STATE OF LOUISIANA v. BRYAN PAUL RUCKER (2025)

The State of Louisiana charged the defendant, Bryan Paul Rucker, with second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1, and the defendant pled not guilty. After a trial, the jury found him guilty as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a fourth felony habitual offender and imposed an enhanced sentenced of thirty years imprisonment.¹ The defendant now appeals, alleging the following counseled and pro se assignments of error: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) his right of confrontation was violated at trial; (3) his right to present a defense was violated at trial; and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and habitual offender adjudication, amend the sentence, and affirm the sentence as amended.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 6, 2020, at 8:14 a.m., Detective Seth Cunningham with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office (STPSO) was dispatched to 15315 Charlene Lane in Covington, regarding a domestic disturbance involving the defendant and his girlfriend, Sarah Ricca. Lisa Coleman, a friend of the defendant's sister, was present in the home when the defendant became angry and began physically attacking Ms. Ricca. In the midst of the attack, Ms. Coleman ran across the street to a neighbor's residence, the neighbor called 911, and thereafter officers arrived on the scene. Detective Cunningham interviewed Ms. Coleman and Ms. Ricca, photographed Ms. Ricca's injuries, and secured a warrant for the defendant's arrest.²

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In counseled assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the State failed to prove he committed second degree battery beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends no rational juror could have found the State met its burden of proving Ms. Ricca's injuries constituted serious bodily injury. He notes Ms. Ricca engaged in excessive drinking the night of the incident. He further notes she did not lose consciousness, was not bleeding, and did not want treatment or require stitches, a cast, or hospitalization. He argues the State merely proved simple battery.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Thomas, 2019-0409 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/25/19), 289 So.3d 1030, 1037.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Currie, 2020-0467 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/22/21), 321 So.3d 978, 982. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Southall, 2022-0746 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 925, 930, writ denied, 2023-00875 (La. 2/6/24), 378 So.3d 750.

Second degree battery is a battery when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury. La. R.S. 14:34.1(A). A battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another. La. R.S. 14:33. In order to prove a second degree battery, the State must prove the defendant: (1) committed a battery upon another, (2) without his or her consent, and (3) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury. State v. Dickerson, 2016-1336 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So.3d 633, 638, writ denied, 2017-1147 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 1062. Serious bodily injury is bodily injury which involves unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted and obvious disfigurement; protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or a substantial risk of death. La. R.S. 14:2(C).

Second degree battery is a crime requiring specific criminal intent. State v. Garnett, 2023-0699 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/24), 384 So.3d 384, 390, writ denied, 2024-00360 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So.3d 67. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the factfinder. Garnett, 384 So.3d at 390-91 (footnote omitted).

Here, Ms. Coleman testified she spent the day in question “hanging out” and later consuming alcohol with Ms. Ricca and the defendant at their residence. She confirmed that she was able to recall the incident in question despite her alcohol consumption. She testified that the defendant became angry when he realized she and Ms. Ricca drank all of the vodka. She stated the defendant knocked Ms. Ricca to the floor, got on top of her, started hitting and hurting her, and put his hands around her neck. Ms. Coleman recalled Ms. Ricca crying and telling her to call the police, which prompted Ms. Coleman to run out of the house. After the police and ambulance arrived, Ms. Coleman saw Ms. Ricca being carried out of the home on a stretcher.

Detective Cunningham testified the defendant was not there when he and several other officers arrived at the residence. They initially met with Ms. Coleman outside of the home, who, though “shook up” and crying, gave the police her account of the incident. After knocking on the door multiple times with no answer, the police forced entry through the front door of the home. They found Ms. Ricca in the master bedroom in a bloodstained bed, with dried blood all over her and “bruises from head to toe.”

