STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOHN SHALLERHORN (2026)

John Shallerhorn (“Appellant”) pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental defect to one charge of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery with a firearm. He waived his right to trial by jury. After a two-day bench trial, Appellant was found guilty on April 4, 2024. In this appeal, he seeks a reversal or modification of that judgment. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Relevant facts

The facts in this case are not in dispute.

Appellant has a lengthy history of mental illness and diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder and bipolar type I with psychotic features. He was indicted for the charges for which he was convicted on June 17, 2021. The acts supporting the conviction are not in dispute.

Silas Forte (“Forte”) was sitting in his car in the parking lot of G.W. Carver High School with his two children on February 26, 2021. They were at the high school to see a basketball game. Forte was the coach of one of the teams competing that evening.

At about 6:00 p.m., Appellant approached the car with a speaker and began a conversation with Forte's children. Then, addressing Forte at the driver's side window, he reached in to grab a chain that was hanging from Forte's neck. When Forte resisted, Appellant pulled up his shirt and displayed a gun, saying, “I said I need that.” Forte handed over the necklace and said, “That's yours, don't kill my kids.” Forte repeated, “don't kill my kids, dog.” Appellant replied, “don't call me a dog, I'm a God [sic].” Appellant then said, “I see you value, you know what's more important to you, you value your kids.” He then said, “Just remember my name – my name, you know, John Shallerhorn.” Forte then stated he was from the neighborhood and that everyone goes through something and that Appellant was blessed. Appellant replied by saying, “you blessed” and then went to the opposite side of the car to give Forte's son a fist bump.

Appellant returned to Forte's side of the car and returned the chain, saying, “it's bigger than this,” adding, “I'm about to make history․remember my name, John Shallerhorn.” Then, he told Forte that he was going into the school “with the gun and weed.” Forte asked Appellant why he was going into the school with a gun. Appellant replied, “Man, just remember my name. I'm John Shallerhorn.” Appellant walked a short distance away from the car then returned and told Forte, “yeah, give it here” and took the chain from Forte again. Forte drove off immediately after the encounter and his son called police to report the encounter with Appellant.

Appellant then walked into the high school building where he encountered Jovan White (“White”), a high school teacher who was volunteering as a ticket salesman in the gym lobby. White called out to Appellant to “hold up dog” because Appellant was not wearing a face mask as required for entry.¹ Appellant replied, “I am not a dog.” He then walked forward and hit White. Police Officer Martinus Mitchum (“Sgt. Mitchum”) who was serving as a security guard for the night stepped in and escorted Appellant toward the building exit. Appellant resisted, saying, “Man, I'm going to show you; I'm going to show you.” He drew his gun and shot Mitchum several times. Appellant immediately threw down his gun and a portable speaker he had been carrying throughout these events. He then ran to the nearest sidewalk and lay down on the sidewalk with his hands above his head.

After the shooting, other security guards rushed to the scene and handcuffed Appellant. One of the guards, a state probation and parole agent, Ernest Rieux (“Rieux”) read Appellant his Miranda warning. Appellant said, “I shot him. I know what I did. Can I go pray for him?” Emergency medical service workers arrived at the scene and brought Mitchum to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

Proceedings below

The State filed a notice of election, on March 10, 2021, to forego the death penalty for any charges for which the grand jury returns an indictment. The case was then presented to the grand jury, which returned indictments for first degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm on June 17, 2021. The aggravating circumstance that elevated Sgt. Mitchum's murder from second degree to first degree per La. R.S. 14:30(A)(2) was the fact that Sgt. Mitchum was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties as a police officer at the time he was killed.

At his arraignment on June 28, 2021, Appellant pled not guilty to both charges. He filed a motion to waive his right to a trial by jury as permitted by La. C. Cr. P. art. 780 on March 16, 2022. The trial court denied the motion for bench trial, cautioning that the State might reverse its position and opt to seek the death penalty. Appellant applied for a writ on the denial. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ and held that Appellant's waiver should have been granted.²

Appellant changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity on April 20, 2022. After a bench trial on April 3 and 4, 2024, the court rejected the insanity defense and found Appellant guilty as charged. On June 27, 2024, Appellant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of insanity acquittal. The following day Appellant filed a motion for new trial and motion for downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole established by La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2). The trial court denied all three motions.

