STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ADOLPH SCOTT (2026)

Defendant, Adolf R. Scott (“Defendant”), appeals his convictions for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and production of pornography involving a juvenile under the age of seventeen.

For the following reasons, we affirm Defendant's convictions, amend Defendant's sentence for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile (count two) to reflect the sentence set forth in the October 25, 2024 minute entry and affirm as amended; and affirm the sentence for the production of pornography involving a juvenile (count three).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 12, 2019, the State filed a bill of information charging Defendant with one count of trafficking of children for sexual purposes (count one), one count of carnal knowledge of a juvenile (count two), and one count of the production of pornography involving juveniles (count three), violations of La. R.S. 14:46.3, 14:80, and 14:81.1, respectively.¹

Defendant appeared for arraignment on February 26, 2019, and entered pleas of not guilty. On March 11, 2019, Defendant filed motions to suppress statements and evidence and a motion to determine probable cause, which the trial court denied following a hearing on August 7, 2023.²

On October 19, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to exclude expert testimony regarding digital cell phone data and child trafficking. After conducting Daubert hearings on October 30, 2023 and October 31, 2023, the trial court denied Defendant's motion.³

On November 6, 2023, the State filed a motion for a proposed special jury instruction to exclude the defense of “mistake of fact,” which the trial court ultimately granted.⁴

Jury trial commenced on November 7, 2023, and on November 9, 2023, the jury returned unanimous verdicts finding Defendant not guilty of trafficking of children for sexual purposes, but finding him guilty as charged of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and production of pornography involving juveniles.

Defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment on November 13, 2023. The State filed an opposition thereto on November 21, 2023. The trial court denied the motion in arrest of judgment on November 27, 2023.

Defendant moved for a new trial on December 21, 2023. The same day, the trial court denied Defendant's motion.

Defendant appeared for sentencing on January 12, 2024, wherein the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years imprisonment at hard labor for the felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile conviction and concurrent sentences of twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for the production of juvenile pornography conviction.⁵ The trial court also ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender upon his release as to both counts.

On January 23, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Following a hearing on October 25, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to reconsider in part. The trial court reduced Defendant's sentence for the production of pornography involving juveniles to fifteen years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, but maintained Defendant's sentence of ten years imprisonment at hard labor for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile.

Defendant filed another motion to reconsider sentence as well as a motion for appeal on October 28, 2024.⁶ On March 21, 2025, the trial court denied Defendant's second motion to reconsider sentence and granted his motion for appeal.

FACTS

Sergeant Michael Sam (“Sgt. Sam”) of the NOPD testified that on September 15, 2018, he was one of the officers dispatched to the Motel 6 on Old Gentilly Road in response to a 911 call “about a possibly exploited juvenile.” He stated that he and the other officers at the scene “made some detentions of some individuals” and “made a detention of the juvenile who was later found to be exploited.” Once Sgt. Sam confirmed the suspected allegations, the case was transferred to the Special Victims Unit.

On cross-examination, Sgt. Sam testified that he learned from dispatch that a “concerned citizen” reported that someone at the motel was attempting to sell him a juvenile. One of the suspects was described as having “dreads” and wearing a white shirt. Sgt. Sam testified that he first observed Defendant in the hallway of the motel “in close proximity to the vending machine” and detained him.⁷ Although Sgt. Sam did not administer Miranda warnings, Defendant identified himself and explained that he was there with a friend. Sgt. Sam noted that Defendant was cooperative during the detention. Sgt. Sam also testified that he spoke to the juvenile victim at the scene who claimed her birthdate was September 18, 2000.

On redirect examination, Sgt. Sam testified that another officer at the scene located the victim's name in the computer database and learned that she had been listed as “an either in-danger or exploited juvenile.”

Erika Darby (“Ms. Darby”) testified that she worked at the Orleans Parish Communication District authenticating 911 records. She identified and authenticated both the audio recorded 911 call and the corresponding written report, which the State introduced and published to the jury.⁸ Ms. Darby testified that the written report reflected that at 1:54 p.m., someone named “Cardal” reported that the “subject is now in the rear Motel 6 parking lot trying to sell the girl to someone in progress.” At 2:03 p.m., the caller reported that the “[s]ubject is inside the Motel 6 in the lobby between first and second floor.”

On cross-examination, Ms. Darby testified that the report reflected the 911 caller's name as Cardal Hayes and that the suspect was initially described as an unknown, black male. She conceded that as a custodian for the New Orleans Communication Division she is not involved in the investigation and has no idea about the accuracy of the information provided by the caller.

Sergeant Bianca Boone (“Sgt. Boone”) of the NOPD testified she was working in the child abuse unit at the time of the incident and was assigned to investigate the case. Sgt. Boone identified a “wanted poster” reporting the victim missing which listed her birthdate as September 18, 2003 and stated that she would have been fourteen years old at the time of the investigation. She identified the wanted poster and it was introduced into evidence.

Sgt. Boone stated that when she arrived at the scene, she learned that “the victim was a runaway from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and that she had possibly been involved in some sexual activity.” Sgt. Boone spoke to “the 911 complainant,” who reported that “[D]efendant was trying to sell a juvenile to a gentleman at the hotel for $250.” Sgt. Boone testified that she obtained surveillance footage from a hotel employee, which the State introduced and played for the jury.

Sgt. Boone identified both Defendant and the victim in the surveillance footage and observed that “the victim's arms [we]re around [Defendant's] waist.” She also identified a silver, GL450 Mercedes in the parking lot that matched the description and license plate reported in the 911 call.⁹ Photographs of the vehicle were introduced into evidence.

Sgt. Boone testified that she arrested Defendant at the scene and seized his cell phone, for which she later obtained a search warrant. Sgt. Boone stated the contents of Defendant's cell phone revealed “explicit video[s]” as well as “pictures of the victim [and] pictures of [Defendant].” She also stated that Defendant's identification card listed his birthdate as June 29, 1989. Sgt. Boone noted that Defendant would have been 29 years old on September 15, 2018. Defendant's ID and cell phone were introduced into evidence. Sgt. Boone also identified photographs taken of Defendant at police headquarters. The photographs were introduced into evidence.

Sgt. Boone testified that she referred the victim for a forensic interview at the Audrey Hepburn Care Center at Children's Hospital and observed the interview from a separate room. She stated that during the interview, the victim alleged that she had been abused by a number of people unrelated to the instant case and that those allegations were investigated separately.

