WENDY RAWLS AND JACOB RAWLS v. LOUISIANA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND MIDFIRST BANK (2026)

This matter is before us on appeal by plaintiff, Wendy A. Rawls, from a judgment of the trial court granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of defendant, Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, and dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early morning hours of December 5, 2019, a residential property owned by Wendy A. Rawls and Jacob W. Rawls, located on Highway 430 in Franklinton, sustained fire damage, rendering the property a total and uninhabitable loss.¹ Wendy was the sole occupant of the home at the time of the fire and called 911 to report it. At the time of the fire, the residence was secured by a mortgage in favor of MidFirst Bank and insured by Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Farm Bureau”) under a residential homeowners’ policy. MidFirst Bank had recently commenced executory process against Wendy and Jacob on November 26, 2019, alleging that they were in default of payments on the mortgage note.

An investigation into the cause of the fire was subsequently conducted by the Louisiana State Fire Marshal's Office, which resulted in the October 19, 2020 arrest of Wendy on charges of arson with intent to defraud. Farm Bureau considered the findings of the State Fire Marshal's investigation to be a material factor in their claim investigation. While Wendy's criminal charges were pending, she did not cooperate with the State Fire Marshal's investigation. However, on August 12, 2021, the State Fire Marshal reported to State farm that counsel for Wendy and Jacob advised Farm Bureau that the charges against Wendy were voluntarily dismissed and that Farm Bureau could schedule Examinations Under Oath for Wendy and Jacob. The examinations took place on October 21, 2021. By correspondence dated November 23, 2021, Farm Bureau advised Wendy and Jacob that it had tendered payment on September 15, 2021, to MidFirst Bank in the amount of $192,003.62 representing the principal balance on their outstanding mortgage, that it would tender the balance of the dwelling coverage, and it requested draft instructions. On November 30, 2021, Farm Bureau tendered Wendy and Jacob the balance of the dwelling coverage in the amount of $68,996.28. On December 2, 2021, Farm Bureau tendered Wendy and Jacob the actual cash value of the contents, less a $1,500.00 advance, in the amount of $54,231.40.

On December 3, 2021, Wendy and Jacob, individually and on behalf of their three minor children, (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed suit against Farm Bureau seeking a declaration of coverage under their residential homeowners’ policy and alleging that Farm Bureau acted in “bad faith” such that they were entitled to damages, statutory penalties, and attorney fees pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973.² Farm Bureau answered and asserted affirmative defenses.³

Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment on January 9, 2025, seeking dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against it. In support of its motion, Farm Bureau attached:

(1) Wendy and Jacob's judgment of divorce;

(2) MidFirst Bank's petition for executory process with appraisement and attachments;

(3) affidavit of Farm Bureau Field Supervisor, Martin Crawford, Jr.;

(3A) Farm Bureau's certified homeowner policy;

(3B) Farm Bureau's claim file;

(3C) affidavit of Deputy State Fire Marshal, Chad Berry, and the Office of the State Fire Marshal's investigative report and attachments;

(3D) Farm Bureau's Origin and Cause Investigation Report for a vehicle fire, which was the subject of a prior claim paid by State Farm;

(3E) November 24, 2021 email correspondence with counsel;

(4) plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory relief;4

(5) April 22, 2021 Examination Under Oath of Wendy Rawls;

(6) April 22, 2021 Examination Under Oath of Jacob Rawls;

(7) October 21, 2021 Examination Under Oath of Wendy Rawls;

(8) October 21, 2021 Examination Under Oath of Jacob Rawls;

(9) plaintiffs’ petition for damages; and

(10) February 22, 2022 deposition of George J. Mahl III, P.E.

On February 7, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment to strike or preclude Farm Bureau from using the defense of arson, which was set to be heard on April 8, 2025. In support of their motion, plaintiffs offered: (1) the unsworn joint affidavit of Wendy and Jacob Rawls; and (2) Farm Bureau's answers to interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs.

