STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JONATHAN BLACK (2026)

Relator—the State of Louisiana—seeks review of the district court's May 29, 2026 judgment, denying its Motion to Introduce Evidence Under La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) (the “Motion”). Considering the writ application and the applicable law, we grant the State's writ, reverse the district court's judgment, grant the State's Motion, and remand.

Relevant factual and procedural background

In May 2025, Respondent/Defendant—Jonathan Black (“Mr. Black”)—was charged with Domestic Abuse Aggravated Assault, a violation of La. R.S. 14:37.7. The charge was based on an April 2025 incident. In preparation for trial, the State filed the Motion, seeking to introduce evidence of prior bad acts—a January 2022 incident involving the same victim. The State contended that it was seeking to use at trial evidence of the January 2022 incident as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and/or absence of mistake or accident.” The State contended that the evidence was admissible to show modus operandi.

At the hearing on the Motion, the State introduced the St. Bernard Sheriff's Office's incident reports for both the January 2022 and April 2025 incidents. To provide background for addressing the issue presented, we summarize the reports.

January 2022 Incident Report

In January 2022, two deputies were dispatched to 2508 Riverland Drive in response to an attempted-suicide complaint. Dispatch advised that Mr. Black had expressed suicidal ideations. When the deputies arrived at the residence, they detained Mr. Black in handcuffs. Mr. Black stated that he was having a bad day and that he had been drinking alcohol. He explained that he took out his weapons to teach the eleven-year-old son of his fiancée—Genese May (“Ms. May”)—how to load and unload magazines. While doing so, a shot went off and startled him. Ms. May then entered the room, and they argued. Mr. Black left the residence and returned a short time later.

The deputies also spoke to Ms. May. She stated that when she returned from work that day with her two children, Mr. Black was “messing with guns in the master bedroom and appeared to be severely drunk.” She retreated to her son's bedroom to avoid Mr. Black. Mr. Black left the residence and returned approximately ten minutes later. Ms. May heard him screaming obscenities in the master bedroom. When she went into the bedroom to investigate, Mr. Black was standing near the doorway. He was on the phone, and he yelled that he was ready to end it all. She retreated from the bedroom. As she walked away, a gunshot hit the wall near the door through which she had just exited. Mr. Black left the residence again.

The deputies removed several weapons and ammunition from the residence. They also contacted the Department of Children and Family Services regarding the two minor children in the residence; the matter was assigned a case number.

According to the January 2022 incident report, Mr. Black was charged with violating La. R.S. 14:94, illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, and La. R.S. 14:37.7, domestic abuse aggravated assault. Mr. Black was charged and pled guilty to the lesser offense of discharge of firearms under a St. Bernard Parish ordinance.

April 2025 Incident Report

In April 2025, a deputy was dispatched to 2508 Riverland Drive in reference to a domestic-disturbance complaint. While the deputy was en route, he was advised that a male had pointed a firearm at his wife. When the deputy arrived at the residence, he detained the male—Mr. Black—in handcuffs. Mr. Black's wife—Ms. May—stated that the two argued and that Mr. Black punched a mirror in the bedroom, shattering it into several pieces. Ms. May then exited the bedroom to console her two small children, who were in another room. When she reentered the bedroom, Mr. Black had armed himself with a gun, which he pointed at her. No shot was fired. She then exited the bedroom and called 911.

The deputy also spoke to Mr. Black, who admitted to shattering the mirror. But, Mr. Black claimed that he picked up the firearm from the bed to secure it in a nightstand. He stated that he did not “intentionally point the firearm at [his wife].”

During arguments on the State's Motion, counsel for the State cited State v. Breaux, 22-581 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/10/23), 366 So.3d 727 (the “Breaux case”), as authority for admitting Mr. Black's prior bad acts—the January 2022 incident—under La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 412.4. At the close of the hearing, the district court ordered supplemental briefing to address La. C.E. art. 412.4 (“Article 412.4”) and the Breaux case.

Thereafter, the district court denied the State's Motion. In so doing, the district court observed:

After reviewing the two incident reports admitted into evidence at the hearing and the relevant case law, the Court finds that there is not the necessary factual connection or nexus of facts between the two incidents. The prior incident does not provide any evidentiary weight as to proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity and/or absence of mistake or accident under Louisiana Code of Evidence Article[s] 404(B)(1) and 412.4. Further, the Court finds that any admission of evidence related to the prior incident would be more prejudicial than probative.

This writ followed.

Discussion

We review a district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Taylor, 16-1124, p. 18 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 296; State v. Perkins, 24-0280, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/4/26), 430 So.3d 1228, 1232. Because we find the district court abused its discretion in failing to find the January 2022 incident admissible under Article 412.4, we cabin our analysis to that article and pretermit addressing Article 404(B)(1).

Article 412.4 provides, in pertinent part:

A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving abusive behavior against a family member, household member, or dating partner ․ , evidence of the accused's commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving assaultive behavior against a family member, household member, or dating partner ․, may be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant, subject to the balancing test provided in Article 403.  1

In the Breaux case, the appellate court set forth the following principles regarding the application of Article 412.4:

• “Under [Article] 412.4, evidence of prior domestic abuse is allowed in cases that involve abusive behavior against a dating partner or household member. Breaux, 22-581, p. 8, 366 So.3d 727, 735.

• “The admissibility of evidence under this article is not limited to those actions that are identical or similar in nature to the charged crime.” Id.

• “[I]it is not necessary [under this article] for the defendant to have been charged, prosecuted, or convicted of the described ‘other acts.’ ” Breaux, 22-581, p. 11, 366 So.3d at 736.

• Article 412.4 is “an exception to La. C.E. art. 404 B(1), which limits the use of other crimes evidence to non-propensity purposes and specifically prohibits evidence that tends to show the defendant's criminal propensity.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 11, 366 So.3d at 736.2

• “[Article] 412.4 permits the admission of other incidents of domestic abuse for any relevant purpose including the defendant's character and his acts in conformity therewith, subject only to the balancing test established by La. C.E. art. 403.” Breaux, 22-581, pp. 11-12, 366 So.3d at 736 (citations and emphasis omitted).

In the Breaux case, the defendant was charged with domestic abuse battery (strangulation) and domestic abuse battery in the presence of a child under the age of thirteen. Breaux, 22-581, p. 2, 366 So.3d at 731. The State filed a “Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4 or in the Alternative 404B.” The State's notice indicated it was seeking to introduce a prior March 22, 2020 domestic abuse incident in which the defendant was alleged to have battered his live-in fiancée. Id. Opposing the motion, the defendant contended that the earlier charges against him had been refused after the victim recanted. Breaux, 22-581, p. 3, 366 So.3d at 731. The district court, without reasons, excluded the evidence of the prior March 22, 2020 incident. Breaux, 22-581, p. 4, 366 So.3d at 732.

Reversing, the appellate court concluded that the March 22, 2020 incident was admissible under both La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 412.4 as it involved a factually similar incident against the same victim (defendant's fiancée), at the same residence, and under similar circumstances. In so doing, the appellate court observed:

We find the March 22, 2020 [prior] incident places the current charged offense in its proper context and is independently relevant, not to prove defendant's bad character, but instead to illustrate to the jury the volatile nature of the relationship between defendant and the victim. The evidence is highly probative to establish defendant's aggressive propensities toward the victim during arguments, especially when the victim is attempting to gather her belongings to leave the residence, even in the presence of her parents. Without this background evidence, the defendant's conduct as charged in the current offense may appear to the jury to be an isolated act not attributable to his pattern of aggression towards the victim.

Breaux, 22-581, p. 13, 366 So.3d at 737. The appellate court further found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Thus, the appellate court concluded that subject to other rules of admissibility of evidence, the State would be allowed to introduce the prior acts evidence at the trial. Breaux, 22-581, pp. 13-14, 366 So.3d at 737-38.

In its writ application, the State contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Motion because the prior bad acts evidence—the January 2022 incident—was admissible under both La. C.E. arts. 404(B) and 412.4. According to the State, like in the Breaux case, the previous domestic abuse incident places the current charges in their “proper context and is independently relevant, not to prove the bad character, but instead to illustrate to the jury the volatile nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 13, 366 So.3d at 737. Opposing the State's writ, Mr. Black raises three types of arguments—procedural, substantive, and factual. We separately address each.

Procedural

Mr. Black's procedural argument is that the State failed to properly raise Article 412.4 in its Motion. The State's Motion cites only La. C.E. art. 404(B) (“Article 404(B)”). Countering, the State contends that Article 404(B) requires both reasonable notice and a hearing; hence, it requires a motion to be filed setting an Article 404(B) hearing. In contrast, Article 412.4(B) only requires reasonable notice, not a hearing. The State contends that it provided reasonable notice to Mr. Black and emphasizes that the district court allowed Mr. Black to respond to the State's arguments. Indeed, the district court allowed the defense to brief the Breaux case and the Article 412.4 issue. We find the State's argument persuasive.

“While [Article] 404 B requires the State to provide the defendant with notice and a hearing before trial if it intends to offer such evidence, there is nothing in the language of [Article] 412.4 that requires a pretrial hearing.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 10, 366 So.3d at 735; see La. C.E. art. 412.4(B) (providing that “[i]n a case in which the state intends to offer evidence under the provisions of this Article, the prosecution shall, upon request of the accused, provide reasonable notice in advance of trial of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes”). Mr. Black's procedural argument lacks merit.

Substantive

Mr. Black next contends that there is a substantive impediment to applying Article 412.4 here. According to Mr. Black, Article 412.4, by its terms, only applies when there is “assaultive behavior against” the complainant. Continuing, he contends that Article 412.4 does not apply to the January 2002 incident because his firing of the gun was “self-directed”—part of a suicide attempt; it was not directed at the victim—Ms. May. The statutory language belies this contention.

The statute defines “abusive behavior” broadly as including “any behavior of the offender involving the use or threatened use of force against the person or property” of the victim. La. C.E. art. 412.4(D)(1). By its terms, the statute covers not only damages to a person but also to property. Regardless, Mr. Black's substantive argument ignores Ms. May's statement to the deputies regarding the January 2022 incident wherein she indicated that a gun shot hit the wall where she had been standing seconds earlier. Thus, the January 2022 incident falls within the ambit of “abusive behavior” under Article 412.4.

Factual

Mr. Black's final contention is that the Breaux case is distinguishable factually from this case. The Breaux case involved two mirror image incidents. In both, the defendant physically battered the victim—his live-in fiancée—as she gathered her belongings to leave the residence, in a family member's presence. Here, Mr. Black stresses that the 2022 incident was not a domestic incident but a “mental health crisis”—a suicide attempt. This argument is unpersuasive.

As the court noted in Breaux, “[t]he admissibility of evidence under [Article 412.4] is not limited to those actions that are identical or similar in nature to the charged crime.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 8, 366 So.3d at 735 (citations omitted). “Under La. C.E. art. 412.4, evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse is admissible if relevant and the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect.” Breaux, 22-581, pp. 8-9, 366 So.3d at 735 (citations omitted). “Prejudice limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 9, 366 So.3d at 735. In this context, the phrase “unfair prejudice” refers to “the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Id.

Applying these principles, we first observe that the January 2022 incident involved the same defendant, the same victim, and the same residence as the April 2025 incident. Likewise, both the January 2022 and the April 2025 incident involved the defendant's—Mr. Black's—possession or use of a firearm. As in the Breaux case, the previous domestic abuse incident, as the State contends, places the current charges in their “proper context and is independently relevant, not to prove the bad character, but instead to illustrate to the jury the volatile nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim.” Breaux, 22-581, p. 13, 366 So.3d at 737.

Moreover, evidence that Mr. Black had previously wielded a gun in a reckless manner during a domestic disturbance and, in fact, fired a shot “near the door through which [the victim] had just exited” is relevant. Such evidence undermines Mr. Black's claim that during the incident at issue “he picked up the firearm from the bed to secure it in a nightstand.” Such evidence is highly probative because it shows that Mr. Black intentionally placed the victim—Ms. May—in a reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery. For these reasons, we find the district court abused its discretion in denying the State's Motion to admit the 2022 incident under Article 412.4.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the State's writ, reverse the district court's judgment, grant the State's Motion, and remand.

REVERSED; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   La. C.E. art. 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.”

2.   As a commentator points out, “[t]he rationale underlying this exception is that by admitting evidence of a defendant's other acts of domestic violence to show a disposition to commit acts of domestic violence, the statute eliminates any presumption that ‘the charged offense was an isolated incident, an accident, or a mere fabrication.’ ” La. Prac. Evidence, Art. 412.4 (2026 ed.).

Judge Rosemary Ledet