On cross-examination, Sgt. Boone testified that she interviewed Defendant at police headquarters and advised him he was being investigated for child sex trafficking. Sgt. Boone said Defendant signed a Miranda form, waiving his Miranda rights. She conceded that during the interview she told Defendant she suspected he was being dishonest and he replied, “[j]ust ask [the victim].”

Sgt. Boone testified that during her investigation of the incident she had also interviewed the driver of the Mercedes-Benz, Joshua Smith. However, Sgt. Boone stated that Defendant was the only suspect arrested in this case. She stated that she neither arrested nor located anyone named, “Sim,” during her investigation, nor did she arrest Joshua Smith. Sgt. Boone also stated she had not obtained search warrants for either the victim's or Defendant's social media accounts.

Sgt. Boone stated that she participated in the forensic examiner's interview of the victim. She noted she was able to communicate with the interviewer from a separate room and “was able to ask the forensic interviewer to follow up with questions if [she] had any.”

On redirect examination, Sgt. Boone testified that T-Mobile had confirmed that the cell phone seized was registered to Defendant. She also stated that she suspected Defendant was lying during his interview because some of his statements were contradictory. Sgt. Boone testified that she had not arrested anyone else in this case because no evidence suggested that any other individuals had committed a crime. Sgt. Boone also explained that she was unable to determine the identity of “Sim” and therefore “had no way to arrest him.”

Kate Homan (“Ms. Homan”), stipulated by the parties as an expert in forensic interviewing, testified that at the time of the incident, she was employed as the “lead forensic interviewer at the New Orleans Children's Advocacy Center.” She stated that she conducted an audio and video recorded forensic interview of the victim on September 26, 2018.¹⁰ The State introduced the footage of the September 26, 2018 forensic video ¹¹ and played it for the jury.

During the interview, the victim told Ms. Homan that she called Defendant “Boogie” and that he had been keeping her “safe” from a man called “Mellow,” whom she had been residing with before meeting Defendant. The victim explained that she had an active sexual relationship with Mellow notwithstanding his knowledge that she was fourteen years old. She stated that Mellow had also forced her into prostitution and forced her to sell drugs. The victim recounted a number of sexual interactions she experienced and explained that Mellow would deprive her of food, hit her, and emotionally abuse her to keep her obedient. She finally escaped Mellow although she was afraid to be alone.

Shortly after her escape from Mellow, the victim was approached by a police officer outside a store around 5:00 a.m.¹² and, to avoid suspicion, she pretended to be waiting for a friend. The victim approached a vehicle nearby where she met Defendant and his friend, “Sim.” She stated that she initially resided with Sim, who called her his “little juvie,” but his girlfriend was unkind to her so she decided to stay with Defendant instead. The victim stated that Defendant would provide her with clothes and hygienic products that he obtained from his female friends and family members. She also said that Defendant was trying to help her find a permanent residence. She stated that she eventually decided to leave Defendant and she needed money to travel to Baton Rouge, so Defendant and Sim arranged for her to have a “topless conversation” with a stranger for $250. She also stated that Defendant intended to be present in the room during the “conversation” and keep her “safe.”

The victim stated that Sim's girlfriend had informed Defendant that she was only fourteen years old and had been reported missing, but that Defendant had insisted the victim was sixteen years old. She stated that Sim's girlfriend also texted Defendant her “missing” poster. The victim said that she suspected that Sim's girlfriend had staged the $250 sexual interaction and called the police to have Defendant arrested at the motel. The victim denied that Defendant had forced her into prostitution, but stated that Sim had forced her to provide sexual favors for his brother and his friends in exchange for rides, food, and the use of a cell phone.

Ms. Homan testified that based on her conversation with the victim, it appeared the victim had been “groomed” by several different men who would provide for her needs and eventually demand her submission in exchange. Ms. Homan agreed that exploited children commonly “try and minimize the harm that's done by someone who's gone through the grooming process,” explaining,

[T]he goal of grooming and manipulation is to minimize the risk of getting caught. So, we can see situations where people build relationships with people and that's when things get complicated. Because oftentimes, and this is true of victims’ exploitation and child abuse victims as well, oftentimes it's not that they want the person who did things to them to go to jail. They just want whatever it is to stop.

On cross-examination, Ms. Homan testified about open-ended questioning and “more closed-ended” questioning in interviewing child sex abuse victims. She noted that forensic interviews of children are conducted in a manner to avoid leading and suggestive questioning. Ms. Homan agreed that the victim was forthcoming with her experiences and willing to provide intimate details when asked follow-up questions.

On redirect examination, Ms. Homan noted that grooming does not have to involve touching the victim; it could be any behavior that would build trust or create a bond that “increases the chances for victimization and minimizes the risk of getting caught.” She stated that grooming could include providing basic needs, such as clothing, food, a place to sleep, and emotional support.

Detective Eddie Williams (“Det. Williams”) qualified by the trial court as an expert in the field of digital forensics. Det. Williams testified that he executed the search warrant for Defendant's phone in this case, extracting all of the files and organizing them into a report. The State introduced the “cell phone report, [the] cell phone extraction and the phone dump” into evidence. The “relevant” portions of the exhibit related to the charges against Defendant were published to the jury while Det. Williams described its contents.

The State played multiple videos that had been recorded on Defendant's cell phone on September 8, 2018 between 4:06 p.m. and 4:15 p.m.¹³ The videos depict the victim performing oral sex on an adult male and having vaginal intercourse with the same male in what appeared to be a park or outdoor playground. Det. Williams noted that the male depicted in the video told the victim to call him “Daddy Boogie” and wore the same watch Defendant was wearing when he was arrested.

Det. Williams also testified about ongoing and incoming text messages from Defendant's phone on September 8, 2018. Defendant received a text message at 8:16 p.m., asking “WYT,” which Det. Williams noted is “shorthand for where you at.” Defendant responded: “Gentilly. Do you need me?” Defendant then received a message which read, “You still got girl with you?” Defendant responded, “You know that. You told me to hold her, bro․she not going nowhere․this our ho.”

Det. Williams testified that Defendant recorded a screenshot on his cell phone on September 14, 2018, of a “missing” poster depicting the victim. A review of that file in the cell phone report shows the victim's photograph, name, and birthdate, and expressly lists her “age now” as fourteen.¹⁴ On September 15, 2018, at 7:35 a.m., Defendant received a text message which read, “[w]ho's the chic you've been having with you?” Defendant responded, “OMG, [s]omebody I've been trying to get rid of. She's a lost person and I just don't want to let her go and somebody f**k her over. But she's homeless with nowhere to go. But I think I'm going to call 911 today because I can't keep doing this. This little girl is starting to get attached to me. I can't do it.” Det. Williams testified that no outgoing calls to 911 had been placed from Defendant's phone.

Det. Williams testified further that on September 15, 2018, starting at 1:13 p.m., Defendant exchanged a series of eight phone calls with someone, then received a text message from the same phone number at 1:25 p.m. stating, “I told him 250. Cool.” Defendant responded: “you got me ha.”

On cross-examination, Det. Williams conceded that the videos from September 8, 2018, depicting sexual activity with the victim were located in the “trash can” file in Defendant's cell phone. He also testified that although the still photos depicting Defendant's face and his watch had been deleted, the corresponding thumbnail images remained in the data extracted from the phone. Det. Williams admitted that he could not deduce how many times, if any, the videos had been viewed before being moved into the trash can file, nor did he know the date the files were moved.

Det. Williams conceded Defendant had received a message in August 2018 that said “[t]his is Sim trying to get my charger.” He also testified that Defendant received at least three text messages from someone looking for Sim or asking him to deliver messages to Sim. Another incoming text message to Defendant stated, “[y]ou don't know this little girl, you're FW a 17-year-old.”

Det. Williams also agreed that the 911 phone call reporting the exploitation of a juvenile at Motel 6 was placed from the same phone number as the text message to Defendant stating, “I told him 250. Cool.”

On redirect examination, Det. Williams testified that there were outgoing and incoming messages sent from Defendant's phone which identified Defendant as “Boogie.”

S.L., the victim in this case, testified that she was born on September 18, 2003, and she was placed into foster care after her mother was killed in 2018. She stated that when she refused to refer to her foster parents as “mom and dad,” they kicked her out of their home and reported her “as a runaway,” as a result of which the victim was afraid she would be arrested and incarcerated. The victim testified that she was homeless and had no phone so she relied on help from strangers. She described how she met Defendant at the age of fourteen:

I had just escaped an abusive situation and I was at the [ ] gas station. A police officer was trying to make conversation with me, which kind of made me nervous because I figured after a while he would be able to tell that I was young and not where I was supposed to be because I told him I was waiting on a friend. But there was no friend. And [Defendant's] friend, Sim, was in the driver's seat of their—of the car and I guess they called out to me or I reached out, but somehow, I ended up at the car and he let me in.

The victim testified that she called Defendant “Boogie” and “Daddy,” and he drove a Mercedes. She said she was not married to Defendant. The victim also identified Defendant in court.

She stated that she initially told Defendant and Sim that she would turn eighteen years old in a few days but noted, “[t]hey didn't believe me at all.” She continued, “I had a hospital band that said that I was seventeen, about to be eighteen․and I also showed them my mom's obituary that mentioned my name to prove everything I was saying.”

The victim told Defendant about the trauma she had endured and that she “previously had been trafficked by other people.” She stated that Defendant “cried a lot and he felt bad.” She felt like Defendant “really cared about her at the time.”

The victim stated that she told Defendant that she was sixteen years old “[n]ot even twenty-four hours after I met him.” She explained that Defendant and Sim had been suspicious of her age due to “the way that [she] spoke, [her] lack of experience,” and her small frame, because “they didn't want to go to jail.” She eventually admitted to Defendant that she was fourteen the day before he was arrested, stating, “I told him because Sim's girlfriend kept on saying it and I wanted him to hear it from me before he heard it from someone else. So, I showed him my ‘missing’ flyer.”

The victim testified that she first had sexual intercourse with Defendant “within, like, twenty-four or forty-eight hours” of meeting him and continued sexual relations every day thereafter “whenever we could” for the two weeks she remained with Defendant. She stated that on the morning of Defendant's arrest, they “had oral sex,” and confirmed that Defendant knew she was fourteen years old at that time. The victim testified that on September 15, 2018, Defendant took her to Motel 6 because he and Sim had arranged for her “to have a naked conversation with someone” in exchange for $250.¹⁵ She explained that the transaction did not occur because the police arrived and arrested her and Defendant. Following her arrest, the victim told police “something was going to be set up, but that [she] was supposed to fake cramps and run off with the money.” She identified herself and Defendant in the motel surveillance video.

The victim testified that she had recently viewed her recorded forensic interview and admitted that she had initially lied to Ms. Homan when she denied having a sexual relationship with Defendant. She indicated that she lied to protect Defendant from legal consequences. She explained:

I figured that because he was arrested with me, he would already be facing some trouble and ․I wanted them to focus on the people who had hurt me worse and also, I felt like if he were to go to jail after being the nicest person to me, like, that I was betraying him.

The victim testified that she had also viewed the videos that were located on Defendant's cell phone. She identified herself and Defendant in the video at a “park that we used to go to nearly every day.”¹⁶ The victim described what she told Defendant in one of the videos, “I said that it hurt and I didn't want to do it anymore and I was irritated that he kept trying to record.”

The victim testified that although she thought Defendant genuinely cared for her, she stated: “I don't think he was helping me just for my benefit. I think he could have helped me without a lot of the things that happened.” She further stated: “I don't understand how a twenty-nine-year-old man could have pursued a sexual and somewhat romantic relationship with a fourteen-year-old.” The victim testified that Defendant's plan was “to get a female family member or friend that didn't have a criminal record and would have been able to take [her] in as a foster child so that [they] could continue [their] relationship.” The victim testified that as a result of Defendant's actions, she has had trouble as an adult accepting assistance or gifts, presuming that as a result, she would owe “something in return.”

On cross-examination, the victim admitted that she attempted to get in contact with Defendant after he was arrested and released. She testified that the hospital bracelet she was wearing the night she met Defendant accurately reflected her real birth month and day, except that it incorrectly listed her birth year as 2000 rather than 2003. She conceded that she had intentionally provided the incorrect information when she was admitted to the hospital.

The victim stated that Defendant had not booked a room at Motel 6 and she did not know the identity of the party she was meeting, but Defendant had told her that she did not have to physically engage in sexual activity and that he would keep her “safe.” She also agreed that Defendant would regularly provide her transportation and let her use his cell phone. She said Defendant and a man named “Josh” had brought her to the motel the day of their arrest. The victim also recalled seeing Sim and his girlfriend prior to going to the motel.

On redirect examination, the victim explained that she lied about being seventeen specifically because “[s]eventeen is the legal age of [ ] sexual consent in Louisiana, so most men are not wary of associating themselves with a seventeen-year-old because it's less risk.” She continued, “[b]ut I also chose that age rather than eighteen because I needed them to know that I was vulnerable and needed help.” The victim testified that she thought she and Defendant were in a relationship. She also stated Defendant had provided her with food and shelter and in return, she wanted to protect him from getting in trouble with the police. She explained that although she did not want to leave Defendant and go to Baton Rouge she “was willing to,” because eventually “it became clear that [Defendant] didn't like [her] attachment to him and [she] felt like a burden.”¹⁷

The medical examination of the victim, stipulated to by the parties, was introduced into evidence.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record reveals an error patent with regard to the sentences Defendant received.

