STATE v. PATTERSON (2025)

The defendant, Justin Edward Patterson, was convicted of manslaughter (responsive) (count one) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count two). See La. R.S. 14:31 and La. R.S. 14:95.1. He was subsequently adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender on count one.¹ The trial court vacated the previously imposed sentence on count one and resentenced the defendant to twenty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, to be served concurrently with the fifteen-year sentence on count two.

On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions and habitual offender adjudication, amended the enhanced sentence on count one and, as amended, affirmed the sentence. State v. Patterson, 2018-1731 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/3/19), 285 So.3d 1154.² However, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs, in part, vacated the defendant's enhanced sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to State v. Lyles, 2019-00203 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 407 (per curiam).³ See State v. Patterson, 2020-00003 (La. 9/27/21), 323 So.3d 861 (per curiam).

On remand, the trial court resentenced the defendant on count one to forty years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with the fifteen-year sentence on count two.⁴ Thus, upon resentencing, the total length of defendant's imprisonment increased from twenty to forty years. In addition, the trial court added a $ 1,000 fine to the sentence on count two. The defendant now appeals, challenging the enhanced sentence on count one and the fine imposed on count two. For the following reasons, we set aside the fine imposed on count two, vacate the enhanced sentence on count one, and remand for resentencing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The pertinent facts of this case were set forth in the defendant's prior appeal. On May 20, 2013, the defendant shot and killed Mikki Dauntain during an altercation. Natasha Garner was at the scene and identified the defendant, whom she had known all her life, as the shooter. Alani Clark was standing near the scene when the shooting occurred and also identified the defendant as the shooter. The defendant's girlfriend, Ashley Rudolph, testified the defendant told her that he did not mean to shoot Dauntain. Rather, the defendant told Rudolph that he was trying to shoot Brandon Scott because he thought Scott had recently robbed him. The defendant did not testify at trial.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

In a single assignment of error, the defendant raises three separate arguments challenging his enhanced sentence. He specifically argues that contrary to the Lyles decision, the trial court applied the wrong version of the Habitual Offender Law (La. R.S. 15:529.1), that his rights to due process and to appeal were violated by the imposition of an increased sentence on remand, and that his forty-year sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. He further asserts that appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance where counsel failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence and to request a downward departure in his sentence. The State argues because the defendant failed to file a motion to reconsider sentence, this court should limit its review to a bare excessiveness analysis and contends the trial court properly resentenced the defendant within the guidelines set out in Lyles.

Although the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence following his original sentencing, a thorough review of the record indicates that he did not make or file such a motion after he was resentenced. Under La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.1(E), the failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence, shall preclude the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence on appeal, including a claim of excessiveness. See State v. Smith, 2022-0231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 697, 703. Further, when the trial court resentences the defendant, the result is the imposition of a new sentence. Since a new sentence is imposed, Article 881.1 requires that a renewed motion for reconsideration be made or filed, specifying the grounds for objection to the new sentence. See State v. Graham, 2014-1769 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 171 So.3d 272, 281, writ denied, 2015-1028 (La. 4/8/16), 191 So.3d 583.

However, we will address the defendant's arguments in his assignment of error, even in the absence of a timely motion to reconsider sentence or a contemporaneous objection, because it will be necessary to do so as part of the analysis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.⁵ Louisiana v. Carter, 2023-0277 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/10/24), 2024 WL 108869, *2 (unpublished).

HABITUAL OFFENDER LAW

We find merit in the defendant's argument that he was sentenced, as a third felony offender, under the wrong version of the Habitual Offender Law. Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years. La. R.S. 14:31(B). Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1, the defendant was previously adjudicated a third-felony offender. At the time of the commission of the underlying offense, La. R.S. 15:529.1 provided if the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life then:

(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]

See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) (prior to the 2017 amendment).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:529.1 was amended by 2017 La. Acts No. 282, § 1 and now, in pertinent part, provides if the third felony is such that upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the following sentences apply:

(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than one-half of the longest possible sentence for the conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction.

See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a) (emphasis added).

The effective date and application of the amendment was addressed in 2017 La. Acts No. 282, § 2, which explicitly provides: “This Act shall become effective November 1, 2017, and shall have prospective application only to offenders whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017.”⁶

In Lyles, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether the defendant's habitual-offender status and sentence were governed by La. R.S. 15:529.1 as it existed at the time the defendant committed the offense in 2015, or as amended by 2017 La. Acts No. 282, or as amended by 2018 La. Acts No. 542.⁷ See Lyles, 286 So.3d at 408. The Court addressed the applicability of the 2017 amendment, noting the language in Section 2 of Act 282 is unequivocal, and therefore is not subject to further judicial construction. Accordingly, the Court found that for persons like Lyles, whose convictions became final on or after November 1, 2017, and whose habitual offender bills were filed before that date, the full provisions of Act 282 apply. See Lyles, 286 So.3d at 411.

As a result, the Court found that Lyles was adjudicated and sentenced pursuant to the wrong version of the Habitual Offender Law, vacated the habitual offender adjudication and sentence, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court was instructed to apply the version of the Habitual Offender Law as it was amended by 2017 La. Acts No. 282, and before its 2018 amendment. See Id. at 411,⁸

In the instant matter, the State challenged the defendant's original sentence as being too lenient under the Habitual Offender Law. See Patterson, 285 So.3d at 1158. Thereafter, the Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the enhanced 26.66-year sentence imposed by this court on count one and remanded the case to the trial court with specific instructions to resentence the defendant pursuant to Lyles. See Patterson, 323 So.3d at 862. Because the defendant's conviction is not final and his habitual offender bill was filed on June 28, 2017, he falls within the first category discussed in Lyles. Thus, the sentencing range for the defendant's conviction on count one was imprisonment at hard labor between twenty to eighty years. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(a). Therefore, we note the original twenty-year sentence imposed by the trial court was proper.⁹

Resentencing was held in this matter on June 28, 2022, and the defendant was represented by counsel. At the resentencing, the new presiding judge stated: “․ as a third-felony offender, you're exposed to 26.66 years to 80 years at hard labor” and imposed a forty-year sentence. Thus, the trial court resentenced the defendant under the law that was in effect at the time of the offense and did not apply the ameliorative changes made by 2017 La. Acts No. 282. See Lyles, 286 So.3d at 411. Accordingly, we find the defendant was sentenced pursuant to the wrong version of the Habitual Offender Law.

As a result, we pretermit discussion of the defendant's remaining arguments regarding his sentence on count one and any patent error.¹⁰ However, we note the record does not show the trial court provided sufficient reasons for the more severe sentence. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents increased sentences when that increase was motivated by vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Thus, in order to ensure the sentencing court does not have a vindictive motivation when it imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial, the court's reasons for the increased sentence must appear in the record. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-726, 2080-2081, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled in part by, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). Otherwise, a presumption arises that a greater sentence has been imposed for a vindictive purpose - a presumption that must be rebutted by objective information justifying the increased sentence. Smith, 490 U.S. at 798-799, 109 S.Ct. at 2204. The presumption of vindictiveness under Pearce can also apply to a remand for resentencing after a defendant has successfully challenged the sentence itself and not the conviction. See State v. Dufrene, 2022-0762 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/14/23), 365 So.3d 837, 843-844.

While we do not specifically find this sentence to be excessive, by remanding the case for resentencing, we give the trial court an opportunity to state sufficient reasons to justify the imposition of the sentence. See State v. Baker, 2023-0815 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/19/24), 389 So.3d 839, 846. By remanding, we also allow for the defendant to inform the court, if he can, of factors that mitigate toward a lesser sentence.¹¹ Accordingly, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