On that same date, plaintiffs also filed an opposition to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment. In their opposition, plaintiffs objected to Farm Bureau's exhibits 1, 2, and 4, and the records of the State Fire Marshal, on the basis that these exhibits were not “in certified form,” and again offered their unsworn affidavit. In support of their opposition, plaintiffs attached their motion for partial summary judgment to strike the arson defense, including their statement of uncontested facts, memorandum in support, unsworn joint affidavit, and excerpts of the February 22, 2022 deposition of George J. Mahl III, P.E.⁵

On February 21, 2025, Farm Bureau filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. Farm Bureau objected therein to plaintiffs’ unsworn and uncertified affidavit on the basis that it was improper summary judgment evidence.

On February 24, 2025, plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion to strike Farm Bureau's reply memorandum as untimely.⁶ Plaintiffs argued therein that they received Farm Bureau's reply memorandum filed on February 21, 2025, at 5:10 p.m., which was filed less than five days before the summary judgment hearing on February 26, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., thus falling a few hours short of five full 24-hour periods.

Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion to strike and Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment were heard by the trial court on February 26, 2025. Thereafter, the trial court signed a judgment on March 26, 2025, which:

(1) denied plaintiffs’ ex parte motion to strike Farm Bureau's reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment as untimely ⁷ ;

(2) granted Farm Bureau's objection to Wendy and Jacob's unsworn affidavits offered in support of plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment;

(3) denied plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to Farm Bureau's summary judgment evidence ⁸ ; and

(4) granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims against it with prejudice.

Wendy filed the instant appeal in proper person, contending that the trial court erred in finding that her unsworn affidavit was inadmissible summary judgment evidence and in granting Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment.⁹

DISCUSSION

Wendy is representing herself in proper person in this appeal. On review of her appellant brief, we note that it does not comply with Uniform Rules - Courts of Appeal, Rules 2-12.2, 2-12.3, and 2-12.4, in numerous particulars, including: the judge who rendered the ruling is misnamed, the text of the brief is not double-spaced, a copy of the judgment complained of or minute entry from the hearing is not attached to the brief, there is no table of authorities, and there are no citations to the record or authorities relied upon. Moreover, although Wendy contends in her brief that this Court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over this matter, we will exercise our appellate jurisdiction over this appeal of a final judgment dismissing all claims against Farm Bureau with prejudice. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915(A)(1) and (2).

Although a pro se litigant assumes responsibility for her lack of knowledge of the law, in the interest of justice, this court will nonetheless read her pro se filing indulgently and attempt to construe her brief in spite of these deficiencies.¹⁰ See Estate of Wilson v. Standard Security Life Insurance Company of New York, 2022-0409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/4/22), 2022 WL 16707124, *2 n.2 (unpublished), writ denied, 2022-01774 (La. 2/14/23), 3 5 5 So. 3d 611, citing Food Perfect, Inc. v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 2012-2492 (La. 1/18/13), 106 So. 3d 107, 108; Brown v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office, 2017-1305, 2017-1306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/13/18), 249 So. 3d 864, 869 n.7, writ not considered sub nom. Brown v. Larpenter, 2018-00964 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 792.

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Jones v. Anderson, 2016-1361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/29/17), 224 So. 3d 413, 417. After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). A “genuine” issue is a triable issue, which means that an issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree; if on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. Simon v. CenturyLink, Inc., 2021-0412 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So. 3d 88, 90. A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Kasem v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2016-0217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/17), 212 So. 3d 6, 13. The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, certified copies of public documents or public records, certified copies of insurance policies, authentic acts, private acts duly acknowledged, promissory notes and assignments thereof, written stipulations, and admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4)(a).

The burden of proof rests on the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. The burden is then on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

Appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Crosstex Energy Services, LP v. Texas Brine Company, LLC, 2017-0895 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/21/17), 240 So. 3d 932, 936, writ denied, 2018-0145 (La. 3/23/18), 238 So. 3d 963. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular issue in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Simon, 340 So. 3d at 91.