La. R.S. 14:80(D)(1) provides that “[w]hoever commits the crime of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or both.” Thus, Louisiana does not require that a sentence imposed for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

However, the January 12, 2024 sentencing hearing transcript provides that the trial court imposed the sentence of “ten years in the Department of Corrections without benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence” for the offense of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile. (emphasis added). Also, at the October 25, 2024 resentencing hearing, the trial court stated it was going to “maintain that sentence” in response to Defendant's motion to reconsider as to the carnal knowledge conviction.

On the other hand, the October 25, 2024 minute entry, signed by the trial court, provides that the sentence imposed for the conviction of carnal knowledge of a juvenile was ten years imprisonment at hard labor (impliedly without restrictions). Also, that sentence is reflected in the notice of sentence issue to the Department of Corrections, to which the signed minute entry is attached.

“Generally, when there is a conflict between the minute entry and the trial transcript, the transcript controls.” State v. Jackson, 2008-0286, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/29/09), 11 So.3d 52 (citing State v. Hall, 1999-2887, (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/4/00), 775 So.2d 52). However, here, the signed minute entries accurately reflect the legal sentence imposed.

Therefore, to the extent that the trial court erred in imposing Defendant's ten-year sentence for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, we delete those illegal restrictions. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 882(A) (“[a]n illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review.”). The sentence for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile (count two) is thus amended to reflect that the sentence is to be served without restrictions in accordance with the minute entry of October 25, 2024. State v. Simmons, 2017-385, p. 5 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 237 So.3d 610, 613 (finding that the restriction of parole benefits for all fifteen years of defendant's enhanced sentence was illegal; and amending the sentence to delete the restriction of parole benefits).

In its brief, the State argues that there is another error patent regarding the sentence imposed for Defendant's conviction for production of pornography involving juveniles. La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(4)(a) provides: “[w]hoever engages in the promotion, advertisement, or production of pornography involving juveniles shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars and imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.” The State notes that in the January 12, 2024 sentencing transcript, the trial court noted the fine set forth in La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(4)(a) but failed to actually impose a fine in sentencing Defendant. The State thus argues that the sentence Defendant received for this conviction is an illegally lenient sentence.

However, Louisiana courts have found that “[w]here a statute authorizes a fine of ‘not more than’ a certain amount, a fine of $0, or its equivalent of no fine imposed, is necessarily contained within the meaning of ‘not more than.’ ” State v. Coleman, 2019-1458, p. 6 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/12/20), 305 So.3d 878, 883 (citing State v. Martinez, 52,882, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So.3d 467, 472; State v. Albercht, 2001-1664, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/02), 809 So.2d 472, 477; State v. Francois, 2006-788, p. 6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So.2d 865, 870; State v. Patin, 2019-157 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/13/19), 285 So. 3d 48, 58-59).

In State v. Course, 2001-1812, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/02), 809 So.2d 488, 492, the defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2), which imposed “a sentence of five to thirty years (five years of which are to be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, as well as payment of a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars).” The trial court failed to impose a fine. The Course Court found that under the language of the statute the trial court had the discretion to “determine the amount of the fine up to $50,000” and found no error patent. Id., at p. 6, 809 So.2d at 492. The Court stated in part:

Although a maximum fine is provided, the minimum fine is not delegated by the statute, La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2). The trial court has discretion to impose a fine with no minimum up to $50,000. Where there is no minimum fine provided by the statute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in omitting the fine, and no error patent exists.

Id.; see also State v. Legett, 2002-0153, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/22/02), 819 So.2d 1104, 1106.

Similarly, here, it was within the trial court's discretion to omit the fine under La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(4)(a) for production of pornography involving a juvenile (count three). Accordingly, contrary to the State's assertions, there is no error patent in this regard.

DISCUSSION

Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 2

In his first assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile. Defendant argues in his second assignment of error that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for production of child pornography. These assignments of error are combined for efficiency.

With regard to the conviction of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, Defendant asserts that the jury should have rejected the victim's trial testimony that she had participated in both oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with Defendant as not credible because she initially denied engaging in sexual relations with him during her forensic interview and admitted that she lied to Defendant (and to the police) about her age.

With regard to the production of pornography involving a juvenile conviction, Defendant claims that the State failed to prove that he personally produced the videos contained on his cell phone depicting him engaging in oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with the victim.

The United States Supreme Court provided the standard for review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979):

․the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. (Emphasis in original).

“Under the Jackson standard, the rational credibility determinations of the trier of fact are not to be second guessed by a reviewing court.” State v. Williams, 2011-0414 p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/29/12), 85 So.3d 759, 771.

Conflicting statements as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency. State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 1244 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989). Such a determination rests solely with the trier of fact who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Id. A trier of fact's determination as to the credibility of a witness is a question of fact entitled to great weight, and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly contrary to the evidence. State v. Vessell, 450 So.2d 938 (La. 1984).

State v. Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/30/11), 64 So.3d 303, 306.

“The testimony of a single witness, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. The finder of fact must determine, from facts gleaned from direct evidence and inferred from circumstantial evidence, considering the relative strength and weakness of each inference and finding, whether this body of preliminary facts excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Dukes, 2019-0172, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/2/19), 281 So.3d 745, 753; State v. Rose, 2005-0396, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/13/07), 955 So.2d 270, 272.

It is also well settled that “it is not the function of the appellate court to assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence.” State v. Richards, 2011-0349, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/11), 78 So.3d 864, 869 (citing State v. Cummings, 668 So.2d 1132 (La. 1996)). “Upon review of the record as a whole, if rational triers of fact could disagree as to the interpretation of the evidence, the rational trier's view of all the evidence must be adopted.” State v. Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/15/19), 272 So.3d 94, 97 (citing State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1310 (La. 1988)).

Felony Carnal Knowledge of a Juvenile

La. R.S. 14:80 provides that felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when “[a] person who is seventeen years of age or older has sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of age or older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not the spouse of the offender and when the difference between the age of the victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater.” La. R.S. 14:80(A)(1). Sexual intercourse is defined in the statute as “anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse.” La. R.S. 14:80(B). “Emission is not necessary, and penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.” La. R.S. 14:80(C). Further, a “[l]ack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense.” Id.