IMPOSITION OF FINE ON FIREARM SENTENCE

Generally, a trial court has authority to impose a fine at sentencing. However, we find that under the facts of this case, the imposition of the fine on remand was error. The previously imposed fifteen-year sentence on count two, imposed without the mandatory fine, was left intact by both this court and the Louisiana Supreme Court. In the original appeal, this court chose not to amend the defendant's “illegally lenient” sentence as to his conviction on count two. This court noted that although the sentence was imposed without the statutorily-included fine, the sentencing error benefited rather than prejudiced the defendant, and neither the State nor the defendant raised the sentencing error on appeal. Patterson, 285 So.3d at 1161-1162. Moreover, as noted above, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this court's prior opinion only to the extent that this court unilaterally amended the defendant's enhanced sentence for the manslaughter conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of resentencing on count one. See Patterson, 323 So.3d at 861. Therefore, the only sentence vacated and for which the trial court was ordered to resentence the defendant is the manslaughter conviction on count one. Given the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in imposing the fine on count two. Accordingly, the trial court's imposition of a $1,000 fine on count two is set aside.

For the above and foregoing reasons, we set aside the fine imposed on count two. Further, we vacate the defendant's sentence on count one and remand for further proceedings consistent with this court's opinion. On remand, the trial court is directed to apply the version of the Habitual Offender Law, La. R.S. 15:529.1, as it was amended by 2017 La. Acts No. 282, and before its amendment by 2018 La. Acts No. 542, and to articulate sufficient reasons for the sentence imposed.

FINE ON COUNT TWO SET ASIDE; SENTENCE ON COUNT ONE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the habitual offender bill, filed June 28, 2017, the State alleged the defendant was previously convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana on May 24, 2012, in St. Mary Parish (docket no. 12-187668) and possession of Xanax on July 28, 2008 in St. Mary Parish (docket no. 08-177244).

2.   Relying upon La. R.S. 15:529.1(K), which provides a defendant must be sentenced pursuant to the provision of the statute that was in effect on the date the defendant's instant offense was committed, we concluded that based on his manslaughter conviction, the minimum sentence authorized for the defendant was 26.66 years. See Patterson, 285 So.3d at 1158-1161.

3.   The Louisiana Supreme Court found that pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 881.4, this court erred in unilaterally resentencing the defendant, granted the State's writ (in part) and reversed this court's decision to the limited extent that this court amended the defendant's sentence on count one. See Patterson, 323 So.3d at 862.

4.   It is noted that the June 28, 2022 court minutes incorrectly state that the defendant's enhanced sentence was imposed without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However, the sentencing transcript is clear that the trial court did not restrict parole eligibility on count one. Where there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript must prevail. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983).

5.   Failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence in itself does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. However, if the defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, his sentence would have been different, a basis for an ineffective assistance claim may be found. State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 207, 210, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 410.

6.   However, effective August 1, 2018, the legislature amended the habitual offender statute to specifically state that the habitual offender penalty provision in effect on the commission date of the offense being enhanced is the penalty provision that must be applied. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(K).

7.   In Lyles, the defendant raised the issue of the correct cleansing period. See Lyles, 286 So.3d at 408.

8.   See also State v. Sylvester, 2019-527 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20), 291 So.3d 718, 725-727 (Upon noting the defendant falls within the first category discussed in Lyles because his conviction was not final and his habitual offender bill was filed May 22, 2017, the third circuit found that the trial court applied the incorrect cleansing period and the wrong penalty provision in sentencing the defendant.)

9.   While the ameliorative changes made to La. R.S. 15:529.1 reduced the defendant's sentencing exposure, he was still subject to a maximum sentence of eighty years under the statute prior to and after the 2017 amendment.

10.   As this is the defendant's second appeal, the error patent review is limited to his resentencing. It appears the trial court provided incomplete advice regarding the postconviction relief prescriptive period. However, because count one is being vacated and remanded for resentencing, no corrective action is required.

11.   “To the extent that the amendment of defendant's sentence entails more than a ministerial correction of a sentencing error, the decision in State v. Williams, [2000]-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, does not sanction the sua sponte correction made by the court of appeal on defendant's appeal of his conviction and sentence.” State v. Haynes, 2004-1893 (La. 12/10/04), 889 So.2d 224 (per curiam).

LANIER, J.