BATISTE v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (2026)

Defendant-Appellant, Edward Michel, in his capacity as Inspector General of the City of New Orleans Office of Inspector General, seeks review of the trial court's July 14, 2025 judgment denying his various declinatory and peremptory exceptions and ordering Defendant to produce records pursuant to La. R.S. 44:31 et seq. in a public records action filed by Plaintiff, Belden Batiste. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment insofar as it denied Defendant's exceptions, vacate the portion of the trial court's judgment ordering production of certain records, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff, who proceeded pro se in the trial court proceedings, filed a pleading titled, “Rule to Show Cause”, which was a printed form provided by the Orleans Civil District Court and completed by Plaintiff in handwritten form. The pleading alleged that a public records request was submitted to Defendant and that Defendant provided incomplete responses to that request. In the pleading, Plaintiff prayed for the trial court to issue an order compelling Defendant to fully respond to his public records request pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 44:31, 44:33, and 44:35.

On April 28, 2025, Defendant filed various dilatory and peremptory exceptions. In summary, Defendant filed exceptions of vagueness, nonconformity with La. C.C.P. art. 891, and improper use of summary proceedings, challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings and complaining that Plaintiff filed a pleading titled “Rule to Show Cause” rather than a petition to institute his public records request proceeding.¹ Defendant further filed exceptions of prematurity, no right of action, and no cause of action, contending that Plaintiff had no right to institute a public records request suit because Defendant had not yet expressly denied Plaintiff's request.

The matter was set for hearing on May 8, 2025. Defendant filed a motion to continue the hearing. On May 8, 2025, defense counsel and Plaintiff appeared before the judge for a status conference and a determination on Defendant's motion to continue.

At that hearing, the parties and the Court discussed at length on the record all of the outstanding items related to Plaintiff's request and ultimately determined that the only outstanding issue between the parties was Defendant's lack of response to Item 6 of the request, which requested: “Mr. Ed Michel's Cell phone text messages from his city issued phone” for the period of January 1, 2022 to February 17, 2025. The trial judge questioned Plaintiff to determine specifically which text message communications he sought from Defendant. Plaintiff responded, “I wanted them from him, his staff, and [New Orleans Ethics Review Board]. That is it.” At that time, defense counsel stated “I can get these to him pretty quickly. He just read a list and that narrowed it. The initial request really was everyone. That is thousands and thousands.” The parties and the court discussed setting the matter for a status conference to attempt to reach an agreement and to allow Defendant time to comply with the narrowed request. The matter was continued without date.

Thereafter, the trial court on its own motion set the matter for a hearing on Defendant's exceptions and the merits of Plaintiff's public records suit for July 9, 2025. Prior to the July 9, 2025 hearing, Defendant had “e-mailed the plaintiff all text messages on IG's cell phone from [Office of Inspector General] and [New Orleans Ethics Review Board] staff” as requested at the May 8, 2025 hearing.

On July 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on Defendant's various exceptions and Plaintiff's public records suit. The record demonstrates that the July 9, 2025 hearing centered primarily on Item 6 of Plaintiff's request. At that time, the transcript suggests that Plaintiff was not satisfied with the narrowed or limited responses as discussed at the May 8, 2025 hearing but rather sought all text message communications for an approximate three-year period as requested in Item 6 of his original written request.²

Concerning Item 6, Defendant introduced into evidence several exhibits reflecting correspondence between the parties. The record reflects that on February 21, 2025, Defendant forwarded correspondence to Plaintiff, stating that the response to Item 6 would “take additional time․estimate[d] to be fifteen additional business days, for review to exclude records exempt from the Public Records Law under La. R.S. 33:9614, La. R.S. 44:3, 4, and 4.1, or protected by attorney-client privilege, and to edit to redact or remove sensitive and confidential information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy․.” On March 14, 2025, Defendant sent additional correspondence indicating that an additional five business days would be necessary to respond to request Item 6. On April 8, 2025, Defendant forwarded a third email correspondence to Plaintiff advising that Item 6 “covers voluminous information” that requires the assistance of the Office of Inspector General's Information Technology Officer for review. On April 10, 2025, Defendant forwarded email correspondence to Plaintiff advising that:

Item 6 of your request as written cannot be fulfilled. However, if you will please limit/modify Item 6 of your request by providing limiting search terms, particular contacts, and/or a shorter time frame, for example, we may be able to timely and effectively fulfill your request. I am available to discuss with you any limitations or modifications that you may be willing to make to Item 6 of your request so that we may get to you the actual public records that you are looking for as you are entitled, without at the same time effectively shutting down our operations to respond.