Here, the victim testified at trial that she was fourteen years old when she met Defendant and engaged in sexual intercourse with him within twenty-four or forty-eight hours after meeting him. She testified that they continued engaging in sexual activity “every day” thereafter “whenever they could.” She also testified that she had performed oral sex on Defendant the morning they were arrested. The record shows that Defendant was aware of the victim's age before their arrest. She also denied that she was married to Defendant. Sgt. Boone testified that Defendant's identification card listed his birthdate as June 29, 1989, demonstrating that Defendant was over the age of seventeen at the time of the offense and that the difference between the victim's age and Defendant's age was greater than four years.

Further, the State introduced a video that was recorded by the camera on Defendant's cell phone depicting the victim performing oral sex on a black male and engaging in sexual intercourse with the same black male who asked her to call him “Daddy Boogie.” The victim testified “Boogie” was Defendant's nickname. Additionally, the victim identified Defendant as the male shown in the video with whom she had sex. Moreover, a review of the video also suggests that Defendant was holding his cell phone while filming the sexual acts. Further, Det. Williams testimony provides that the person filming the sex acts with the victim was wearing the same watch Defendant was wearing when he was arrested.

The record reflects that the victim lied about her age and initially denied having a sexual relationship with Defendant; however, the victim explained that she lied about her age as a survival tactic and did not want to get Defendant in legal trouble. Moreover, the testimony from Ms. Homan shows that due to the grooming and manipulation of the abuser, victims of child abuse often do not want the abuser to go to jail; the victims just want the behavior to stop. Furthermore, as noted above, “[c]onflicting statements as to factual matters is a question of weight of the evidence, not sufficiency.” Wells, 2010-1338, p. 5, 64 So.3d at 306 (citing State v. Jones, 537 So.2d 1244, 1249 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989). The credibility of a witness is the province of the jury “who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness.” Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 4, 272 So.3d at 98 (quoting State v. Scott, 2012-1603, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/13), 131 So.3d 501, 508). The Jackson standard asserts that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction provided “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789.

In a recent Third Circuit case, State v. Smith, 2024-654, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/9/25), 408 So.3d 1230, 1237, the defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first degree rape ¹⁸ based on the “incredible” testimony of the victim. The defendant argued that the victim's allegation that she was having sexual intercourse with defendant “multiple times a day” every day was “too outrageous to be true.” Id. at p. 13, 408 So.3d at 1237. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit found that the “State's case was more than sufficient to sustain [the] conviction” stating, “[t]he jury only had to believe that C.K. [victim] had sex with [the d]efendant once prior to her thirteenth birthday in order to convict.” Id.

Here, based on the evidence presented, a rational juror could have found that Defendant and the victim were not married; that Defendant was over the age of seventeen and at least four years older than the victim; and that he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim at least once while she was between the ages of thirteen and seventeen, even if portions of her trial testimony were inconsistent with her forensic interview. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile.

Production of Pornography Involving a Juvenile

Defendant next asserts that the evidence is insufficient to establish a conviction for production of pornography involving a juvenile because the State failed to prove Defendant's identity as the person who filmed the sexual encounter on his cell phone or that the video had ever been viewed or distributed.

In 2018, at the time of the offense, La. R.S. 14:81.1(A)(1) provided “[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to produce, promote, advertise, distribute, possess, or possess with the intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles.”¹⁹ “Produce” means “to photograph, videotape, film, or otherwise reproduce pornography involving juveniles, or to solicit, promote, or coerce any child for the purpose of pornography involving juveniles.” La. R.S. 14:81.1(B)(9). “Pornography involving juveniles” is “any photograph, videotape, film, or other reproduction, whether electronic or otherwise, of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of seventeen.” La. R.S. 14:81.1(B)(3). Also, “[l]ack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense.” La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1).

Here, the State need not establish that Defendant viewed or distributed the video footage to establish production of pornography involving a juvenile. It was sufficient for the State to show that Defendant filmed the sexual acts with the victim as to support his conviction. As discussed above, there was video evidence recovered from Defendant's phone depicting the victim engaging in oral sex and vaginal intercourse with a black man. The victim testified at trial that Defendant was the man in the video with her. Further, Defendant was wearing the same watch in the video footage as he was when he was arrested. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to show that Defendant was the individual who filmed the video, thus supporting Defendant's conviction for production of pornography involving juveniles.

These assignments of error appear meritless.

Assignment of Error No. 3

As his third assignment of error, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. However, Defendant does not separately analyze this claim in his brief.

Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) provides that the “court may consider as abandoned any assignment of error or issue which has not been briefed.” See also State v. Joyner, 2011-1397, p. 28 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/24/12), 107 So.3d 675, 691 (finding that because the defendant “failed to brief this assignment of error, it is deemed to have been abandoned”).

Nevertheless, the grounds on which Defendant moved for new trial are addressed in other assignments of error. In his motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain each of his convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury charge on the mistake of fact defense pursuant to La. R.S. 14:16. The sufficiency of the evidence is discussed in the assignments of errors above and the failure to read the requested jury instruction is discussed later in assignment of error number eight.

Assignment of Error No. 4

As his fourth assignment of error, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion in arrest of judgment ²⁰ /post-verdict judgment of acquittal.²¹ Again, Defendant failed to separately analyze this claim in his appellant brief and Uniform Rules–Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4) provides that any assignment of error or issue for review which has not been briefed is considered abandoned.

However, similar to above, the basis for this assignment of error is addressed in another assignment of error. Defendant's sole claim on appeal with regard to his motion in arrest of judgment is that La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1), which provides that “[l]ack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense[,]” is unconstitutional. Defendant argues that because the trial court included the alleged unconstitutional portion of the statute in its jury instructions, his conviction for violating La. R.S. 14:81.1 (production of pornography involving a juvenile) cannot stand. This argument will be addressed in assignment of error number eight.

Assignments of Error Nos. 5, 6, & 7

Defendant's fifth, sixth, and seventh assignments of error all relate to his sentences. In his fifth and sixth assignment of error, he argues that the sentences imposed for his convictions of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and production of pornography involving a juvenile were excessive. In his seventh assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his second motion to reconsider his sentence. These three claims will be addressed together herein.

With regard to felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, La. R.S. 14:80(D)(1) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or both, provided that the defendant shall not be eligible to have his conviction set aside or his prosecution dismissed in accordance with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 893.