However, the abuse of discretion standard of review is applied to the trial court's evidentiary rulings on objections to documents filed in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion that are raised by a party in a timely filed opposition or reply memorandum in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). Trombettas v. Williams, 2023-0250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/23), 372 So. 3d 360, 370, writ denied, 2023-01532 (La. 1/17/24), 377 So. 3d 249. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 967(A), an affidavit offered in support of a motion for summary judgment shall be based on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

Evidentiary Objection to Plaintiffs’ Unsworn Affidavit (Assignment of Error Number One)

In support of their opposition to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs offered the joint affidavit of Wendy and Jacob that contained a signature line providing that it was sworn to before a notary public, which was left blank. Farm Bureau objected to the unsworn and unnotarized affidavit as being improper summary judgment evidence in its reply memorandum. The objection was heard and considered by the trial court at the February 26, 2025 hearing. At the hearing, plaintiffs’ attorney conceded that the affidavit was not notarized and that his failure to sign the affidavit was “an oversight” on his part. The trial court ruled that the unnotarized affidavit was inadmissible.

On appeal, Wendy contends that the trial court erred in finding that the unsworn affidavit offered by plaintiffs in support of their opposition to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment was improper summary judgment evidence after plaintiffs’ attorney acknowledged that the lack of notarization of the affidavit was an oversight on his part. Wendy further contends that their attorney subsequently attempted to submit “properly notarized affidavits to remedy the matter” and that the trial court erred in not admitting same.

An affidavit that is not notarized is not competent summary judgment evidence under La. C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967 and may not be considered. Stevens Construction & Design, LLC v. Hillman, 2019-1329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/12/20), 2020 WL 3109444, *3 (unpublished), citing Blagg v. Blanch, 94-831 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So. 2d 1166, 1168. Any opposition to the motion for summary judgment and all documents in support of the opposition shall be filed and served not less than fifteen days prior to the hearing on the motion. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2). The court shall not consider any documents filed after these deadlines. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(5). The Legislature's use of “shall be filed” in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2) is clear and unambiguous, and the word “shall” is mandatory, excluding the possibility of being optional or subject to discretion. Guidry v. Southern Regional Medical Center, 2024-0760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So. 3d 1241, 1249, citing Auricchio v. Harriston, 2020-01167 (La. 12/10/21), 332 So. 3d 660, 663. Compliance with the deadlines set for filing documents in a motion for summary judgment proceeding are mandatory, without regard to cause or prejudice. See Auricchio, 332 So. 3d at 663; Matter of Succession of Breen, 2021-0806, 2021-0807 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/11/23), 370 So. 3d 1114, 1125 (en banc).

Applying the well-established law, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in excluding the unnotarized joint affidavit of Wendy and Jacob. Moreover, to the extent that Wendy contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the subsequently notarized joint affidavit, the trial court had no discretion to consider the supporting document because it was untimely filed. See Guidry, 403 So. 3d at 1250. Accordingly, we find no merit to this assignment of error.

Outstanding Genuine Issues of Material Fact (Assignment of Error Number Two)

In her second assignment of error, Wendy contends that the joint affidavit set forth genuine issues of material fact, which remained in dispute. Wendy then concedes that the trial court's refusal to admit the joint affidavit “effectively removed all ․ evidence regarding genuine issues of material fact.” Further, Wendy candidly admits that no other summary judgment evidence of record creates a material issue of fact.

Despite Wendy's concession that the only evidence that creates genuine issues of material of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment was excluded, and we have affirmed such exclusion herein, as an appellate court, we are nonetheless required to review the summary judgment evidence submitted by the mover de novo to determine if it is sufficient to resolve all material fact issues. See First Heritage Credit of Louisiana, LLC v. Griffin, 2023-034 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 10/18/23), 372 So. 3d 456, 461-462.

Bad Faith Penalties

Insurance “bad faith’ law is codified in La. R.S. 22:1892, which sets forth affirmative duties for insurers and prescribes penalties when that duty is breached. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1892(A)(1) generally requires insurers to pay the amount of any claim due to any insured within 30 days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss. Section (B)(1) of this statute provides, in pertinent part:

[F]ailure to make payment within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory written proofs and demand therefor ․ when the failure is found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause, shall subject the insurer to a penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, of fifty percent damages on the amount found to be due from the insurer to the insured, plus any proven economic damages sustained as a result of the breach, or one thousand dollars, whichever is greater, payable to the insured, or in the event a partial payment or tender has been made, fifty percent of the difference between the amount paid or tendered and the amount found to be due, plus any proven economic damages sustained as a result of the breach, as well as ․ reasonable attorney fees and costs.