Assignments of error

1. The evidence presented at trial proved that Appellant was not guilty by reason of insanity.

2. Appellant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a trial by jury.

3. The incomplete record deprives Appellant of his constitutional right to an appeal.

4. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to suppress statement.

5. The trial court's exclusion of a jail phone call on grounds of relevance deprived Appellant of meaningful evidence that would have supported his insanity defense.

Assignment 1: Insanity defense

A defendant in a criminal prosecution is presumed to be sane under La. R.S. 15:432. That presumption may be overcome by rebutting evidence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 652. La. R.S. 14:14 codifies the historic definition of legal insanity in the criminal context:

If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility.

In all cases in which a defendant pleads insanity as a defense, the defendant bears the burden of “establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” La. C. Cr. P. art. 652. Whether the defendant has a mental defect that prevents him from distinguishing between right and wrong must be determined by the trier of fact at the trial court. State v. Claibon, 395 So. 2d 770, 772 (La. 1981). On appeal, the trial court's determination is tested in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In other words, this court must decide whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense.

At trial, Appellant presented abundant evidence of bizarre behavior and delusional thinking. Two psychiatrists, Dr. Sarah Deland (“Dr. Deland) and Dr. Brad McConville testified at trial. They testified that Appellant's behavior and thought patterns supported a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder. They both concluded that Appellant's delusions that he was “a god” and was not bound by “man's laws” meant that he did not understand the difference between right and wrong.

In opposition, a psychologist, Dr. Gina Manguno-Mire (“Dr. Manguno-Mire”) testified that the bizarre behavior and delusional thinking were the product of Cannabis Use Disorder. She testified further that Appellant's actions immediately before and after he killed Sgt. Mitchum proved that Appellant knew the difference between right and wrong, even in his deluded condition. Specifically, she pointed to four observations that indicated Appellant knew that his actions were wrong.

First, Appellant told police that he knew guns were not allowed in the gym. He added that he knew that once he pulled his gun out he would be going to jail. He was familiar with gun laws and, in fact, had a permit to carry a concealed weapon. Appellant also expressed to Dr. Manguno-Mire his understanding that carrying a weapon into the gym was illegal.

Second, Appellant at times described his actions as being motivated by “the spirit.” Dr. Manguno-Mire testified that Appellant specifically denied to police that the spirit told him to shoot Sgt. Mitchum. In Dr. Manguno-Mire's interview with Appellant, he described the spirit as “an internal representation of goodness and who one is.” She concluded that none of his bad acts were done at the direction of the spirit. Dr. Manguno-Mire's impression of Appellant was that he was, “very interested in goodness and right and wrong, and trying to do the right thing. And I think it disappointed him and -- and others in his environment when -- when he -his behavior perhaps didn't live up too (sic) par.”

The third observation on which Dr. Manguno-Mire relied was the fact that Appellant threw down his weapon and lay down on the ground after the shooting. Dr. Manguno-Mire concluded that these actions indicated that he knew he had done something wrong. Appellant knew that police would be coming to apprehend him after the shooting and he disposed of the gun to protect himself from being shot accidentally in the process of being disarmed.

Finally, Dr. Manguno-Mire noted that Appellant attempted, in his police interview, to justify the shooting of Sgt. Mitchum as a reasonable act of self-defense. Dr. Manguno-Mire noted that Appellant told police that he “saw red” when he was called a “dog”³ or a “boy.” She determined that Appellant was angered by what he considered a sign of disrespect. Appellant also claimed that he felt frightened by the fact that he was accosted by an armed security guard. He explained that he felt “it was him or me” and he had to defend himself. Dr. Manguno-Mire concluded:

In terms of -- in terms of right and wrong, I think, this to him means, that he was justified that it was right for him to respond in the way that he did because he was perceiving disrespect, being put down and threatened. So in his mind, which is why I think partly he thought he should get out of jail, not because he was delusional, but because he was justified.

Although Dr. Manguno-Mire found that Appellant's rapid and compulsive speaking seemed manic, she disagreed with the psychiatrists that his condition made it impossible for him to distinguish right from wrong. It is apparent from the trial judge's verdict that she found Dr. Manguno-Mire's diagnosis and interpretation of events were, more likely than not, correct. The transcript reflects the judge's reasoning:

I had an opportunity to review the evidence that was presented. I am now ready to render my verdict. Mr. Shallerhorn, please stand. I do not believe that Mr. Shallerhorn was in an active psychotic state or experiencing an active psychotic break at the time of the charges, when he committed Armed Robbery against Silas Forte. And also do not believe that he was in an active psychotic break when he committed murder against Sergeant Mitchum. So for those reasons, I find him guilty as charged on both charges.

As we indicated above, the test enunciated in Claibon calls upon this court to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have reached the same conclusion as the trial court. The record reveals that the written report and testimony of Dr. Manguno-Mire diverges from that of the other witnesses. The oral reasons for judgment contained in the trial transcript show that the trial judge did not “believe” that Appellant was in the throes of a psychotic episode at the time he committed the crimes with which he was charged. Based on the trial court's stated reasoning, we must conclude that she found Dr. Manguno-Mire more credible than the doctors who presented a competing diagnosis of Appellant's mental condition. “When a trial court makes findings of fact based on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses, a reviewing court owes those findings great deference, and may not overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support those findings.” State v. Wells, 2008-2262, p. 4 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So. 3d 577, 580. In this case, there is evidence to support the trial court's findings. Therefore, we are bound to accept the trial judge's determination that Appellant was not legally insane at the time that he committed his crimes.

Assignment 2: Waiver of jury trial

At the outset, we must observe that the Supreme Court has already addressed this issue in its opinion State v. Shallerhorn, 2022-01385, p. 4 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So. 3d 42, 45. The court held that the State's formal decision not to seek the death penalty meant that this was no longer a “capital case,” leaving the defendant free to waive his right to a jury.

This leaves open the question of whether Appellant had the capacity to make a knowing waiver. In light of the trial judge's finding that Appellant did not have a psychotic episode, we find that Appellant's was competent to make the choice to waive the jury. In fact, Appellant admitted that he was taking anti-psychotic medicines at the time that he waived the jury trial. Dr. Deland testified that, during that time, his thoughts were much more linear and coherent.

The minute entry for April 20, 2022, reflects that the trial court advised Appellant of his right to trial by judge or jury and he elected to have a trial by judge, consistent with his earlier-filed motion.

Finally, we note that neither Appellant nor his counsel ever objected to his waiver of the jury. With such a history of Appellant pressing for the right to waive the jury, he cannot now be heard to seek relief based on that decision.

Assignment 3: Missing transcript

Appellant argues that he is deprived of his constitutional right to a “judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based.” La. Const. art. 1, § 19 (1974). In this case, there is no transcript or recording of the trial court's hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress his confession.⁴ The motion suggested that Appellant was not competent to waive his Miranda rights before being interrogated by police. Appellant's contention was supported by an opinion rendered by Dr. Deland. She opined that Appellant was in a manic state characterized by grandiose delusions that rendered him incapable of making a knowing, intelligent decision to waive his rights.

“[N]ot every omission from a record on appeal constitutes a violation of constitutional rights warranting reversal of a conviction and the ordering of a new trial.” State v. Small, 2013-1334, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/27/14), 147 So.3d 1274, 1286. The ultimate question is whether “the record “is so inadequate that the defendant's constitutional right to judicial review is prejudiced.” State v. Boatner, 03-0485, p. 6 (La.12/3/03), 861 So.2d 149, 153. To reach such a conclusion, a reviewing court must conduct a two-part analysis to determine whether a missing transcript renders the appellate process constitutionally null. (1) The missing transcript must be material to the outcome of the prosecution; and (2) its absence must be prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Norah, 2012-1194, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/13), 131 So. 3d 172, 182.

Whether a missing portion of a record is material takes into account the importance of the missing element and the quality and quantity of other evidence available in the trial record that is relevant to the assignment of error asserted by the defendant. State v. Boatner, 2003-0485, p. 5 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So. 2d 149, 153. Second, the defendant must show a “reasonable likelihood that he suffered prejudice” from that material omission in substantiating his other assignments of error. Boatner, 03–0485, pp. 7-8, 861 So.2d at 154.

While Dr. Deland's March 23, 2022 testimony is absent from the record, her February 14, 2022 expert report is contained in the appellate record. In her report, she concluded in relevant part:

It is my opinion with reasonable medical certainty that at the time that Mr. Shallerhorn was arrested, and he decided to speak to the police, that he was delusional and manic, and that he was unable to make a knowing and intelligent decision to waive his Miranda rights. Mr. Shallerhorn can intellectually understand his Miranda rights, but he had grandiose and paranoid delusions. He reported receiving messages, whether in the form of delusions or hallucinations, from the spirits. He talked about spirits directing his actions, and he talked about engaging in some of his behaviors such as the alleged robbery in the parking lot, in the spirit of doing good things, doing the right thing, and being able to teach people. In the interrogation room, he is alternately unresponsive with his head down and then having mildly pressured speech, difficult to interrupt and redirect.

It is fair to understand that Dr. Deland's testimony at the suppression hearing would not have varied from the central conclusion of her report. Applying the doctrine addressed in Boatner and other similar cases, Appellant may rely on the statements in the report as expert evidence to support his argument.⁵ There is also videotaped interrogation in which Appellant waived his Miranda rights. This video provides an adequate factual record from which an appellate court is able to witness Appellant's demeanor firsthand. Coupled together, these two evidentiary offerings provide an adequate substitute for the missing transcript.

Assignment 4: Motion to suppress

This assignment follows naturally from Assignment 3. It challenges the correctness of the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress his videotaped confession. A motion to suppress “ ‘presents a mixed question of law and fact.’ ” State v. Hill, 2025-0316, pp. 10-11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 418 So.3d 1119, 1127 (quoting State v. Debose, 2024-0217, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971, 977). On issues of fact, the appellate court's standard of review is abuse of discretion. On issues of law, this court's standard is de novo. Id.

In a transcript dated April 20, 2022, the trial judge gave her reasons for denying the motion to suppress. She stated on the record that she considered Dr. Deland's testimony and reviewed the videotapes of the crime as well as Appellant's interrogation by the police. She comments on all the evidence in delivering her opinion:

I'm going to deny [the motion to suppress] based on one, I know that there was testimony from Dr. Deland as it relates to Mr. Shallerhorn's potential mental state during that time and there were arguments about Mr. Shallerhorn potentially being in a manic state[,] however, I have to note that during the time-period when there is—the camera's off so it's dark and Mr. Shallerhorn is in the room presumably by himself, he doesn't make many statements, but one of the things that he does say that stands out is the fact that he does ask when he will—he does make a point to say that he has not been read his rights and that — I can't ignore the fact that he says that he says that.

I also cannot ignore the fact that Mr. Shallerhorn does appear to understand the ramifications of reading of the rights. I know that just because someone may be suffering from mental illness does not mean that they are also ‘cognitively or intellectually impaired[’] and so that the ․ two can work together.

However, I think just based on all the information that's present to the Court, I think that Mr. Shallerhorn did knowingly waive his Miranda Rights at that time. So, I am going to deny the motion to suppress.

The standard by which a waiver of Miranda rights is judged is set forth in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), and the many cases that follow that ruling. In pertinent part, Moran explains:

First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.

Id. at 475 U.S. 421.

The trial court's review of the law and the evidence comports with this standard. Having reviewed this same videotaped evidence as well as Dr. Deland's written report, we agree with and affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.

Assignment 5: Exclusion of recorded telephone call

The final assignment of error is the trial court's exclusion from evidence of a recorded phone call made from jail by Appellant to his mother. Appellant contends that the exclusion of this evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it would have shown Appellant's lingering insanity weeks after the robbery and murder. Appellant argues that this conversation evidences delusional thinking and incoherent speech long after any effects of marijuana would have left his system. This court has reviewed Appellant's proffer of the tape recording. Without going into great detail, it reveals a delusional, grandiose pattern of thinking and speaking. The State objected to the admissibility of the recording as irrelevant. The trial court sustained the objection.

We agree with the trial court's determination that Appellant's condition at the time of the phone call is irrelevant. All three experts agree that Appellant was experiencing disordered and delusional thinking at the time the crimes were committed. The disagreement was the cause of the deranged thought pattern. The two psychiatrists diagnosed Appellant with schizoaffective disorder, but the psychologist concluded he had cannabis abuse disorder. All three experts agreed that the effect of the cannabis abuse disorder would have dissipated once the marijuana left Appellant's system. According to testimony, that would have taken a few days at most.

The phone call in question was made on March 14, 2021, two weeks after Appellant's last opportunity to use marijuana.⁶ At the time of the phone call, Appellant had not yet begun the medical treatment of his psychotic condition. These facts, taken together, tend to undercut the force of Dr. Manguno-Mire's diagnosis of cannabis abuse disorder. They do not, however, undercut her factual observations (detailed above) that led to her opinion that Appellant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he committed his crimes.

To the extent that the phone call evidence presents a less compelling case for cannabis abuse disorder, it also challenges the reasoning of the trial court. In the trial judge's oral reasons for judgment, she declares that she did not believe that Appellant was “in an active psychotic state or experiencing an active psychotic break at the time of the charges.”

In our opinion, the trial court's judgment is well-supported by the facts adduced at trial, even if the court's reasons for judgment are flawed.⁷ Even though the audio recording of the phone call was not admitted into evidence, the court heard testimony from Ms. Rita Shallerhorn, Appellant's mother. She characterized Appellant's telephone conversations after his arrest. Apparently referring to the March 14, 2021, conversation, she testified that, “he wanted me to call Drew Brees. He wanted me to call Shaq, Shaquille O'Neal. He wanted me to call all these people to raise money to try and come get him [out of jail].” Appellant also expressed to his mother that he believed she could go to the jail and, “sign him out right away like nothing had happened.” Ms. Shallerhorn was convinced and testified that Appellant did not understand the seriousness of his situation.

As a point of emphasis, we also note that this court reviews judgments, not reasons for judgment. As our Supreme Court analyzed the review process, “oral or written reasons for judgment form no part of the judgment and ․ appellate courts review judgments, not reasons for judgment.” Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571, p. 77 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572.

We have reviewed the record as a whole and we have considered the possible implications of the excluded audio recording. It is our opinion that the judgment of the trial court is correct based on the entirety of the record. Even if the exclusion of the recording was error, the availability of other competent evidence regarding the content of the phone call was considered by the trial court and the error, if any, was rendered harmless.

Patent Error, Sentencing

Our review of the record reveals that there is one patent error. The sentencing transcript reflects that the trial court failed to specify that defendant's sentences for first degree murder (in violation of La. R.S. 14:30) and armed robbery with a firearm (in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.3) were to be served without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. When statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, our court has held that:

“[P]aragraph A of La. R.S. 15:301.1 provides that in instances where the statutory restrictions are not recited at sentencing, they are contained in the sentence, whether or not imposed by the sentencing court.” State v. Wyatt, 2011-0219, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/22/11), 83 So.3d 131, 143 (citing State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790). Accordingly, “this Court need take no action to correct the trial court's failure to specify that the defendant's sentences be served without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence” because it is statutorily affected. State v. Wyatt, 2011-0219, p. 20, 83 So.3d at 143 (citing La. R.S. 15:301.1(A)).

State v. Dominick, 2013-0270, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 250, 252. This error is statutorily self-correcting.

Conclusion

Based on a review of the entirety of the record, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Appellant did not have a mental defect that made him “incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question.” We hold further that the assignments of error brought before the court in this appeal are without merit.

For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court convicting Appellant of first degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   This was required by the school at the time as part of its COVID prevention protocol.

2.   State v. Shallerhorn, 2022-0377 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/22), 346 So.3d 818, writ granted, 2022-1385 (La. 1/25/23), 353 So.3d 719, reversed, 2022-1385 (La. 6/27/23), 366 So.3d 42.

3.   Javon White, one of the witnesses who testified at trial, told him, “hold up dog” as he entered the gym because he was not wearing a protective mask.

4.   The former court reporter who took the transcript was no longer employed by the court and no stenography notes or recording of the March 23, 2022 proceeding could be found.

5.   In fact, Appellant's argument in brief does rely on statements in Dr. Deland's report.

6.   The experts acknowledged the reality that marijuana does occasionally find its way into prisons, there was general agreement among the experts that it is not likely Appellant had used marijuana while incarcerated.

7.   We do not hold here that the trial judge's reasoning is flawed as the expert testimony to support such a conclusion is not available to make that determination.

Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome

JOHNSON, J. DISSENTS WITH REASONS.