As to the production of pornography involving juveniles, La. R.S. 14:81.1(E)(4)(a) states:

Whoever engages in the promotion, advertisement, or production of pornography involving juveniles shall be fined not more than fifty thousand dollars and imprisoned at hard labor for not less than ten years nor more than twenty years, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

On January 12, 2024, the trial court imposed a sentence for Defendant's conviction for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile of “ten years in the Department of Corrections without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” For the production of pornography involving a juvenile conviction, the trial court imposed a concurrent sentence of twenty years in the Department of Corrections․without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” The trial court also ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender “upon [his] release.”

On January 23, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence “due to the excessive and harsh nature of the sentence imposed.” As noted earlier, on October 25, 2024, the trial court denied the motion with regard to the felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile sentence, but granted it with regard to the production of juvenile pornography sentence. After noting the defense's argument that maximum sentences are reserved for “the worst of the worst,” the trial court stated:

I agree with you. So, my sentence on the ten years felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, court is going to maintain that sentence. I won't touch that. I'll note your objection for the record on that․But on the production of the child pornography, the court sentenced you to twenty years. After argument from the defense [ ], I don't think you're the worst of the worst. In fact, in this situation, they have at least two individuals that are worse than you. And I hope that they get brought to justice one day․I want them to have their day in court because I think that the actions that they did are way more egregious that what you did. And because of that, [ ] this court is going to reduce your sentence. This court is going to sentence you to fifteen years in the Department of Corrections. All other conditions still apply.

So, we are giving you a five-year reduction because I don't think that you are the worst of the worst. I don't think this factual scenario is the worst of the worst. But we still have a young child because of that that was traumatized. I think she was fourteen years old at the time and her life was in shambles before. It certainly was in shambles during this time and after. I think now she is trying to put the pieces of her life together like a puzzle and she's having difficulty, not just because of you though[.] I said it once and I'm going to say it again, they have at least two people that I just hope are brought to justice.

Defendant objected and stated that he was “looking for more.” The State also objected and responded as follows:

Should [Defendant] find that he does want to do the right thing and help the [S]tate bring those people to justice, that (sic) I can assure this court and [Defendant] that I will be sitting at the table when that day comes. It is still available for him to speak to me in my office if he would like to save some years on that sentence.

The trial court then told Defendant, “If you and the [S]tate agree on something that's below what I have sentenced you to, I have no problem going below that, if y'all can agree on it․I am not going to stand in the way of it.”

The minutes also reflect that Defendant filed a second motion to reconsider his sentences on October 29, 2024, which the trial court denied on March 21, 2025. As noted above, his second motion to reconsider is not contained in the appellate record; thus, the grounds on which the motion was based are unknown. See State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059, 1060 (La. 1993) (finding that where the defendant fails to specify grounds for excessiveness in objection to sentence, then he does not lose the right to appeal the sentence, but is relegated to the “bare claim of excessiveness”).

In his brief, Defendant claims the sentences he received are excessive because he had no prior history of criminal convictions.²²

As discussed in the errors patent section above, the trial court erred in imposing Defendant's sentence for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as noted in the transcript. We correct that illegal sentence to clarify that the ten-year sentence of imprisonment does not restrict the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence as noted in the October 25, 2024 minute entry. Nevertheless, we find that the sentences imposed by the trial court are not excessive.

La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibits the imposition of excessive sentences. See State v. Grant, 2024-0430, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/20/24), 402 So.3d 109, 111. “[A] sentence may still be excessive even if it falls within a crime's statutory range.” Id. (citing State v. Bertrand, 2004-1496, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04), 891 So.2d 752, 757). “A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, is nothing more than the purposeless imposition of pain and suffering, and is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” Grant, 2024-0430, p. 3, 402 So.3d at 111-112 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 2021-0488, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/21), 334 So.3d 449, 453). “A sentence is grossly disproportionate if it shocks the sense of justice when considered in light of the harm done to society by the underlying crime.” Id., at p. 3 402 So.3d at 111-112 (citing Mitchell, 2021-0488, p. 6, 334 So.3d at 453)

“The trial judge is afforded wide discretion in determining sentences[.]” Bradley, 2018-0734, p. 8, 272 So.3d at 99-100. “The appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the record supports the sentence imposed.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.4(D). Thus, “[t]he relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate.” State v. Mathieu, 2018-964, p. 4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/19), 283 So.3d 1041, 1045 (citing State v. Cook, 1995-2784, p. 3 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 959).

Here, as noted above, the trial court granted Defendant's first motion to reconsider his sentences for production of pornography involving juveniles and reduced the term of imprisonment for the conviction from the statutory maximum of twenty years to fifteen years. The fifteen-year sentence falls squarely within the statutory sentencing range of ten to twenty years imprisonment. Notably, both the State and the trial court advised Defendant that he could obtain a further reduction of his sentence(s) if he agreed to provide the State information leading to the arrest of the other offenders who sexually exploited the victim, which Defendant apparently declined.

As to Defendant's conviction of felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, the trial court imposed the statutory maximum term of ten years imprisonment. In its reasons for imposing its sentences, the trial court stated that Defendant was not the “worst of the worst” offender. However, the trial court also considered the harm Defendant's actions inflicted on the fourteen-year-old victim. Moreover, the victim testified that she had told Defendant that she had been previously forced into prostitution and was sexually abused by a number of men before she met him.

While the defense asserted at trial that Defendant only intended to “help” the victim, the witness testimony and video footage presented indicate that Defendant chose instead to engage in regular and continuous sexual activity with the victim, even after learning that she was under seventeen years old and had a history of abuse. Defendant also filmed at least one sexual encounter, during which the victim indicated she did not want to continue performing oral sex and did not want to be recorded, both of which Defendant ignored.

For these reasons, the record supports the length of the trial court's sentences for each of Defendant's convictions. As such, the trial court did not abuse its vast sentencing discretion nor did it err in denying Defendant's second motion for reconsideration of his sentences. These assignments of error lack merit.

Assignment of Error No. 8

Lastly, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in improperly instructing the jury on the applicable law. Specifically, Defendant claims La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1), which states that a lack of knowledge of the victim's age is not a defense to the production of pornography involving juveniles, was declared unconstitutional and thus should not have been included in the jury instructions for that offense. Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to provide his requested special jury instruction on the “mistake of fact” defense.