This statute must be strictly construed because it is penal in nature. Richardson v. GEICO Indemnity Company, 2010-0208 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/10/10), 48 So. 3d 307, 314, writ denied, 2010-2473 (La. 12/17/10), 51 So. 3d 7. It subjects an insurer, when it is arbitrary or capricious in failing to unconditionally tender the undisputed amount or make a written offer to settle a claim within 30 days of satisfactory proof of loss, to the mandatory imposition of penalties and attorney's fees for the collection of such amount. Bourg v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, 2019-0270 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/5/20), 300 So. 3d 881, 890.

An insured who claims penalties and attorney's fees under La. R.S. 22:1892 has the burden of proving that the insurer received a “satisfactory proof of loss” as a necessary predicate to a showing that the insurer was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Richardson, 48 So. 3d at 314. Whether and when a satisfactory proof of loss was received is a question of fact. Harris v. Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, 2020-1323, 2020-0869 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/21/21), 328 So. 3d 1208, 1216, writ denied, 2021-01282 (La. 11/17/21), 327 So. 3d 994.

In order to prevail on a claim under La. R.S. 22:1892, a claimant must not only establish that the insurer received satisfactory proof of loss. Harris, 328 So. 3d at 1216. He must also establish that the insurer failed to pay the claim within the applicable statutory period, or failed to make a written offer to settle the claim; and that the failure to timely tender a reasonable amount was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. See Harris, 328 So. 3d at 1216; Bourg, 300 So. 3d at 891.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the phrase “arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause” is synonymous with “vexatious.” See Guillory v. Lee, 2009-0075 (La. 6/26/09), 16 So. 3d 1104, 1127. A “vexatious refusal to pay” means one that is unjustified, without reasonable cause or excuse. Both phrases describe an insurer whose willful refusal of a claim is not based on a good faith defense. Guillory, 16 So. 3d at 1127. The determination as to whether an insurer's handling of a claim is arbitrary and capricious is one of fact. Harris, 328 So. 3d at 1216; Bourg, 300 So. 3d at 891.

The penalty provisions should not apply if the insurer has a good faith, reasonable explanation for its failure to timely pay on a claim. Moreover, when a reasonable disagreement exists between an insurer and an insured, the insurer is not arbitrary and capricious or without probable cause to deny payment on the disputed claim. McDonald v. American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus, 2010-1873, 2010-1287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/27/11), 70 So. 3d 1086, 1093.

Farm Bureau submitted its entire claim file in support of its motion for summary judgment. The evidence showed that the Forensic Investigation findings, reported on December 26, 2019, indicated that the cause of the fire was “due to either an unspecified failure of the Rainbow Vacuum or was the result of an intentional human act.” This finding created a question as to whether plaintiffs violated the policy's intentional act exclusion, which would preclude any coverage under the policy at issue.¹¹

The evidence submitted by Farm Bureau also established that on May 12, 2020, a search warrant was issued in connection with the State Fire Marshal's investigation, based on a tip received through its Arson Hot Tip Online notification system. A tip received on February 25, 2020, stated that the fire was intentionally set by the homeowner and an ex-boyfriend. Thus, the State Fire Marshal, who had closed his initial case on December 27, 2019, reopened the case. A second tip providing similar information was received on April 26, 2020. Moreover, the evidence submitted by Farm Bureau established that plaintiffs refused to cooperate with Farm Bureau's investigation as well as the State Fire Marshal's investigation, which resulted in delaying the investigations. Plaintiffs further requested additional time, a thirty-day extension, to submit their contents inventory, which was granted by Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau also attached the laboratory report of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, which concluded after examining the remnants of the Rainbow Vacuum and electrical outlet from the hall closet, there was no evidence of electrical failure resulting in fire causation. As a result of the State Fire Marshal's investigation, Wendy was arrested on October 19, 2020, and charged with one count of arson with intent to defraud.

