STATE OF LOUISIANA v. AARON LITTLE (2026)

The defendant, Aaron Little, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder (count one), a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and armed robbery with the use of a firearm (count two), a violation of La. R.S. 14:64 and La. R.S. 14:64.3(A).¹ He pled not guilty, and following a trial by jury, he was found guilty as charged on each count.² He filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, a motion for new trial, and a motion to quash, all of which the trial court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence on count one, and on count two, the defendant was sentenced to fifty years imprisonment without probation or suspension of sentence.³ He was sentenced to an additional five years imprisonment on the firearm enhancement to be served consecutively to his sentence on count two. He filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.

The defendant now appeals, raising five assignments of error, including insufficient evidence to support his convictions of count one, second degree murder, and count two, armed robbery. He also asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash count two based on double jeopardy. He further argues the trial court erred in failing to observe the mandatory twenty-four hour sentencing delay, asserts ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, and contends that his sentence for armed robbery, fifty years, was unconstitutionally excessive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the defendant's conviction as to count one, second degree murder, and affirm, as amended, his sentence on count one. We vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence as to count two, armed robbery with the use of a firearm, and remand for confection of the commitment order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 9, 2021, Jalen Mahone arranged to purchase marijuana from Larmond Henri Godbolt (the victim) at a residence located at 1834 Lassley Street in Bogalusa. After Mahone arrived, he learned that other individuals present at the residence, Aaron “Junior” Little (the defendant), Noah “Juggo” Hinkle, and Willie “Wooski” Cherry, also wanted to purchase marijuana.

When Godbolt arrived at the Lassley Street residence in a vehicle driven by his girlfriend, Elarryca Brown, Mahone went outside, approached the passenger side of the vehicle where Godbolt was seated, and took possession of the marijuana he had paid for via Cash App. Mahone then informed Godbolt that the defendant also wanted to purchase marijuana from him. After Godbolt agreed to another transaction, Mahone went inside, and Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant exited the home, approached the vehicle, robbed Godbolt of the marijuana, and shot him.

Brown immediately drove Godbolt to a nearby hospital, where he died from a gunshot wound to the chest. Thereafter, Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant were apprehended and arrested in Slidell, Louisiana on February 12, 2021.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter or acted as a principal to murder and armed robbery. He asserts that the State's sole witness, Hinkle, is unreliable and his testimony conflicts with physical evidence to such a degree that it cannot support any factual conclusion. He contends he was merely present at the scene when Hinkle acted alone in robbing and shooting Godbolt.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460; see also La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B).

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Currie, 2020-0467 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/22/21), 321 So.3d 978, 982.

When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Alexander, 2021-1346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So.3d 705, 713, writ denied, 2022-01262 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 62.

On count one, the defendant was charged with second degree murder, which is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or

(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of․ armed robbery, first degree robbery, [or] second degree robbery, ․ even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

La. R.S. 1430.1(A).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 1430.1(A)(1) sets forth the specific intent element and La. R.S. 1430.1(A)(2) sets forth the felony murder element.⁴ At trial, the jury was instructed as to both the specific intent and felony murder elements of second degree murder. Specific criminal intent is “that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant's actions. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant's act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Livous, 2018-0016 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 259 So3d 1036, 1040, writ denied, 2018-1788 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.3d 1130.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:24, “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” An individual may be convicted as a principal only for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. Under the law of principals, all persons involved in the commission of a crime are equally culpable. A person may be convicted as a principal to second degree murder even if he has not personally fired the fatal shot. Alexander, 344 So.3d at 713,

One need not possess specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to be a principal to a second degree felony murder. Rather, under the felony murder doctrine, the State need only prove the commission of the underlying felony or the attempt thereof. State v. Southall, 2022-0746 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 925, 931, writ denied, 2023-00875 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 750. Under its felony murder theory, the State alleged the defendant was engaged in the commission of armed robbery with a firearm when the victim was shot and killed. Armed robbery is “the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon.” La. R.S. 14:64(A). Armed robbery is a general intent crime. In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal. See La. R.S. 14:10(2); State v. Martinez, 2024-0134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So.3d 1146, 1154, writ denied, 2025-00123 (La. 5/29/25), 409 So.3d 752. When the dangerous weapon used in the commission of the armed robbery is a firearm, La. R.S. 14:64.3(A) mandates that the offender be imprisoned at hard labor for an additional five-year period, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, along with the burden of proving the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802. When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. It is the role of the factfinder to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. State v. Williams, 2016-0519 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 2017 WL 4082077, *2 (unpublished), writ granted in part on other grounds, denied in part, 2017-1753 (La. 6/15/18), 245 So.3d 1042.

At trial Jalen Mahone, who was then twenty years old, testified that he regularly purchased marijuana from Godbolt, whom he considered a close friend. On the day in question, Mahone arrived at the Lassley Street residence just before dark. Upon entering the residence, he found Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant in the living room; all three had guns, with the defendant and Cherry carrying their guns on their person and Hinkle resting his gun on a nearby charger. Mahone testified that the three asked him if he knew someone who had marijuana and Mahone informed them his supplier, Godbolt, was already on his way there. When Godbolt arrived in a vehicle driven by Brown fifteen to twenty minutes later, it was dark outside. Mahone said he went out to the vehicle, which was parked in the driveway, to get his one gram of marijuana. Mahone denied seeing a gun in Brown's vehicle when he got the marijuana from Godbolt. Mahone testified that he then told Godbolt that the defendant, Cherry, and Hinkle wanted to purchase marijuana. Once Godbolt agreed to another transaction, Mahone went into the residence, passing the defendant and Cherry, who were counting money in the doorway. Mahone testified that he believed they were going to purchase marijuana from Godbolt, as they indicated earlier, although the defendant and Cherry had their guns on them.

Mahone testified that upon reentering the house, he noticed that Hinkle's gun was no longer on the charger. Mahone stated that when he was inside, he heard the gunshot and then heard Brown's vehicle take off. Mahone testified that after the gunshot, Cherry, Hinkle, and the defendant reentered the house. According to Mahone, Cherry seemed nervous and scared and stated, “They tripping.” Mahone further testified Hinkle was “mad” and that Hinkle stated, “[Godbolt], almost shot him in his face.” They gathered their belongings and left.

Laveta Sewell testified that she was living at the Lassley Street residence at the time of the shooting and was home when it occurred. She testified that although she had been drinking and smoking marijuana that day, she was capable of recognizing faces. She noted that on the day of the shooting, Mahone was at the residence as well as the defendant who came to the house with two other male individuals who she did not know. Sewell stated that she did not see a vehicle pull into the driveway, hear any conversations among anyone, or see any guns that day. She further testified that she did not pay much attention to anyone's comings and goings, but she confirmed the defendant and the other two males that arrived with him went outside at one point, as they were not in the house when she heard a loud pop. She testified that following the noise, she immediately fell off the couch onto the floor and remained there for about a minute before opening the door to look outside. According to Sewell, she saw three people walking across the field from the house, and that from the back, the three individuals appeared to look like the defendant and his two associates.

Elarryca Brown testified that she was dating Godbolt at the time of the shooting and was aware that he sold marijuana. Brown confirmed that she drove Godbolt to the Lassley Street residence on the day in question to conduct a marijuana transaction with his friend, Mahone. Although she did not know the address of the residence, she was aware of its location, having driven Godbolt there for previous marijuana transactions, and was able to provide directions to the house to the police when questioned. She stated it was nighttime when they arrived and pulled into the driveway. Brown testified that after Mahone approached the passenger side of the vehicle, Godbolt placed the marijuana on a digital scale, and then passed it to Mahone, who told Godbolt “[the defendant] and them” also wanted to purchase marijuana. Brown said she did not know who the defendant was, but she and Godbolt waited for him to come outside and make his purchase.

Brown testified that after Mahone went back inside the house, two individuals approached the passenger side of the vehicle, with a third individual approaching the vehicle within seconds of the first two. She testified that when the three individuals arrived at the passenger side of the vehicle, they stood close to each other side by side. After Godbolt asked them how much marijuana they wanted, the one in the middle put a silver and black gun to Godbolt's head, as the other two stood by. Brown said she tried to slap the gun away and put the vehicle in reverse, as one of the individuals grabbed the bag of marijuana out of Godbolt's lap and then fired the gun. Godbolt then exclaimed, “I'm hit.”

Brown confirmed that she initially misidentified the individual who placed the gun to Godbolt's head, and testified that she was unable to identify the three individuals or the shooter, as it was dark outside, and the area was not well lit. The black and silver gun Brown recalled seeing the night of the shooting appeared similar to State's Exhibit 16, a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol. Brown further testified she believed all three men acted together because they were standing close together and “no one stopped it[,]․[n]o one acted shocked, [and] [n]o one ran away.” On cross-examination, Brown confirmed that in her initial statement to the police, she indicated that the individual who put the gun to Godbolt's head was the same individual who grabbed the marijuana.

Also testifying at trial was Hinkle, who stated he was present at and participated in the robbery and murder of Godbolt. Hinkle testified that he pled guilty to manslaughter and armed robbery prior to the defendant's trial, receiving a forty-year sentence in exchange for his testimony. Hinkle confirmed that the defendant and Cherry also participated in the robbery. Hinkle testified that he, Cherry, and the defendant arrived at the Lassley Street residence together and Mahone arrived thereafter. He testified that he, Cherry, and the defendant had been smoking marijuana that day and ran out, so they asked Mahone about getting more and Mahone told them he knew Godbolt could get them more marijuana. Hinkle added, “Then we were discussing about we could rob the man and how we can get off him. We asked [the defendant] what did he have. He told us [Godbolt] had a Glock 22 and some weed.” Hinkle further testified he personally had a gun that night, a Glock 30, 45 millimeter and Cherry had “[a] Glock 19, 9 millimeter.” Hinkle stated the defendant had a “Smith & Wesson 40.” Hinkle identified his gun that he had that night and the guns Cherry and the defendant had that night as the guns in evidence.

Hinkle testified that Mahone was aware of the decision to rob Godbolt. After Godbolt arrived, Mahone went outside first to purchase his marijuana then came back inside. Then Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant went outside together. Hinkle clarified that he was a few seconds behind Cherry and the defendant because he had to grab his gun. He said the three of them armed with their guns approached the passenger side of the vehicle where Godbolt was seated. He also saw a female driver in the vehicle. Hinkle testified that they intended to rob Godbolt, but he denied that they discussed killing Godbolt and testified that the shooting was not part of the plan. Hinkle denied pulling his gun out but testified both Cherry and the defendant pulled their guns out and the defendant pointed his gun at Godbolt. Hinkle further testified that he saw the marijuana in the vehicle and that the defendant took the bag of marijuana away from Godbolt and passed it to him and Cherry.⁵ Hinkle further testified that the female in the vehicle “slapped the gun from [Godbolt's] face” and put the car in reverse. He said the defendant then fired his gun, the car pulled back, stopped by the curb, and “took off.”

Hinkle testified that he questioned the defendant after the shooting as to why he did it, and the defendant said, “[I]t was either going to be me or him.” Hinkle denied seeing anything that made him think the defendant was in a “me or him situation.” Hinkle said he told Mahone what happened when he went back in the house, stating he was upset about it, and confirmed he, Cherry, and the defendant went to Mississippi that night. He testified that he touched the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol after the shooting because it was jammed and he was told to unjam it and did so. Hinkle further testified Cherry touched the same gun before and after the shooting. Hinkle admitted he repeatedly lied to the police and the district attorney's office after the shooting when he denied involvement and initially implicated another individual. On cross-examination, Hinkle testified to giving four police statements and admitting he changed his statement after he learned from the police that Cherry identified him as the shooter.

Lieutenant Casey Hidalgo with the Bogalusa Police Department (BPD) testified that she responded to the hospital and scene of the shooting in this case. Lt. Hidalgo testified that a .40 caliber shell casing was recovered at the scene of the shooting and sent to the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory (“crime lab”) for testing. Lt. Hidalgo stated that after speaking to Sewell, a resident of the Lassley Street residence, the defendant became a person of interest in the shooting. Lt. Hidalgo further confirmed that she also interviewed Mahone, who showed her Instagram photographs of Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant, as Mahone identified them by their street names.

The BPD subsequently obtained a search warrant for the home of the defendant's sister, where the defendant had been staying. The BPD also obtained the sister's license plate number and vehicle description, as well as her cell phone information, and the BPD was able to locate the defendant, Cheny, and Hinkle using cell phone tracking. Officers caught up with the defendant's sister's vehicle near Slidell and soon realized it was traveling with other vehicles. When the “caravan” stopped at a gas station in Slidell, officers located Cherry, Hinkle, and the defendant.⁶

The BPD recovered and seized marijuana from the defendant's sister's vehicle. Three firearms, including a .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol, were recovered and seized from the truck in which the defendant was traveling.⁷ The firearms were sent to the crime lab for examination. Swabs taken from the firearms and buccal swabs taken from Cherry, Hinkle, and the defendant were submitted for DNA testing.

Cherry and Hinkle participated in recorded interviews after being advised of their Miranda ⁸ rights. During his statement, Cherry admitted to going to the Lassley Street residence that day to get marijuana. Cherry further admitted he had a gun at the scene, specifically stating he had a 9-millimeter gun. Cherry repeatedly denied that he robbed or shot Godbolt, stating he and the defendant were on the porch, while Hinkle was at the car. Cherry further stated he had no knowledge of Hinkle's plan to rob or shoot Godbolt. Cherry stated he took off running when he heard the gunshot. He admitted he did not try to stop the incident from occurring. During his initial interview, Hinkle did not make any confessions. However, Hinkle participated in a second interview, during which he corroborated information regarding the shooting.

Detective Toby Leos testified regarding the search of Brown's vehicle. He noted there was a bullet hole in the passenger seat, which was saturated in blood. The bullet was ultimately removed and sent to the crime lab for testing.

Chelsee Richardson, a firearms examiner at the crime lab, testified as an expert in the field of firearms examination. Richardson examined the three firearms submitted to the lab, the shell casing recovered from scene of the shooting on Lassley Street, and the bullet that was removed from the passenger seat of Brown's vehicle. Richardson testified that she test-fired each of the firearms, conducted microscopic comparisons, and determined that the shell casing recovered at the scene was fired from the recovered .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol. Richardson confirmed all three of the firearms had no malfunctions or jams during test firing. Based on her examination of the bullet recovered from the passenger seat of Brown's vehicle, Richardson concluded it had characteristics “in agreeance with” the recovered .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol and its weight was also consistent with .40-caliber. However, Richardson testified that the bullet was too damaged to conclusively identify it as having been fired from the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol in evidence.

Ashley Cook, a technical specialist at the crime lab in the forensic DNA unit, testified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis. Cook stated she performed forensic DNA analysis in connection with the DNA evidence submitted to the lab, which included the recovered firearms, swabs taken therefrom, and buccal swabs from Hinkle, Cherry, and the defendant. She noted that some of the swabs taken from the rough surfaces of the pistols did not produce sufficient, interpretable, or amplifiable DNA profiles. However, she determined the DNA profiles obtained from swabs taken from the magazine of the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol and the smooth surfaces of the Glock .45-caliber pistol and laser light each consisted of two contributors. Cherry could not be excluded as a contributor to each of those profiles, testimony was inconsistent with Mahone's testimony and conflicted with the physical forensic and DNA evidence. He argues Hinkle acted alone in the offenses.

Conversely, in its brief, the State argues the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction under the felony murder theory, noting that all the State had to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, was that defendant was involved in the commission of an armed robbery wherein the victim was killed. The State further asserts that the evidence also shows that the defendant acted with specific intent, namely, that the State proved the defendant was the shooter, who after having his gun initially slapped away by Brown, brought his arm back around and stuck the gun into the victim's chest before firing. The State concludes that both with or without specific intent, the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming.

We agree. Compelling testimony was presented by Brown indicating three individuals approached the vehicle; stood very close to each other and acted together; and gave no indication of surprise or disagreement when the marijuana was taken from Godbolt and the pistol was placed to his head. Further, much of the testimony presented by Brown, Mahone, and Hinkle was notably consistent in that the jury could have rationally concluded that all three of the perpetrators embarked on a concerted course of action, each being responsible not only for his own acts, but for those of the others. See State v. Dupre, 2022-1228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/14/23), 367 So.3d 81,86.

Moreover, Brown, who was sitting next to Godbolt when he was shot, testified that the individual who held the gun to Godbolt's head was the same individual who took the marijuana from him. Brown was shown the .40 caliber Smith & Wesson pistol in evidence, recovered from the truck in which defendant was a passenger, and she confirmed it looked like the murder weapon. Expert testimony presented at trial indicated the .40 caliber shell casing found at the scene was fired by the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol in evidence. The damaged bullet removed from the passenger seat of Brown's vehicle, where Godbolt was sitting when he was shot, was consistent in characteristics and weight with the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol. Further, the defendant was neither included nor excluded as a contributor to the DNA profile from the weapons in evidence.

At trial, Hinkle testified the defendant was armed with the .40-caliber Smith & Wesson pistol at the time of the offense. Moreover, Hinkle positively identified the defendant as the person who held the gun to Godbolt's head, snatched marijuana from Godbolt's lap, and fired the fatal shot as the vehicle took off. The jury was free to accept or reject any portion of Hinkle's testimony, and this court will not second-guess the jury's credibility determination.

Finally, we note the defendant fled the scene after the shooting. Flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicate consciousness of guilt and therefore are circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. State v. Stephens, 2024-0399 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/21/25), 407 So.3d 55, 64, writ denied, 2025-00403 (La. 6/3/25), 410 So.3d 784.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Alexander, 344 So.3d at 718.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the jury was irrational in determining the defendant perpetrated an armed robbery, robbed Godbolt at gunpoint and fired the fatal shot. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the elements of second degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. Accordingly, we find no merit in assignment of error number one.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to quash. He argues that although he was charged with specific intent and felony murder with the underlying felony of armed robbery, the State almost exclusively presented its case for second degree murder against the defendant based on the theory of felony murder. Therefore, the convictions for both felony murder and the underlying felony violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The federal and state constitutions both guarantee that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense. See U.S. Const. amend. V; La. Const. art. I, § 15. Double jeopardy provisions protect an accused not only from a second prosecution for the same offense, but also multiple punishments for the same criminal act. U.S. Const. amend. V; La. Const. art. 1, § 15; La. Code Crim. P. art. 591. See State v. Frank, 2016-1160 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 27, 30-34 (finding protections against double jeopardy fall within the analytical framework set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and Louisiana courts need apply only that framework in analyzing questions of double jeopardy). Under the Blockburger test, the applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182.

Thus, the Blockburger test focuses on the statutory elements of the offenses, not on their application to the facts of the specific case before the court or on the actual evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the question under Blockburger is not whether this violation of a certain criminal statute also constituted a violation of a second criminal statute, but whether all violations of the former constitute violations of the latter. Burgess, 315 So.3d at 285.

The State, in brief, concedes to defendant's argument that defendant's convictions for both felony murder and armed robbery violate double jeopardy. Thus, the State agrees that defendant is entitled to relief regarding his conviction for armed robbery with a firearm under count two, pursuant to State ex rel. Adams v. Butler, 558 So.2d 552 (La. 1990). We find merit in the State's concession; thus, we vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence as to count two, armed robbery with the use of a firearm.¹⁰

TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO OBSERVE MANDATORY 24-HOUR SENTENCING DELAY AND PATENT ERROR REVIEW

In assignment of error number three, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motions and then immediately imposing sentence without asking whether the defense would waive the mandatory twenty-four hour sentencing delay. In addressing assignment of error number three, and pursuant to our routine patent error review as outlined in La. Code Crim. P. art. 920,¹¹ we note several issues with respect to sentencing.

Failure to observe the twenty-four hour sentencing delay

In assignment of error number three, the defendant notes he filed motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal, and the trial court denied them on the day of sentencing, just prior to the imposition of the sentences. However, under La. Code Crim. P. art. 873, “[i]f a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled.”¹² There is no indication in the record the defendant waived the delay in this case. In State v. Kisack, 2016-0797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, 1205 (per curiam), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175, 200 L.Ed.2d 322 (2018), the Louisiana Supreme Court found the defense counsel's participation in the sentencing hearing was insufficient to constitute a waiver of the delay required by Article 873. While acknowledging defense counsel's participating, the Court explained, “[a]n implicit waiver . .. runs afoul of the plain language of [Article] 873 that requires that the waiver be expressly made.” Id. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant immediately after ruling on the motion for new trial.

Nevertheless, a failure to observe the twenty-four hour delay provided in Article 873 may be considered harmless error where the defendant cannot show that he suffered prejudice from the violation, and sentencing is not raised on appeal. State v. Stafford, 2020-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/22/21), 321 So.3d 965, 969, citing State v. Augustine, 555 So.2d 1331, 1333-34 (La. 1990). Where, however, a defendant does challenge his sentence, failure to follow the required twenty-four hour delay renders a sentence void. See Augustine, 555 So.2d at 1333-34.

In the instant appeal, through a claim of excessiveness, the defendant challenged his sentence on count two in assignment of error number five, which would meet the requirements of Augustine for remand as to count two.¹³ See State v. McElveen, 2023-0939 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/24), 406 So.3d 429, 449, writ denied, 2025-00563 (La. 11/19/25), 420 So.3d 1188.¹⁴ However, as the conviction and sentence as to count two must be vacated, and the life sentence imposed on count one is mandated by La. R.S. 14:30.1(B), we find any error in the trial court's failure to observe the twenty-four hour delay as to count one harmless and does not require a remand for resentencing. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, 380, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997); State v. Savoie, 2024-0769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/11/25), 417 So.3d 1149, 1155, writ denied, 2025-01006 (La. 1/28/26), 425 So.3d 115.

Failure to impose sentences at hard labor

As noted at the outset of this opinion, the sentencing transcript reveals the trial court did not impose the defendant's sentences at hard labor, despite being statutorily mandated to do so. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(B); La. R.S. 14:64(B); and La. R.S. 14:64.3(A). Inasmuch as an illegal sentence is an error discoverable by a mere inspection of the proceedings without inspection of the evidence, La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2) authorizes consideration of such an error on appeal. Moreover, La. Code Crim. P. art. 882(A) authorizes the appellate court to correct an illegal sentence on review. Thus, correction of the sentence does not involve sentencing discretion, and as such, this court has the authority to simply amend the sentence. See State v. Jefferson, 2018-0037 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/1/18), 2018 WL 2454474, *4 (unpublished). Accordingly, we hereby amend the sentence on count one to provide that it be served at hard labor.¹⁵ We instruct the trial court to amend the commitment order to accurately reflect that the defendant's sentence on count one is to be served at hard labor and to transmit a corrected commitment order to the Louisiana Department of Corrections Legal Department. See State v. Ledezma, 2024-0258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 988, 1001, writ denied, 2025-00114 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 574.

Improper restriction of parole

The sentencing transcript also reveals the trial court inadvertently restricted parole on count one in stating, “Aaron Little, for second degree murder of Larmond Henri Godbolt, having been indicted on or after August 1, 2017, the [c]ourt finds that there's no Miller hearing required, and sentences you to life without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Any parole to be had, in accordance with [La. R.S.] 15.574.4(F).” (Emphasis added). In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. See also La. R.S. 15:574.4(F); La. Code Crim. P. art. 878.1. The defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses.

The appropriate remedy for a juvenile sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a non-homicide crime is to let stand the life sentence, but delete the mandatory restriction on parole eligibility. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2034, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010); State v. Shaffer, 2011-1756 (La. 11/23/11), 77 So.3d 939, 942 (per curiam). Our courts have used the same approach in applying Miller to sentencing juveniles for homicide. State v. Graham, 2014-1769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/24/15), 171 So.3d 272, 280, writ denied, 2015-1028 (La. 4/8/16), 191 So.3d 583. Thus, the only sentence available to the defendant on count one under Miller was life with parole eligibility (barring any deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence, pursuant to State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672 and State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La. 1993)). State v. Young, 2018-0564 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/5/18), 2018 WL 5785260, *4 (unpublished), writ denied, 2018-1968 (La. 5/20/19), 271 So.3d 201.

In the instant case, it is clear from the record the trial court attempted to impose the mandatory minimum sentence for the defendant's conviction on count one with the benefit of parole eligibility as evidenced by its acknowledgment that parole is restricted by La. R.S. 15:574.4(B). However, the trial court inadvertently restricted the benefit of parole prior to that acknowledgment. As the trial court's intentions are clear from the record and the only sentence available under Miller was life with parole eligibility, correction of the error does not involve sentencing discretion and does not require remand for resentencing. We exercise our authority under La. Code Crim. P. art. 882(A) to vacate the trial court's restriction of parole on count one. See State v. Fontenot, 2016-0724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/28/16), 2016 WL 6395348, *3 (unpublished). We instruct the trial court to amend the commitment order to reflect the defendant's sentence on count one is to be served with the benefit of parole in accordance with the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4(F) and transmit a corrected commitment order to the Louisiana Department of Corrections Legal Department.

Advisement of delays for post-conviction relief

Finally, the record reflects after imposing the sentences, the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8(D) directs the trial court to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at the time of sentencing. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. However, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. Hollins, 2023-0785 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/19/24), 3 87 So.3d 641, 652, writ denied, 2024-00487 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So.3d 865. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead advise the defendant La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. Hollins, 387 So.3d at 652.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF SENTENCING COUNSEL/ EXCESSIVE SENTENCE 16

In assignment of error number four, the defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. He argues counsel was per se deficient, as counsel did not present any mitigation, legal argument, or witnesses to the court in advance of sentencing.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted. However, in the interest of judicial economy, an appellate court may address the issue of ineffective assistance when the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue and the defendant raises the issue by assignment of error on appeal. State v. Kimble, 2023-0176 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/23), 376 So.3d 869, 875.

A court analyzes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the two-pronged test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The defendant must show: (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced him. To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for the attorney's unprofessional errors, the proceeding would have resulted differently. It is unnecessary to address both prongs of the Strickland test if the defendant makes an inadequate showing as to one prong. Kimble, 376 So.3d at 875. In the context of sentencing, if a defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, his sentence would have been different, a basis for an ineffective assistance claim may be found. State v. Chatman, 2021-13 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/29/22), 344 So.3d 131, 134.

Further, as applied to ineffective assistance at sentencing claims, an objectively reasonable standard of performance requires that counsel be aware of the sentencing options in the case and ensure all reasonably available mitigating information and legal arguments are presented to the court. State v. Harris, 2018-1012 (La. 7/9/20), 340 So.3d 845, 858. In the instant case, the defendant cites Harris in arguing his attorney was per se deficient for failing to present any mitigation or legal argument before sentencing. He notes he was only sixteen years old at the time of the shooting and was a first-offender.

In Harris, 340 So.3d at 858, the Louisiana Supreme Court held counsel at sentencing could be ineffective for failing to investigate mitigating circumstances. The defendant in Harris contended his attorney was ineffective at sentencing because he failed to argue for a downward departure from a mandatory life sentence under the habitual offender statute. In agreeing with the defendant, the Court noted counsel does not adequately represent his client when he fails to conduct a reasonable investigation into factors which may warrant a downward departure from the mandatory minimum. Id.

In State v. Clement, 2023-1356 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/10/24), 404 So.3d 739, 752-53, writ denied, 2025-00039 (La. 4/1/25), 404 So.3d 655, this court discussed Harris in reviewing a similar ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In Clement, the defendant challenged the imposition of a five-year maximum sentence for his conviction of negligent homicide, arguing it was unconstitutionally excessive. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing based on his counsel's failure to present any mitigating evidence. This court found the sentence was not unconstitutionally excessive but stated, “[W]e are troubled by the fact that counsel did not present any argument or mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing.” Clement, 404 So.3d at 750-51. This court noted that the State presented numerous victim impact statements from the victims’ families and friends, while defense counsel simply stated the defendant would not make a statement and was ready to waive sentencing delays and proceed with sentencing. There was no indication the trial court was aware of mitigating factors, and the trial court did not have access to a pre-sentence investigation report. Thus, this court remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing. See Clement, 404 So.3d at 753.

Herein, as amended by this court and intended by the trial court, the defendant's life sentence is with the benefit of parole pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4(F). Thus, the defendant has benefitted as a result of his age at the time of the offenses. Miller and its progeny do not entitle a defendant to be resentenced to a fixed number of years. Rather, Miller requires simply that a sentencing court consider an offender's youth and attendant characteristics as mitigating circumstances before deciding whether to impose the harshest possible penalty for juveniles who have committed a homicide offense. State v. Coleman, 2023-1020 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/17/24), 3 88 So.3d 420, 425.

At sentencing, the State presented victim impact statements from three individuals. Thereafter, the trial court imposed the sentences. Defense counsel did not present any mitigating factors, there is no pre-sentence investigation report in the record,¹⁷ and there is no indication in the record that the trial court was aware of any mitigating factor other than the defendant's age. Moreover, after the sentences were imposed, defense counsel merely submitted his motion to reconsider sentence on its face, without argument.¹⁸ Considering the above, we find appellate review of the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited by the record. Cf. Anderson, 2023-0271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 2023 WL 7270839, *5 (unpublished), writ denied, 2023-01591 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 241. Because the record does not allow for definitive resolution on appeal, we find the defendant's claim is more properly relegated to post-conviction proceedings, where the trial court may conduct a full evidentiary hearing.¹⁹ See State v. Clement, 404 So.3d at 753.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's second-degree murder conviction and affirm his sentence as amended. Due to a double jeopardy violation, we vacate his armed robbery with the use of a firearm conviction and sentence. Finally, we instruct the trial court to correct the commitment order to reflect that the sentence is to be served at hard labor with the benefit of parole and to transmit the corrected commitment order to the Department of Corrections Legal Department.

SECOND DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION AFFIRMED AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; ARMED ROBBERY WITH THE USE OF A FIREARM CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF THE COMMITMENT ORDER.

The State established beyond a reasonable double all the elements of second-degree murder. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A). The State also established beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of armed robbery with a firearm. See La. R.S. 14:64 & La. R.S. 14:64.3(A). However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that those convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.¹

The Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), declared the applicable rule for analyze claims of double jeopardy: where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. See also State v. Frank, 2016-1160 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 27, 33-34. Thus, the Blockburger test focuses on the statutory elements of the offenses, not on their application to the facts of the specific case before the court or on the actual evidence presented at trial. Therefore, the question under Blockburger is not whether this violation of a certain criminal statute also constituted a violation of a second criminal statute, but whether all violations of the former constitute violations of the latter. Burgess, 315 So.3d at 285.

There is not a violation of double jeopardy when a defendant is convicted of second degree murder and an underlying felony when there is sufficient evidence to support second degree murder as a specific intent crime. State v. Thomas, 50,929 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So.3d 263, 279, writ denied, 2016-1642 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So.3d 980. As the trial court noted in denying the defendant's motion to quash, the jury was instructed with theories of second degree murder based on both specific intent and felony-murder. Further, the evidence presented at trial supports a finding of specific intent to kill in this case, which the majority also acknowledged.

Under the specific intent theory of second degree murder, we find the crimes of second degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm are two separate and distinct offenses, requiring separate and distinct evidence for conviction. Each offense required proof of an additional fact not required by the other offense. Specifically, second degree murder under the specific intent theory requires proof of the killing of a human being and specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, elements that are not required to prove armed robbery with a firearm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) & La. R.S. 14:64(A). Further, armed robbery with a firearm requires the taking of anything of value, an element not required to prove second degree murder under the specific intent theoiy. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) & La. R.S. 14:64(A). Thus, the defendant failed to meet the burden of proof under his double jeopardy claim since each of his convictions require the proof of at least one additional fact which is not required by the other provision. See State v. Tabb, 55, 514 (La. App. 2d Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So.3d 1066, 1080, writ denied, 2024-00617 (La. 1/14/25), 398 So.3d 648.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. The defendant was charged along with Noah Hinkle, who was seventeen at the time of the offenses, and Willie Cherry, who was fifteen at the time of the offenses. Hinkle pled guilty to manslaughter and armed robbery and testified against the defendant and Cherry at trial.

2.   Co-defendant Cherry was also found guilty as charged on each count. This court affirmed Cherry's conviction and sentence (as amended) for second degree murder and vacated his conviction and sentence for armed robbery due to violation of double jeopardy. State v. Cherry, 2024-0525 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/24/25), 417 So.3d 624, 635-636, writ denied, 2025-00658 (La. 11/5/25), 420 So.3d 34.

3.   The minutes state that the sentences were imposed at hard labor and with the benefit of parole. However, as later discussed in the patent error review section, the sentencing transcript reveals the trial court did not impose the sentences at hard labor and inadvertently restricted parole on count one. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

4.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1(A)(2) contains the circumstances under which a defendant can be found guily under the “felony murder rule,” which dispenses with the necessity of proving mens rea accompanying a homicide—the underlying felony supplies the culpable mental state. State v. Small, 2011-2796 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 797, 805.

5.   On cross-examination, Hinkle testified Cherry purchased some marijuana when they first approached the vehicle.

6.   Cherry and Hinkle were in the backseat of the defendant's sister's vehicle, while the defendant was traveling in a white truck.

7.   A fourth firearm was recovered but not seized, as it was determined to belong to the driver of the vehicle who cooperated with the police.

8.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

10.   The defendant's fifth assignment of error is moot due to this court's decision to vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence as to count two.

11.   Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242.

12.   Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873 does not require the same delay after the denial of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Thus, a trial court's failure to apply the twenty-four hour sentencing delay under La. Code Crim. P. art. 873 between the denial of a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and sentencing is neither a patent error nor a valid basis to vacate a sentence when assigned as error. State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/26/24), 405 So.3d 786, 797, writ denied, 2024-01276 (La. 4/23/25), 406 So.3d 1177.

13.   Under La. R.S. 14:64(B), the sentencing range for armed robbery (count two) is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years. In this case, the trial court imposed a mid-range sentence of fifty years on count two.

14.   Petition for Certiorari docketed on February 27, 2026 with the United States Supreme Court.

15.   As the sentence on count two must be vacated, this sentencing error is moot as to count two.

17.   A pre-sentence investigation report would have included information regarding the defendant's criminal history, his family situation and background, economic and employment status, education, and personal habits. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 875(A)(1).

18.   The defendant's motion to reconsider sentence contains boilerplate language stating “the sentence received was excessive” under “the criteria outlined in the Sentencing Guidelines, La. [Code Crim.] P. art. 894.1[.]”

19.   The defendant would have to satisfy the requirements of La. Code Crim. P. art. 924, et seq., in order to receive such a hearing. Anderson, 2023 WL 7270839 at *4 n.6.

1.   In its brief, the State concedes the defendant is entitled to relief under his assignment of error related to double jeopardy. However, regarding assignment of error number one, the State also argued the evidence showed the defendant acted with specific intent, citing reasons consistent with this court's assessment of the evidence. Therefore, I read the State's concession as an alternative argument asserted in the event this court did not find sufficient evidence to support a second-degree murder conviction under La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1)(requiring specific intent to kill or cause great bodily harm).

FIELDS, J.

Edwards, J. dissents in part with reasons.