Defense counsel explained to the Court by argument that Item 6 would require Defendant to review thousands of text communications for over a three-year period individually to redact confidential and privileged information.

At the hearing, Defendant attempted to call as a witness Barbara Jones, an information technology officer for the Office of the Inspector General, to prove that Plaintiff's request for Item 6 was overly broad and would be unduly burdensome for the Inspector General's Office. The trial court did not permit such testimony.

Concerning the evidence and testimony that Defendant sought to present to prove that Plaintiff's request was unduly burdensome, the trial judge stated, “I do not want to hear. That is an excuse.” Without considering any testimony or evidence concerning the information technology functions of Defendant's office, the trial court stated, “You need to update your IT.” When defense counsel attempted to explain that the request was unduly burdensome and to introduce evidence to that effect, the trial judge stated, “I am not buying you cannot get it done because, oh, it is overburdensome and it is all this and all that.”

On July 14, 2025, the trial judge issued a written judgment denying Defendant's exceptions and granting Plaintiff's public records request action as it related to Item 6. The trial court ordered that Defendant produce the requested records related to Item 6 of the public records request, without any modification or limitation, within thirty (30) days from the date of judgment. This timely appeal followed.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

“The legislature, by enacting the ‘Public Records Law’ (LSA–R.S. 44:1 et seq.), sought to guarantee, in the most expansive and unrestricted way possible, the right of the public to inspect and reproduce those records which the laws deem to be public.” Shane v. Par. of Jefferson, 14-2225, p.9 (La. 12/8/15), 209 So.3d 726, 734. “Under La. R.S. 44:35(A), a person who has been denied the right to inspect, copy, reproduce, or obtain a copy or reproduction of a public record may institute proceeding for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, injunctive or declaratory relief, together with attorney's fees, costs and damages.” Muhammad v. Off. of Dist. Att'y for Par. of St. James, 19-24 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/19/19), 275 So.3d 421, 429.

In a public records suit, “the court has jurisdiction to enjoin the custodian from withholding records or to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the production of any records improperly withheld from the person seeking disclosure.” La. R.S. 44:35(B). Where a custodian seeks to deny access to certain requested records, “it is not enough to overcome the public's right of access to public records to claim undue burden or expense; rather, it is only where the request is so burdensome that it interferes with the custodian's constitutional and legal duties that the public's right to access the records may be restricted.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 23-01396, p. 23 (La. 6/28/24), 387 So.3d 527, 542. Thus, “the burden of proving the public record was properly withheld rest[s] squarely with the custodian.” Id., 23-0196, p. 9, 387 So.3d at 534-35; see also, La. R.S. 44:31(B)(3) (“The burden of proving that a public record is not subject to inspection, copying, or reproduction shall rest with the custodian.”). Moreover, should a custodian fail to respond fully to a request, “[t]he burden of proof to justify any restriction or limitation on the public's right to access a public record is on the custodian. La. R.S. 44:31(B)(3).” Id.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that: “Through La. R.S. 44:32(A)(2), the legislature has provided a mechanism for addressing burdensome requests. According to the provisions of this statute, ‘[i]f the custodian reasonably determines that the request would substantially disrupt required government operations, the custodian may deny access only after reasonable attempts to narrow or specify the request with the requestor.’ ” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 23-01396, p. 23, 387 So.3d at 542, quoting La. R.S. 44:32(A)(2).

Thus, La. R.S. 44:32(A) provides a procedure by which an entity can attempt to narrow or limit an unduly burdensome request. At the trial court level, the defendant bears the evidentiary burden to prove that a request is unduly burdensome and thus not subject, as requested, to production.

On appeal, Defendant assigns the following errors: (1) the trial court erred in denying the exceptions of prematurity and no right of action; (2) the trial court erred in denying the exceptions of unauthorized use of summary proceedings and no cause of action; (3) the trial court erred in granting Plaintiff relief on the merits of his public records request suit; and (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant the opportunity to present the testimony of witness Barbara Jones to meet its burden to prove that Plaintiff's request was unduly burdensome.

Exceptions

Defendant filed various exceptions in the trial court. First, Defendant's exceptions of prematurity and no right of action challenged Plaintiff's right to bring a public records suit. At the trial court level and on appeal, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no right to bring such a suit because Defendant has not yet expressly denied Plaintiff's request. Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiff is not entitled to file a proceeding to compel Defendant to produce records where Defendant has not yet denied such records request. Second, Defendant filed exceptions of unauthorized use of summary proceedings, no cause of action, vagueness, and nonconformity with the requirements of La. C.C.P. art. 891, challenging that Plaintiff failed to a petition but rather filed a pleading titled, “Rule to Show Cause” setting forth his public records action.

