STATE v. HALE (2025)

The Grand Jurors of the Nineteenth Judicial District for the Parish of East Baton Rouge charged the defendant, Meshell A. Hale, with first-degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Following a two-week felony bench trial, the trial court found the defendant guilty of the responsive verdict of second-degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The defendant filed a motion for new trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, both of which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.

The defendant now appeals.¹ She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the admission of the State's La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) “other crimes” evidence; and the failure to quash a search warrant or to suppress the evidence obtained therefrom. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. We remand for correction of the minutes and commitment order.²

FACTS

At 10:39 p.m. on June 22, 2015, the defendant transported the victim,³ her domestic partner Damian Paul Skipper, to the emergency room at Baton Rouge General Medical Center (“BRG”) where he presented with complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting. Lab results indicated that Mr. Skipper had a low potassium level. Doctors administered potassium and discharged Mr. Skipper the next morning, June 23, 2015, at 4:40 a.m.

Mr. Skipper returned to the emergency room at BRG at 11:52 p.m. that same day, June 23, 2015, with abdominal pain so severe that he arrived in a wheelchair because he could not walk on his own. Again, Mr. Skipper's potassium was low, so doctors administered potassium and discharged him the next morning, June 24, 2015, at 2:41 a.m.

Four days later, on June 28, 2015, at 11:22 p.m., the defendant transported Mr. Skipper to the emergency room at Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center (“OLOL”), where he again presented with abdominal pain, nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting. Doctors diagnosed Mr. Skipper with bloody diarrhea and acute hypokalemia.⁴ Again, doctors administered potassium to Mr. Skipper and discharged him the next morning, June 29, 2015, at 1:54 a.m.

Twenty-three hours later, the defendant called 9-1-1 to report that Mr. Skipper was not breathing. Emergency medical services (“EMS”) arrived and transported Mr. Skipper to the emergency room at OLOL. When Mr. Skipper arrived at the emergency room at 12:53 a.m. on June 30, 2015, he had no pulse, was not breathing, and presented in cardiac arrest. Doctors administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) but could find no shockable rhythm despite their resuscitative efforts. Mr. Skipper was declared dead at 1:30 a.m. on June 30, 2015.

No autopsy was performed on Mr. Skipper after he died on June 30, 2015. The coroner's report lists atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease as the cause of his natural death. However, over a year later, the coroner exhumed Mr. Skipper's body and conducted an autopsy on April 21, 2017. The coroner's report compiled after the autopsy lists Mr. Skipper's cause of death as toxic effects of barium.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In her first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction of second-degree murder. The defendant advances several possible theories of innocence, including that Mr. Skipper's exposure to barium was accidental or environmental, resulting in his natural death; thus, no crime was committed. Further, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to identify her as the perpetrator. She contends that other persons had access to her cell phones, electronic devices, credit card, and PayPal accounts purportedly used to purchase barium.

Law: Sufficiency of the Evidence

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand, as it violates due process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2; State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 770, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 385 So.3d 242.

The standard of review for testing the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could conclude the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); State v. Coleman, 2021-0870 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 7, 11, writ denied, 2022-00759 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 460. This Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. Code Crim. P. art. 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Welch, 2019-0826 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/21/20), 297 So.3d 23, 27, writ denied, 2020-00554 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So.3d 1193.

When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. La. R.S. 15:438; Coleman, 342 So.3d at 12. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Welch, 297 So.3d at 27.

When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. Welch, 297 So.3d at 27. The trier of fact is charged with making credibility determinations and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. Thus, a reviewing court may impinge on the factfinder's discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 929, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); Coleman, 342 So.3d at 13.

Second-degree murder is defined, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact. State v. London, 2023-1229 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/24), 391 So.3d 1076, 1081. Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of defendant. State v. Bishop, 2001-2548 (La. 1/14/03), 835 So.2d 434, 437.

The State bears the burden to prove all elements of a crime, along with the burden to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. State v. Bessie, 2021-1117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/22), 342 So.3d 17, 22, writ denied, 2022-00846 (La. 9/20/22), 346 So.3d 802. When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. Bessie, 342 So.3d at 23.

Evidence Presented by the State at Trial

The 2016 Death of Arthur Noflin

In order to explain the decision to exhume Mr. Skipper's body in 2017 to conduct an autopsy and the subsequent prosecution of the defendant for his murder, the State introduced evidence concerning the 2016 death of Arthur Noflin, who was the defendant's estranged husband.⁵ Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. Noflin's death in connection with Mr. Skipper's death is addressed infra in connection with the defendant's second assignment of error.

The State presented the following evidence at trial regarding Mr. Noflin's death: On March 18, 2016, just before midnight, Sergeant Deborah Normand Pruitt, a homicide detective with the New Orleans Police Department, responded to the 2600 block of Forstall Street, which is located in the Ninth Ward area, where the New Orleans Fire Department had discovered a burned truck containing a charred body. Sergeant Pruitt ran the truck's license plate number and learned the truck was registered to Arthur Noflin, whose body was later identified as the body found inside the truck. Sergeant Pruitt also learned that Mr. Noflin's vehicle had been burned using an accelerant.

Sergeant Pruitt investigated Mr. Noflin's death. She discovered that Mr. Noflin's family reported him missing on March 21, 2016. The missing person report listed the defendant as a point of contact, as well as Lieutenant Roger L. Corcoran with the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office, who initiated the investigation into the missing person report. Sergeant Pruitt spoke with Lieutenant Corcoran and subsequently met with the defendant and members of Mr. Noflin's family, who expressed suspicions about the defendant and noted that it was their understanding that Mr. Noflin and the defendant were divorced. His family also indicated that in July 2015, Mr. Noflin had changed the beneficiary on his $750,000.00 life insurance policy to name the defendant as the sole beneficiary and her granddaughter, Joy Hale, as the successor beneficiary.

Because Mr. Noflin lived in Baton Rouge but his body was discovered in New Orleans, Sergeant Pruitt analyzed license plate reader data from locations between Baton Rouge and New Orleans to establish a timeline of Mr. Noflin's vehicle movements on the day of his death. Sergeant Pruitt learned that a Jeep rented by Nina Alexander—the domestic partner of the defendant's daughter, Dominique Hale—had followed Mr. Noflin's truck on its way to New Orleans the day of his death. Based on that information, Sergeant Pruitt obtained search warrants for the rental vehicle; the defendant's home and vehicle; Nina and Dominique's residence and their vehicle; and all their respective cell phones.

Sergeant Pruitt learned that Mr. Noflin's cell phone had been located at the defendant's home on March 18, 2016, from approximately 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. She further discovered that the defendant, her daughter Dominique, and Nina had been in constant contact that date.

Digital forensic specialists analyzed a laptop recovered from the trunk of the defendant's white Mercedes Benz during the execution of the search warrant of the defendant's home. The laptop showed that in January and February 2015, a user conducted a series of searches for “barium acetate”; “Barium Acetate Poisoning”; “How Common is Barium Poisoning”; and “Barium Poisoning Heart Failure”. The laptop also contained a text message dated September 13, 2015, sent from the laptop to the defendant's granddaughter, Joy Hale. The text message instructed Joy to keep the defendant's bedroom door closed and to “keep your eye on him if he comes there”, in an apparent reference to Mr. Noflin.

Digital forensic specialists also analyzed data on an iPhone 5 and an iPhone 6 that were seized during the execution of the search warrant of the defendant's home. Law enforcement officers recovered the iPhone 6 from the defendant's master bathroom and the iPhone 5 from the defendant's kitchen counter.

Data from the iPhone 6 showed that in January 2016,⁶ a user of that device accessed the website www.rightpricechemicals.com. Invoices from Right Price Chemicals showed that the defendant purchased “Barium Acetate” on January 8, 2015, May 8, 2015, and January 11, 2016. Each invoice listed the purchaser as “Meshell Hale” and listed her home address, 316 Stoney Creek Avenue in Baton Rouge, as the billing and shipping addresses. The January 8, 2015 and May 8, 2015 invoices included the defendant's email address, yoursecret007@yahoo.com. The January 8, 2015 and January 11, 2016 purchases were made with a Visa card. The May 8, 2015 purchase was made with a PayPal account registered to the defendant's email address, yoursecret007@yahoo.com.

The January 8, 2015 invoice shows a purchase of one hundred twenty-five (125) grams of “Barium Acetate, Reagent (ACS)”; the May 8, 2015 invoice shows a purchase of five hundred (500) grams of “Barium Acetate, Reagent (ACS)”; and the January 11, 2016 invoice shows a purchase of one hundred twenty-five (125) grams of “Barium Acetate, Reagent Grade (ACS)” and one hundred twenty-five (125) grams of “Barium Chloride, Dihydrate Reagent Grade (ACS)”.

Data recovered from the iPhone 6 also showed text messages from January 2016 between the defendant and Mr. Noflin where he discussed having an upset stomach and using “poo pills”.

Data from the iPhone 5 showed that from January through March 2016, searches were made on that phone as follows: “succinylcholine is it the perfect murder weapon”; “How bad does Barium taste Truly”; “heart stopping drugs”; “can flex straps be used as handcuffs”; “best way to conceal flex strap marks”; and “license plate readers”. The iPhone 5 also showed that results from those searches were tracked in the “Notes” application of that phone.

Once Sergeant Pruitt reviewed the evidence and information obtained from the execution of the search warrants, she examined Mr. Noflin's 2015 hospital records. On May 9, 2015, Mr. Noflin presented at the emergency room at OLOL in Baton Rouge complaining of diarrhea, severe nausea, and abdominal cramping that had persisted for more than three days. After lab work revealed that Mr. Noflin's potassium level was low, doctors administered potassium and released him a few hours later.

Two days later, on May 11, 2015, Mr. Noflin returned to the emergency room at OLOL complaining of “tightness, pressure[,] and ‘squeezing’ ” in his chest. After examination and treatment, Mr. Noflin was discharged that same day.

On December 2, 2015, Mr. Noflin presented at the emergency room at BRG chiefly complaining of abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. It was determined that Mr. Noflin's potassium levels were extremely low. The emergency room doctor noted Mr. Noflin suffered from “life threatening hypokalemia”. Mr. Noflin also suffered from nonsustained ventricular tachycardia, i.e., cardiac arrest. While in the emergency room, Mr. Noflin developed some slurred speech and became unresponsive, for which he was intubated and placed on a ventilator. Mr. Noflin was discharged four days later on December 6, 2015.

While investigating Mr. Noflin's death, Sergeant Pruitt learned that the defendant's domestic partner, Mr. Skipper—who was only forty-one years old at the time of his death—had also been sick. She reviewed his medical records and learned Mr. Skipper had died months before Mr. Noflin's death and that no autopsy was performed. Following Mr. Skipper's death, the defendant had also received $10,000.00 in life insurance proceeds from a policy insuring Mr. Skipper.

After Sergeant Pruitt discovered the defendant had purchased barium, she testified, “I knew that both [Mr. Skipper] and [Mr. Noflin] ․ were sick in the hospital for [a] considerable amount of time[ ][,] with one of them passing and the other almost passing away[.]” She further stated, “I definitely had to have a conversation about having [Mr.] Skipper exhumed to see if there were any chemicals in his system at the time of his death.” Sergeant Pruitt contacted Lieutenant Shane Evans—Chief of Investigations at the East Baton Rouge Parish Coroner's Office— to discuss her findings. After learning of Sergeant's Pruitt's investigation of the Noflin case, Lieutenant Evans contacted Mr. Skipper's family and asked for permission to exhume his body to check for the presence of barium. Linda Skipper— Mr. Skipper's mother—readily agreed, as she had been suspicious of the circumstances surrounding her son's death.⁷

Expert Testimony—Dr. Karen Ross, forensic pathologist

Dr. Karen Ross, a forensic pathologist previously employed by the East Baton Rouge Coroner's Office, testified that she performed the autopsy of Mr. Skipper. She collected fluids from his internal organs such as his brain, stomach, liver, and kidneys. She also took samples of his nails and hair. Dr. Ross discovered elevated levels of barium in Mr. Skipper's stomach, liver, brain, and hair follicles. She testified “there was a massive ingestion” of barium by Mr. Skipper “just prior to his death because [it was] in his stomach.” Dr. Ross listed Mr. Skipper's cause of death as toxic effects of barium.

Expert Testimony—Dr. Justin Browder, forensic toxicologist

Dr. Justin Browder, a forensic toxicologist, testified that he certified the results of the toxicology lab work done on the specimens collected during Mr. Skipper's autopsy. Dr. Browder confirmed that barium was present in the sample of fluids collected from Mr. Skipper's liver. He stated that the presence of barium in that sample alone was two thousand times higher than normal.

Expert Testimony—Dr. Patricia Williams, expert in forensic toxicology, anatomy, and pathology

Dr. Patricia Williams—an expert in forensic toxicology, anatomy, and pathology—testified extensively about barium. She stated that barium is a metal, an element that can be neither created nor destroyed. Dr. Williams testified that the toxicity of barium compounds depends on their solubility. For example, she explained that people are prescribed insoluble barium sulfate prior to certain medical procedures, such as colonoscopies. Other barium compounds, however—such as barium acetate, barium chloride, barium hydroxide, and barium sulfide—can be highly soluble. These soluble barium compounds can cause hypokalemia and gastrointestinal issues, if consumed. Dr. Williams testified barium is a physiological antagonist to the normal function of potassium. Symptoms of these conditions include nausea, salivation, vomiting, abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and decreased potassium in the blood, which can lead to ventricular tachycardia, high blood pressure, muscle weakness, paralysis, and kidney damage. Dr. Williams analyzed the medical records of Mr. Skipper and Mr. Noflin. Dr. Williams opined that both men exhibited signs of barium poisoning.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant offers several possible explanations for Mr. Skipper's death, including that Mr. Skipper's barium exposure was accidental, environmental, due to embalming fluid, or a mistake that could be explained by Mr. Skipper's work cleaning up hazardous materials at various petroleum plants. However, the expert testimony of Dr. Browder and Dr. Williams excluded any passing environmental or other accidental exposure to barium in Mr. Skipper's case.

The amount of barium inside of Mr. Skipper's liver was higher than the average person. The levels indicate Mr. Skipper's exposure to barium was more than fleeting, indirect, accidental, or work related. Dr. Williams explained that environmental exposure would be expressed via the lungs and airways, as opposed to the internal organs as was seen with Mr. Skipper. Dr. Williams also rebutted any possibility that barium came from the fluids used to embalm Mr. Skipper's body. She opined that the barium was present inside the cells of his organs and could have only gotten there if ingested—which could only have occurred while Mr. Skipper was alive. Dr. Williams further added that barium is not an item for household use and that one would have to seek it out.

The defendant also emphasizes the fact that during the search of Nina and Dominique's residence, police found an assortment of pills, which were never tested for barium as a potential source of poison. Despite this assertion, other evidence implicates the defendant. Electronic searches conducted on a laptop and iPhones revealed data queries for “Barium Acetate Poisoning” and “perfect murder weapon”, all of which were conducted on devices found at the defendant's home. Furthermore, the evidence shows the defendant purchased three orders of barium from Right Price Chemicals, and all purchases were made in the defendant's name using her credit card and PayPal account, billing address, shipping address, email address, and phone number. Moreover, the defendant's access to and role of caretaker to both men provided her the opportunity to poison them. Further, both men initially blamed their symptoms on food poisoning.

In support of her claim of innocence, the defendant contends that she “voluntarily gave a statement to authorities and willingly turned over a notebook with passwords” for every electronic device. Digital forensic specialists were able to discover searches made on her electronic devices using “cookies” despite evidence suggesting attempts were made to delete the searches.

The defendant further argues that her level of cooperation and decision to not cremate Mr. Skipper's remains should amount to proof of her innocence. At trial, the defense argued that if the defendant had indeed killed Mr. Skipper, she could have opted to cremate his body and “destroy[ ] the evidence.” However, the court took judicial notice of Louisiana's laws on cremation, which set forth that a surviving spouse can authorize cremation, but must make a representation that he or she has the right to authorize the cremation of the decedent. See La. R.S. 37:876 and 877. The defendant and Mr. Skipper were not legally married; thus, she could not make such representations as required by statute.

Analysis and Discussion

As outlined in detail above, the record on appeal shows that between June 22, 2015 and June 30, 2015, Mr. Skipper experienced repeated episodes of abdominal pain, nausea, diarrhea, vomiting, and hypokalemia. At each hospital visit, doctors treated his hypokalemia by administering potassium, and Mr. Skipper temporarily improved before being discharged. He ultimately died on June 30, 2015, after presenting in cardiac arrest. The coroner's report listed atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease as the cause of Mr. Skipper's natural death; no autopsy was performed. More than a year later, however, Mr. Skipper's body was exhumed. Toxicology from his autopsy revealed the presence of extremely elevated barium levels. The coroner then revised Mr. Skipper's cause of death to barium poisoning.

The question presented to the trial court—the trier of fact in this matter—was whether the medical evidence, coupled with circumstantial proof, was sufficient to show that Mr. Skipper died from barium poisoning and to identify the defendant as the person who administered the barium. A thorough review of the record shows that the State presented ample evidence to establish that Mr. Skipper's death was consistent with barium poisoning and the defendant's identity as the person who administered the barium to Mr. Skipper. The coroner testified that Mr. Skipper's cause of death was barium poisoning. Toxicology from Mr. Skipper's autopsy revealed the presence of extremely elevated barium levels. Digital forensic evidence tied the search history regarding barium poisoning, symptoms, treatment of hypokalemia, and lethal dosages to electronic devices that were discovered in the defendant's home during the execution of the search warrants. Invoices from Right Price Chemicals showed that the defendant purchased “Barium Acetate” the month before Mr. Skipper's death. Furthermore, the expert testimony rebutted that the barium found in Mr. Skipper's body could have originated from environmental or accidental exposure.

The trial court expressed “no doubt that Mr. Skipper was a victim of barium poisoning that led to his death.” As found by the trial court in denying the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, the evidence against the defendant was “overwhelming.” In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say the trial court's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 661-62. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find based on the record before us, a rational trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of second-degree murder and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. Accordingly, we find that the defendant's first assignment of error lacks merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO: ADMISSION OF LOUISIANA CODE OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE 404(B) EVIDENCE

In her second assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) “other crimes” evidence to be admitted regarding the circumstances surrounding Mr. Noflin's death.

In June 2019, the State provided the defendant with notice of its intent to offer evidence of the circumstances leading up to and including Mr. Noflin's March 18, 2016 death. The trial court presided over a hearing on the issue in January 2020, ordered post-hearing memoranda, and ultimately found the evidence to be relevant and admissible at trial. The defendant filed an application for supervisory writ, which this court denied. State v. Hale, 2020-0626 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/14/20), 2020 WL 6051196 (unpublished writ action).

Although the State argues that this court's denial of the defendant's writ application precludes reconsideration of this issue, we note that the denial of a writ is merely a decision not to exercise this court's extraordinary powers of supervisory jurisdiction. Moreover, the denial of a writ does not constitute law of the case and therefore does not bar subsequent re-litigation of the same issue. See State v. Dressner, 2008-1366 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 127, 135, cert. denied, Dressner v. Louisiana, 562 U.S. 1271, 131 S.Ct. 1605, 179 L.Ed.2d 500 (2011); State v. Fontenot, 550 So.2d 179 (La. 1989) (per curiam). Accordingly, we will consider this assignment of error.

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1),⁸ controls the admission of “other crimes” evidence and provides, in pertinent part:

[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding. [Emphasis added.]

Even when the other crimes evidence is offered for a purpose allowed under La. Code Evid. art. 404(B), the evidence is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to rebut a defendant's defense. State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, 2016-1183 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 292. Additionally, the State must make a showing of sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the other act. Taylor, 217 So.3d at 292. Moreover, the probative value of the extraneous crimes evidence must outweigh any prejudicial effect. State v. Hatcher, 372 So.2d 1024, 1027 (La. 1979).

The defendant has challenged her identity as the perpetrator and that a crime was committed. The State sought to introduce the circumstances surrounding Mr. Noflin's death to rebut those defenses and to prove identity, motive, preparation, plan, system, knowledge, and absence of mistake.

Louisiana jurisprudence allows the use of other crimes evidence to show modus operandi (i.e., system) as it bears on the issue of identity, particularly when the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and uncharged offenses is so peculiarly distinctive one must logically say they are the work of the same person. State v. Calloway, 2018-1396 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/19), 276 So.3d 133, 148, writ denied, 2019-00869 (La. 1/20/21), 308 So.3d 1164. The plan exception can refer to a plan conceived by the defendant in which the commission of the uncharged crime is a means by which the defendant prepares for the commission of another crime (such as stealing a key in order to rob a safe), or it may refer to a pattern of crime, envisioned by defendant as a coherent whole, in which he achieves an ultimate goal through a series of related crimes (such as acquiring a title by killing everyone with a superior claim). Calloway, 276 So.3d at 149.

Motive evidence reveals the state of mind or emotion that influenced the defendant to desire the result of the charged crime. To have independent relevance, the motive established by the other crimes evidence must be more than a general one, such as gaining wealth, which could be the underlying basis for almost any crime; it must be a motive factually peculiar to the victim and the charged crime. State v. Jackson, 2018-0261, 2018-0262 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/2/18), 265 So.3d 928, 939, writ denied, 2018-1969 (La. 4/22/19), 268 So.3d 304.

Specifically, the State presented testimony and evidence surrounding Mr. Noflin's death. This testimony and evidence established that both Mr. Skipper and Mr. Noflin's families were suspicious of the defendant, who claimed to be married to both men and who was known to be caretaker to both men during their period of illnesses (identity). The testimony also showed that both men—who were otherwise known to be reasonably healthy—experienced adverse medical symptoms requiring hospitalization in overlapping time periods and died under suspicious circumstances (preparation and plan). The testimony further demonstrated that both men had life insurance policies, which named the defendant as beneficiary (motive). Thus, but-for the investigation into Mr. Noflin's death, the investigating officers never would have discovered the true cause of Mr. Skipper's death.

The defendant argues that she has never been charged with the murder of Mr. Noflin and the investigation surrounding his death remains open, rendering the evidence unfairly prejudicial. Any inculpatory evidence is “prejudicial” to a defendant, especially when it is “probative” to a high degree. Taylor, 217 So.3d at 295. As used in the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly and unfairly prejudicial. The term “unfair prejudice,” as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged. Taylor, 217 So.3d at 295-96.

Under the circumstances of this case, we find the probative value of the La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) “other crimes” evidence outweighs any prejudice. The similarities between Mr. Noflin's and Mr. Skipper's hospitalizations, the lack of an apparent explanation for the low levels of potassium in both men, the defendant's purchase of barium on dates corresponding to the men's hospitalizations, the expert testimony and evidence that both men were poisoned with barium, and the defendant's proximity to both men is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant committed the “other crime, wrong, or act.” Mr. Skipper's death appeared natural until suspicions arose from Mr. Noflin's death, leading to the discovery of barium poisoning in Mr. Skipper's exhumed body. Without the evidence from Mr. Noflin's death, the trial court, as fact finder, might not have understood how Mr. Skipper's cause of death was uncovered. The trial court could reasonably conclude the probative value outweighed the prejudice. Through that evidence, the State was able to demonstrate the defendant's “peculiarly distinctive” plan/system and her motive. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) “other crimes” evidence. State v. Wright, 2011-0141 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So.3d 309, 316. This assignment of error is without merit.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE: DENIAL OF MOTION TO QUASH AND SUPPRESS

In her third assignment of error, the defendant alleges the trial court's pre-trial ruling denying her motion to quash the search warrant and/or to suppress the evidence obtained in execution thereof was error.⁹ In this regard, the defendant's arguments on appeal are a reiteration of the arguments presented on the prior writ. See State v. Hale, 2022-0688 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/29/22), 2022 WL 3867607 (unpublished writ action).

A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of a magistrate (judge), by the affidavit of a credible person, particularly describing the person or place to be searched and the things to be seized. La. Const. art. I, § 5; La. Code Crim. P. art. 162; State v. Lee, 2005-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, 122, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S.Ct. 143, 172 L.Ed.2d 39 (2008). Probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that evidence or contraband may be found at the place to be searched. Lee, 976 So.2d at 122.

Although certainty of knowledge of the commission of a particular crime is frequently an important factor in the determination of probable cause, probable cause may exist when the commission of a crime has not been definitely established, but is reasonably possible under the totality of the known circumstances. State v. Green, 2002-1022 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 962, 969.

This determination of probable cause, although requiring something more than bare suspicion, does not require evidence sufficient to support a conviction. Probable cause, as the name implies, deals with probabilities. Green, 831 So.2d at 969. The determination of probable cause involves factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which average men, and particularly average police officers, can be expected to act. Green, 831 So.2d at 970.

The process of determining probable cause simply requires that enough information be presented to the issuing judge to enable him to determine that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal justice system. State v. Rodrigue, 437 So.2d 830, 833 (La. 1983). This affidavit must contain, within its four corners, the facts establishing the existence of probable cause for the warrant. Green, 831 So.2d at 969.

For a reviewing court, the task is simply to ensure that under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate has a “substantial basis” for concluding probable cause existed. Lee, 976 So.2d at 122. Thus, the judge's determination of probable cause, prior to the issuance of a search warrant, is entitled to sufficient deference by the reviewing court, and marginal cases should be resolved in favor of finding the magistrate's assessment to be reasonable. Green, 831 So.2d at 969.

An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid. The defendant at a suppression hearing has the burden of proving that the representations in the affidavit by the affiant are false. State v. Marchbanks, 2012-1157 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/13), 2013 WL 1196627, *2 (unpublished) (citing State v. Brannon, 414 So.2d 335, 337 (La. 1982)). That burden requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit contains intentional misrepresentations. State v. Fugler, 97-1936 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 1, 19, rehearing granted and amended in part on other grounds, 97-1936 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/14/99), 737 So.2d 894, writ denied, 99-1686 (La. 11/19/99), 749 So.2d 668.

Four search warrants were applied for in this case. The factual basis for the search warrants were the same and were emailed by Sergeant Pruitt to Baton Rouge Police Lieutenant Chiquita Broussard, who applied for the warrants but had no personal knowledge of the underlying facts. The search warrant for the Jeep rented by Nina included an assertion that Fire Marshal Brian Mashon and a K-9 Monty assisted in the search. K-9 Monty alerted on the rear tire cover of the vehicle located near the hatch back door. K-9 Monty detected an accelerant on the described area and a sample of the material was collected as evidence for testing. Subsequent analysis by the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab was unable to detect any “common ignitable liquid residue” in the sample of the carpet extracted from the Jeep.

The defendant argued that after Sergeant Pruitt received the lab results on May 4, 2016, and learned that the crime lab was unable to confirm the presence of ignitable fluid in the Jeep, Sergeant Pruitt failed to notify Lieutenant Broussard—the affiant who obtained and executed the search warrants—who then presented the warrants to Commissioner Nicole Robinson of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Sergeant Pruitt testified that she was not trying to mislead anyone by not providing this information. When asked directly why Sergeant Pruitt did not inform Lieutenant Broussard about the results when she learned of them, Sergeant Pruitt replied:

Because the dog still detected it. And the dog is trained to detect ignitable sources, so that was still important. The results -- the end results of -- I don't know how much of the ignitable source had to be present for a machine to detect it. But that would come later in the report.

Her opinion was reinforced by the Louisiana State Police Crime Lab forensic scientist, Mindy Buratt, who testified regarding the high amounts of ignitable liquid that must be present for the lab's equipment to identify it as such. When explaining the initial alert made by the canine, she stated, “it doesn't mean that there wasn't some there[,] we just couldn't detect it.”

On review, we find the defendant failed to prove that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in denying the motion to quash/suppress. The warrant contained a substantial basis to support a finding that evidence of murder could be found at the residences, on electronic devices, and the vehicles at issue. The defendant failed to prove that either officer committed a deliberate act made for the purpose of deception. The defendant did not offer any new evidence at trial that would support this assignment of error. See State v. Richard, 2024-0030 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/21/25), 408 So.3d 529, 544 (In determining whether the ruling on defendant's motion to suppress was correct, an appellate court is not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion; it may also consider all pertinent evidence introduced during the trial of the case.).

When considering the totality of the other facts included in the affidavit, the negative lab results do not negate the existence of probable cause for the search warrant. Here, the trial court admonished the State for this oversight and agreed that the omitted lab result is “not a major part of the warrant, but still [is] a factor.” Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that “there was enough presented” to support the issuance of the warrant. We agree. This assignment of error is without merit.

PATENT ERROR

Pursuant to La. Code Crim. P. art. 920(2), this court routinely conducts a review of all appeals for error discoverable by mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. State v. Anthony, 2023-0117 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/23), 378 So.3d 766, 775, writ denied, 2024-00027 (La. 5/21/24), 3 8 5 So.3d 242. After a careful review of the record, we have found one patent error.

The transcript reflects the trial court failed to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 930.8(C) directs the trial court to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for filing an application for post-conviction relief at the time of sentencing. See State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142-43, writ denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d 1158. Nevertheless, the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the prescriptive period has no bearing on her sentence and is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of judicial economy, we advise the defendant that La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.8 generally provides that no application for post-conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence have become final under the provisions of La. Code Crim. P. arts. 914 or 922. LeBoeuf, 943 So.2d at 1143.

CORRECTION OF MINUTE ENTRY AND UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER

The minute entry for December 20, 2022 and the uniform commitment order incorrectly reflect a verdict of first-degree murder, but the transcript accurately reflects that the trial court convicted the defendant of the responsive verdict of second-degree murder. When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails. State v. Lynch, 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). Consequently, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. We remand this matter solely for the trial court to correct the minute entry for December 20, 2022 and the uniform commitment order to show that the defendant was convicted of the responsive verdict of second-degree murder.

DECREE

We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. We remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the December 20, 2022 minute entry and the uniform commitment order to reflect that the defendant was convicted of the responsive verdict of second-degree murder.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF MINUTE ENTRY AND UNIFORM COMMITMENT ORDER.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The defendant filed a motion for appeal on December 20, 2022. The trial court signed an order of appeal on February 22, 2023, notice of which was transmitted by the Clerk of Court to the parties on March 15, 2023.

2.   The minute entry for December 20, 2022, and the uniform commitment order incorrectly reflect a verdict of first-degree murder, but the transcript accurately reflects that the trial court convicted the defendant of the responsive verdict of second-degree murder. As discussed infra, we remand this matter solely for the correction of the minutes and commitment order.

3.   Although the defendant and Mr. Skipper were not married, the defendant is identified as Mr. Skipper's wife in his obituary.

4.   Hypokalemia is a condition characterized by a decrease in, or low levels of, potassium in the blood.

5.   We note that Mr. Noflin's death in 2016 occurred after Mr. Skipper's death in 2015.

6.   There is a discrepancy between Sergeant Pruitt's testimony (that the search occurred in January 2015) and Exhibit S-58 (which lists the search as occurring on “18-Jan-16).”

7.   Linda also knew that Mr. Skipper and the defendant had never been married.

8.   We apply the version of La. Code Evid. art. 404(B) in effect at the time of the commission of the offense, prior to its amendment by 2016 La. Acts 357, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2016), 2023 La. Acts 354, § 1 (eff. Aug. 1, 2023), and 2025 La. Acts 188, § 2 (eff. Aug. 1, 2025). See State v. Parker, 2003-0924 (La. 4/14/04), 871 So.2d 317, 322.

9.   Similar to assignment of error number two, the defendant sought supervisory review of the trial court's ruling; this court denied writs. See State v. Hale, 2022-0688 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/29/22), 2022 WL 3 867607 (unpublished writ action).

EDWARDS, J.

Fields, J. concurs without reasons.