Unconstitutionality of La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1)

At the outset, arguably, Defendant did not preserve this issue for review. The first time Defendant complained of the trial court's inclusion of the defense of lack of knowledge of the victim's age in La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1) was in his motion in arrest of judgment, filed days after Defendant was convicted. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) (“[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence”)

Nevertheless, La. C.Cr.P. art. 859(2) provides that a motion in arrest of judgment may be based on the ground that the “offense charged is not punishable under a valid statute.” In his motion, Defendant contended that the Louisiana Supreme Court found La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)²³ unconstitutional in State v. Cinel, 1994-0942 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 309 as it applied to Defendant's possession of child pornography in the context of the First Amendment right to expression, and should also be found unconstitutional as applied to the production of child pornography.²⁴

In the State's opposition to Defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, it pointed out that the holding in Cinel was limited in its application specifically to La. R.S. 14:81.1(A)(3), which at the time, stated: “the intentional possession, sale, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute of any photographs, films, videotapes, or other visual reproductions of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of seventeen.” (emphasis added). The defendant claimed in Cinel that because he was charged under subsection (A)(3) with the intentional possession or sale of materials depicting any sexual performance involving a child under seventeen, subsection (D) eliminating knowledge of the victim's age as a defense, contradicted the requirement that the State prove that the defendant's possession of the contraband was intentional, that is, that the defendant knew that what he possessed was contraband, violating his right to free speech under the First Amendment.  ²⁵ Cinel, 1994-0942, pp. 1-7, 646 So.2d at 311-14.

The trial court in Cinel struck down the statute in its entirety. Id., p. 7, 10, 646 So.2d at 315-16. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found subsection (D) severable and left the “unoffending portions” of the statute intact. Id. at p. 11, 646 So.2d at 317. The Cinel Court then found that because La. R.S. 14:81.1(D) removed the State's burden to prove that a defendant had the requisite intent to possess materials depicting sexual performances of children under the age of seventeen, that subsection was unconstitutional.²⁶ Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Granier, 1999-3511, p. 5 (La. 7/6/00), 765 So.2d 998, 1001, summarized Cinel's holding as follows:

We noted [in Cinel] that while the states have greater leeway in prohibiting child pornography even when the materials would not otherwise qualify as “obscene” under prevailing standards, they cannot dispense with a scienter 27 element, a constitutional prerequisite of any valid obscenity law, and the offender must be aware of the general content and character of the materials he possesses. Therefore, we found that under subsection A[3] of the statute, prohibiting pornography involving juveniles, the State had to prove knowledge of the performer's age. Only after this finding did we hold that subsection D created an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the State and that this subsection was unconstitutional.

Importantly, in 2010 the legislature eliminated subsections (A)(1)-(4) of La. R.S. 14:81.1, which included the portion of the statute in which the defendant in Cinel was charged. See Acts 2010, No. 516, § 1. La. R.S. 14:81.1(A)(1) now provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to produce, distribute, possess, or possess with the intent to distribute pornography involving juveniles.”²⁸ Moreover, Defendant in this case has cited no other authority holding that La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to the amended legislation, or even as applied to the former version of the statute criminalizing the production of child pornography,²⁹ neither of which included intent or special knowledge as an element.³⁰

“Statutes are generally presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging the validity of the statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional.” State v. Hatton, 2007-2377, p. 13 (La. 7/1/08) 985 So.2d 709, 719. Because Defendant failed to show that La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1) is unconstitutional, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the lack of knowledge of the victim's age is not a viable defense. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on this claim.

Mistake of Fact

Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in excluding the “mistake of fact” defense from the jury instructions.

The record does not include a written motion for special jury instructions filed on behalf of Defendant. It does, however, contain the State's written motion to exclude from the jury instructions the defense of mistake of fact, which the trial court granted. Following closing arguments, Defendant lodged an objection to the jury instructions, stating,

I just wanted to note defense objection to the court's exclusion of the entire mistake of fact instruction from the jury instructions. The defense had asked that while—that ignorance be removed from the mistake of fact instruction because there is a specific provision in the charges that [Defendant] faces that says ignorance is not a defense. It is the defense position that mistake of fact is a separate disjunctive defense that is not foreclosed by the charging statutes and that is why we ask for that to be included and are objecting to the lack of inclusion.31

La. C.Cr.P. art. 807 provides that each party “shall have the right before argument to submit to the court special written charges for the jury.” “A requested special charge shall be given by the court if it does not require qualification, limitation, or explanation, and if it is wholly correct and pertinent.” Id. Special jury charges must be given “as to the law applicable to any theory of defense which the jurors could reasonably infer from the evidence.” State v. Telford, 384 So.2d 347, 350 (La. 1980). However, “[t]his charge must be supported by the evidence presented at trial, because the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on abstract principles of law.” Id.

La. R.S. 14:16 provides, “[u]nless there is a provision to the contrary in the definition of a crime, reasonable ignorance of fact or mistake of fact which precludes the presence of any mental element required in that crime is a defense to any prosecution for that crime.” Defendant argues in his brief that the victim lied to him about her age and provided as evidence her hospital band confirming she was seventeen, thus the jury should have been able to consider that he lacked the intent to commit the offenses.

However, neither La. R.S. 14:80 (felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile) nor La. R.S. 14:81.1 (production of pornography involving a juvenile) includes the element of intent or special knowledge of the victim's age. Thus, because the mistake of fact defense operates to “preclude the presence of any mental element required in that crime,” it appears inapplicable on its face. Further, La. R.S. 14:16 specifically provides that the mistake of fact defense applies “unless there is a provision to the contrary in the definition of a crime.” Both felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile and production of pornography involving a juvenile contain a provision that a lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense. See La. R.S. 14:80(C); La. R.S. 14:81.1(D)(1). As such, the defense of mistake of fact cannot constitute “the law applicable to any theory of defense” in this case. See Telford, 384 So.2d at 350. Therefore, the trial court did not err in excluding the defense of mistake of fact from its jury instructions. This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm Defendant's convictions, amend Defendant's sentence for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile (count two) to reflect the sentence set forth in the October 25, 2024 minute entry and affirm as amended; and affirm the sentence for the production of pornography involving a juvenile (count three).

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT TWO AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED; SENTENCE ON COUNT THREE AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant was also charged with one count of indecent behavior with a juvenile; however, the State dismissed that charge prior to trial.

2.   The ruling on Defendant's motions to suppress were delayed four years due to COVID pandemic court restrictions and multiple continuances granted to both parties.

3.   Defendant orally moved to continue the trial date on October 30, 2023, which the trial court subsequently denied. Defendant thereafter filed a writ application in this Court seeking review of the denial of his motion to continue. This Court denied writs on November 3, 2023. See State v. Scott, 2023-0698 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/3/23).

4.   As noted later herein, the trial court instructed the jury that the lack of knowledge of victim's age is not a defense to the crimes at issue.