Detective Cunningham assisted Ms. Ricca to the living room sofa and began to talk to her about what happened. He testified there were no signs of impairment such as slurred speech or rolling eyes. However, he noted Ms. Ricca was partially responsive, as she would “clam up” and “frantically” scan the room during lines of questioning regarding her boyfriend, the defendant, while holding her arms close to her body. Detective Cunningham testified Ms. Ricca's behavior was consistent with someone who was afraid of physical harm. After she ultimately provided a statement, her injuries were photographed at the scene and again at the hospital after being transported by the ambulance. As shown in the photographs, Ms. Ricca's visible injuries included a laceration on her forehead, an abrasion on her neck, a busted and bloody lip, and bruises on her collar bone, head, neck, arms, and legs. Further, her face was swollen, including her forehead, left eye, nose, and lips. After failed attempts to locate the defendant, he was placed under arrest on October 25, 2020.³

Matthew Primeaux, the Acadian Ambulance paramedic on the scene, also testified at trial. He testified that Ms. Ricca had bruises all over her body, including her eyes, both arms, behind her right ear, and both legs. He further stated she had multiple bruises at different stages of healing. Mr. Primeaux noted Ms. Ricca complained of pain in her left side, rib area, and that she had an injury to her head. Referencing the Acadian Ambulance report that he generated, Mr. Primeaux noted Ms. Ricca did not have signs of impairment, indicating he would have noted any such observations.

Mr. Primeaux further testified Ms. Ricca seemed scared, was crying or tearful at times, was initially hesitant to answer questions, and would completely shut down when asked about her boyfriend at the time. However, Ms. Ricca ultimately stated that she had an altercation with her boyfriend at 4:00 a.m. that morning. Mr. Primeaux testified that he did not observe life threatening conditions such as blood spurts, lack of breathing, low pulse, or unresponsiveness. However, based on her condition and concern for her safety, he determined Ms. Ricca needed to go to the hospital for treatment but had to convince her to do so after she initially signed a refusal.

Dr. Taylor Wells Sanders, the emergency room physician at St. Tammany Parish Hospital who treated Ms. Ricca, testified as an expert in emergency medicine. Dr. Sanders testified his assistance was not routinely sought in the emergency room, as the physician's assistant would often independently manage the patients’ care, depending on the level of the injuries involved. In this case, Dr. Sanders was summoned by the physician's assistant, due to the seriousness of Ms. Ricca's injuries. According to the records of the Emergency Department of St. Tammany Parish Hospital, Ms. Ricca complained of an incident of domestic violence, during which she was physically assaulted by her boyfriend, specifically stating she was choked, punched multiple times to her body, kicked in the left ribs, and struck multiple times in her head and face.

On a scale from one to five, Ms. Ricca's injuries were rated by the triage nurse at a level two, indicating high risk for life or limb-threatening illness or injury, just below a level one injury which would indicate the need for resuscitation or a non-breathing patient. The nurse noted Ms. Ricca had physical signs of abuse and her answers during questioning confirmed she felt unsafe at home, had been threatened by someone, and was being prevented from having contact with others outside of her home.

Dr. Sanders ordered x-rays and CT scans and noted Ms. Ricca suffered a nasal fracture and acute rib fractures, including her left rib cage to the posterior lateral, a displaced rib fracture on her ninth left rib, and a displaced fracture on her right tenth rib. She had bruises and reported having a headache, all consistent with blunt force trauma and assault. She also reported pain in her left ribs that increased while moving and taking deep breaths, consistent with the rib fractures. Dr. Sanders noted the fractures to the left side of her abdomen were consistent with being kicked. Dr. Sanders testified that rib fractures cause a patient to experience significant sharp pain.

Dr. Sanders further noted swelling on her nose and lips, a bloody lip, an abrasion to the center of her forehead, and periorbital bruising around her left eye described as acute because of the reddish-purple nature, indicating it could be anywhere from immediately before presentation to a couple of days in age. Ms. Ricca had various other abrasions, bruises, and swelling on her face and neck, including prominent bruising behind her ear and a hematoma around the top of her ear, caused, in Dr. Sanders’ opinion, by a direct impact at that location. Dr. Sanders also observed a contusion on her left forearm, likely caused by blunt force trauma, and an unusually shaped bruise on her upper right arm, noted as confluent, potentially high impact, and consistent with a bruise that took the shape of the cause of the blunt force, such as a fist or fingers. He further observed older bruises on the left side of her face, her elbow and upper thigh, scrapes to her knees, and a combination of bruises and contusions on her legs consistent with blunt force trauma.

Dr. Sanders confirmed Ms. Ricca denied any strangulation or loss of consciousness. However, Dr. Sanders also confirmed that Ms. Ricca at one point admitted to being choked and had injuries around her neck consistent with having been strangled, including bruising “of increased pressure that could have occurred with a grip.” Dr. Sanders noted the terms choke and strangle were commonly used interchangeably but technically defined differently and stated he was not aware of the phrasing used in questioning Ms. Ricca or of Ms. Ricca's definition of the two terms.

Dr. Sanders also testified Ms. Ricca's medical records showed that after her emergency room visit on September 6, 2020, she returned to the emergency room on February 1, 2021, with complaints of facial injury and left sided rib pain. She had multiple areas of bruising to her face, left elbow, collar bone, left front pain, blood in the right eye, and a large knot on her forehead. New x-rays were taken showing the fractures on the left side of her ribs from the instant incident, as Ms. Ricca was still complaining of pain in that area. She reported an altercation with a male friend, but was reluctant to give specifics. The 2021 incident was reported as an assault, but Ms. Ricca refused to press charges.

Jessica Howell, Ms. Ricca's cousin who also testified at trial, arrived at the hospital while Ms. Ricca was being treated for the instant incident. Ms. Howell described Ms. Ricca's injuries as brutal, noting she had multiple head injuries, broken ribs, was unable to walk or write, was in horrible pain, and was “scared to death.” Ms. Howell testified Ms. Ricca stayed with her after the instant incident and obtained a restraining order, but eventually went back to the defendant. She later found out Ms. Ricca died on February 16, 2021, on Mardi Gras Day.⁴

The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135. The reviewing court does not determine whether another possible hypothesis has been suggested by the defendant which could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion; rather, the reviewing court evaluates the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational factfinder could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 2016-1502 (La. 1/30/18), 318 So.3d 678, 682 (per curiam).

In his counseled brief, the defendant argues no rational juror could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt Ms. Ricca's injuries constituted serious bodily injury, noting she denied being strangled or losing consciousness. However, Louisiana jurisprudence has accepted a wide range of conduct resulting in a wide range of consequences as evidence sufficient to establish a serious bodily injury sustained by a victim. See State v. Scheanette, 51,851 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So.3d 718, 723 (sufficient evidence supported conviction for second degree battery where victim testified that while driving, defendant punched her in her face, hard enough to split skin open, causing her to bleed profusely, the injury required four or five stitches, and the injury caused extreme physical pain, resulting in a permanent scar on victim's face); State v. Hamilton, 2009-1048 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/23/09), 2009 WL 5647220, *2 (unpublished) (evidence supported a finding that the victim sustained a serious bodily injury where the defendant repeatedly struck victim, causing a laceration requiring at least four stitches over her left eye and a key-lime-sized hematoma behind her left ear, and where the victim testified that the pain caused by her injuries was severe and excruciating). See also Dickerson, 218 So.3d at 637-39 (the defendant did not dispute that the victim suffered serious bodily injury where the defendant punched the victim in his face, causing him to briefly lose consciousness, and also caused an orbital blowout fracture, a hematoma behind his eye, and a nasal bone fracture).

The testimony presented at trial showed Ms. Ricca suffered injuries that involved extreme physical pain. Her rib fractures, with some displacement, caused her to feel pain while simply trying to breathe or move. Ms. Ricca still had pain in that area months later. In addition to the broken ribs, she suffered head injuries, hematomas, bruises all over her body, and contusions showing she endured severe blunt force trauma. A factfinder could reasonably infer from these facts that the defendant had the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury and did, in fact, inflict serious bodily injury upon Ms. Ricca. Further, the defendant fled from the scene after the offense, initially could not be located, and was not arrested until nearly two months later. We note that flight and attempt to avoid apprehension indicates consciousness of guilt, and therefore, is one of the circumstances from which a juror may infer guilt. State v. Fuller, 418 So.2d 591, 593 (La. 1982). Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662.

Moreover, the jury was advised it could return a simple battery verdict if the evidence did not support conviction for a more serious grade of the offense but, nevertheless, returned a verdict of guilty as charged. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the elements of second degree battery. Accordingly, counseled assignment of error number one is without merit.

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

In assignment of error number two, the defendant, in part, argues his right of confrontation was violated at trial by the admission of hearsay containing evidence of other crimes and bad acts. Together, the counseled and pro se briefs challenge the admissibility of the following four items: (1) the 2003 domestic violence incident; (2) statements made by Ms. Ricca in the 2021 redacted video; (3) hearsay statements in Ms. Ricca's medical records; and (4) Ms. Howell's testimony regarding text messages purportedly sent by Ms. Ricca alleging the defendant held her hostage. In his counseled brief, the defendant argues the admission of the challenged evidence was not harmless. In his pro se brief, he similarly argues the other crimes evidence distracted and confused the jury.

At the outset, the defendant did not object to Ms. Howell's testimony stating that Ms. Ricca sent her text messages claiming the defendant held her hostage, which defendant now challenges in his pro se brief. An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence. La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); see also State v. Jiles, 2006-1206 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/07), 2007 WL 466792, *12 (unpublished), writ denied, 2007-0555 (La. 10/26/07), 966 So.2d 572. As the defendant failed to contemporaneously object, any complaint the defendant may have with the referenced testimony was not preserved for appeal. Furthermore, as the defendant concedes, the challenged testimony was elicited by the defense, not the State. We now turn to the remaining challenged evidence.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The main purpose of confrontation rights is to secure for the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine. State v. Alexander, 2021-1346 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/13/22), 344 So.3d 705, 719, writ denied, 2022-01262 (La. 11/8/23), 373 So.3d 62. Cross-examination is the primary means by which to test the believability and truthfulness of testimony and has traditionally been used to impeach or discredit witnesses. See id. at 719-20.

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. La. C.E. art. 801(C). Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the Code of Evidence or other legislation. La. C.E. art. 802. If a statement is offered for a purpose other than for the truth of the matter asserted, then the statement is not hearsay. State v. Boudreaux, 2023-0993 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/19/24), 390 So.3d 345, 357, writ denied, 2024-00695 (La. 1/28/25), 399 So.3d 416.

Generally, evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant is inadmissible at trial due to substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant. State v. Hicks, 2022-0350 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/4/22), 354 So.3d 715, 718, writ denied, 2022-01749 (La. 4/12/23), 359 So.3d 29. Such evidence may, however, be admitted by certain statutory and jurisprudential exceptions to the exclusionary rule when it tends to prove a material issue and has independent relevance other than showing that the defendant is of bad character. Id.; see also La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1).

One exception is set forth in La. C.E. art. 412.4, which provides in pertinent part:

A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving abusive behavior against a family member, household member, or dating partner ․ evidence of the accused's commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving assaultive behavior against a family member, household member, or dating partner ․ may be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant, subject to the balancing test provided in Article 403.

The admissibility of evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4 is not limited to those actions that are identical or similar in nature to the charged crime. Hicks, 354 So.3d at 719. Evidence of prior acts of domestic abuse is admissible if relevant and the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. As used in this balancing test, prejudice limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. Id.

Remoteness in time, in most cases, is only one factor to be considered when determining whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. A lapse in time goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. State v. Germany, 2021-1614 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/26/22), 353 So.3d 804, 821, writ denied, 2022-01568 (La. 1/11/23), 352 So.3d 983. The burden is on the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the admission of other crimes evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) will not be disturbed. This same standard is applied to the rulings on the admission of other crimes evidence under La. C.E. art. 412.4. Hicks, 354 So.3d at 719. A trial court is generally accorded discretion concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence, and a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Mullen, 2018-0643 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/18), 269 So.3d 772, 781, writ denied, 2020-00408 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So.3d 529.

At a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled the 2003 incident and the 2021 redacted video ⁵ admissible under La. C.E. art. 412.4. Regarding the 2003 incident, the defendant pled guilty to domestic abuse battery, and Captain Hardaker observed the victim's injuries, which were nearly identical to the facial injuries suffered by the victim in the instant offense. His testimony did not contain any hearsay, only his personal observations as the officer who responded to the scene. Further, the State introduced the file in that case, including the bill of information and minute entry of the defendant's guilty plea. Similarly, the 2021 video of the victim alleging the defendant physically attacked her constitutes evidence of another crime, wrong, or act involving assaultive behavior against the victim in this case.

We find that the probative value of the extraneous incidents was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See La. C.E. arts. 412.4 and 403. Specifically, any prejudice from evidence showing the defendant engaged in domestic assaultive behavior extraneous to the instant offense was outweighed by the probative value, as it was independently relevant to show a pattern of domestic abuse and demonstrated to the jury the volatile nature of the defendant. See Hicks, 354 So.3d at 719. Further, evidence of the incidents tended to prove a material fact at issue—i.e., whether or not the defendant acted with the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. See La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1). We find no error or abuse of discretion in the admission of the extraneous evidence in this case.

Regarding evidence of other crimes or bad acts from Ms. Ricca's medical records, the defendant notes he filed a motion in limine to preclude Ms. Ricca's statements to police, emergency medical staff, and hospital employees, which the trial court denied at a pretrial hearing. The trial court ruled the challenged portions of the medical records admissible to the extent that they were created for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment.

Hospital records are an express statutory exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, La. R.S. 13:3714(A) establishes an exception to the hearsay rule for certified copies of hospital records. It provides:

Whenever a certified copy of the chart or record of any hospital, signed by the administrator or the medical records librarian of the hospital in question, or a copy of a bill for services rendered, medical narrative, chart, or record of any other state health care provider, as defined by R.S. 40:1299.39(A)(1) and any other health care provider as defined in R.S. 40:1299.41(A), certified or attested to by the state health care provider or the private health care provider, is offered in evidence in any court of competent jurisdiction, it shall be received in evidence by such court as prima facie proof of its contents, provided that the party against whom the bills, medical narrative, chart, or record is sought to be used may summon and examine those making the original of the bills, medical narrative, chart, or record as witnesses under cross-examination.

The purpose of the statute is to save a litigant the difficulty and expense of producing as a witness each person who assisted in the treatment of the patient. It provides that the opposing party may defend against the record by calling those who made the record as witnesses under cross-examination. It provides an exception to the hearsay rule with respect to those who made the medical record, i.e., physicians, nurses, and technicians. State v. Juniors, 2003-2425 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, 324, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S.Ct. 1940, 164 LEd.2d 669 (2006). When the statutory requirements have been satisfied, introduction of certified copies of hospital records does not deny a defendant the right to confront witnesses against him. Mullen, 269 So.3d at 781.

Further, Louisiana Code of Evidence article 803(4) provides a hearsay exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment and medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history ․ insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment.” Under this exception, the use of hearsay history of a case as told to a physician by a patient is admissible if received, not to show the truth of the facts stated, but only the basis for the physician's opinion. Juniors, 915 So.2d at 325.

Applying these exceptions, we find the statements at issue in Ms. Ricca's medical records, including her answers to questions regarding her injuries, were properly admitted where, as here, the defendant did not indicate he was unable to call the nurse who made the summations; the physician who examined Ms. Ricca testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination; and Ms. Ricca's statements were reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion in limine seeking to exclude Ms. Ricca's statements to police, emergency medical staff, and hospital employees in the medical records.

We also find that the admission of evidence pertaining to prior incidents of domestic abuse was not an abuse of discretion, was independently relevant to show a pattern of domestic abuse, and demonstrated to the jury the defendant's volatile nature. Based on the record before us, the defendant has failed to show a violation of his right of confrontation. Accordingly, we find no merit in the right of confrontation, other crimes evidence, and hearsay arguments raised in assignments of error number two of the defendant's counseled and pro so briefs.

RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

In counseled assignment of error number two, the defendant further argues the trial court erroneously denied his constitutional right to present a defense by preventing him from introducing the following to rebut or impeach the State's hearsay evidence: (1) Ms. Ricca's written statement made at the hospital on September 6, 2020; (2) Ms. Ricca's sworn affidavit regarding the charged incident; (3) Ms. Ricca's two prior convictions for domestic violence; and (4) Ms. Ricca's oral statement to the reentry counselor that was purportedly documented in their records. He notes the items were proffered.⁶

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. State v. Dressner, 2008-1366 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 137, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1271, 131 S.Ct. 1605, 179 L.Ed.2d 500 (2011); Boudreaux, 390 So.3d at 356. In compelling circumstances, the defendant's right to present a defense allows admission of hearsay evidence. State v. Nixon, 2017-1582 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/13/18), 250 So.3d 273, 279-80, writ denied, 2018-0770 (La. 11/14/18), 256 So.3d 290. Constitutional guarantees, however, do not assure the defendant the right to admit any type of evidence, only that which is deemed trustworthy and has probative value. State v. Governor, 331 So.2d 443, 449 (La. 1976). See also Nixon, 250 So.3d at 280.

A statement was obtained from Ms. Ricca on September 6, 2020, while she was at the hospital. The statement was written on Ms. Ricca's behalf by her cousin, Ms. Howell, and provides:

It was around 4:30 or 5 [a.m.] She got up[.] [L]isa was still awake, they were just talking. [Lisa] wanted to go across the street, Sarah was laughing. Bryan started yelling for Sarah. They Sarah [and] Bryan were fighting about something[.] [S]he said she is not staying [and] walked. Bryan grabbed her by the neck [and] threw her on the ground. Sarah asked her friend to call the cops.

The defendant argued the statement was admissible since it was based on the victim's state of mind at the time. In ruling the evidence inadmissible, the trial court concluded there was no applicable exception to the hearsay rule.

Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 803(3), the hearsay rule does not exclude a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), offered to prove the declarant's then existing condition or his future action. La. C.E. art. 803(3). Evidence to prove the declarant's state of mind can be used to prove the declarant's subsequent conduct. La. C.E. art. 803(3); Germany, 353 So.3d at 817. A state of mind declaration is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any consequential fact more or less probative than it would otherwise be without the evidence. La. C.E. art. 401. Nevertheless, relevant declarations may be legally inadmissible if their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misapplication by the jury. Germany, 353 So.3d at 817, citing La. C.E. art. 403.

In this case, the defendant notes he wanted to introduce Ms. Ricca's statement, as relayed by Ms. Howell, to establish a timeline and to rebut Ms. Coleman's claim that the incident happened shortly before the 911 call. We find the defendant was attempting to admit the statement to establish his own actions, rather than the future actions or condition of the declarant (Ms. Ricca). Thus, we find the trial court properly ruled the challenged evidence was not admissible under La. C.E. art. 803(3). See Germany, 353 So.3d at 818.

Moreover, even if the statements were considered a state of mind declaration, we note the statements were not relevant for the stated purpose, as the content seems to support, not rebut, Ms. Coleman's claim that police were called right after the attack. Thus, the challenged ruling, even if erroneous, was harmless and did not constitute reversible error. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 921. The guilty verdict rendered in this case was surely unattributable to the error, if any, associated with the challenged ruling. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Germany, 353 So.3d at 818.

Next, the sworn affidavit addressing the charged incident, proffered by the defendant, and purportedly signed by Ms. Ricca, indicates Ms. Ricca woke up when the police arrived after the altercation, the police told her the defendant attacked her, and that she told the police Ms. Coleman caused her injuries, not the defendant. The affidavit further states:

I was adamant in my response to [the police officer] that I was in a fight with Ms. Coleman and not Mr. Rucker. At about this time, my cousin, Jessica Howell, arrived at the hospital and she was also under the impression that Mr. Rucker caused my injuries, despite the fact that she was not at my home during the altercation. Ms. Howell had written out a document for me to sign and asked me to sign, despite never letting me read and/or review what was written in the document. The police officer that was there at the hospital told me that I had to sign the document; so based upon his orders, I signed the document. To this day, I still do not know what was written in that document.

The defendant argued the affidavit was admissible under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3).

Pursuant to La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3), the hearsay rule does not exclude a statement which, at the time of its making, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3). Typical corroborating circumstances include statements against the declarant's interest to an unusual or devastating degree, or the declarant's repeating of consistent statements, or the fact that the declarant was not likely motivated to falsify for the benefit of the accused. State v. Hammons, 597 So.2d 990, 997 (La. 1992).

The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude the affidavit as hearsay. In maintaining its pretrial ruling, the trial court noted the affidavit did not contain a date on which it was signed by Ms. Ricca. The trial court further found the statement was inconsistent with the statements in Ms. Ricca's medical records. It is well settled that the party who seeks to admit such a statement under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3) at trial for its exculpatory value must first demonstrate its trustworthiness. The burden of satisfying the corroboration requirement is on the accused. See State v. Lacoste, 2014-0499 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/12/14), 2014 WL 5840239, *11 (unpublished), writ denied, 2014-2590 (La. 11/16/15), 184 So.3d 22. Considering the inconsistent and inherently suspect nature of Ms. Ricca's statements therein, we find the trial court did not err in finding the affidavit inadmissible under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(3). We also find the exclusion of the affidavit did not violate the defendant's right to present a defense, as the evidence lacked a sufficient degree of trustworthiness and reliability. See Governor, 331 So.2d at 449; Nixon, 250 So.3d at 280.

The defendant also claims on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to allow into evidence Ms. Ricca's two prior convictions for domestic violence and a statement attributed to Ms. Ricca in a reentry court document for the defendant. However, we note the defendant only referenced these claims in his brief and did not fully develop arguments in support thereof. Moreover, at a pretrial hearing on several motions, regarding Ms. Ricca's criminal history, defense counsel stated, “Judge, I haven't even thought about putting that in at the moment.” Thus, the trial court did not rule on the matter. Regarding the reentry court document, the trial court noted that the defendant only offered the reentry statement in support of its request for reconsideration of the ruling excluding Ms. Ricca's written affidavit. The trial court concluded that the reentry document did not change its mind on the admissibility of the affidavit. There was no indication the defendant ever sought to introduce the reentry statement into evidence at trial. Consequently, these objections have been waived under La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A); see also Germany, 353 So.3d at 816.⁷

Considering all of the above, we find the defendant has failed to show a violation of his right to present a defense. As previously detailed, this Court did not find any merit in the defendant's claim of a violation of his right of confrontation. Thus, counseled and pro se assignments of error number two lack merit.

EXCESSIVE SENTENCE

In pro se assignment of error number one, the defendant argues the thirty-year enhanced sentence imposed herein is excessive. He argues the trial court failed to consider mitigating circumstances. He contends the trial court should have made a downward departure from the mandatory minimum or imposed the minimum sentence in this case.

Both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions prohibit the imposition of excessive or cruel punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; La. Const. art. I, § 20. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and this Court will not set aside such a sentence as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Scott, 2017-0209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/17), 228 So.3d 207, 211, writ denied, 2017-1743 (La. 8/31/18), 251 So.3d 410.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the trial court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary, even when there has not been full compliance with Article 894.1. Scott, 228 So.3d at 211.

The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. State v. Harris, 2022-1190 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/2/23), 369 So.3d 447, 451. On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. Scott, 228 So.3d at 211.

To rebut the presumption that the mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional, the defendant must clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional, which means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the legislature's failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So.2d 672, 676. It is not the role of the sentencing court to question the wisdom of the legislature in requiring enhanced punishments for multiple offenders. Instead, the sentencing court is only allowed to determine whether the particular defendant before it has proven that the mandatory minimum sentence is so excessive in his case that it violates the constitution. Departures downward from the minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law should occur only in rare situations. Id. at 677.

Following the defendant's adjudication as a fourth-felony offender, he faced a sentencing range of not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction but in no event less than twenty years and not more than his natural life. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). Thus, the thirty-year sentence imposed by the trial court is at the lower end of the sentencing range. The defendant argues the trial court should have departed from the minimum mandatory sentence.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Ms. Howell. Ms. Howell testified regarding the facts of the instant offense and the history of abuse endured by the victim and continuous threats on the victim's life and the lives of her children made by the defendant. Ms. Ricca's mother, Mary Mauer, also provided an impact statement and read a statement by Ms. Ricca's brother. Ms. Mauer described the devastating abuse Ms. Ricca experienced and stated the defendant “kept her hostage” and “beat her continuously.”

As an aggravating factor, the trial court noted the defendant's record indicates that after a prior conviction resulting in a life sentence, he was given an opportunity in reentry court. The defendant subsequently committed the instant offense. The trial court further took into consideration the severity of Ms. Ricca's injuries and the impact statements. As mitigatory factors, the trial court noted the defendant did well and was helpful to others in prison during his prior incarceration. Considering the nature of the offense and the defendant's history of abuse, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The defendant has not presented any evidence that this case warrants a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence. Further, the imposed sentence is not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense, nor does the sentence shock this Court's sense of justice. Accordingly, pro se assignment of error number one lacks merit.

PATENT ERROR REVIEW

On appeal, this court routinely reviews the record for patent error. Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), in conducting a patent error review, this Court shall consider “[a]n error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” Inasmuch as an illegal sentence is an error discoverable by a mere inspection of the proceedings without inspection of the evidence, La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2) authorizes consideration of such an error on appeal.

Here, the trial court did not impose the sentence at hard labor. However, La. R.S. 15:529.1(G) provides that any sentence imposed under the provisions of the Habitual Offender Law shall be at hard labor. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 882(A) authorizes the appellate court to correct an illegal sentence on review. State v. Parker, 2023-0941 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/27/24), 392 So.3d 652, 662. Accordingly, we amend the defendant's sentence to reflect that it be served at hard labor.

Additionally, La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(C) provides that, at the time of sentencing, the trial court shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief.⁸ Here, the record reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for applying for post-conviction relief under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(C).

Nonetheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the limitation period has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. State v. Ledezma, 2024-0258 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/27/24), 404 So.3d 988, 1001, writ denied, 2025-00114 (La. 4/8/25), 405 So.3d 574. Out of an abundance of caution, we advise the defendant that La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences have become final under the provisions of La. C.Cr.P. arts. 914 or 922. Ledezma, 404 So.3d at 1001.

CONVICTION AND HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As will be discussed in our patent error review section, the trial court did not impose the sentence at hard labor.

2.   Neither the defendant, nor Ms. Ricca, who died in 2021 of unrelated causes before the trial took place, testified at trial.

3.   Detective Cunningham also testified that he discovered another domestic incident involving the defendant in 2003. Captain Brad Hardaker with the STPSO testified he responded to the scene of the 2003 incident, which was in the Slidell area. He stated the victim in that case, Alisa Moran, suffered a split lip, abrasions to her forehead, a swollen eye, and marks to her face, similar to the injuries sustained by Ms. Ricca in the instant case. The defendant pleaded guilty as charged to domestic abuse battery in that case.

4.   After Ms. Ricca's death, Ms. Howell accessed a video of Ms. Ricca from her Google account dated January 31, 2021, during which she stated, in part, the defendant “beat the crap” out of her, and she continuously begged him to leave.

5.   The trial court further ruled hearsay in the 2021 redacted video admissible as it was “not being asserted to prove the truth of the matter” and consisted of a tacit admission, as Ms. Ricca made statements claiming the defendant, who was present in the video but did not deny it, had caused her injuries at the time. The trial court noted certain portions of the video would be muted. The trial court reserved for trial a ruling on the authenticity and foundation for the admission of the video.

6.   As noted in the State's brief, the defendant did not argue below or on appeal that Ms. Ricca's written statement at the hospital or her sworn affidavit was admissible to attack her credibility under La. C.E. art. 607(D)(2).

7.   Regarding Ms. Ricca's criminal record, we further note there was no evidence admitted at trial showing that Ms. Ricca made a hostile demonstration or committed an overt act against the defendant at the time of the instant incident pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a), governing the admissibility of character evidence of a victim. Regarding the reentry court document, the trial court correctly noted that the document does not reflect the person to whom Ms. Ricca made the purported statement, nor was there any proposed witness to testify regarding the purported statement.

8.   We note that the legislature recently amended La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8, and in doing so, re-lettered this subsection, now setting forth the applicable language in subsection (D). However, the amendment does not change the substance of the subsection. See 2025 La. Acts No. 393, § 1, effective August 1, 2025.

GREENE, J.