The Public Records Law is enforced through the procedure set forth in La. R.S. 44:35. This statute allows “[a]ny person who has been denied the right to inspect, copy, reproduce, or obtain a copy or reproduction of a record, ․ either by a determination of the custodian or by the passage of five days, ․ from the date of his in-person, written, or electronic request” to “institute proceedings for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, injunctive or declaratory relief.” La. R.S. 44:35(A).

La. C.C.P. art. 865 provides that “[e]very pleading shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.” Louisiana is a fact pleading state and courts are “tasked with looking ‘to the substance of a pleading rather than its caption to determine the pleading's intent.’ ” Pocket Billiards & Bar, LLC v. Fast & Affordable Coll. Student Movers, Inc., 22-0109, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/10/22), 346 So.3d 399, 401, quoting Joseph v. Wasserman, 15-1193, p. 7 n.3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/4/16), 194 So.3d 720, 725. Thus, “it is the substance rather than the caption of a pleading that determines its effect.” Id., quoting Brown v. Harrel, 98-2931, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/23/00), 774 So.2d 225, 228. Moreover, this Court has consistently found that “[p]ro se plaintiffs are generally given more latitude than those represented by counsel.” Green v. Acadian Ambulance Service, Inc. 25-649, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/26), ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, citing Tatum v. Peoples, 23-0807, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/24), 398 So.3d 723, 729.

In her written reasons for judgment, the trial judge correctly characterized Defendant's various exceptions as complaints primarily concerning “procedural or technical deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleadings.” Granting Plaintiff leniency in the title and format of his pleadings as a pro se litigant, the trial judge denied Defendant's exceptions of prematurity and unauthorized use of summary proceedings. Further, although Defendant contended Plaintiff's suit was premature or that he had no right of action to institute a public records request proceeding because Defendant had not yet expressly denied his request, the trial judge treated Defendant's failure to produce records in response to Item 6 after several months, and considered the discussion between the parties on the record as well as the correspondence introduced into evidence between the parties prior to the hearing, to serve as a “functional denial” of Plaintiff's request as it relates to Item 6.

Upon review of the record on appeal and allowing leniency in the interpretation of Plaintiff's pleadings, we see no error in the trial court's judgment denying Defendant's exceptions.

Public Records Suit

On appeal, Defendant assigns as error the trial court judgment granting Plaintiff's public records suit and ordering Defendant to produce all text message communications for over a three-year period as set forth in Item 6 of Plaintiff's request. Defendant's final assignment of error challenges the trial court proceedings insofar as Defendant was prevented from producing certain evidence and testimony to support his defense of Plaintiff's public records suit—that Plaintiff's request as written was unduly burdensome.

Upon our review of the record on appeal, we find Defendant's final assignment of error has merit, warranting that the judgment at issue be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A review of the transcript in this case, as briefly outlined above, demonstrates that the trial court prohibited Defendant from presenting the testimony of Barbara Jones, an information technology officer who Defendant attempted to call as a witness to prove the breadth and unduly burdensome nature of Plaintiff's request as it relates to Item 6. In denying such evidence, the trial court essentially denied Defendant the ability to attempt to meet his burden at trial on Plaintiff's public records action. We find this error to be prejudicial and to have interdicted the fact-finding process in this case. We accordingly vacate that portion of the judgment ordering Defendant to produce the records associated with Item 6 and remand this matter for a new evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff's suit.

DECREE

Accordingly, for the reasons provided herein, we affirm that portion of the trial court judgment denying Defendant's dilatory and peremptory exceptions. For the reasons herein, we vacate that portion of the trial court judgment granting Plaintiff relief on the merits and ordering the production of Item 6 of Plaintiff's public records request. We remand this matter to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of Plaintiff's public records suit.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Attached to its exceptions, and introduced into evidence at the hearing on the exception, were: Plaintiff's February 12, 2025 original public records request, Plaintiff's February 17, 2025 amended public records request, and various correspondence between Plaintiff and Defendant.

2.   At the hearing, Defendant explained to the Court that Defendant responded to the majority of Plaintiff's requests. The parties discussed Items 32 and 34, which sought sign in sheets or attendance data. Defense counsel informed the Court those records either do not exist or are not in Defendant's custody. Those records are not at issue in this appeal.

Judge Monique G. Morial

LEDET, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT