STATE OF LOUISIANA v. VERA CHESTER (2025)

The defendant, Vera Chester, was charged by bill of information with malfeasance in office (count one), in violation of La. R.S. 14:134, and malfeasance in office-evidence tampering (count two), in violation of La. R.S. 14:134.2. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. The trial court deferred imposition of the sentences and placed the defendant on two years of felony probation for each count, to run concurrently, and assessed a $500 fine. The defendant now appeals, alleging the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of malfeasance in office-evidence tampering and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On February 13, 2021, the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff's Office (“TPSO”) arrested Latoya Nixon for suspicion of driving while under the influence. In the early morning of February 14, 2021, Nixon was taken to the Tangipahoa Parish jail to be transferred into the custody of Sergeant Latoya ¹ Williams and the defendant, Deputy Vera Chester. During the intake procedure, Nixon was pushed against a wall by Sgt. Williams and the defendant. The defendant, then, forcefully removed Nixon's wig. According to the record, after Nixon changed into a prison jumpsuit, she was shoved into a restroom by Sgt. Williams and the defendant. Testimony at trial revealed Nixon was pepper-sprayed while inside the restroom, which had no cameras. Once out of the restroom, Nixon sat suffering from the effects of pepper spray. The prison trustee, Malcolm Chester, handled Nixon's wig, put it in a bag, and moved it to a nearby desk. The State presented evidence that the trustee, Malcolm Chester, is the defendant's brother. Sgt. Williams filed an incident report on behalf of herself and the defendant but failed to mention any use of force.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

The defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to find her guilty of malfeasance in office-evidence tampering and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial based on the insufficient evidence to convict her of malfeasance in office-evidence tampering.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. La. Code. Crim. P. art. 821(B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1st Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So. 3d 460. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Welch, 2019-0826 (La. App. 1st Cir. 02/21/20), 297 So. 3d 23, 27, writ denied, 2020-00554 (La. 09/29/20), 301 So. 3d 1193.

When circumstantial evidence is used to prove the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 15:438 mandates “assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” This is not a separate test for evaluating the evidence; rather, all of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson to convince a rational juror the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cabellero, 2022-0441 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/04/22), 356 So. 3d 389, 394, writ denied, 2022-01777 (La. 04/25/23), 359 So. 3d 982. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. See State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 1984); State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 04/08/22), 342 So. 3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 09/20/22), 346 So. 3d 802.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:134.2 provides, in pertinent part:

A. It shall be unlawful and constitute malfeasance in office for a “peace officer” to tamper with evidence.

(1) ․ [A] peace officer shall be defined as a commissioned state, parish, or municipal police officer, a sheriff, or a deputy sheriff.

(2) ․ “[T]ampering with evidence” is the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or addition of any object or substance when the peace officer,

(a) Knows or has good reason to believe that such object or substance will be the subject of any investigation by state, local, or federal law enforcement officers; and

(b) Acts with the intent of distorting the results of such an investigation.

Principals are all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. An individual shall be convicted as a principal only for which those crimes which he personally has the requisite mental state. State v. Wright, 2001-0322 (La. 12/04/02), 834 So. 2d 974, 983, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 833, 124 S.Ct. 82, 157 L.Ed.2d 62 (2003). The State may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. State v. Huey, 2013-1227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 02/18/14), 142 So. 3d 27, 30, writ denied, 2014-0535 (La. 10/03/14), 149 So. 3d 795, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1198, 135 S.Ct. 1507, 191 L.Ed.2d 443 (2015).

On appeal, the defendant argues her conviction for malfeasance in office-evidence tampering should be overturned because the evidence failed to prove she acted with the intent to distort the results of an investigation. The defendant argues that she could not have ordered the prison trustee to pick up Nixon's wig as she was in the restroom with Nixon when it happened; thus, no jury could reach the conclusion the defendant acted with intent. In response, the State argues that the evidence presented allowed the jury to make the rational inference that the defendant and Sgt. Williams sought to hide their actions by going into the restroom where there were no cameras, having the prison trustee move Nixon's wig, and failing to report use of force. We agree.

Lieutenant Terry Lane, the assistant warden at the Tangipahoa Parish jail at the time of incident, testified that the defendant was given policies and procedures that she was expected to adhere by as a TPSO deputy. According to Lt. Lane, anything above handcuffing is considered a use of force to a deputy. When a deputy uses force, that deputy is expected to file a separate “use of force” report. Lt. Lane testified that these two reports allow the deputy's conduct to be reviewed by TPSO to determine whether her actions were within policy. Lt. Lane testified the defendant received forms explaining relevant criminal provisions for deputies, including the malfeasance in office law. The defendant also received instructions on how to access Power DMS, a program containing the jail's policies and procedures.

The defendant presented multiple hypotheses of innocence to the jury, all of which were clearly dismissed by the trier of fact. The defendant argued she was justified in removing Nixon's wig because it was prison contraband. On cross-examination, Lt. Lane agreed that inmates are not allowed to wear wigs; however, they are not considered contraband and would be removed by the inmate when the inmate changes into their prison jumpsuit.

Additionally, the defendant argued she was not in charge of Malcolm Chester; thus, she could not have ordered him to pick up Nixon's wig. At trial, Lt. Lane testified that Sgt. Williams would have been in charge of prison trustees and their duties on the night that she and defendant worked together. According to Lt. Lane, Chester was prohibited from being in that area the night of the incident and it was unclear why he was there. Lt. Lane admitted that the defendant and Sgt. Williams were inside the bathroom at the time Nixon's wig was handled by the trustee and, he could not say who directed the trustee to pick up the wig because the surveillance footage had no audio. However, in light of the defendant's relationship with the trustee, his presence in the booking area, Sgt. Williams's authority over the trustee the night defendant and Sgt. Williams were working together, and Lt. Lane's testimony indicating he could not say who directed the trustee to pick up Nixon's wig, the jury obviously rejected the hypothesis of innocence and we see no reason to believe their conclusion was unreasonable.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 01/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). As Lt. Lane explained in his testimony, the report filed by Sgt. Williams did not mention the use of force. (R. 660, lines 1-10; R. 675) The defendant concedes that she was a peace officer as defined under La. R.S. 14:134.2. Further, the record is clear she was employed as a deputy for the TPSO at the time of the crime. Lt. Lane testified that the prison trustee, the defendant's brother, should not have been present on the night of the incident. After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of malfeasance in office-evidence tampering.

In addition, the defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial and argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with intent to impede the investigation. We note that the question of legal sufficiency of evidence is properly raised by motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, not a motion for new trial. See La. Code Crim. P. 858; State v. Stalls, 2023-0829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 09/26/24), 405 So. 3d 786, 2024 WL 4298033, *2 n.3 (en banc). Here, according to the record, the defendant did not raise this motion at trial. Nevertheless, based on our review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The trial court's denial of a motion for new trial will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Curtin, 2022-1110 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/05/23), 376 So. 3d 918, 935, writ denied, 2023-01464 (La. 04/23/24), 383 So. 3d 603.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for errors discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. See State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/03/23), 378 So. 3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-0027 (La. 05/21/24), 385 So. 3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The record reflects that after the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing the application for post-conviction relief. State v. LeBeouf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 09/15/06), 943 So. 2d 1142-43. While La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(C) directs the trial court to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period at the time of sentencing, its failure to do so has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand the case for resentencing and the article does not provide a remedy for an individual defendant who is not told of the limitations period. Id.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we now advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. art. 914 or 922.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the defendant, Vera Chester.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Officer Williams’ first name is often spelled “LaToia” in the record; however, the TPSO incident report indicates the correct spelling is “Latoya”. Accordingly, we spell the officer's name as Latoya Williams.

BALFOUR, J.

Penzato, J., Concurs