5.   As noted later, there is a discrepancy between the minute entry and the sentencing transcript regarding the felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile sentences with regard to probation, parole, and suspension of sentence restrictions.

6.   Although the minutes reflect the filing of the second motion to reconsider sentence, this motion is not contained in the record.

7.   The body camera video was played on cross-examination to refresh Sgt. Sam's recollection of the circumstances of Defendant's detention.

8.   These exhibits were not provided with the appellate record. However, neither party requested that the record be supplemented with these specific exhibits. Also, Defendant does not complain about their absence from the record.

9.   The record indicates that the 911 caller had given a description of the vehicle.

10.   Ms. Homan also conducted a second interview on October 3, 2018, during which the victim briefly mentioned Defendant's “name towards the end of the interview,” but was “largely focused on other things․that [the victim] had experienced.”

11.   The transcript indicates that the interview is continuous but contained on two discs due to size.

12.   The victim did not provide the date when she first encountered Defendant in the forensic interview.

13.   Det. Williams noted that based on the digital evidence, the videos (and images) were not downloaded from an online source but were “recorded via that phone.”

14.   The photo indicated that the victim went missing on June 25, 2018 in Baton Rouge.

15.   Later, the victim described the planned encounter further, stating that “Boogie called Sim about setting up the [$250] ‘play.’ ” On cross-examination, the victim clarified, “Boogie reached out to Sim to set it up and Sim and Boogie worked together to set it up.” On redirect examination, she clarified further, “Boogie told Sim that he wanted something set up and they were both looking for people together and I believe Sim is the person who found whoever it was that I was supposed to meet with.”

16.   The video of the sex act was not played again but instead the victim made identifications of still images of the video.

17.   Leanne Desselle, an expert in human trafficking also provided testimony for the State. However, because her testimony related solely to Defendant's charge of child trafficking, which resulted in an acquittal, Desselle's testimony is not included in this opinion.

18.   Defendant was convicted of violating La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4), which defines first degree rape as a rape occurring “[w]hen the victim is under the age of thirteen years.”

19.   Pursuant to Acts 2025, No. 261, § 1, the term “pornography involving juveniles” was replaced with the term “child sexual abuse materials.”

20.   La. C.Cr.P. art. 859 provides the grounds for arrest of judgment and states, in part:The court shall arrest the judgment only on one or more of the following grounds:(1) The indictment is substantially defective, in that an essential averment is omitted;(2) The offense charged is not punishable under a valid statute;․(5) The verdict is not responsive to the indictment, or is otherwise so defective that it will not form the basis of a valid judgment;

21.   Notably, Defendant did not file a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, he instead filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which he suggests in his brief “operates as a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal.”

22.   Defendant also claims that the sentences are excessive because the State's evidence in support of his convictions was insufficient due to the credibility issues of the victim. The sufficiency of evidence is addressed in assignment of errors number one and two above.

23.   The statutory provision which excludes lack of knowledge as a defense in 1994 was set forth in La. R.S. 14:81.1(D).

24.   Defendant specifically claimed “[w]hile the defendant in Cinel was charged with possessing, and not producing child pornography, nothing about the reason in Cinel would suggest it does not apply to both; if anything, the First Amendment considerations cited therein would be heightened as applied to a producer instead of a consumer of otherwise protected content.”

25.   As explained by the Cinel Court, “the conduct here proscribed—the possession, sale, distribution, or possession with intent to sell or distribute, of materials that are not necessarily obscene but depict children under the age of 17 engaging in sexual conduct—would not be criminal conduct but for the fact that the materials depict children under the age of 17.”Cinel, 1994-0942, p. 9, 646 So.2d at 316. The defendant thus argued that the State cannot dispense with a knowledge element and the offender must be aware of the general content and character of the materials he possesses.

26.   The Court in Cinel, stated in part:We are constrained to find that this subsection does indeed create an impermissible presumption in favor of the State. First Amendment and overbreadth considerations have bound us to interpret § 81.1A(3) to require proof of intent or scienter that at least one performer involved was under the age of 17. New York v. Ferber, supra; Osborne v. Ohio, supra. This entails proof, in every instance, that the offender intended to possess materials that he knew or should have known depicted sexual performances of a child under the age of 17. See also United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d at 191. Subsection D relieves the State of proving this essential element of the offense or negates the necessity of proving scienter as to minority. Thus it undermines the constitutional interpretation of subsection A(3).We are not persuaded by the State's reference to § 81.1G in support of its argument. By its own terms, § 81.1G addresses only what the trier of fact may consider in determining the performer's age, and in no way imposes on the State the duty of proving what the defendant knew or should have known. Under the proper analysis of § 81.1A(3), whereby the State must prove general criminal intent, these factors will be relevant both to the State's case in chief and the accused's defense. However, § 81.1G does not salvage § 81.1D.The District Court was not wrong to find § 81.1D unconstitutional. This conclusion, however, does not justify striking the whole statute. Whenever possible, only the unconstitutional part should be stricken. Subsection 81.1D is unconstitutional as applied to 81.1A(3) because it relieves the State of proving scienter as to minority. Subsection 81.1D, however, is not so interrelated or connected with 81.1A(3) that severing it would frustrate the purpose of the statute. La. R.S. 24:175; State v. Azar, supra. The 1986 amendment added general criminal intent to subsection 81.1A(3), while the prior statute precluded lack of knowledge as a defense; this is equivalent to passing 81.1A(3) without the invalid provisions of 81.1D. State v. Johnson, supra, 343 So.2d 705. The apparent legislative intent, in this evolving area of the law, was to regulate child pornography to the fullest extent possible; the intent is better served by enforcing subsection 81.1A(3). Subsection 81.1D meets the criteria for severance and we strike it from the statute.Id., 94-0942, pp. 11-12, 646 So.2d at 317.

27.   Scienter is the “the Latin word for ‘knowingly.’ ” Cinel, 94-0942, p. 4, 646 So.2d at 313.

28.   Subsection (A)(2), however, still prohibits parental consent for a child to participate in pornography.

29.   La. R.S. 14:81.1(A)(1) formerly prohibited the “photographing, videotaping, filming, or otherwise reproducing visually of any sexual performance involving a child under the age of seventeen.”

30.   Notably, the sentencing provisions included in R.S. 14:81.1 separately delineate punishment for the “intentional possession” of pornography involving juveniles from the other acts that constitute a violation of the statute. See R.S. 14:81.1(E)(1)-(5).

31.   He also raised mistake of fact later in his motion for arrest of judgment.

Judge Karen K. Herman