STATE OF LOUISIANA v. DONALD JULES DAVIS (2025)

The defendant, Donald Jules Davis, was charged by bill of information with one count of third degree rape, in violation of La. R.S. 14:43. The defendant pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.¹

FACTS

In October of 2019, A.A.² called the Baton Rouge Police Department (“BRPD”) to report the defendant for rape. BRPD Corporal Charles Ruble led the investigation and conducted an in-person interview with A.A., who disclosed that the defendant sexually assaulted her multiple times from February 2017 to June 2017, ultimately impregnating her. As a result, A.A. gave birth to K.A. The defendant started living in the same home as A.A. in January of 2017, while dating A.A.’s mother, G.A. Shortly after moving into the family home, the defendant began sexually assaulting A.A. A.A. has suffered from cerebral palsy since birth, and has lived with her mother the majority of her life.³ She was twenty-six years old at the time of the assaults. A.A. informed the defendant of her pregnancy in April 2017. After G.A. kicked the defendant out of the family home in June 2017, A.A. disclosed the sexual abuse and pregnancy to her mother. The defendant was arrested in February 2020, after A.A. was interviewed by Cpl. Ruble. A.A. consented to a DNA swab of her child, K.A., which indicated that the defendant could not be ruled out as K.A.’s biological father.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of third degree rape

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Code. Crim. P. art. 821(B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Martinez, 2024-0134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/30/24), 403 So.3d 1146, 1153, writ denied, 2025-00123 (La. 5/29/25), 409 So.3d 752. When analyzing sufficiency of the evidence, consideration is given to the entirety of the evidence, including inadmissible evidence erroneously admitted, to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992).

The testimony of the victim alone, if found to be credible, is sufficient to establish the elements of a sex offense, even where the State does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. Lilly, 2012-0008 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/12), 111 So.3d 45, 62, writ denied, 2012-2277 (La. 5/31/13), 118 So.3d 3 86. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Higgins, 2003-1980 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So.2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S.Ct. 182, 163 L.Ed.2d 187 (2005). Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses nor reweigh the evidence to overturn a jury's determination of guilt. Lilly, 111 So.3d at 61.

Rape is the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse committed without the person's lawful consent. See La. R.S. 14:41(A). Third degree rape is also committed when anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse occurs without the consent of the victim. See La. R.S. 14:43(A)(4).

The defendant contends that the State failed to prove his sexual relationship with A.A. was not consensual, arguing that inconsistent testimony amongst the State's witnesses proves the witnesses were not credible. In response, the State argues that the trier of fact was free to accept in whole or in part the testimony of the witnesses, and that no irreconcilable conflicts were established on the issue of consent, and the jury believed A.A. when she testified that the defendant had non-consensual sex with her. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we agree that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant committed third degree rape.

The defendant concedes that sexual intercourse occurred; however, he claims the sexual intercourse was consensual. The State introduced DNA evidence indicating that A.A. was K.A.’s biological mother and the defendant could not be ruled out as K.A.’s biological father. Since the defendant agreed that sexual intercourse occurred and that the DNA evidence introduced indicates the defendant cannot be excluded as K.A.’s biological father, the State only needed to prove that the sexual intercourse was not consensual. See La. R.S. 14:43(A)(4).

A.A. testified that the defendant was her mother's boyfriend and that he moved into the family home in January of 2017. The defendant first assaulted A.A. sometime in January 2017 when he picked her up and carried her to her room, then “washed [her] ear with his tongue,” and said “there's more where that came from if you want it.” After the incident occurred, A.A. was stunned by the defendant's actions and was left unable to say anything. In early February, the defendant asked A.A. to assist him in filling out a food stamp application. After finishing the defendant's application, he returned to A.A.’s room and removed her underwear, insisting she would like it. A.A., who suffers from cerebral palsy, attempted to close her legs and told the defendant no; however, he pushed open her legs and began oral and vaginal intercourse.

A.A. explained to the jury that she knew she was not fast enough to outrun the defendant nor able to fight him off due to her disability. A.A. testified that the defendant “scrap[p]ed junk” and that he would be in and out of the house all day. After the first incident, the defendant continued sexually assaulting A.A. anywhere from one to three times per week depending on his mood. A.A. explained that the constant sexual assaults made her feel like the defendant would do whatever he wanted to her. Upon learning she was pregnant, A.A. told the defendant in hopes he would cease assaulting her; however, it did not deter him. A.A. adamantly testified she was not in a relationship with the defendant nor was he her boyfriend.

G.A. testified that she met the defendant online towards the end of 2016 and that he gradually started staying at her home more frequently, though she said no decision was made as to him moving in. G.A. explained that the defendant “somewhat” helped financially, providing gas and groceries, but did not pay any bills or rent. G.A. testified that A.A. changed after the defendant moved in, specifically stating that A.A. was not the same person and only left her room to go to work. After G.A. kicked the defendant out of the family home, A.A. told her not to let him back in the house and showed her mother her belly, explaining that the defendant raped her and was the father to her unborn child. G.A. described the anger she felt for allowing the defendant into her home, referring to him as a “monster.” On cross-examination, G.A. reiterated that A.A. totally shut down and she knew something was wrong. When asked, G.A. testified that she sometimes heard screams or sexual noises, but assumed it was her grandson who was loud when playing games.

BRPD Cpl. Ruble testified about his investigation into the alleged assaults committed by the defendant. Cpl. Ruble first received a call from A.A. in October of 2019, where she disclosed that she was sexually assaulted by the defendant and that he was the father of her two-year-old son. An in-home interview was conducted on January 23, 2020, by Cpl. Ruble which he recorded on his body camera. Based on A.A.’s interview, Cpl. Ruble found that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant. A.A. signed a DNA consent form for her child and a warrant for DNA was issued for the defendant. When asked about whether a rape kit was done, Cpl. Ruble explained that too much time had passed to collect usable evidence. Cpl. Ruble viewed the DNA report and explained to the jury that the defendant could not be excluded as K.A.’s father.

After reviewing the trial court record, we found minor inconsistences in the testimony of A.A. and G.A. concerning insignificant matters such as what, if anything, the defendant contributed towards household expenses and when or where he was employed. Moreover, although A.A. was unable to state with certainty the number of times she was raped by the defendant, her testimony was clear that she did not voluntarily submit to his sexual advances.

After hearing testimony from the State's witnesses and viewing all evidence presented at trial, the jury determined that the State proved all elements of third degree rape beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found credible A.A.’s testimony that the defendant had sex with her without her consent. In fact, A.A.’s testimony and pre-trial statements to Cpl. Ruble consistently established that the defendant had oral and vaginal intercourse with her against her will. Therefore, the victim's testimony, which the jury credited, was sufficient to prove all elements of third degree rape.

An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the factfinder's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See Higgins, 898 So.2d at 1226.

Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/3/23), 3 78 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

After the trial court imposed the sentences herein, it advised the defendant, “if you wish to file any post[-]conviction relief, you must do so within two years from the time your conviction becomes final.” A defendant generally has two years “after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final” to seek post-conviction relief. La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8(A) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court failed to adequately advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for seeking post-conviction relief. However, the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-1143, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Accordingly, this error is not reversible, and we decline to remand for resentencing.

Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we instead note for the record and advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. See LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the conviction and sentence of the defendant, Donald Jules Davis, with notice to him of the prescriptive or limitations period for seeking post-conviction relief.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ad hoc Judge J. Michael McDonald presided over the jury trial and sentenced the defendant. Judge Louise Hines, successor judge to Division F, Section VII, granted the defendant's motion for appeal.

2.   We use the victim's initials and her relatives’ initials to protect their identity. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

3.   Cerebral palsy is a group of conditions that affect movement and posture. It is caused by damage that occurs to the developing brain, most often before birth. See Diseases & Conditions, Cerebral Palsy, September 28, 2023, http://www.mayoclinic.org.

WOLFE, J.