LARICHA ALFRED AND JOHN ALFRED v. WALGREEN LOUISIANA COMPANY INC ABC INSURANCE COMPANY AND JOHN DOE (2026)

Plaintiffs, Laricha Alfred and John Alfred (the “Alfreds”), appeal the district court's September 26, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Elliott Security Solutions, LLC (“Elliott”) and Acceptance Indemnity Insurance Company (“Acceptance”) and dismissing all claims against Elliott and Acceptance with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This litigation arises out of the shooting death of the Alfreds’ son, Ja'Mere Alfred (“Ja'Mere”), on December 25, 2020, in the parking lot of the Walgreens store located at 11297 Lake Forest Boulevard in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Alfreds filed suit against multiple defendants, including Walgreen Louisiana Company, Inc. (“Walgreens”) and various security-related entities – Single Source Security, LLC d/b/a Protos Security (“Protos”) and Elliott – alleging, among other things, that defendants owed Ja'Mere a duty to protect him from foreseeable criminal activity, breached that duty, and shared custody or garde of the premises where the shooting occurred. In Alfred v. Walgreens Louisiana Co., Inc., this Court recently acknowledged that:

At the time of the incident, Protos had a service agreement (the “Agreement”) with Walgreens under which Protos arranged for security services through subcontractors. Protos, in turn, had an Independent Contractor Agreement (“Contractor Agreement”) with [Elliott], which provided a security [officer] at the Walgreens store.

2025-0578, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/20/26), ___ So.3d ___, 2026 WL 1413148 at *1 (“Alfred I”).

On July 1, 2025, Elliott and Acceptance filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Elliott contended that the summary judgment evidence established that it was contracted to provide one armed security officer inside the Walgreens store, not in the parking lot; that the shooting occurred outside the scope of its contractual undertaking; that it did not increase the risk of harm to Ja'Mere; and that it did not exercise the direction and control necessary to establish custody or garde of the premises.

The district court heard the motion on September 19, 2025, and thereafter took the matter under advisement. In its written judgment with reasons, dated September 26, 2025, the district court found that the applicable work order required Elliott to “maintain a presence in the front of the store.” The district court determined that Elliott's contractual undertaking did not extend to the parking lot. Accordingly, it concluded that the Alfreds failed to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding either duty or garde. Therefore, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the Alfreds’ claims against Elliott and its insurer, Acceptance, with prejudice.

The Alfreds filed a motion for devolutive appeal on October 17, 2025, and the order granting the appeal was signed on October 23, 2025. This timely appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review for a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Kazen v. Red Lion Hotels Corp., 2021-01820, p. 2 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 267, 269 (citation omitted). “After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The mover bears the burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). If the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the mover is not required to negate every essential element of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Id. The mover need only point out an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to that claim, action, or defense. Id. In Alfred I, we observed:

“The granting of summary judgment is contingent upon the pleadings, depositions, answers to discovery, admissions on file and affidavits demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Majoue v. Fish, 2023-0549, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/8/24), 385 So.3d 321, 325. Genuine issues are ones in which reasonable factfinders could disagree. Id. “[I]f reasonable persons could only reach one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue, and summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. “A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute.” Id.

2025-0578, p. 4, ___ So.3d at *2. “The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Manning v. RH Windrun, LLC, 2023-0588, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/1/24), 421 So.3d 1, 6 (citing La. C.C.P. art. 996(A)(2)). “The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends.” Id.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Alfreds assert three assignments of error; however, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Elliott's motion for summary judgment.¹ In their petition, the Alfreds alleged negligence and premises liability against Elliott under La. C.C. arts. 2315, 2315.1, 2315.2, 2317, and 2317.1. “Whether a claim arises in negligence under La. C.C. art. 2315 or in premises liability under La. C.C. art. 2317.1, the traditional duty/risk analysis is the same.” Alfred I, 2025-0578, pp. 4-5, ___ So.3d at *2 (citing Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 2022-00849, p. 5 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So.3d 467, 471-72).

Under the duty-risk analysis, the plaintiff is required to prove five elements in order to be successful in a negligence claim: (1) that the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) that the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) that the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of duty element); and (5) actual damages (the damages element). Id. at p. 5, ___ So.3d at *2. “While interpreting La. C.C. art. 2317.1, this Court has expressed that to succeed under a custodial theory of recovery, the plaintiff must prove four elements by a preponderance of the evidence; specifically: (1) the thing was in the custodian's custody or control; (2) the thing had a vice or defect, which created an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the vice or defect presented an unreasonable risk of harm; and (4) the defect caused the plaintiff's damages.” Id. at p. 5, ___ So.3d at *3 (citing Haynes v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2023-0678, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/24), 399 So.3d 626, 640). A plaintiff's failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal to the negligence claim. Id. at pp. 5-6, ___ So.3d at *3 (citing Ramirez v. Lighthouse Prop. Ins. Corp., 2021-0184, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/21), 333 So.3d 1286, 1291).

The Alfreds contend the district court erred in granting summary judgment because Elliott owed a duty of care to Ja'Mere. The threshold inquiry in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Manning, 2023-0588, p. 9, 421 So.3d at 7 (quoting FIE, LLC v. New Jax Condo Ass'n, Inc., 2016-0843, p. 23 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/21/18), 241 So.3d 372, 391-92). Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. Farrell, 2022-00849, p. 6, 359 So.3d at 473 (citing Malta v. Herbert S. Hiller Corp., 2021-209, p. 11 (La. 10/10/21), 333 So.3d 384, 395); see also Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-1222, p. 4 (La. 11/30/99), 752 So.2d 762, 766. “Specific duties can arise from codal, statutory, administrative and local laws, as well as private contracts and custom.” Favret v. Favret, 2022-0820, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/31/23), 371 So.3d 511, 521-522 (citing Doe v. McKesson, 2021-00929, p. 15 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 524, 537 n.1 (Weimer, C.J., concurring)) (emphasis added). Where the alleged duty arises from a contractual relationship, its scope is defined by the contract's express terms. See Bonilla v. Verges Rome Architects, 2023-00928, p. 3 (La. 3/22/24), 382 So.3d 62, 65.

“Louisiana Civil Code Article 2317.1 establishes a duty on a ‘custodian of property to keep [that] property in a reasonably safe condition.’ ” Alfred I, 2025-0578, p. 5, ___ So.3d at *3 (citing Ramirez, 2021-0184, pp. 3-4, 333 So.3d at 1289-90). However, there is no duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third persons unless such a duty has been assumed. See Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364, 1371 (La. 1984). “Whether a legal duty is owed by one party to another depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties.” Brou v. Orleans Par. Criminal Sheriff's Office, 2003-1760, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/05), 897 So.2d 817, 820; see also Terrell v. Wallace, 1998-2595, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/99), 747 So.2d 748, 750.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Elliott attached Protos’ responses to the Alfreds’ request for production of documents; excerpts from the deposition of Walgreens’ corporate representative, Gerard Robinette (“Mr. Robinette”); Protos’ answers to the Alfreds’ interrogatories; the Alfreds’ original petition for damages; Walgreens’ responses to the Alfreds’ interrogatories and requests for production of documents; excerpts from the deposition of Walgreens’ employee, Rishard Davis; the Alfreds’ supplemental opposition to Protos’ motion for summary judgment; excerpts from the deposition of Protos’ corporate representative, Blake Vaughan; excerpts from the deposition of Elliott's security officer working the night of the shooting, Justin Wells (“Mr. Wells”); and excerpts from the deposition of Elliott's corporate representative, Dayone Elliott. Elliott also filed a motion to file exhibits under seal, namely, the Protos-Elliott Work Order (“Work Order”) and the Contractor Agreement.

As previously noted, at the time of the incident, Walgreens retained Protos to arrange security services through subcontractors, and Protos, pursuant to its independent contractor agreement with Elliott, supplied a security officer for the subject store. The Alfreds contend that, by those agreements, Elliott assumed a duty sufficiently broad to encompass the parking lot. They point to provisions addressing customer safety, the escort of Walgreens employees to their vehicles, and the deterrence of violence and other criminal activity. According to the Alfreds, these provisions imposed obligations extending beyond the store's interior and into the parking lot area where the shooting occurred.

The summary judgment evidence does not support the Alfreds’ position. During his deposition, Walgreens’ corporate representative, Mr. Robinette, testified that Walgreens determined the level and type of security to be provided at this location; that the post orders called for one armed security officer to be stationed inside the store; and that Walgreens never requested parking lot patrols for this store. He further testified that the security officer's role was to follow Walgreens’ post orders and maintain a security presence at the store.

Protos's corporate representative, Mr. Vaughan, offered materially consistent testimony during his deposition. He testified that the post Walgreens requested for this store was not a parking lot security post and that Walgreens – not Protos – determined whether a requested post included parking lot duties. According to Mr. Vaughan, Walgreens did not request parking lot security officers for this location, and had it wanted an officer assigned to the parking lot, that duty would have been included in its security request to Protos.

The district court found this evidence consistent with the Work Order language requiring Elliott to “maintain a presence in the front of the store,” concluding that Elliott's contractual undertaking contemplated an interior post, not a parking lot patrol function. We agree. Read as a whole, and in light of the uncontroverted testimony in the record, the Work Order did not impose upon Elliott a duty to patrol or secure the parking lot against the sudden criminal act at issue in this case.

Accordingly, Elliott established that it owed no duty to provide security in the parking-lot area where the shooting occurred. The Alfreds, in turn, failed to produce competent summary judgment evidence that Elliott undertook the specific duty they seek to impose. Further, even assuming Elliott owed or voluntarily assumed a duty to Ja'Mere, the record does not support a finding that Elliott breached that duty. Nevertheless, the Alfreds contend that Elliott failed to provide adequate security and to serve as an armed deterrent, and they maintain that the record contains no evidence that Elliott's security officer was present at his assigned post when the shooting occurred.

The record does not support the Alfreds’ contention. Elliott submitted the surveillance video from the Walgreens store – as part of the Walgreens’ responses to the Alfreds’ requests for production of documents – showing that Ja'Mere and another individual entered the Walgreens store, that an SUV arrived shortly thereafter, and that, upon exiting the store, Ja'Mere walked directly to that SUV and was shot approximately one minute after its arrival. The record further reflects that there was no prior altercation, no suspicious activity, and no expressed concern for safety before the shooting. Elliott also submitted evidence, through the deposition testimony of Mr. Wells, that he was posted inside the store – his assigned post – at the time of the incident.

Once Elliott made that showing, the burden shifted to the Alfreds to produce factual support sufficient to establish a genuine issue for trial. The Alfreds failed to do so. They produced no competent summary judgment evidence contradicting Elliott's showing that the security officer was at his assigned post inside the store. Nor did they identify evidence demonstrating that any act or omission by Elliott constituted a breach of a duty owed under the circumstances presented herein.

Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that Elliott's conduct increased the risk of harm. Rather, the evidence reflects a sudden shooting by an unknown third party in the parking lot, occurring without warning and outside the scope of the officer's assigned interior post. On this record, the Alfreds failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to breach, causation, or scope of protection.

The Alfreds also argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment despite evidence and legal precedent that Elliott shared custody or garde of the Walgreens premises with Walgreens. Regarding shared custody or garde, this Court has observed:

In determining whether custody or garde over a premise is shared, the courts look to the parties’ actions and relationships to the thing causing injury. The test for determining custody or garde is two-fold. First, we must determine whether the defendant bears such a relationship as to have the right of direction or control over the thing. Next inquiry is, what, if any, kind of benefit the defendant derives from the thing.

Alfred I, 2025-0578, p. 6, ___ So.3d at *3.

The Alfreds contend Elliott shared garde because it undertook responsibilities relating to customer safety and deterrence of criminal conduct. However, this argument, conflates a limited service obligation with the legal right of direction and control required for garde. The summary judgment evidence established that Elliott did not own the parking lot, did not determine what security services would be provided there, and had no authority to alter, repair, or otherwise control the premises. Rather, Mr. Robinette testified that Walgreens exclusively determined the nature and extent of security measures at the store and that the post orders came from Walgreens. The same evidence showed Elliott's assignment was limited to an interior security officer post.

The Alfreds produced no factual support demonstrating that Elliott shared with Walgreens the right to direct, manage, or control the parking lot where the shooting occurred. In the absence of such evidence, the district court correctly concluded that the Alfreds failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of garde.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's September 26, 2025 judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Elliott and Acceptance and dismissing the claims of the Alfreds against Elliott and Acceptance with prejudice is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Alfreds assert three assignments of error: (1) the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Elliott's motion for summary judgment because Elliott owed a duty of care to Ja'Mere; (2) the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Elliott's motion for summary judgment because Elliott breached the duty of care it owed to Ja'Mere; and (3) the district court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment despite evidence and legal precedent that Elliott shared custody or garde of the Walgreens store located at 11297 Lake Forest Boulevard in New Orleans, Louisiana, with Walgreens.

Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott