City failed to give him the same equitable treatment as it gave the property owner in Chaumont v. City of New Orleans, 20-0017 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/20), 302 So.3d 39. Third, the duplicative fines imposed on him were constitutionally excessive. We divide our analysis along these lines.

Duty to warn of violations

Mr. Deshommes first argues that the City violated his due process rights by failing to provide him notice (warning) of the multiple alleged violations and an opportunity to be heard on the violations. He contends that the fines imposed against him were based on the same advertising error—listing on the STR platforms the incorrect number of bedrooms (three instead of two) and guest-occupancy limit (six instead of four). According to Mr. Deshommes, the City could not impose duplicate fines on him for the same violation until it warned him of the violation.

The City counters that it had no duty to warn. According to the City, Mr. Deshommes’ due process rights to proper notice were not violated. The City emphasizes that it properly served Mr. Deshommes with the Notice in February 2025. The City contends that the Notice met all the requirements for a notice of violation and that Mr. Deshommes was provided with an opportunity to be heard at an administrative hearing as required under CCNO § 6-36. As a result, the City contends that Mr. Deshommes was given proper notice and that no due process violation occurred. We agree.

Mr. Deshommes’ duty to warn argument is premised on the timing of notice of the violations. But nothing in CCNO § 26-626 requires the City to send a property owner notice at its first citing of a violation. Moreover, nothing in CCNO § 26-626 requires the City to send separate notices of each violation and notice of the hearing details, albeit conceptually different documents.¹⁰ The alleged violations and the hearing details may be combined in the same notice. The City correctly combined those notices here and sent the Notice.

Mr. Deshommes does not dispute that the City properly sent him the Notice by certified mail more than fifteen days before the hearing and that the City posted the Notice on the Property. Nor does he dispute that the Notice met all the requirements of a notice of violation. See CCNO § 6-36.¹¹

The gist of Mr. Deshommes’ argument is that the timing of the notice resulted in a due process violation and that the timing had the effect of imposing improper duplicative fines on him. As his attorney argued before the trial court, Mr. Deshommes’ duty to warn argument can be capsulized as follows: “if you [have] not given me notice and you [are] going back pretty much half a year [back to October 2024 from February 2025] and imposing fines based on those violations without providing me notice, that does [not] seem fair, reasonable.” This argument is unpersuasive.

To the extent Mr. Deshommes asserts the City's STR ordinances violate due process, this Court rejected the same argument in the Chaumont case; this Court observed:

Because the current City's ordinances ․ require notice of a violation, require notice of hearing, require a hearing before a hearing officer before imposing penalties, allow the penalties to be appealed, and absent a threat to public safety provide an opportunity for a hearing before revoking a license, the ordinances do not violate the homeowner's constitutional right to due process.

Chaumont, 20-0017, pp. 19-20, 302 So.3d at 54. Under the City's STR framework, a STR permit “is a privilege, not a right.” Hignell Two, 46 F.4th at 324 (internal citations omitted).

As the City emphasizes, permit holders are on notice when they are issued a permit of the requirements with which they must comply. Indeed, as part of the permit application process, a permit holder signs a STR-owner attestation, which states: “[t]he Owner has read, understands, and agrees to comply with all legal duties imposed by New Orleans City Code Chapter 26 and the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.” The City, thus, has no duty to warn a permit holder, such as Mr. Deshommes, of his violation of the ordinances that the permit holder agrees to comply with when he obtains his license.¹²

Mr. Deshommes also cites CCNO § 6-37(b) in support of his duty to warn argument. This ordinance provides that “[e]ach day that violation(s) continue after due notice has been served shall be deemed a separate offense.” CCNO § 6-37(b). Based upon the “after due notice” language of this ordinance, Mr. Deshommes contends that the alleged violations should not have been noted as separate offenses (violations) until after he received the Notice on February 10, 2025. He emphasizes the lack of any evidence of another violation after that date.

Mr. Deshommes’ reliance on CCNO § 6-37(b) is misplaced. The “after due notice” language in CCNO § 6-37(b) is a prerequisite to imposing daily fines. The same “after due notice” language appears in CCNO § 26-626, which provides that “[e]ach day that a violation continues after due notice has been served shall be deemed a separate offense.” Construing that language in CCNO § 26-626, this Court in Mystery House, 20-0014, p. 8, 365 So.3d at 100, observed that it supported the daily fine judgment against the property owner. Stated otherwise, this Court observed that the language authorized a hearing officer to assess fines for each day a violation continued unabated. Id.