Farm Bureau set forth correspondence from plaintiffs’ counsel dated April 21, 2021, advising that plaintiffs would appear for Examinations Under Oath scheduled the next day, April 22, 2021, but that they “fully intend to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights in response to any questions by Farm Bureau that warrant invoking it[.]” During the examinations, Wendy refused to answer questions regarding the fire and whether she intentionally set it. Jacob likewise confirmed that he was not cooperating with the Fire Marshal's investigation concerning the fire.

Farm Bureau further submitted correspondence from plaintiffs’ counsel dated August 12, 2021, advising that the criminal charges against Wendy had been voluntarily dismissed and demanding that Farm Bureau pay their claim within sixty days. Plaintiffs submitted to Examinations Under Oath on October 21, 2021, and Farm Bureau submitted its correspondence of November 23, 2021, advising it would tender payment on the claim and requesting draft instructions. Farm Bureau submitted evidence establishing that it tendered the balance of the dwelling coverage on November 30, 2021, and the balance on the contents coverage on December 2, 2021.

On our de novo review, we find that the evidence submitted by Farm Bureau in support of its motion for summary judgment establishes that a valid reasonable dispute existed between the parties as to whether plaintiffs violated the policy's intentional act exclusion by intentionally causing the fire, which would preclude any coverage under the policy at issue. Farm Bureau further established that plaintiffs’ limited cooperation attributed to delays in concluding its investigation. Farm Bureau has shown that based on the facts known to it at the time, there was a reasonable disagreement between the insurer and the insured. Thus, we find Farm Bureau met its burden of proof, and the burden of proof shifted to plaintiffs to show a genuine issue of material fact. In response to Farm Bureau's motion, plaintiffs failed to rebut this showing or present sufficient evidence that Farm Bureau acted vexatiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, or without cause in adjusting plaintiffs’ homeowners’ claim under the circumstances herein.

Considering the above and foregoing, we find that Farm Bureau had a reasonable basis to defend plaintiffs’ claims and acted in good-faith reliance on those defenses. Plaintiffs, admittedly, failed to rebut such showing by producing factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to bad faith on the part of Farm Bureau. As there is no genuine issue as to material fact, Farm Bureau is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau and dismissing plaintiffs’ bad faith claims against it.

We find no merit to this assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

For the above and foregoing reasons, the March 26, 2025 judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Louisiana Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company and dismissing the claims of Wendy A. Rawls against it with prejudice is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff/appellant, Wendy A. Rawls.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Wendy and Jacob, who were previously married, were divorced pursuant to a May 9, 2019 judgment.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1973 was subsequently repealed by La. Acts 2024, No. 3, § 2, effective July 1, 2024. However, the version in effect when plaintiffs’ petition was filed described an insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to the insured. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1973(B)(6) stated that an insurer breaches his duty of good faith and fair dealing if he knowingly fails to pay claims involving immovable property when such failure is arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1973(C) provided that, in addition to any general or special damages to which a claimant is entitled for breach of an imposed duty, the claimant may be awarded penalties assessed against the insurer in an amount not to exceed two times the damages sustained or $5,000.00, whichever is greater.

3.   Plaintiffs also named MidFirst Bank as a defendant. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment of “any amounts due by petitioners to MidFirst Bank and damages from Farm Bureau to the extent that any monies are due MidFirst Bank directly attributable to any late or untimely payment by Farm Bureau to MidFirst Bank to satisfy or partially satisfy the balance of the aforesaid loan and Rawls’ mortgage.” Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment against MidFirst Bank “declaring what amount of monies, including interest, penalties, attorney fees, insurance payments, and other expenses or claims if any, which are due MidFirst Bank by petitioners relating to its loan and mortgage on the residential property[.]” MidFirst Bank filed an answer and admitted that it possessed a mortgage on the Rawls’ residence and that there was an outstanding balance on the Rawls’ loan with MidFirst Bank. MidFirst Bank further asserted affirmative defenses contending that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted and urging a dilatory exception of vagueness. Farm Bureau ultimately settled with mortgagee MidFirst Bank for the principal balance of the Rawls’ outstanding loan in the amount of $193,003.62.

4.   In their petition for declaratory relief, Wendy and Jacob sought to restrict Farm Bureau from taking their sworn statements while criminal charges were pending against them.

5.   To the extent that plaintiffs “incorporated” their motion for partial summary judgment objecting to Farm Bureau's use of an arson defense into their memorandum in opposition to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, we note that pleadings previously filed into the record may be specifically referenced and considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See La. C.C.P. arts. 966(B)(2) and 966(A)(4)(a) and (b).

6.   A reply memorandum shall be filed and served not less than five days inclusive of legal holidays notwithstanding Article 5059(B)(3) prior to the hearing on the motion. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(3).

7.   In its oral ruling, the trial court found that there was no provision in law or court rule that required that a memorandum be filed by a certain time on the fifth day prior to the hearing.

8.   In its oral ruling, the trial court determined that the State Fire Marshal's report was properly authenticated by a notarized affidavit from the State Fire Marshal's Office and was part of Farm Bureau's claim file by an affidavit from Farm Bureau's representative.

9.   On June 6, 2025, Wendy, appearing in proper person, filed a “Notice of Intent to Appeal” on her own behalf. In her appellate brief, however, Wendy indicated that this appeal was on her behalf and on behalf of co-plaintiff, Jacob. It is unlawful for a natural person who has not been first duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law by the Louisiana Supreme Court to engage in the practice of law in this state. See La. R.S. 37:213(A)(1); Senior's Club ADHC and PC A Center v. State, 2015-1165 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/16), 2016 WL 7439328, *2 (unpublished), writ not considered sub nom. Senior's Club ADHC and PCA Center (La. Medicaid Provider No. 17259) v. State Through Department of Health and Hospitals, 2017-0342 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So. 3d 117. Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:212(A)(1) provides that the “practice of law means and includes ․ [i]n a representative capacity, the appearance as an advocate, or the drawing of papers, pleadings or documents, or the performance of any act in connection with pending or prospective proceedings before any court of record in this state[.]” Accordingly, because Wendy is not licensed to practice law in Louisiana, she cannot represent Jacob or anyone else in proper person. See Louka v. Board of Supervisors for University of Louisiana System, 2023-0076 (La. App. lst Cir. 9/21/23), 376 So. 3d 864, 867, writ denied, 2023-01410 (La. 1/10/24), 376 So. 3d 131; Senior's Club ADHC and PCA Center, 2016 WL 7439328 at *2. Thus, where Jacob has not filed a notice of intent to appeal or otherwise indicated any attempt to appeal in this matter, the March 26, 2025 judgment of the trial court is final as to Jacob, and we will consider this appeal only on behalf of Wendy.

10.   To that end, we note that Wendy did not assign error to the trial court's denial of her ex parte motion to strike Fann Bureau's reply memorandum, wherein Farm Bureau lodged its objection to plaintiffs’ unsworn affidavit. Nevertheless, had the trial court granted her ex parte motion to strike and considered plaintiff's unsworn affidavit as summary judgment evidence, on our de novo review on appeal, we are required to determine whether we should give any evidentiary value to documents offered in support of, or in opposition to, summary judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). As we later determine herein, an affidavit that is not notarized is not competent summary judgment evidence under La. C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967 and may not be considered. Stevens Construction & Design, LLC v. Hillman, 2019-1329 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/12/20), 2020 WL 3109444, *3 (unpublished), citing Blagg v. Blanch, 94-831 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2/1/95), 649 So. 2d 1166, 1168. Thus, even if the trial court had considered the unsworn joint affidavit, we can afford it no evidentiary value on our de novo review of this summary judgment. See Campbell v. Hospital Service District No. 3 for Parish of Lafourche, 2022-1118 (La. App. 1stCir. 8/1/23), 371 So. 3d 543, 549 n.2.Furthermore, we note that a motion to strike is not an appropriate means of raising an objection to documents offered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2) and La. C.C.P. art. 966, Comments - 2015, comment (k).

11.   The policy excluded coverage for an “[i]ntentional [l]oss, meaning any loss arising out of any act committed: a. by or at the direction of the insured; and b. with the intent to cause a loss.”

MILLER, J.

Edwards, J., concurs in the result only.