Our construction of the “after due notice” language as directed to daily fines is supported further by CCNO § 6-36(h), which provides:

At the initial hearing, if the hearing officer sets daily fines, the date of a subsequent hearing to determine if the violation(s) have been remediated shall be set. The date of such subsequent hearing shall be within 60 days of the initial hearing date. Such setting of a subsequent hearing date during the initial hearing shall constitute proper notice. If at the subsequent hearing it is determined that the violation(s) have not been remediated, daily fines shall begin to accrue from the date of initial hearing. Daily fines shall continue to accrue until the hearing officer determines that violation(s) have been remediated.

Thus, CCNO § 6-37(b)’s “after due notice” requirement refers to the prerequisite to starting the time running for imposing daily fines. This is not a daily fines case.

Here, the imposition of daily fines was neither sought nor awarded by the hearing officer. Instead, sixteen separate violations of three separate ordinances on eight non-consecutive days (multiple violations on one of those days) were identified in the Notice. The hearing officer imposed fines for each of the sixteen violations as permitted by CCNO § 26-126 (a), which provides that “[a]ny violation of this article is prohibited, and shall subject the owner, operator, or platform to penalties as provided in section 26-629,” and by CCNO § 26-629 (a), which provides:

Any person who violates this article or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance shall be subject to a fine of not less than $1,000.00 for each offense. Each day that such violation exists shall constitute a separate and distinct offense. Multiple violations may relate to the same guest stay, day, action, situation, or event, and may be noticed and heard in a single administrative hearing.

Summarizing, this is not a daily fines case. The hearing officer imposed a $1,000 fine for each of the sixteen violations, not daily fines. The City's STR ordinances do not impose a duty to warn on the City. Rather, the City satisfied the requirements of providing notice of violations and notice of hearing by issuing the Notice. Mr. Deshommes’ failure to warn argument is unpersuasive.

Inequitable treatment under the case law

Mr. Deshommes next contends that the City failed to afford him the same equitable treatment that it afforded the property owner in the Chaumont case. There, the property owner was charged with advertising excessive bedrooms and guest occupancy. Chaumont, 20-0017, pp. 2-4, 302 So.3d at 43-44. In June 2017, the City found a listing on a STR platform advertising more bedrooms and guest occupancy than permitted. Id. at p. 3, 302 So.3d at 43. The following month, the City sent the owner a letter advising of the violations and potential penalties. Id. Six months later, the City sent the owner another letter notifying of the suspected violations. Id. Seven months later, in July 2018, the City mailed the owner a notice of hearing. Id. at p. 4, 302 So.3d at 44. Ultimately, the hearing was held in October 2018; and the owner was fined $1,000 ($500 for each of two violations). Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed. Id. at p. 21, 302 So.3d at 54.

Mr. Deshommes’ reliance on the Chaumont case is misplaced for two reasons. First, as the City's attorney pointed out at the hearing before the trial court in this case, the City has stopped its practice of sending warning letters to property owners before issuing a notice of hearing. The City's attorney explained this change in practice as follows:

We [are] not—under the old rules before they got rewritten, you know, they used to send warning letters and stuff like that [such as field letters 13]. They dispensed with that, stopped sending warning letters. They [are] on notice. When they get their permit, they know what they [are] supposed to do.

The notice of hearing now serves as both the notice of the alleged violations and the notice of the scheduled administrative hearing on the violations. This change in practice explains why in Chaumont, which was decided in 2000, there were two prior notices of the violations before the notice of hearing, but none here.

Second, since 2000 when Chaumont was decided, the City has amended its STR ordinances and doubled the penalty, raising it from $500 to $1,000 per violation. Consequently, Mr. Deshommes’ argument of inequitable treatment based on the Chaumont case is unpersuasive.

Constitutionally excessive fines

Mr. Deshommes’ final argument is that both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit excessive fines. See U.S. Const. Amend. 8; La. Const. art. 1, § 20. According to Mr. Deshommes, Louisiana courts frequently hold duplicative fines are unreasonable. In support, he cites Sutter v. City of New Orleans, 17-0547 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/28/18), 238 So.3d 1059, and Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union v. Jouandot, 05-269 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/17/06), 921 So.2d 1054. Neither case is instructive.

In Sutter, this Court did not address the excessive fine issue. Rather, this Court simply observed, as a matter of procedural background, that “the trial court denied the relief requested in the Plaintiff's petition; however, it reduced the violations from fourteen to nine.” Sutter, 20-0547, p. 2, 238 So.3d at 1061. The other cited case, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union, involved a labor union contract. There, the appellate court observed that “[a] fine for violating this section [of the contract], in addition to the specific section violations, is duplicative of the other fines, and is unreasonable.” Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union, 05-269, p. 8, 921 So.2d at 1059. Thus, neither case is helpful here.

To the extent Mr. Deshommes’ argument is that the fines imposed by the City's STR ordinances are constitutionally excessive, the same argument was rejected by the federal court in Hignell v. City of New Orleans, 476 F.Supp.3d 369, 378 (E.D. La. 2020) (“Hignell One”).¹⁴ There, the plaintiff contended that the City's fines for STR ordinance violations were excessive, unlimited, and violated the Eighth Amendment. Hignell One, 476 F.Supp.3d at 380. In support, the plaintiff posed the following two hypothetical scenarios:

• “ ‘[A] resident who simply doesn't like that their neighbor shares their home via home sharing platforms could lodge multiple complaints of violations ․’ against STR owners”; and

• “[T]he provision authorizes the City to ‘discontinue electric service to a home without regard to whether there are infants, elderly, or residents with special needs living there ․’ ”

Id. at 380-81 (emphasis in original).

Enunciating the principles governing constitutionally excessive fine challenges, the federal district court, in Hignell One, observed:

As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the [fine] must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” [United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)] “If the amount of [fine] is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the [ ] offense, it is unconstitutional.” Id. at 337․ The Fifth Circuit has found that “[a]n administrative agency's fine does not violate the Eighth Amendment—no matter how excessive the fine may appear—if it does not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it.” Cripps v. Louisiana Dep't of Agric. & Forestry, 819 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Newell Recycling Co. v. E.P.A., 231 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2000)).

Id. at 380. Applying these principles, the federal court, in Hignell One, observed as follows:

• “Sec. 26-629(a) of the [City's STR] ordinances outlines the penalties and fines that may be assessed for violations of the ordinances.” Id. at 381;

• “The STR ordinances allowing the imposition of fines were made in conjunction with state law, are proportional, and are facially constitutional.” Id.;

• “[D]efendant's contention that disconnecting the electrical service allows the City an opportunity to impose meaningful penalties on STR owner who take the fines assessed as a mere cost of doing business is persuasive.” Id.; and

• “Plaintiff's speculative arguments that the disabled and elderly will be burdened by this are unavailing and unpersuasive. “ Id.

Accordingly, the federal court, in Hignell One, concluded that the City's fines for STR ordinance violations do not violate the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines prohibition. Id.

We find only one aspect of the fines imposed by the hearing officer on Mr. Deshommes for violating the City's STR ordinances dictates a different result. The one aspect we find objectionable is the City's fining Mr. Deshommes twice on a single day—December 2, 2024—for the same excessive advertising violations because the same ads appeared on two different STR platforms-- Airbnb and Vrbo. We, thus, reduce the fines imposed by $2,000. In all other respects, we find the fines imposed were not constitutionally excessive for the following three reasons.

First, the fines imposed were in accord with the governing ordinance, CCNO § 26-629 (a), which provides for a fine of $1,000 per violation. The Notice informed Mr. Deshommes of the potential penalties he faced—$1,000 per violation.¹⁵ The ordinance states that multiple violations can occur on the same day and can be heard at the same hearing, as was done here.

Second, the fines imposed, as modified to $14,000, are proportional. The City established at the hearing that Mr. Deshommes had a history of operating without a permit and then exceeding the limits of his newly issued licenses. The City further established that, on the date of the administrative hearing (March 12, 2025), Mr. Deshommes’ violations were ongoing. Despite having received the Notice in February 2025, alerting him of the violations, on the date of the hearing Mr. Deshommes still was advertising a three-bedroom, six-guest occupancy STR, a violation of two STR ordinances. See Nola Bourbon, 19-0847, p. 5, 290 So.3d at 229 (observing fines were not excessive given that “[t]he lease established that Nola Bourbon's violations of the STR ordinances had been, and continued to be, ongoing”).

Finally, the fines imposed here, as modified, are consistent with the City's stated purposes in implementing its STR regulations, which include to “mitigate the disruptive effects that unmonitored short-term rentals can have on neighborhoods, and [to] protect the livability and quality of life of the city's residential neighborhoods.” CCNO § 26-613. The record reflects that Mr. Deshommes’ neighbors filed complaints regarding his use of the Property as an illegal STR without a permit, which sparked the investigation in this case. Accordingly, we find the fines imposed, as modified, are not constitutionally excessive.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the hearing officer's judgment is modified to reduce the total fines to $14,000.¹⁶ As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

JUDGMENT MODIFIED AND, AS MODIFIED, AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The term STR is defined in the Code of the City of New Orleans (“CCNO”), § 26-614, as follows:[T]he use and enjoyment of a dwelling unit, or any portion thereof, by guests for a period of less than 30 consecutive days, in exchange for money, commodities, fruits, services, or other performances. Hotels, motels, bed and breakfasts, and other land uses explicitly defined and regulated in the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance separately from short-term rentals are not considered to be short-term rentals.Stated otherwise, STR is “the City's term for the type of lodging offered on platforms such as Airbnb and Vrbo.” Hignell-Stark v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.4th 317, 320 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Hignell Two”).

2.   Although Mr. Deshommes’ wife co-owns the Property, the City brought this administrative proceeding against only Mr. Deshommes. For this reason, we refer to Mr. Deshommes only as the Property's owner.

3.   The hearing officer's award of $291 in costs and the trial court's award of $291 for the City's legal costs also are affirmed.

4.   The City's ordinances divide STR permit classifications into two categories—STR, noncommercial (Type N); and STR, commercial (Type C). This division “correspond[s] to the types of short-term rental uses set forth by the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.” CCNO § 26-616. The Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance includes a provision addressing short-term rental, noncommercial—NSTR. CZO 21.8.C.18. Here, the permits the City issued to Mr. Deshommes fall within the Type N—the NSTR category. For ease of discussion, we refer elsewhere in the opinion to the permits simply as “STR” permits.

5.   Mr. Deshommes does not live on the Property; he lives in Arkansas. Mr. Deshommes submitted a lease between himself and his daughter as proof that she was residing on the Property as the operator. Mr. Deshommes also submitted the floor plan of the single-family residence located on the Property.

6.   The new licenses also required the operator—here, Mr. Deshommes’ daughter—be present when the Property was rented as a STR. Practically, this requirement reduced the number of available bedrooms from three to two. Mr. Deshommes’ alleged violation of this requirement that the operator be present was not at issue in the administrative proceeding; thus, we do not address it on appeal.

7.   The reason for the inclusion of December 2, 2024 twice is that the City found Mr. Deshommes advertised illegally on two platforms on that same date—Airbnb and Vrbo.

8.   CCNO § 26-618 (b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:The following acts shall be prohibited and may be grounds for suspension or revocation of a short-term rental owner permit, or any other remedy authorized by the article:(1) Advertising an illegal short-term rental.* * * * *(3) Exceeding in the advertisement, the legally available guest bedroom limitation set forth in the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.(4) Exceeding in any advertisement, the legally available guest occupancy limitations set forth in the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.

9.   La. R.S. 49:978.1(G) provides:The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;(4) Affected by other error of law;(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or(6) Not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court. In the application of this rule, the court shall make its own determination and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety upon judicial review. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by first-hand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency's determination of credibility issues.

10.   CCNO § 26-626 provides:(a) Any violation of this article is prohibited, and shall subject the owner, operator, or platform to penalties as provided in section 26-629.(b) Notice and hearing requirements for determining violation(s) shall be in accordance with the administrative procedures provided in Chapter 6, Article II of the Code of the City of New Orleans.

11.   CCNO § Sec. 6-36 provides:(a) Whenever the city agency having enforcement responsibility determines that a Code violation exists, a notice of violation(s) shall be provided to the owner(s).(b) A notice of violation(s) shall:(1) Be in writing;(2) Provide the municipal address of the cited property;(3) Provide the date of the inspection;(4) Provide notice of alleged Code violation(s) at the cited property;(5) Provide the mailing address and telephone number of the enforcement agency;(6) Provide the time, date and location of the administrative hearing whereby the alleged Code violation shall be adjudicated;(7) Provide notice that the failure to appear at the hearing shall be considered an admission of liability for the charged violation(s);(8) Provide the risk of fees, penalties, costs, and liens that may be imposed for continued violation(s); and(9) Provide the risk of remedial measures that may be ordered by a hearing officer to correct or abate Code violation(s).

12.   As noted elsewhere in this opinion, Mr. Deshommes signed the Attestation as part of the permit-application process for the new licenses.

13.   See Nola Bourbon, LLC v. City of New Orleans, 19-0847, p. 2 n.1 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/29/20), 290 So.3d 225, 227 (observing that “[i]n 2017, the City served repeated notices advising Nola Bourbon that the City suspected the Property was being utilized as an unlawful short-term rental property. These notices consisted of two letters and the posting of a ‘field notice’ at the Property”).

14.   The federal district court in Hignell One found that there was no Eighth Amendment violation. Although some of the findings in Hignell One were overturned on appeal in Hignell Two, the finding of no Eight Amendment violation was not.

15.   As observed elsewhere in this opinion, the hearing officer declined the City's request to revoke Mr. Deshommes’ licenses because the Notice failed to inform him of that possible penalty.

16.   The hearing officer's award of $291 in costs and the trial court's award of $291 for the City's legal costs also are affirmed.

Judge Rosemary Ledet